Culprits of Lockerbie a treatise Concerning the Destruction



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(b) Shortcomings in the character and conduct of the photospread “parade” of 15 February 1991

Gauci was given the standard warning for British identification parades, that the array might not include the clothes buyer, but there were very obvious and disturbing shortcomings in the procedure.



Non-compliance with principle that foils should be of similar age and appearance to that of the suspect The guidance on conducting photographic “parades”, or “line-ups” (to use the American nomenclature) advised that the foils should be people of “similar age and appearance.” Yet most of those in the photospread were younger than al-Megrahi, half of them by a considerable margin. The dates of birth of nine of the twelve were supplied but only one of the other three appeared to be close to al-Megrahi in age (Ashton, Megrahi, p.101). The only one who was older was a Chilean, rather than an Arab. The twelve faces, with al-Megrahi shown at position number eight, are reproduced in Ashton, Megrahi, centre plates.

Hints designed to remove the age factor from the photospread Initially Gauci said that all twelve of the men shown in the photographs were “younger” than the customer. Accounts differ as to the precise exchanges which then followed. According to DCI Bell and Gauci himself (whose statement was written out by Bell) he was asked to look again carefully and to try to allow for any age difference (Bell statement S262AR; Gauci statement S4677R). However, according to the statement of Maltese police security branch Inspector Godfrey Scicluna (S5262D) DCI Bell also told Gauci that the man could be ten to fifteen years older, presumably thereby hinting that the photograph of the suspect was an old one by that margin. In any event, the result was that Gauci stated that number eight was “similar to the man who bought the clothes” but that he was “in my opinion in his thirty years” and “would perhaps have to look about ten years or more older and he would look like the man.” Both Professors Clark and Valentine in their respective reports demonstrate that even the seemingly innocuous instruction described by Bell is of a kind which can lead to a significantly increased risk of error: Clark, report, pp.27-28 and 29; Valentine, report paras. 8.17.17 and 8.17.20.1; both citing research studies).

Conflicting accounts of the procedure undermines its reliability The very conflict between the two accounts of what was said during the parade is in itself a factor which undermined the cogency of Gauci’s supposed assertion of resemblance, a point made by Professor Valentine.

Contrast between the quality, size and presentation of the photograph of al-Megrahi used in the photospread and that of the foils When conducting an identification procedure employing still photographs in a photospread it may be regarded as elementarily undesirable and bad practice to use a photograph of the suspect of a quality, size and presentation significantly contrasting with those of the foils in the photospread. This danger was evidently not lost on DCI Bell. Noticing that al-Megrahi’s photograph was of poor quality, asked a Maltese police photographer to re-photograph the other eleven to improve uniformity but it still remained quite different, pale and grainy with two white parallel horizontal lines and a series of dots along the left-hand side (see Ashton, Megrahi, p.101). In preparation for al-Megrahi’s second appeal the differences were itemised in a detailed inspection of the original photospreads by Prof Clark and defence solicitor Tony Kelly (see Ashton, Megrahi, pp.327-328 for details of the differences; the Crown had unsuccessfully objected to permitting defence access: ibid). The mere presentation of a photograph of the suspect which causes it to stand out from those of the foils may of itself induce an unconscious impression on the part of the witness that the person depicted in the non-uniform photograph is the suspect.

