Cp solves the whole aff and gets China onto the fmct key to counter prolif


Unconditional engagement gives China a hall pass to do whatever it pleases- sets the framework for conflict in the future and gives China a false sense of reality



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Unconditional engagement gives China a hall pass to do whatever it pleases- sets the framework for conflict in the future and gives China a false sense of reality


Erickson, U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute Professor, 2014

(Andrew, “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s “New Type of Great-Power Relations”, October, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk)



In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise. After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise. THUCYDIDES TRAP The “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict with the established one. The Chinese side has exploited this oversimplified narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable

,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.” Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans. They deny human agency (and responsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters. And they reject progress. Further, they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, for better or for worse. Most problematic, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other, worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed.

Erodes every international norm – China is key


Erickson, 2013, PhD, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center (Andrew, “Deterrence by Denial: How to Prevent China From Using Force”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/war-china-two-can-play-the-area-denial-game-9564)

In contrast to ongoing limitations, shared interests, and even opportunities for increasingly-robust cooperation far away, China’s navy and other services are achieving formidable [4]anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) [4] capabilities closer to shore. Beijing is prioritizing an “anti-Navy [5]” to deter U.S. intervention in the Western Pacific over a blue-water, power-projection navy. The Chinese have identified, and are exploiting, limitations in U.S. weapons systems that stem from fundamental physical principles. For example, quiet diesel submarines will always be difficult to detect, track and kill. Fixed targets like airbases will always be difficult to defend against ballistic missiles. Beijing seeks to wield this growing might to pursue outstanding territorial and maritime claims and to [6]carve out [6]in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and airspace above them a “zone of exceptionalism” within which existing global security, legal, and resource management norms are subordinated to its parochial national interests. This can only weaken the global system on which all nations’ security and prosperity depends, and will continue to destabilize a vital but vulnerable region that remains haunted by history. If not addressed properly, China’s rise as a major A2/AD military power could give it unprecedented capacity to deny sanctuary and communications to U.S. forces, and thereby challenge the type of military operations for which the U.S. has equipped and prepared. While the Soviet Union posed significant challenges to the U.S. Army and Air Force based in continental Europe in the Cold War, the precision-weapons revolution and the maritime geography of the Asia-Pacific theater enable Chinese A2/AD to render U.S. forces, largely naval and island-based air forces, far more vulnerable. While conflict with China should be avoided, China must also be prevented from significantly coercing its neighbors or unilaterally altering the region’s status quo in ways that are inimical to the interests of the U.S. and its allies, as well as to regional stability in general. Failure to emphasize this point as well risks making the U.S. appear weak and acquiescent to mounting Chinese assertiveness, both to Beijing and to regional allies, friends, and partners. This risks miscalculation on Beijing’s part. It also makes taxpayers and their representatives question why significant U.S. military investments are needed in a time of austerity. This should be framed in terms of ensuring the continued functioning of the existing international system. Washington should clarify, as necessary, that it is not trying to contain Beijing per se, but rather to resist any Chinese actions that would harm the existing system. Conversely, positive Chinese behavior—such as providing international public security goods in the Gulfs of [7]Aden [7] or [8]Guinea [8], or helping to stabilize the North Korean border if the [9]barbaric Kim Jong-un regime [9] collapses, should be encouraged and applauded.


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