Culprits of Lockerbie a treatise Concerning the Destruction
AAIB and RAE investigations
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AAIB and RAE investigations Separate investigations were conducted by the AAIB, generating a single report, and by the Royal Aeronautical Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough, which body produced two reports, in 1990 and 1999 respectively. Various RARDE, AAIB and RAE findings The findings on positioning of the bomb reached by the three investigative bodies together covered five main topics, although not comprehensively by all three. Such findings as were reached are set out as follows: (i) Quantity and nature of the explosive According to a summary of the results of the tests in America prepared by DCI Harry Bell, the explosive charge weight was probably of the order to 454 to 680 grams. Without explanation this was revised downwards in the RARDE joint report to 350 to 450 grams. Yet, the Indian Head test (number 5) which, in the RARDE joint report, was considered to have produced effects most consistent with the damage to the recovered components of AVE4041 used 460 grams of Semtex. The AAIB and the first RAE reports did not consider the amount of explosive but the second RAE report estimated the quantity of explosive as 450 grams, well within the RARDE joint report’s range. (ii) Vertical distance from explosion to AVE4041 container base level In two different sections of their joint report the RARDE experts expressed different estimates for the vertical distance from the explosion epicentre to the container base level, 25 to 28 cm and 28 to 30 cm, giving a mean estimate of a little over 10.75 inches in imperial. The AAIB calculated the figure to be 25.5 cm, that is, around 10 inches. Neither RAE report considered this measurement. (iii) Stand-off distance The “stand-off” distance is that between the epicentre of the explosion and the nearest point to it on the fuselage skin. All three bodies agreed that the distance was around 62 to 64 cm, that is 24 or 25 inches. The figure proved to be an overestimate, as to which see further below. (iv) Evidence of relevant damage to the container AVE4041 While explosive pitting, cratering and sooting were prevalent on the surfaces and struts of recovered pieces from the lower part of the angled section of AVE4041, the evidence of such marking was relatively absent from the base, although the area of the base most likely to have been explosively marked was never found. There was an indentation in the base which, according to the RARDE and AAIB experts, had been caused by a suitcase on the bottom layer being forced downwards. All the successful tests placed the primary suitcase in the second layer In only one of the seven tests (number 4) was the primary suitcase positioned anywhere other than in the second layer and in that test an uncontrollable fire caused by the detonation precluded any “easily recordable results,” ie, meaningful conclusions. RARDE conclusion as to the position of the primary suitcase On the basis of the Indian Head observations as to position and the relative absence of pitting, etc, to the container floor the conclusion reached in the RARDE joint report was that the epicentre of the explosion was located between 25 and 30 cm above the level of the container base and about 5 cm into the angled section. From this the authors deduced that the primary suitcase was in one or other of the two following positions: (i) Second layer It was lying flat in the second layer and extending a short distance into the angled section, overhanging the case below it by about 16 cm (6.5 inches) in the way depicted in illustration Fig. 1, below. (ii) On the angled base of the extended section Alternatively, the whole suitcase was lying flat against the right-angled base of the container’s extended overhang section and propped up by the bottom layer of luggage, with the bomb in the lower end of the bag (see Fig. 2, below). In the case of (i) it would have been likely to have come in with the Frankfurt luggage, given that on the evidence of the Heathrow baggage handlers the floor of AVE4041 was covered with bags before the container was transported out to the tarmac to await loading from the Frankfurt flight. 
