Cryptoki: a cryptographic Token Interface
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pkcs11-base-v2.40-cos01
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- C_DecryptDigestUpdate
- C_DecryptInit and C_DigestInit
- C_DigestEncryptUpdate
- C_DecryptDigestUpdate . C_DecryptDigestUpdate
- C_DigestFinal
C_DecryptDigestUpdateCK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptDigestUpdate)( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen ); C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part combined decryption and digest operation, processing another data part. hSession is the session’s handle; pEncryptedPart points to the encrypted data part; ulEncryptedPartLen is the length of the encrypted data part; pPart points to the location that receives the recovered data part; pulPartLen points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data part. C_DecryptDigestUpdate uses the convention described in Section on producing output. If a C_DecryptDigestUpdate call does not produce decrypted output (because an error occurs, or because pPart has the value NULL_PTR, or because pulPartLen is too small to hold the entire decrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active digest operation. Decryption and digesting operations must both be active (they must have been initialized with C_DecryptInit and C_DigestInit, respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with C_DecryptUpdate, C_DigestUpdate, and C_DigestKey calls (it would be somewhat unusual to intersperse calls to C_DigestEncryptUpdate with calls to C_DigestKey, however). Use of C_DecryptDigestUpdate involves a pipelining issue that does not arise when using C_DigestEncryptUpdate, the “inverse function” of C_DecryptDigestUpdate. This is because when C_DigestEncryptUpdate is called, precisely the same input is passed to both the active digesting operation and the active encryption operation; however, when C_DecryptDigestUpdate is called, the input passed to the active digesting operation is the output of the active decryption operation. This issue comes up only when the mechanism used for decryption performs padding. In particular, envision a 24-byte ciphertext which was obtained by encrypting an 18-byte plaintext with DES in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Consider an application which will simultaneously decrypt this ciphertext and digest the original plaintext thereby obtained. After initializing decryption and digesting operations, the application passes the 24-byte ciphertext (3 DES blocks) into C_DecryptDigestUpdate. C_DecryptDigestUpdate returns exactly 16 bytes of plaintext, since at this point, Cryptoki doesn’t know if there’s more ciphertext coming, or if the last block of ciphertext held any padding. These 16 bytes of plaintext are passed into the active digesting operation. Since there is no more ciphertext, the application calls C_DecryptFinal. This tells Cryptoki that there’s no more ciphertext coming, and the call returns the last 2 bytes of plaintext. However, since the active decryption and digesting operations are linked only through the C_DecryptDigestUpdate call, these 2 bytes of plaintext are not passed on to be digested. A call to C_DigestFinal, therefore, would compute the message digest of the first 16 bytes of the plaintext, not the message digest of the entire plaintext. It is crucial that, before C_DigestFinal is called, the last 2 bytes of plaintext get passed into the active digesting operation via a C_DigestUpdate call. Because of this, it is critical that when an application uses a padded decryption mechanism with C_DecryptDigestUpdate, it knows exactly how much plaintext has been passed into the active digesting operation. Extreme caution is warranted when using a padded decryption mechanism with C_DecryptDigestUpdate. Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID. Example: #define BUF_SZ 512 CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; CK_BYTE iv[8]; CK_MECHANISM decryptionMechanism = { CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv) }; CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism = { CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_BYTE encryptedData[(2*BUF_SZ)+8]; CK_BYTE digest[16]; CK_ULONG ulDigestLen; CK_BYTE data[BUF_SZ]; CK_ULONG ulDataLen, ulLastUpdateSize; CK_RV rv; .
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); memset(encryptedData, ‘A’, ((2*BUF_SZ)+8)); rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &decryptionMechanism, hKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) { . . . } rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism); if (rv != CKR_OK){ . . . } ulDataLen = sizeof(data); rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate( hSession, &encryptedData[0], BUF_SZ, data, &ulDataLen); . . . ulDataLen = sizeof(data); rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate( hSession, &encryptedData[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ, data, &ulDataLen); . . . /*
* separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode */ /* First, complete the decryption of the buffer */ ulLastUpdateSize = sizeof(data); rv = C_DecryptUpdate( hSession, &encryptedData[BUF_SZ*2], 8, data, &ulLastUpdateSize); . . . /* Get last piece of plaintext (should have length 0, here) */ ulDataLen = sizeof(data)-ulLastUpdateSize; rv = C_DecryptFinal(hSession, &data[ulLastUpdateSize], &ulDataLen); if (rv != CKR_OK) { . . . } /* Digest last bit of plaintext */ rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5); if (rv != CKR_OK) { . . . } ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest); rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen); if (rv != CKR_OK) { . . . } Download 360.55 Kb. Share with your friends:
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