(b) Did the Abu Elias character really exist or
was he a fiction invented by Khreesat?
Did the Abu Elias character actually exist or was he merely a fiction invented by Khreesat? Was there really a fifth lethal device which was handed over to Abu Elias and went missing? These questions lie at the heart of the whole Lockerbie mystery.
Khreesat’s earlier encounters with Abu Elias in Yugoslavia and elsewhere Khreesat told the FBI that at no stage did he meet Abu Elias in person in Germany but he said that in September 1988 he had been in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, from where he had been driven about 200 kilometres to the PFLP-GC safe-house/forward base in Krusevac by a man he claimed he knew only by the name of Abu Fuad. From a photograph he confirmed that the man was actually Mobdi Goben, the PFLP-GC “co-ordinator” for Yugoslavia. While there he had received his assignment to the German cell and met with Dalkamoni and Abu Elias, whom, he said, Dalkamoni described as the cell’s “expert in airport security” who knew “all the details” on how to smuggle bombs on to targeted aircraft (FD302, pp.5 and 10). He said he had previously met Abu Elias in Damascus. In fact, from what is now known they must have long been closely acquainted, to say the least, and he must already have known of his expertise.
(c) Khreesat’s claim that the fifth device was handed
on to the PFLP-GC’s expert in airport security
Whatever his name may have been the PFLP-GC must have had an expert in airport security to orchestrate the planting of bombs In an earlier edition of this treatise the author wrote that of the existence of Abu Elias there could be little doubt. That statement prompted the Lockerbie on-line commentator “Baz,” to ridicule the present author’s “attempt to prove Abu Elias’s existence” (see Prof Robert Black QC’s blog http://lockerbiecase.blog-spot.co.uk/ 2012/ 03/english-barris-ter-demolishescrowns.html). The barb was misconceived. The author had not actually made any such attempt – but only because the existence of the man whom Khreesat named as Abu Elias seemed to be so self-evident. We can be sure that such a man – whatever his name – must have been recruited to serve with the Frankfurt cell. How else would Dalkamoni and Jibril have hoped to smuggle a bomb into the baggage hold of an airliner? They could hardly have managed it without someone expert in airport security, as Khreesat aptly described him. The Autumn Leaves surveillance and arrests hardly precludes an important player evading the net.
The importance of assessing the credibility of Khreesat’s story of a device being passed to the airport security expert The more problematical question is whether we can believe Khreesat that the “fifth device” was spirited out of the workshop and into the hands of the cell’s air security specialist who thereafter evaded arrest. We have already canvassed the likelihood that while it was taken out of the workshop by Dalkamoni there was never any secret about its destination; Khreesat went with him to Frankfurt and, no matter what may have expressly passed between them, Khreesat would have been well aware that it was handed over to Abu Elias. The web commentator “Baz” deprecated the author’s reliance on Khreesat’s story unsupported by any credible evidence. In spite of the peremptory terms of his lambast (even going so far as to challenge the author’s professional credentials!) his intervention is welcome in pointing to the need for an explicit account of the process of reasoning by which we can be tolerably sure of the validity of Khreesat’s claim that the fifth device was handed to the Abu Elias character.
The Autumn Leaves arrests would not have precluded fatal fruition of the plot Over the years the shift of attention to Libya has been justified by the argument that the Autumn Leaves action all but destroyed the Frankfurt cell and that the Iranians were forced to enlist the aid of Libyan-sponsored terrorists. That supposition ignores the plain fact that to wreak havoc it only needed one operable bomb to escape the net in the hands of a determined terrorist with vital know-how. That a number of suspects were rounded up by the BKA hardly precludes the possibility that other active PFLP-GC operatives escaped arrest or never specifically came on the police radar. Even though the release of most of the Autumn Leaves suspects followed within days of their arrest – well before Lockerbie – they would obviously have been of little further use to the organisation in Germany.