Fig. 1 The Crown’s Working Basis of Assumption The Crown therefore proceeded on the assumption that the primary suitcase had been in the second layer of baggage, which meant that it must have come from off Pan Am 103A from Frankfurt. No account was taken of the possibility that the Heathrow loaders might have rearranged baggage when loading the container on the tarmac. The conclusion tied in with evidence from Frankfurt which was interpreted to mean that the suitcase had come as unaccompanied baggage from Malta. We shall return to these topics in due course. Atlantic City tests The two relevant tests (numbers 6 and 7) conducted at FAA HQ, Atlantic City, were initiated and devised by the FAA but were regarded by RARDE as 
Fig. 2 deficient. The diameter of the DC10 fuselage is smaller than that of a Boeing 747, its floor arrangement of structural beams is different and its basic strength is less. Containers of the AVE4041 design do not fit two abreast in the DC10 as they do in the 747 and while the bomb-carrying container was placed in the normal position the adjacent container had to be positioned at right angles to it. The cargo floor of the DC10 used in the tests was missing and a section of expanded laminate installed to serve as a floor became raised on the outboard side, with the result that the container holding the test bomb was tilted and was incorrectly located relative to the floor beams. The containers employed in the Lockerbie tests had been used in previous tests and may have had structural damage which precluded a proper evaluation of the results. Material disclosed in 2009 revealed that the FAA were keen to conduct additional tests using a 747 but that Feraday had successfully opposed the suggestion on the ground that the defence would seize on it to argue that further testing implied doubts about the cogency of the earlier tests. In the event it appears that a further test was conducted in the UK but the results have never been disclosed. (f) Contention of the Defence at Zeist: primary suitcase in the bottom layer The original RARDE opinion On examination of the largest fragment of the primary suitcase shell (PI/911) Dr Thomas Hayes of RARDE noted that it was “compressed and fractured in a manner suggesting it was in contact with the luggage pallet’s base and subjected to explosive forces from above.” From this he had deduced that the suitcase was resting on the base. However, it was an opinion which was superseded by the second layer theory and was therefore not incorporated in the Hayes-Feraday joint report. Opinion of the Forensic Science Agency of Northern Ireland (FSANI) instructed by the defence In preparation for the trial at Zeist the defence instructed the Forensic Science Agency of Northern Ireland, a body ideally qualified to report on the impact and effects of bomb damage. By contrast with the estimate given by RARDE as to the vertical distance from the epicentre of the explosion to the container floor (25 to 30 cm) and the AAIB estimate of 10 inches (25.5 cm) the FSANI experts estimated the distance to be around 10 cm, that is roughly 4 inches (note of defence meeting with the expert team, 20 December 1999, cited by Ashton, Megrahi, p.216). If reliable this meant that the suitcase containing the bomb was on the bottom layer. Response of the Crown at Zeist Although Dr Hayes’ original opinion had been omitted from the joint report, the Crown at Zeist did not seek to suggest that the damage to the suitcase was of such a nature that the possibility that the suitcase containing the bomb was on the bottom layer could be excluded. They could hardly do so in the light of the FSANI report and a number of concessions made in cross-examination by expert witnesses called by the prosecution. These are summarised in the following sub-paragraphs. Substantial AAIB miscalculation as to stand-off distance Christopher Prothero of the AAIB admitted that the AAIB report contained a significant error which, rectified, more than halved the stand-off distance (from 64 to 31cm; ie roughly 25 to 12 inches). The effect of this, of course, was significantly to lower the vertical drop distance of the primary suitcase to the container base. Necessary adjustment of the original AAIB calculation shows that the vertical distance from the bomb to the container base would have been very small Even on the original AAIB calculation of 25 inches for the stand-off distance it is tolerably clear that the 10 inch estimate for the vertical distance from the explosion epicentre to the container base would have been double that which it was likely to have been. This ought to be become tolerably clear from a scrutiny of the diagram in the AAIB report, reproduced in Fig. 3 below, and the illustrative diagram, Fig, 4, reproduced from Ashton, Megrahi, p.404. It can be seen that the line marking the stand-off distance of 25 inches cuts the fuselage skin at the upper edge of the section marked “Area of blast damage on skin,” rather than more logically at the centre of the section. This is because the point on the skin closest to the epicentre of the explosion would ex hypothesi receive the greatest blast and hence suffer the most damage with lesser damage radiating outwards. Given that the epicentre of the explosion was located in the overhang, if the area of blast damage to the skin is accurately marked on the AAIB diagram the epicentre must be lowered down a vertical axis to the point where the shortest distance to the skin cuts it at the centre of the area of blast-damage to the skin. This reduces the stand-off distance from 25 to 20 inches but more significantly lowers the position of the epicentre to about half of the 10 inches given in Fig 3 as the height of the epicentre above the container base. So it may it may have been no more than about 5 inches from the base. RAE expert adjustment on stand-off distance On behalf of the RAE it was conceded by team leader Prof Peel (a) that their second report used a different casual analysis than did the first report and (b) that although he had given an estimate of 24 inches (62 cm) for the stand-off distance it might have been anything from 20 to 28 inches. This would have reduced the corresponding height of the explosion epicentre above the container base by a substantial margin. RAE calculations based not on Semtex use but on C4 explosive The RAE 24-inch estimate for the stand-off distance was modelled on the assumption that the bomb had used C4 plastic explosive rather than Semtex, as the Crown contended. Semtex is about 10 per cent less powerful than C4 and, as Dr Ian Cullis for the RAE agreed, it would have been reasonable to assume that, in order to cause the same observable damage to the fuselage skin, the stand-off distance for Semtex would be that much less than for C4, strengthening the probability that the suitcase was on the bottom layer. 
