Culprits of Lockerbie a treatise Concerning the Destruction
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- An unwarranted blanket denunciation
- Israel’s intelligence services: a repository of special knowledge
- Israel’s reluctance to make official disclosure
- A plausibly deniable disclosure
- Questions for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Office
- Further questions arising
- Further Heathrow inquiries
(f) Inference of Rouhani’s complicity in Lockerbie from biographical details in the public domain Even if the plot for revenge was not known to the whole government there are special reasons for believing that Rouhani could not have been unaware, at the very least, of the deal with Jibril. Of course exercising all due forensic restraint it can be argued that knowledge of a plan is no proof of complicity in its execution or of aiding and abetting the instrumental executants. However, Rouhani was a member of the Supreme Defence Council in the very year the deal was made and, significantly, was a close ally of Mohtashemi in their shared opposition to Rasfanjani. Can he conceivably have played no role with others in formulating the terms of the deal and authorising his intimate associate Mohtashemi to close it? In an earlier edition of this treatise (and in the author’s Jewish News article published on October 31, 2013: see above XII, (5), (d)) it was conceded that there is no smoking gun in Rouhani’s hand, no blood stains or DNA traces, no secret tape-recordings, no audit trail linking him to the atrocity of Pan Am 103. There is merely—
Although Megrahi’s trial illustrates what a dangerous weapon the doctrine of circumstantial evidence can be when used to prove too much, nonetheless when deployed carefully and with restraint it can be a powerful tool. In the decade following the Lockerbie bombing Rouhani resumed his involvement with Scotland when he graduated from Glasgow Caledonian University in 1995 with an M.Phil. in Laws and with a Ph.D in 1999 for a thesis intriguingly entitled “The Flexibility of Sharia with reference to the Iranian Experience.” Rouhani’s interest in the potential elacticity of Sharia is perhaps not surprising given the fate of Pan Am 103. Given the totality of what has been made available in the public domain relevant to Rouhani’s likely connection with the destruction of PanAm 103 images of the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond engaging with a beguiling President Rouhani are only rendered less disconcerting by the assumption that they have not been briefed as to his likely complicity. 
Fig. 12 UK Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond and President Rouhani in Teheran on 24 August 2015 (g) Inference now gilded A metaphor of guilt In both the earlier version of this treatise to which reference was made above and in the author’s Jewish News article it was suggested that metaphorically speaking, President Hassan Rouhani’s “fingerprints” might be inferred “to be all over the Lockerbie bombing.” However, beyond inference and metaphor is there any specific evidence to implicate Rouhani more directly? An unwarranted blanket denunciation Lockerbie has spawned a mountain of innuendo, rumour and tittle tattle but, occasionally, a golden nugget has come to light. In professing to denounce the whole of the Iranian leadership cadre for their complicity in Lockerbie, as he did on the Aljezeera TV documentary Lockerbie: What Really Happened (above XII, 5, (a)), Iranian ex-intelligence officer Abolghassem Mesbahi might indeed have been well placed to know about the Mohtashemi-Jibril deal, that it had the sanction of the Supreme Leader and that some players at least among the leadership were aware of its existence and even that some specific individuals were actually complicit. Of course that would be very far from warranting a blanket denunciation that the deal was collectively sanctioned or ratified by each and every member of the Iranian government, top down. Israel’s intelligence services: a repository of special knowledge? Although nothing official has ever been published to confirm the role of Israel’s intelligence services in acquiring information about the inception of the deal between Iran and the PFLP-GC this has been reported by such well-informed writers as Emerson and Duffy, and Katz, with their extensive contacts in the U.S and Israeli intelligence community. In a more general context Israel’s expertise in deploying deep-cover agents to infiltrate terrorist groups has long been described in a host of literary works – histories, biographies and book-length analyses, as well as in newspaper reportage and in journals. Against that background it could always have been assumed that Israeli agents had penetrated the PFLP-GC and always knew as much as anyone about the truth behind the Lockerbie bombing. It may be assumed that Israel could reveal facts about the role played by their enemies in the atrocity which it could do them no harm for the world at large, and the American public in particular, to learn. Israel’s reluctance to make official disclosure Yet curiously, in spite of the obvious lure of offering up proofs of the Iranian procurement of the services of the PFLP-GC in carrying out the bombing, the Israeli Government has always deployed a studied silence on the issue. Their reticence is not difficult to explain. It has clearly been conditioned by the perceived need to avoid offending the US intelligence service, with whom it must be assumed it has been vital for them to remain on good terms of co-operation. In fact, ever since the year before the Lockerbie bombing the Israelis have been under a particular burden of demonstrating their unquestioning loyalty. The Pollard case In 1987 Jonathan Pollard, a civilian intelligence analyst employed by the U.S. Naval Intelligence Command, was convicted of passing classified documents to Israeli intelligence, being handsomely paid for doing so. According to the CIA’s 1987 damage assessment of Pollard’s crimes, declassified in December, 2012, Pollard was not asked by his Israeli handlers to gather information on U.S. military activities, but rather to collect U.S. intelligence on Arab states, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, and especially their weapons systems (Ron Friedman and Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Pollard gathered intel on Arab and Soviet weaponry, not US military activities, CIA document reveals,” The Times of Israel, December 14, 2012; http://www.timesofisrael.com/pollard-gathered-intel ligence-on-arab-and-soviet-weaponry-not-us-military-acti vities-declassified-cia-document-reveals/#ixzz34YxtMq6i). Nonetheless, Israel’s standing was very seriously damaged in American eyes at the time by the Pollard case, as President Chaim Herzog and Defence Minister (and future Prime Minister) Yitzkhak Rabin acknowledged when issuing an abject apology to Ronald Reagan (“Israel apologies for Pollard spy plot,” The Pittsburgh Press, March 6, 1987). Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment but was not released on parole until 20 November, 2015. So sensitive is the Pollard case even today that it remains a potent factor in perpetuating the subservience of Israeli intelligence towards their American counterparts. That is why it is almost inconceivable that Israel would do anything officially to undermine the stubborn determination of the U.S. Government to continue justifying al-Megrahi’s conviction in the teeth of repeated demonstrations of the absurdity of the case against him and the existence of evidence which the Americans themselves obtained implicating Iran and the PFLP-GC before the shutters came down. A plausibly deniable disclosure Israel might not want to reveal officially what it knows about the Lockerbie plot, but there may be reasons to believe that the Netanyahu Administration would very much want to find a way of disseminating what it knows about Iranian complicity, and about who exactly was involved and in particular the close involvement of President Rouhani, without being perceived officially to do so. Indeed, when Benjamin Netanyahu uttered his wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing denunciation of Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013 it may well be imagined that he was straining at the leash to make specific disclosures. Suffice to say that encouraged by an earlier edition of this treatise, my Jewish News article and the Scottish Herald report (see above p.107), a source actually from within Israeli intelligence has professed to confirm to me in person the accuracy of the conjectures about Rouhani’s role and the modus operandi of the bomb delivery to Maid of the Seas set out in an earlier edition of this treatise. Citing solid “blue-chip” intelligence it is asserted that the Israeli Government seek to procure the publication of certain facts implicating the PFLP-GC and Iran albeit, it is conceded, on an entirely non-attributable basis of “plausible deniability,” to use that hackneyed phrase. The following facts are therefore disclosed for dissemination into the public domain–
(h) Should the Scottish police investigate Hassan Rouhani for complicity? It has already been mentioned (at XII, 5, (d)) that on November 13, 2013, Scotland’s leading daily newspaper The Herald carried a prominent report written by chief reporter Lucy Adams about the edition of this treatise posted two days earlier. The newspaper had tried to contact President Rouhani’s office but received no response. Asked to comment, a Crown Office spokesman predictably said: “The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and Police Scotland are actively working with US law enforcement in pursuit of lines of inquiry to bring to justice the others involved in the Lockerbie bombing. This is a live investigation and in order to preserve the integrity of the investigation it would not be appropriate to offer further comment.” Questions for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Office Accordingly, the author wrote to the Scottish First Minister on 19 November, asking the following questions–
Reply The inquiry was referred to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, whose Principal Depute Laura Buchan replied with substantive answers on 30 December. Among her answers were these:
Further questions arising It seems from this that only one visit to Libya was made in 2013. It is not clear how many officers flew to Libya in February nor how long the team spent there but it could hardly have taken very long to be told that there was little the Libyan authorities would at present (if ever) be able to do to offer assistance. How many officers needed to be in Libya to listen to this predictable enough assertion? Given that the economy class return fare from the UK to Libya is no more than £250 maximum and that reasonable accommodation costs were unlikely to have exceeded £200 per night it is difficult to see how the total figure was computed. If the figure given includes the cost of taking an interpreter to Libya it might be asked why our diplomatic mission was unable to provide someone suitably qualified, accredited and trustworthy to do the job. It is not known what further inquiries or foreign expeditions the police team have embarked upon since 2013, but doubtless the Scottish authorities would claim they have not been idle: on 15 October, 2015, the Crown Office triumphantly announced that Frank Mulholland, the lord advocate, had sent a letter of request to the Libyan attorney-general asking for permission for Police Scotland to interview two “new” suspects (see eg, The Guardian). One is reported to be Abdullah al-Senoussi, Colonel Gaddafi’s brother-in-law and former head of intelligence, now in prison in Libya under sentence of death, and one Nasser Ali Ashour. No doubt the Scottish police had stumbled on the fact, already known to commentators, that many years ago al-Senoussi had been indicted and convicted in France in his absence for involvement in the destruction of flight UTA 772, an atrocity which in fact bore all the hallmarks of a classic PFLP-GC bombing (see above p.95). We have no means of knowing how many hours the team spent digging and delving but there is a curious proximity in timing between the Crown Office