Doubts as to the possibility of a hand-over of the fifth device in Frankfurt on 22 October Khreesat told the FBI that the fifth device was brought back from Frankfurt on 22 October and that it was on the 24 October that the incident took place in which Dalkamoni knocked on the shower door saying he was leaving for Frankfurt and the fifth device was then found to be missing from the workshop. We have already noted that the BKA surveillance log shows that Dalkamoni made his last trip down the 100 miles to Frankfurt on 22 September and that Khreesat went with him. So it could not have been handed over to Abu Elias in Frankfurt later than 22nd. As to the possibility that it was indeed the 24th when he found the fifth device missing from the workshop at 22 Isarstrasse and that it was never in fact handed over Khreesat was adamant that the radio cassette player which went missing was not the F-453D found concealed in Dalkamoni’s Taunus when the two men were arrested on 26 October. Could he have been lying about that? The short answer is that if he had wanted to exonerate himself (and incidentally his controllers and the PFLP-GC into the bargain) from any responsibility for the fatal bomb he could simply have said that the bomb found in the car was the one which went missing from the workshop. We have therefore conjectured that Khreesat got his dates muddled (or was deliberately obfuscating) and (a) that collection of the fifth device from Frankfurt must have been earlier than 22nd (possibly the 18th, when according to Dalkamoni’s account to the BKA he was given a Toshiba radio cassette player by Ramzi Diab) and (b) that it was handed over to Abu Elias on 22nd. The problem with (a) is that the surveillance log shows that essential materials for bomb-making were purchased in Neuss on 24 October, making an earlier date for completion of construction perhaps less likely. On the other hand, Khreesat might already have been in possession of sufficient bomb-making materials and the purchases of 24 October might only have been for additional devices. As to (b), we have already noted that the BKA record says nothing about Khreesat being dropped off at the zoo, although that might be another invention by Khreesat designed to distance himself from the hand-over. Importantly, moreover, it makes no reference to Dalkamoni meeting anyone in Frankfurt on 22 October apart from Diab/Kwekes.
Absence of any reference in the BKA surveillance log to Khreesat’s telephone alert to his controller in Amman Whether a Toshiba bomb was passed to the man appointed to plant it, as Khreesat implied, will depend in part on the question whether he actually made a call to Amman in which he reported the episode. That it was not monitored – or at least the fact of it recorded – by the BKA hardly means that the call was never made. Khreesat would probably have used a public telephone box, as he had been doing when he was arrested. He would not have wanted to risk being overheard, by Dalkamoni or anyone else, making such a call from 16 Isarstrasse. Moreover, if the BKA already knew that Khreesat was undercover for the Jordanian Mukbaret, and perhaps therefore a proxy for the CIA, they might well have wished to omit from the surveillance record the fact of such a telephone message.
Could Khreesat’s alert have been the factor which led the BKA to swoop? It may be that the German police did swoop because they learnt the cell members were “nearly ready.” On the other hand, it might have been wiser to wait until they were actually ready. Something must have happened to induce the police to form a judgment that that point had been reached and that they ought to take swift action to prevent disaster. What is more likely to have been the trigger for action than an insider tip-off via a friendly intelligence agency that a completed bomb had been passed to the man in charge of planting it on a plane, just as Khreesat asserted?
Khreesat’s regret that the police jumped too soon As things were, Khreesat purported to complain that the police had jumped in too soon. The FD302 report states–
“Khreesat advised that he did not tell the Germans anything about Abu Elias. Khreesat never saw Abu Elias in Germany but was told by Dalkamoni that Abu Elias had arrived. Khreesat told the Germans that they should have waited one more day to make the arrests, as Dalkamoni was on the way to meet Abu Elias when they were arrested.”
Khreesat’s complaint could be warranted only if he had warned his control about the impending meeting. He did not mention whether he voiced such a warning. If the two men were on the way to meet Abu Elias that does not preclude the possibility that they, or at least Dalkamoni, had already met up with him four days earlier, or at least that the fifth device had been delivered to Frankfurt for him.