Fig. 3 
Fig 4 Response of the Crown at Zeist In view of the foregoing evidential developments during the trial at Zeist the Crown did not seek to suggest that the damage to the suitcase and the container was of such a nature that the possibility that the suitcase was on the bottom layer could be excluded. They could hardly do otherwise when Peter Claiden, the AAIB’s lead investigator, expressly accepted the possibility posed by the defence that the case was in the bottom layer with one end (where the bomb was located) pushed slightly upwards and about 2 inches into the angled extension overhang, as depicted in photograph, Fig. 5. It takes only a glance at Fig. 5 to see it is almost exactly on all fours with the adjustments to the AAIB estimate of the height of the epicentre above the container base rendered necessary by scrutiny of Figs. 3 and 4. The position of the suitcase containing the bomb as proposed by the defence in Fig. 5 would have been consistent with at least three aspects of the observable damage:–
We shall return to issue of the position of primary suitcase in the discussion over the Heathrow origin of the bomb when we shall show conclusively that it was on the bottom layer. 
Fig. 5 3. Attempts to establish forensically which articles of clothing had been in the primary suitcase (a) Objective Once the primary suitcase was identified it became imperative to establish which if any items of clothing had been packed in the suitcase with the bomb. From identifying those items it might be feasible, from their description or any labelling, to trace their origin and hence discover the identity of the person or persons who bought them. From that it might be only a short step to discover the identity of the perpetrators. The remains of numerous blast-damaged articles of clothing were recovered in the vicinity of the remains of the container AVE4041 and of the primary suitcase and it was the objective of the experts in the first instance to try to establish which of the remains had been in the primary suitcase. (b) The two categories of recovered blast damaged garments The two categories Blast-damaged items thought to have been in either the primary suitcase or in surrounding baggage in the container were designated as being in one of two categories: Category 1 Garments in this category contained fragments of the bomb but not that of the suitcase shell. Category 2 Garments in this category contained either no bomb fragments or fragments both of the bomb and the suitcase shell. Rationale The ostensible theory underpinning this distinction was that garments in the first category would be regarded as likely to have been in the primary suitcase because the radiating blast carrying fragmented remains of the bomb and its radio-cassette player housing would reach the garment ahead of the shell. Garments not in the primary suitcase would meet a blast containing fragments of both or neither, depending on the distance of the baggage they were in from the primary suitcase and on whether they were shielded by other objects. Professed aim and utility of the American tests The explosive tests conducted in America were supposedly designed to test the theory on which the two-category scheme was based and the RARDE joint report certainly purported to assert that the scheme was based on the results. However, it has been argued that on close analysis the science involved in the distinction was tenuous, if not invalid, since the brief test reports did not constitute proper scientific studies (report of Dr Roger King, a forensic scientist instructed by al-Megrahi’s lawyers for his second appeal, cited Ashton, Megrahi, p.407). Shortcomings of the American tests In the event, none of the five Indian Head tests were regarded as of any value in supporting the theory, in particular because the interval between each test explosion was too short to allow a comprehensive recovery of clothing for forensic examination. Only the two tests conducted by the FAA in Atlantic City (numbers 6 and 7), were relied on to establish how the primary suitcase clothing might be distinguished from the rest. The methodology was to compare the items of debris recovered after the test with the items recovered from Pan Am 103. However at least three shortcomings implicit in the Atlantic City tests diminished the value of any findings which might have been derived from them: (i) Different order of explosive quantity Whereas, according to RARDE, the Pan Am 103 bomb used 350 to 450 grams of explosive, tests 6 and 7 used 680 and 570 grams. (ii) Fire prevent dousing At the end of both tests the luggage was saturated to prevent fire and this might well have affected the distribution of bomb and suitcase fragments within the clothes by dislodging and transferring fragments elsewhere. (iii) Explosions at ground level As the tests were conducted on the ground it is implicit that they could hardly come close to replicating events following the catastrophic decompression of an aircraft at 31,000 feet. (c) Fundamental shortcomings of the two-category scheme There were several respects in which the system of separating the clothing into two categories was flawed or unreliable: (i) Lack of detail on the examination of test debris The disclosed RARDE material furnished no details of the examination of the debris. (ii) No scientific underpinning No attempt was made in the joint report to offer any scientific analysis upon which the categorisation scheme could be underpinned (see Dr