Police had two al-Megrahi portraits The police had in their possession two photographs of al Megrahi. They are shown at http://www.vetpath.co.uk/lockerbie/ photoid.pdf). One appears to have been a colour portrait later used in the 1991 indictment and subsequent “wanted” posters, which although not a recent image is recognisable as its subject. Used in the photospread, however, was a black-and-white photocopy of a strange image retrieved from Czech immigration records. Blurry and noticeably puffier than al-Megrahi’s longish face it is otherwise practically unrecognisable as al-Megrahi apart from some passing resemblance around the eyes. The distorted width of the face corresponds more to that in the constructs. Why the police chose to use it instead of the colour portrait is open to conjecture. It may be asked whether this might have been because the colour image was even less like the sketch/photofit than the black and white photocopy. A later suggestion that Gauci might be shown an up-to-date, recognisable image of al-Megrahi was overruled by senior officers “for fear of tainting the first identification.” The decision is elemental in assessing the validity of his subsequent statements regarding al-Megrahi’s resemblance to the purchaser of the clothes at his shop. If, on the 15 February, 1991, he said that aside from the question of age the purchaser resembled that photograph (which bears little resemblance to al-Megrahi), it must follow (especially having regard to the non-resemblance of the constructs to al-Megrahi) that the person he remembered at that stage could scarcely have been al-Megrahi! The fact that at Camp Zeist Gauci picked out al-Megrahi demonstrates almost conclusively that he must have been swayed by the suggestive force of repeated exposure to good likenesses of al-Megrahi in the media during the intervening years, rather than a real memory of a short encounter with a stranger more than 10 years before.

Gauci’s reference to Abu Talb’s photograph during the identification procedure In his written statement about the identification process on 15 February, 1991, Gauci said that the image of al-Megrahi was similar to the man who bought the clothing. The eyebrows, nose, chin and face were the same, but he was too young by ten years or more. However, importantly, the statement included this passage:

“It’s been a long time now and I can only say that [number 8 – al-Megrahi] resembles the man who bought the clothing, but it is younger . . . I can only say that of all the photographs that I have been shown [number 8] is the only one really similar to the man who bought the clothing, if he was a bit older, other than the one my brother showed me.”



This was of course a reference to the photograph of Abu Talb which had appeared in the Sunday Times of 5 November, 1989. The words “other than the one my brother showed me” had been inserted plainly as an afterthought. DCI Bell, who took Gauci’s statement, made no mention of the Abu Talb photograph in his own statement dealing with procedure on the 15 February (S2632AR) but when asked about it at the trial he explained that it was Inspector Scicluna who had referred to the photograph Paul Gauci had shown Anthony, which was why he, Bell, inserted the reference to it in Anthony Gauci’s statement (evidence 12 July 2000, transcript p.4883). For his part Scicluna in his statement (S5262D) recalled Gauci saying to him in Maltese “Bring me that newspaper. He is similar.” The newspaper was produced and was in front of Gauci at the same time as the photospread array. Interviewed by the SCCRC both officers stood by their accounts (Bell, 25 and 26 July 2006; Scicluna, 1 December 2004).

Confidence-enhancing feedback cues: the absence of double-blind supervision In the wake of Gauci’s statement about al-Megrahi on 15 February, 1991, the police officers were supposedly careful to conceal their “euphoria” (Ashton, Megrahi, p.96). However, four police officers were present, all of whom would have known which of array the suspect was and his identity and who would have been motivated to obtain a positive identity ibid, p.326), as was borne out by the celebrations which followed. Despite their best intentions not to influence Gauci it would have been next to impossible, as Professor Valentine points out in his report (para. 8.17.20 and 21) for them to have avoided unconsciously providing verbal or non-verbal cues, which would have been likely to influence his behaviour. Significantly, DCI Bell noted that Gauci was visibly upset and worried that he would be targeted. His involvement in the investigation had already been widely reported and he was concerned about any further publicity. Prof Clark remarks that this suggests he knew, whether through explicit feedback or simply by observing the reaction of police, that “this one mattered” and that they believed he had picked the right man (op. cit., p.33). Clark observes that such feedback may increase confidence in the selection, especially where the witness appreciates the importance of his evidence and is anxious to be of assistance, with the consequently increased risk of mistaken identification (citing eg Bradfield, A.L., Wells, G.L., and Olsen, E.A. “The damaging effect of confirming feedback on the relation between eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy,” (2002) 87 Journal of Applied Psychology, 112-120). The antidote, which also guards against pre-decision cueing, would have been a “double blind” procedure, in which the identity of the suspect is not known to an investigator administering the viewing of the array, now regarded as best practice. To demonstrate the potential influence on Gauci of the police officers being present in the room when he viewed the photospreads Prof Canter conducted an experiment in which two groups were asked to pick out the culprit from a selection of photographs. The first group, consisting of 36 people, were supervised by an interviewer who knew which photograph was that of the suspect but who was instructed to say or do nothing which might reveal the suspect’s identity. The second group, consisting of 20 people, were supervisor by an interviewer who was unaware of the suspect’s identity. While 15 of the first group selected the suspect, not one of the second group did so. This outcome was consistent with the findings of numerous similar research projects.