Assessing the reliability of Khreesat’s story about the alert to his Amman control Could Khreesat have been telling the truth about the fact of the call when he was interviewed by the FBI under the auspices of the Mukabaret? That interview took place nearly a year after Lockerbie by which time his agenda and that of the Mukabaret may have changed. Whereas Edward Marshman of the FBI might by then have been minded to suppress any tale suggestive of perpetration by the PFLP-GC the Jordanians might still have been anxious to have their man blame Jibril, an avowed enemy of the Hashemite kingdom. (The fact that Khreesat was willing to give an account suggestive of PFLP-GC culpability tells against his retaining any lingering, secret, allegiance to Jibril.) On the other hand, although the Jordanians would have had an undoubted motive for attributing Pan Am 103 guilt to Jibril they might at the same time have been wary of undermining efforts by the CIA to blame Libya. This insoluble dilemma only leads us into a cul-de-sac. We need to re-focus on the Autumn Leaves arrests. The fact is there must have been a trigger for the round-up. There is no other discernible reason why the BKA should at that point have decided to give up surveillance and proceed to strike. An alert about the airport security expert going missing with a live bomb is surely the front-runner. It “ticks all the right boxes.”
Khreesat’s alarm and the “Toshiba alert” In the previous paragraph it was argued that validation of the truth of Khreesat’s claim that he alerted his control about the missing bomb may be supplied by the Autumn Leaves arrests themselves. What more cogent reason would the BKA have had to go into action, it may be asked? However, there is a further reason for confidence in his claim. That the BKA issued the Toshiba alert on 9 November suggests that they had reliable evidence that a device had escaped their net. What better grounds than that the inside man should have given that alert, either to his controller before the arrests or to the BKA directly, after the arrests?
Was Khreesat lying to his control? For these various reasons, Khreesat, on balance at least, probably did make the call to Amman which he described to the FBI. But in calling his controllers to inform them about the removal of the fifth device was he telling them the truth? Is there any reason why he might have invented it? The answer may be put in the form of a rhetorical question. What sensibly conceivable reason might he have had for telling them this if it were not true? He would hardly have said such a thing if he secretly harboured an allegiance to the PFLP-GC. On the other hand, supposing his primary allegiance was to the Mukabaret, prior to Lockerbie would the Jordanians have had any particular motive for concocting such a story with him? Did his controllers implant in his mind the expectation of a fiction which he supposed they might want to hear? Could they perhaps have wanted to give the Germans an urgent justification for arresting their enemy’s gang? Yet they must have known that it was highly unlikely the BKA would simply “return to barracks” without arresting the gang, if no specific alert were sounded. The Jordanians would surely have appreciated that ultimately the gang would be “in the bag” come what may. It is difficult to envisage any benefit to them from passing on a story which they knew Khreesat had invented. If Khreesat did make the call he described and if his call was more or less in the terms he described to the FBI – secret removal from under his nose and passing on to Abu Elias – that would not necessarily mean it was all true. He could well have considered it tactically beneficial to invent the idea of the secret removal in order to make the handover all the more dramatic and urgent and the trigger for action.
5. Who was “Abu Elias”?
(a) RamziDiab/SalehKwekas
It has been argued here that the “fifth device” may well have been handed over to Abu Elias in Frankfurt on 22 October, 1988, that Marwen Khreesat actually knew this to have happened rather than that he merely assumed as much, and that it possibly took place in Khreesat’s presence. As already mentioned, the BKA surveillance log relates that at 2 pm Dalkamoni “met up with” Ramzi Diab, the “big-eared stranger” he had previously met on 18 October. (Ramzi Diab’s real name has been said to be Saleh Kwekas and that he also used the alias Ali Nasrfi Assaf). Katz states baldly that Ramzi “is believed to have transported Khreesat’s fifth barometer Toshiba [BomBeat] bomb to Vienna before disappearing” (p.216) but he does not state whether this was supposed to be before Ramzi’s arrest by Autumn Leaves or after his release (Jibril Versus Israel, p.216). On being questioned by the BKA Dalkamoni stated that Ramzi had handed him a Toshiba radio-cassette player when they met on 18 October (cf Khreesat, FD302, stating that Abu Elias had given Dalkamoni a Toshiba – the fifth device – on 22 October). If Dalkamoni was reliable and if the “belief” passed on by Katz (presumably from his Israeli intelligence source) is correct the bomb Ramzi took to Vienna would be one he took there after his release. Might this possibly suggest that Ramzi himself was the Abu Elias character? The proposition seems unlikely for the simple reason that after his release it was in November – well before Lockerbie – that he returned via Vienna and Belgrade to Damascus where, suspected to be a Mossad mole, he was liquidated on the orders of Ahmed Jibril (Israel Versus Jibril, pp.216-217, citing various reports on Ramzi Diab’s possible allegiances). It is of course possible that it was to Ramzi that the fifth device was handed on 22 October when Dalkamoni and Khreesat met him in Frankfurt, and that he passed it on to Abu Elias before his arrest? Whoever he may have been Abu Elias was the man whose expertise was crucially needed to plant the bomb on the plane.
