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EKC doesn’t apply to biodiversity loss – their evidence only looks at individual species – our evidence takes into account overall biodiversity



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AT: EKC



EKC doesn’t apply to biodiversity loss – their evidence only looks at individual species – our evidence takes into account overall biodiversity


Majumder 6—Professors at the University of New Mexico— Robert Berrens, and Alok Bohara [Pallab, “Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for the Risk of Biodiversity Loss?”, The Journal of Developing Areas, Volume 39, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp. 175-190, muse]

The empirical robustness of the inverted U-shape relationship remains a debatable issue (Dasgupta et al. 2002; Grossman and Krueger, 1996). Stern (1998) argues that the evidence for the inverted U-shape relationship applies only to a subset of environmental measures. Such arguments require investigating the EKC relationship for as broad an array of possible types of pollutants. Whether the EKC relationship holds for biodiversity loss or the risk of biodiversity loss, remains an open issue. While there are several recent studies (McPherson and Nieswiadomy 2000; Dietz and Adger 2001; and Naidoo and Adamowicz 2001) investigating the EKC relationship for biodiversity, they are subject to various limitations. Specifically, all the prior EKC studies for biodiversity looked into the diversity of a particular species or a number of species rather than a broader measure or index of overall biodiversity. In addition, these studies do not account for variations in ecosystems that directly affect species diversity. We investigate the EKC hypothesis for the overall risk of biodiversity loss by using the multivariate National Biodiversity Risk Assessment Index (NABRAI; Ryers et al. 1998, 1999) and several variants, which include genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity.1 Analyzing cross-country data, our findings suggest that there is no EKC relationship for the risk of biodiversity loss. The EKC relationship has generated extensive debate and empirical investigation. Various empirical EKC studies have employed different methods, and evaluated different environmental indicators resulting in a broad spectrum of findings. Based on a number of empirical findings supporting the EKC, some analysts (e.g., Beckerman 1992) argue that there exists a general inverted U-shape relationship between economic growth and the environment. They tend to draw the broad policy conclusion that economic growth in a society will somehow automatically take care of most environmental problems. On the contrary, others argue that there is no blanket inverted U-shape relationship between income and overall environmental quality (e.g., Stern 1998; Stern and Common 2001; Harbaugh et al. 2002).2 Further, even if the EKC relationship holds over some historical range, it may not hold in the future due to ecological thresholds and carrying capacities (e.g. Arrow et al. 1995). Since the EKC results are usually estimated from a reduced form equation, a variety of conflicting theoretical explanations may be consistent with the EKC. Suggested reasons for observed EKC results are: shiftable externalities (Arrow et al. 1995), industry composition (Grossman and Krueger 1996), environmental regulation [End Page 176] (Grossman and Krueger 1996), technology (Grossman and Krueger 1996), net migration (Berrens et al. 1997) and differences in trade policy regimes (Copeland and Taylor 2003). In a recent meta-analysis synthesizing the results of numerous EKC studies, Cavlovic et al. (2000) show that EKC relationships and their corresponding income turning points depend on the scale of analysis and the type of pollutants. The view that the EKC relationship holds only for a subset of environmental pollutants or disamenities is supported by a number of different perspectives. From the consumption-side view, it is simply easier to live with some pollutants than others, or it is easier to shift the externality effect for some types of pollutants than others.3 As income rises, households are more likely to spend to have access to safe drinking water, but not necessarily to spend for less directly visible measures, such as biodiversity protection, with the same urgency. On the other hand, production-side EKC theories imply that with higher per capita income, countries will be able to substitute environmental-friendly production technology. However, there may be some environmental damages that cannot be continuously substituted with better production technology due to ecological thresholds (Dasgupta, 2000) and the unique nature of the damage (e.g., loss of critical habitat and keystone species). From a broad perspective, biodiversity refers to the variety of life on earth, and includes genetics, species, ecosystems and the ecological processes of which they are a part (Ecosystem Health 2001). As is common, Turner et al. (1993) divide the notion of biodiversity into three different categories: (1) genetic diversity, (2) species diversity and (3) ecosystem diversity. The richness and diversity of genetic information stored in the genes of plants, animal and microorganisms is referred as genetic diversity. The richness and variety of different species is referred as species diversity, where species variety is most commonly used to proxy biodiversity. The richness and variety of ecological process is referred to as ecosystem diversity. Recently, some biologists measure biodiversity as an index that incorporates all three aspects (Ryers et al. 1998). Ryers et al. (1998, 1999) developed the National Biodiversity Risk Assessment Index (NABRAI), which attempts to account for all three aspects of biodiversity and is potentially more accurate than simpler measures of biodiversity (i.e., counts of species, or types of species). There are several recent EKC studies for biodiversity that use these simpler measures. McPherson and Nieswiadomy (2000) examined the EKC relationship for threatened birds and mammals and found an N-shape relation for threatened birds; the implication is that biodiversity loss ultimately increases with higher level of income. They found no evidence of an EKC relationship for threatened mammals. Naidoo and Adamowicz (2001) examined the EKC relationship for birds and mammals as well as for amphibians, reptiles, fishes, invertebrates and found a general U-shape relationship for amphibians, reptiles, fishes, and invertebrates. However, they find an inverted U-shape relationship for birds and mammals. Dietz and Adger (2001) examined the EKC hypothesis using species area-relationship in a number of tropical countries. They found no EKC relationship between income and biodiversity loss, but did find that conservation effort increases with income. These studies focused on the diversity of particular species rather [End Page 177] than some overall biodiversity stock or index. More preferably, a proper measure of biodiversity should include other factors that directly affect species diversity. Land exposed to high disturbance levels, human population density, other endemic species, genetically invented new species etc. can be the examples of such factors. None of the earlier studies took these factors into account in exploring EKC relationship for biodiversity. To fill this gap, we investigate the EKC relationship using cross-sectional (country-level) data and the recently introduced NABRAI, which measures the overall biodiversity risk considering species diversity, genetic diversity and ecosystem diversity.4