5. The prelude to trial: “dans hu!”

On 9 April, 1999, three days before Gauci flew to Holland accompanied by Mario Busuttil, a Maltese police officer, he handed the officer the December 1998 edition of Focus magazine containing an article on the Lockerbie investigation. Pointing to a photograph of al-Megrahi, Gauci said “danshu,” a phrase in Maltese which translates as “that’s him.” Whatever reliance the Crown may have placed on this it remains unclear whether he meant any more than that the photograph depicted the man he had previously picked out as resembling the purchaser of the clothes. This is the classic conundrum where an identification parade is held by way of testing the validity for example of a “street identification” or the cold selection of a suspect from an array of still photographs, as where a witness is invited to look through a “rogue’s gallery” of known offenders selected on the basis of relevant criteria such as modus operandi, age, physical appearance, and ethnicity.



6. Live ID parade at Camp Van Zeist

(a) Parade outcome

On 13 April, 1999, eight days after al-Megrahi was handed over by the Libyans, Gauci participated in a live identification parade at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands. Referring to number 5, al-Megrahi, Gauci initially said, “Not exactly the man I saw in the shop. It is ten years ago but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5.” He then altered the words “it is” to “I saw him,” so the whole now read “Not exactly the man I saw in the shop. I saw him ten years ago, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5.” At his Crown precognition in Dumfries on 25 August, 1999, Gauci stated that he had picked out somebody as “resembling” the purchaser, adding that “his hair was different, not so full and was receding. He seemed narrower.” He mentioned that al-Megrahi “seemed very nervous at the parade” and this may well have caused him to draw attention to himself – always a fundamental problem with live ID parades.



(b) Manifest unsuitability of the parade foils

Of the 12 men present to participate as foils only seven were chosen but eight of the twelve would have been in their 20s in 1988 and one would have been 14. Given that Gauci had stated (15.2.91) that al-Megrahi (36 years old in 1988) was too young (the purchaser being about fifty), selecting foils who would have been that much younger still was absurd. Of the three remaining foils, one, although al-Megrahi’s age, was a Dutch policeman, so presumably of different ethnicity. Another, though older, was much too short (5’3” – ie 9 inches shorter than the original 6 foot “or more” estimate). That left only one suitable foil! (See Clark, p.24.)



7. Trial

(a) Dock identification of al-Megrahi

In July 1990, during his evidence at the trial Gauci was shown the December 1989 Focus article with al-Megrahi’s photograph and was asked to recall his having said “danshu.” He was then asked if he could see the man who bought the clothing and he replied, “He is the man on this side.” He then instantly watered it down with the qualification: “He resembles him a lot.” The invitation to Gauci to make an identification was of course a classic “dock identification” procedure, seemingly only allowed in this case because he had previously made a statement of resemblance. Yet to use as a prompt the Focus picture, carrying the clearest possible suggestion of al-Megrahi’s guilt, coupled with the reminder about his “dans hu” remark, is about as blatant and breathtaking an example of leading the witness as one might dare to imagine. Even then, the Crown failed to achieve the unequivocal identification for which they were no doubt looking.



(b) Statement also of Abu Talb’s

resemblance to the customer

The literality of the statement “he is the man on this side” was then further diminished when Gauci was shown Abu Talb’s photograph. About him, too, remarkably, Gauci stated “He resembles him a lot” and repeated this for emphasis.