(b) Khreesat professes to “help” make a
photo-construct of Abu Elias
Khreesat supposedly helped the FBI agents make up a composite picture of Abu Elias which he described as a good likeness. He may not have told the Germans much about Abu Elias but was he as helpful as he might have been to the agents? Taken at face value the preparation of the composite would suggest he was being equally circumspect with them. If he had revealed the man’s true identity, there would have been no need to prepare a composite because the likelihood is that the intelligence services would have been in possession of a photograph. If claims made later were true Khreesat must have known very well who Abu Elias was and equally it is certain they would have been in possession of a photograph. Was Abu Elias his name real or an alias (if the pun can be forgiven)? The Abu preface is merely an informal soubriquet common in Arabic, a sort of nickname, meaning “father of.” He would be father of Elias.
(c) The PLO disclosure
Rumours and reports as to the man’s true identity have been in circulation for many years. Not long after the indictments of al-Megrahi and Fhimah were announced in November 1991 the PLO released a report to the international press describing the 1988 deal between Iran and the PFLP-GC and claiming that the bomb which destroyed Pan Am 103 was built by one Khaisar Haddad, also known as Abu Elias, a blond blue-eyed Lebanese Christian member of the PFLP-GC (see Roy Rowan, “Why Did They Die?” Time magazine cover story, April 27 1992; re-cycled in Goddard, D. and Coleman, L., Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut to Lockerbie – Inside the DIA, New York: Bloomsbury, 1993).
(d) The Goben Memorandum
During the trial at Zeist, in October 2000, the Crown unexpectedly disclosed to the defence a so-called death-bed confession made by Mobdi Goben, mentioned earlier as the PFLP-GC’s co-ordinator for Yugoslavia. (Why they left it as late as to the trial to make the sudden disclosure is unclear.) Goben had managed the organisation’s safe house in Krusevac, 200 kilometres distant from Belgrade and had played a prominent role in assisting the German cell. The safe house was raided after the Autumn Leaves arrests in 1988 and the police found there detonators and Semtex later proved to have been likely to come from the same consignment as that which destroyed Pan Am 103 and that seized at 28 Sandweg, Frankfurt, the safe-house and home of suspected PLFP-GC operative Ghandafar. Goben evaded arrest after the raid and in 1996, shortly before his death, dictated the “Goben Memorandum,” as his testamentary narrative came to be known. It retailed his involvement with the PFLP-GC and set out what purported to be a highly detailed account of the Lockerbie plot, although how much credence can be attached to the narrative must be tempered by evidence, later disclosed to the defence, that Goben came to hate Ahmed Jibril (Ashton, Megrahi: You are My Jury, p.249). Those he implicated included Dalkamoni, Ghadanfar and Kwekes (Ramzi Diab), seized in the Autumn Leaves raids. He stated that following the raids he had helped co-ordinate the bombing from Yugoslavia, that Khreesat was not the organisation’s only bomb-maker, and that he, Goben, had smuggled from Syria a bomb built by a Damascus-based Palestinian named Awad (cited in Ashton, p.248). His account tallied with Khreesat’s in stating that they had met in Belgrade in 1988, together with Dalkamoni, although he put the meeting in the summer rather than September, as Khreesat had stated.
(e) Goben and Abu Elias
Of key interest is the fact that Goben named Abu Elias as the central figure of the Lockerbie plot on the ground, describing him as a “close relative” of Ahmed Jibril. Intriguingly, he stated that Abu Elias had planted the bomb in a suitcase associated with Khaled Jaafar, the young Lebanese American who was on Pan Am 103. Goben stated that according to his wife Miroslava Abu Elias and Jaafar met in Belgrade in early December 1988, an assertion which conflicted with claims made by two brothers named El-Salheli that Jaafar did not leave Dortmund between 8 November and the day he died (see Ashton, Megrahi: You Are My Jury, pp.123-127 and 248). The story of the bomb being planted on Jaafar at Frankfurt (or elsewhere) had first seen the light of day in the Interfor Report, referred to earlier. The inherent improbability of the primary suitcase having been flown from Frankfurt to London on the feeder flight before being transferred on the Heathrow tarmac to Maid of the Seas has already been demonstrated.