King’s report, above, cited in Ashton, Megrahi, p.407). (iii) Illogical ambit of definition of bomb fragments For the purposes of the two-categorisation scheme the joint report brought within the definition of bomb fragments not only those from the radio-cassette player and its explosive device innards but also its instruction manual. This was doubtless on the assumption that the manual had been packed immediately adjacent to the radio-cassette player in the suitcase, possibly in a cardboard carton with it. However, the definition also embraced the brown fabric-lined cardboard partition within the primary suitcase. The thinking behind this was presumably that the radio-cassette player was separated from the clothes by the partition, but photographs of an suitcase identical to the primary suitcase demonstrated that this would have been physically impossible in the case of a Toshiba RT-SF16 radio-cassette player. For the purpose of determining whether or not to place clothing in Category 2 pieces of the partition should have been designated as suitcase fragments rather than bomb fragments. (d) Drawbacks of the two-category scheme in its application Deficient method of collecting exhibits and adverse consequences Aside from the lack of any theoretical scientific analysis to support the 2-category system it may have been undermined by the very method of debris-collection at the crash site. The scale of the destruction forced the police to abandon the standard rules of evidence-gathering and permitted debris to be collected together in large plastic bags, in consequence of which explosive material loosely associated with a fragment of clothing might have been transferred to other clothing or debris in the collection bag, or may have been lost when the items were re-packaged (see Dr King’s report, above, cited in Ashton, Megrahi, p.408). Category 1 clothes listed by RARDE The RARDE joint report professed to place thirteen items of clothing in Category 1. Over the course of time the Dumfries and Galloway police investigators came to believe that the following nine had been purchased from Mary’s House, the small boutique in Malta whose owner, Anthony Gauci, claimed Abdelbaset el-Megrahi strongly resembled the purchaser (a topic we shall return to in considerable detail):
In addition, two further items on the list, a white T-shirt and a dark-blue sweatshirt/jumper, were considered to be a possible match for items stocked at Mary’s House. Two other Category 1 items, a training shoe and a piece of light blue cloth, could not be linked to the shop. Inconsistency of application In the opinion of Dr King the scheme was followed inconsistently. If the criteria were rigorously applied to the thirteen items designated in the RARDE joint report as Category 1, the following six of them would have to be re-classified as Category 2:
On the other hand, exhibit PI/148, a pair of jogging trousers, was one of at least two items which were attributed to luggage surrounding the primary suitcase but met the Category 1 criteria in that they contained bomb fragments but none from the suitcase shell. Although some Category 2 items could be matched to passengers with luggage surrounding the primary suitcase others could not and these included a number of very damaged articles such as the five small scraps of blue and black material given exhibit reference PK/2120. Re-classification consequent upon re-defining ambit of “bomb fragments” to exclude cardboard partition In the view of Dr King, if the scheme were modified to re-define the ambit of “bomb fragments” to exclude the cardboard partition in the suitcase (in keeping with the argument that it was illogical to include it having regard to the absence of room for the radio-cassette player in the partitioned off section of the primary suitcase) the following further six Category items would have to be re-classified as Category 2:
Thus, if the scheme had been applied logically and consistently twelve of the joint report’s thirteen Category 1 items would have to be moved to Category 2. Two stark examples of inconsistency following an unexplained change of opinion The almost all pervading inconsistency which characterised the allocation of items between the two categories could hardly have been lost on the authors of the RARDE joint report, least of all Dr Thomas Hayes. When he first examined the Puccini cardigan, exhibit PI/594, he noted that it showed only “distant explosive involvement” and indeed it contained no bomb fragments. Similarly the brown checked pattern Yorkie trousers (PI/221) also contained no bomb fragments and Dr Hayes at first attributed them to surrounding luggage. Yet it was the trousers which led the police to Mary’s House (see Ashton, Megrahi, p.158) and, curiously, as we have seen, the joint report attributed both items to the primary suitcase, with no explanation for the change of opinion. It is little wonder that at Zeist Dr Hayes admitted that he had–– “long ago given up trying to predict exactly where particles will fly.” Allen Feraday, in his precognition statement, revealed that he too harboured doubts about the classification system. Self-evidently, it was worthless and plainly could not justify the attribution to the primary suitcase of those articles of clothing which the Crown contended had been contained in it. Quite apart from any other aspect of the case this must utterly destroy the case against al-Megrahi and Libya.
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