(c) Why the court plumped for al-Megrahi

At first blush this qualifier, coupled with the history of the resemblance competition between the two suspects, ought finally to have put paid to the identification issue. But other circumstantial evidence induced the court to plump for al-Megrahi as the likely candidate and, in effect, to make a finding that he was indeed the man who bought the clothes. This was essentially their finding that the sale almost certainly took place on 7 December, 1988, when al-Megrahi was in Malta staying at the Sliema Holiday Inn coupled with his visit to the island on 20 and 21 December, when, they found – in the teeth of evidence pointing to the contrary – that the Samsonite bag had begun its journey from Luqa. That will bring us shortly to the crucial issue of Anthony Gauci’s memory of the sale.



8. Prior exposure to suggestive media coverage

In addition to the Il Torca (7.03.99) and Focus articles there was of course considerable media coverage of the Lockerbie case between 1991 and 2000 with al-Megrahi’s image being frequently touted around (see the extensive list in Prof Clark’s report, p.4 and see also p.21). Of particular note are two Maltese TV broadcasts and two Maltese newspaper articles just over one week before the Camp Zeist identification parade (ibid). It is hard to exaggerate the suggestive impact which all this material must have had on Gauci. Citing a landmark study by Elizabeth Loftus and others (Loftus, E.F., Miller, D.G., and Burns, H.J., “Semantic integration of verbal information into a visual memory,” (1978) 4 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 19) Clark (p.33) makes the telling point that by the time he saw the photograph his memory of the actual event would have been weakest, because it must have faded over time, whereas the “post-event” input would have been strongest, because it was relatively recent. Prof Tim Valentine, the leading authority on forensic facial identification, in his report commissioned by defence solicitors for the second appeal observed to like effect: “Research demonstrates that memory distortion due to misleading post-event information and social influence can provide a plausible account for the changes in the witness’s memory” (para. 9.1.1). Gauci’s subsequent responses at the ID parade and at trial would have been based in part on his memory of the photograph he had picked out on 15 February 1991 and on the subsequent media material, including, prominently, the Focus picture. In other words, rather than making a judgment based purely on an uncontaminated memory of the purchaser’s appearance in 1988 he was likely, eleven years after the event, to be remembering the image of a face which he had, in 1991, unconvincingly judged to be similar and which was thereafter reinforced by repeated media depictions.



9. Anthony Gauci’s memory of selling the clothes

(a) Gauci is shown a photograph album

of blast damaged items

We now turn to the question of Anthony Gauci’s memory of the sale of items to the man the Crown alleged was al-Megrahi. As already mentioned he was first approached by police on 1 September, 1989, some 9 months after the alleged purchase of the clothes. He was shown a photograph album depicting various blast damaged clothing articles from the aircraft wreckage and he purported to remember the occasion when he sold a number of articles some of which corresponded to those which may well have been in the bomb suitcase and, as we have seen he claimed to remember the appearance of the customer.



(b) The purported time of day of the sale

He claimed to remember that he had sold the items to a man he described one evening during the winter of 1988 not long before the shop’s closing time of 7.30 pm, so probably around 6.30pm. The timing proved to be of some importance.



(c) Shifting descriptions of the purchases

Gauci’s descriptions of the various items he claimed the customer bought changed significantly. In some respects the changes were self-evidently responses to his learning the descriptions of items identified as associated with the suitcase carrying the bomb.



(d) First description

The list made on 1st September 1989 On 1 September, 1989, Gauci listed the purchases as follows:-

  • three pairs of large size pyjamas similar to the only one of that type found at Lockerbie;

  • a size 42 imitation Harris Tweed men’s jacket which had been in the shop for about five years;

  • two pairs of Yorkie trousers (one dark brown checked, the other light brown herringbone);

  • a large size tartan cardigan (“we do not have any left but it had colours red/black. I cannot recall exactly”) ;

  • a blue babygro;

  • an umbrella.