announcement and the airing of Ken Dornstein’s Frontline documentary, Lockerbie: My Brother’s Bomber, initially in the United States and then by BBC television on 2 November. Based on an uncritical acceptance of the case against Megrahi, Dornstein’s approach involved an admittedly indefatigable but sadly futile exercise in sleuthing, the highpoint of which took us to a limelight craving individual named Eter, a character second only to the fantasising witness Giaka in his desire to disclose worthless snippets of suspicion. It was doubtless the “evidence” unearthed by Dornstein against al-Senussi, without Scottish police help, which doubtless inspired the Crown Office. Suggested inquiries Rather than indulging in cosmetic trips to Libya and fanfare-accompanied announcements of “progress” the PSS Lockerbie team might be better occupied in focusing their attention on Messrs Jibril, Mohtashemi and Rouhani. When the last named was in Scotland in 1999 to collect his doctorate from Glasgow Caledonian University this was in the run-up to the trial at Camp Van Zeist. Bearing in mind that it is almost inconceivable that American intelligence did not appreciate from the outset his position as a major player in Iranian security and intelligence in 1988 it would be interesting to know if the authorities here, for posterity's sake, arranged for GCHQ to monitor his telephone calls for any confessional morsels. Further Heathrow inquiries It may be asked whether the Scottish police, in conjunction with their colleagues in the Metropolitan Police, might consider reviewing evidence of the possible involvement of crew members of IranAir cargo flight IRA4073/4072 in the planting of the primary suitcase in container AVE4041 at the Heathrow interline shed on on 21 December 1988. One useful line of inquiry (if not already undertaken) might be to show the interline x-ray operators Kamboj and Parma (see above p.64), if still alive, a photograph of Marwad Bushnaq, available from Israel, if not in the public domain (see above, p.94.). To have any validity as evidence the photograph would have to be shown as one of an array of portraits of foils in accordance with current investigative protocols (see Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.66, Code D, The Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, current edition, 2011, use of still photrgaphs in a video format, Annex A.4; see also Wolchover D, Visual Identification Procedures Under PACE Code D., online, www.David Wolchover.co.uk, p.88). Again, it would be interesting to find out if the interior of the interline shed and of the area surrounding the structure and its approaches were covered by CCTV and, if so, whether any recorded footage was seized relating to the relevant time (see above p.99). In the light of the Israeli disclosures referred to in this treatise it may be asked whether the Crown Office and the Police Scotland team supposedly “working on” the Lockerbie case might wish to send an international letter of request to the Government of Israel for their assistance. Bibliography Primary documentation Report into the accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988, Department of Transport, Air Accidents Investigation Branch aircraft accident report 2/90, 6 August 1990. Determination of the Fatal Accident Inquiry relating to the Lockerbie air disaster, 1 October 1990 to 14 February 1991, and Note dated 18 March 1991. Transcripts of the proceedings of the Scottish court at Camp Zeist, Netherlands, 3 May 2000 to 31 January 2001 Opinion of the High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist, case no. 1475/99, HM v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin KhalifaFhimah. Opinion of the Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, appeal no. C104/01, appeal against conviction by Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi. 14 March 2002. Press release from the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission on the referral of the case of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi to the High Court of Justiciary, 28 June 2007. Documents prepared for al-Megrahi’s abandoned second appeal, available at www.megrahimystory.net Selected commentary Emerson, S., and Duffy, B., The Fall of Pan Am 103: inside the Lockerbie investigation, New York: G. P. Putnam, 1990. Leppard, D., On the Trail of Terror: the inside story of the Lockerbie investigation, London: Jonathan Cape, 1991. Katz, S..M., “Israel Versus Jibril: The thirty-Year War Against a Master Terrorist, New York: Paragon, 1993. Foot, P., Lockerbie: The Flight from Justice. London: Pressdram, 2001. Ashton, J. and Ferguson, I., Cover-up of Convenience: the hidden scandal of Lockerbie, Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2001. Marquise, R. A., Scotbom: evidence and the Lockerbie investigation, New York: Algora Publishing, 2001.
Davina Miller, “Who Knows about this? Western Policy towards Iran: the Lockerbie Case,” Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2011, © Taylor and Francis Ashton, J., Megrahi You Are My Jury – The Lockerbie Evidence, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2012. Kerr, M., Adequately explained by stupidity? Lockerbie Luggage and Lies (Leicester: Troubadour 2013 
The author is a barrister and Former Head of Chambers at 7 Bell Yard, Temple Bar, London. Some of the text of this monograph has been adapted from the author’s four articles in Criminal Law and Justice Weekly: ‘Masking Justice with “Mercy”’ vol. 175, No 15, 9 April 2011, pp.221-228; “Exploding Lockerbie,” vol. 175, 16 and 23 July, 2011; “A Postscript on Lockerbie,” vol 175, No 35/36, 27 Aug/3 Sept, 2011, pp.509-510. Material will is also carried in “Lockerbie: The True Culprits,” (2012) vol 176; Feb 25, pp120-121; March 3, pp.137-139; March 17, pp.168-171; March 24, pp.185-189; March 31. In the drafting of some passages of the text of those articles he received invaluable assistance from persons who explicitly preferred to remain unacknowledged. Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 0.96 Mb. Share with your friends:
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