(f) The Goben witnesses and the Syrian
living in America
At the same time as the Crown handed the defence the Goben Memorandum they disclosed the names of six witnesses, Goben’s wife Miroslava, his son Samir and other relatives or associates, all of whom had sought refuge in Norway. In Oslo, defence solicitors Alistair Duff and Eddie MacKechnie interviewed the six witnesses and gleaned from them that Goben had hated Jibril, who had treated him very badly following his return to Syria after the safe-house was shut down in 1988. One of the witnesses stated that a Syrian, whom he named and who he said had long been living in the United States was Abu Elias and although five of the witnesses stated that the man was a relative of Ahmed Jibril they did not claim that he was Abu Elias. However, the sixth witness, who claimed to be a 20-year veteran member of the PFLP-GC and responsible for the military division finances, said that although he had once met the man named by the first witness as Abu Elias, he doubted if he was indeed that person (see Ashton, Megrahi: You Are My Jury, p.249). Subsequently to the Oslo interviews the Crown disclosed that in May 1987 the man named by the witnesses had deposited into his bank account nearly $6,000 in travellers’ cheques which had been purchased from an Arab bank in Cyprus a few days earlier by Hafez Hussein, one of Dalkamoni’s aliases. Comparative analysis of relevant signatures suggested that the one on a document relating to the purchase had been written by Dalkamoni.
(g) The Syrian US resident interviewed
by defence solicitors
(See Ashton, Megrahi: You Are My Jury, pp.250-251.) In the United States solicitors Duff and MacKechnie duly interviewed the man named by the witnesses. He refused to say if he was related to Ahmed Jibril or whether his father was a senior PFLP-GC member and claimed not to recall receiving the travel cheques 13 years before. He denied ever having used the name Abu Elias or to have heard of Goben or Khaled Jaafar. He said he had often returned to Syria between 1982 and 1988, had obtained a Syrian visa on 19 December, 1988, flying there via Frankfurt on 30 December. He said he had also visited Yugoslavia, where he had friends. He claimed, and it was later confirmed in a letter dated 2 November, 2000, from the Crown to defence solicitors, that he had had meetings with FBI officials during 1988 and 1989 and that in particular on 23 January, 1989, he was asked if he had any information about Lockerbie. He stated he had none. Ashton wonders whether a month after Lockerbie the FBI were asking him if he had any information about the bombing because they knew or believed that he was related to Jibril (Megrahi, p.251).
(h) Early indications that Abu Elias may
have been Jibril’s nephew
Evidence was later submitted to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) and subsequently passed over to the Scottish Court of Appeal for the purposes of al-Megrahi’s second appeal to the effect that Abu Elias was in fact Jibril’s nephew. Within days of the initiation of the appeal process it was reported in a mass circulation British Sunday newspaper, possibly for the first time, that the man believed to be Abu Elias was Jibril’s nephew and that he was living near Washington DC under an alias which the newspaper could not “divulge” (see Derek Lambie, “Finger of blame for Lockerbie pointed at American citizen,” Sunday Express, July 8, 2007, http://www.express. co.uk/posts/view/12732/Finger-of-blame-for-Lockerbie-pointed-at-American-citizen). A journalist who has long been deeply involved in investigating the Lockerbie bombing has disclosed to the author that Abu Elias’s mother is, or was, Ahmed Jibril’s sister. In the light of the revelation that Abu Elias may have been Jibril’s nephew it can now be seen that Khreesat may have given an early clue suggesting this in his FBI interview. Of the five 1985 F-453D bombs he built in 1985 he told the FBI that in 1987 one of them was “shown” to Abu Elias. But intriguingly he also said that one had apparently been kept intact for Jibril “to show his nephew.” It rather sounds as if he might have been talking about the same showing.
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