Yorkie trousers and the jacket The album included photographs of two fragments of material which he confirmed matched the light-brown herringbone Yorkie trousers he had sold and he gave police an identical pair of trousers and a tweed jacket identical to the one he had sold.

(e) Later amendments and additions

Pyjamas When interviewed by the Crown prior to the trial and subsequently in court Gauci said the man had purchased two pairs of pyjamas, not three as in his description of 1 September, 1989, adding that they were striped.

Jacket Dealing with Gauci’s description of the purchaser’s build we have already covered the stark change in Gauci’s account of the style of jacket, in the wake of his learning of al-Megrahi’s comparatively slight figure.

Cardigan On 13 September, 1989, two weeks after his original statement, Gauci described the cardigan as “two colour” with big imitation leather, brown colour buttons, he thought six in number. He said his brother Paul had bought it from a shop in Paola in Malta. Six days later when visiting the shop (19.09.89) one of the officers noticed a blue cardigan (DC92) otherwise in all other respects identical to a blast-damaged plain beige or brown one he had previously seen at RARDE, the only cardigan to have been recovered at Lockerbie (PI/594).It was established that both the blue and the beige, Lockerbie, cardigan had been manufactured locally by Eagle Knitwear. In the wake of that discovery Gauci changed the colour of the cardigan purchased he had sold from “red/black” to “beige or maybe darker colour” although with the same buttons as previously described. Subsequently shown a photograph of PI/594 he agreed it was the same as the one he had sold. In contrast to his account of 13 September, 1989, on 30 January, 1990, Gauci stated that the one sold was one of three of Italian make with “big checks” which he had bought from a retired policeman who had obtained it from Hammet Brothers, a supplier based in Paulo. On 15 February, 1991, the day he first picked out al-Megrahi’s picture from a photospread, Gauci told Detective Sergeant Crawford that he “now realised” that the Puccini cardigan was bought from Eagle knitwear and not from the ex-policeman, although no written statement was taken from him. Perhaps mindful of his changing memory of the colour, at the trial he said the man had purchased two cardigans, in contrast to one, as he had claimed in his first description.

The babygro Gauci subsequently described the babygro as pink, later reverting to blue. Originally he had stated it had a sheep’s face motif on the front.On 13 September, 1989, he was shown a babygro obtained from the manufacturer of the Lockerbie babygro, which had a lamb’s whole body on the front. He maintained nonetheless that it was different from the one he had sold, with its sheep’s head, but three weeks later, on 4 October, 1989, he conceded after all that the motif was probably that of a lamb’s whole body.

Pullovers For the first time at trial he said the man bought two pullovers.

(f) The extraordinary matter of the Slalom shirts

First description of 15 February 1989 The description of items sold to the man which Gauci gave on 15 February, 1989, contained no reference to any shirts.

Interview of 30 January, 1990: Gauci maintains he did not sell shirts to the purchaser but police attempts to connect the MEBO MST-13 timer and a Slalom shirt are apparent We shall see later that the Crown’s case was that in the Spring of 1989 exhibit PT35b, the fingerrnail-size fragment of a PCB, had been found wedged in PI/995, the blast-damaged neck or collar of what was identified as a grey Slalom brand shirt which had been in the bomb suitcase. Supposedly it was not identified as coming from a MEBO MST-13 electronic timer until the summer of 1990 but the authorities had begun to give it close attention at the beginning of the year. When he was interviewed again by police on 30 January he was shown a remnant of a grey shirt with the “Slalom” label on the pocket and a complete grey Slalom shirt. He said he had had such shirts in stock for about two or three years, in beige, in grey and in sky blue. He was also shown a blast-damaged piece of blue and white striped cloth and stated that he had “a small stripe like that; it is on a girl’s shirt, a Slalom one I think.” However, he was adamant (“for sure”) that he did not sell any shirts to the man he had sold the other items. It seems that he supplied examples of shirts to the police, for which they paid.


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