EKC only addresses the capacity to care for the environment, the founders of the EKC concede that growth doesn’t save the environment, its about what policies happen


Carson 09 — Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Richard T, The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Seeking Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure, 22 December 2009, http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/4/1/3)

In the popular press, economic growth per se began to be touted as the answer to environmental problems (e.g., Bartlett 1994).8 However, this was not quite what Grossman and Krueger (1991) had said. They were clear about the nature of their assumptions and put in the usual caveats typical of careful researchers. They were particularly forthcoming about the fact that the reduced-form nature of their model limited the policy implications of their results. Still Grossman and Krueger (1996) felt compelled to reiterate these points again in a policy forum piece in Environment and Development Economics and to emphasize that "there is nothing inevitable about the relationship between growth and environment that has been observed in the past." Taking on their most prominent critics, Grossman and Krueger noted: Arrow et al. (1995) conclude, ‘economic liberalization and other policies that promote GNP growth are not substitutes for environmental policy’. We would agree. But we would go further and state that neither is the suppression of economic growth or of economic policies conducive to it a suitable substitute for environmental policy.

And there’s no motive


Speth 08 – law prof—Served as President Jimmy Carter’s White House environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations’ largest agency for international development Prof at Vermont law school. Former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University . Former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching environmental and constitutional law. .Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President. Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Was law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black JD, Yale. (James Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Gigapedia, 1-2,)

Each of these indicators measures environmental impact in some way, and each shows that impacts are increasing, not declining. It is significant that these growth rates of resource consumption and pollution are lower than the growth of the world economy. The eco-efficiency of the economy is improving through “dematerialization,” the increased productivity of resource inputs, and the reduction of wastes discharged per unit of output. However, eco-efficiency is not improving fast enough to prevent impacts from rising. Donella Meadows summed it up nicely: things are getting worse at a slower rate.14 What the environment cares about, moreover, is not the rate of growth but the total loading. These loadings—for example, the amount of fi sh harvested—were already huge in 1980, so that even modest growth per decade produces large increases in environmental impacts—impacts that were already too large. By 2004, the world was consuming annually 369 million tons of paper products, 275 million tons of meat, and 9 trillion tons of fossil fuels (in oil equivalent). Freshwater for human use was being withdrawn from natural supplies at a rate of about a thousand cubic miles a year. Behind these numbers is the phenomenon of exponential expansion. A dominant feature of modern economic activity is its exponential growth. A thing grows linearly when it increases by the same quantity over a given time. If college tuition goes up three thousand dollars a year, the increase is linear. A thing grows exponentially when it increases in proportion to what is already there. If college tuition goes 52 up 5 percent a year, the increase is exponential. The modern economy tends to grow exponentially because a portion of each year’s output is invested to produce even more output. The amount invested is related to the amount of the economic activity. Food production, resource consumption, and waste generation also increase because they are linked to population and output growth. Or so it has been thus far. But what of the future? The world economy is poised for explosive exponential economic growth. It could double in size in a mere fi fteen to twenty years. So the potential is certainly present for large and perhaps catastrophic increases in environmental impacts in a period when they should be decreasing rapidly. There are many good reasons for concern that future growth could easily continue its environmentally destructive ways. First, economic activity and its enormous forward momentum can be accurately characterized as “out of control” environmentally, and this is true in even the advanced industrial economies that have modern environmental programs in place. Basically, the economic system does not work when it comes to protecting environmental resources, and the political system does not work when it comes to correcting the economic system. Economist Wallace Oates has provided a clear description of “market failure,” one reason the market does not work for the environment: “Markets generate and make use of a set of prices that serve as signals to indicate the value (or cost) of resources to potential users. Any activity that imposes a cost on society by using up some of its scarce resources must come with a price, where that price equals the social cost. For most goods and services (‘private goods’ as economists call them), the market forces of supply and demand generate a market price that directs the use of resources into their most highly valued employment. “There are, however, circumstances where a market price may not emerge to guide individual decisions. This is often the case for various forms of environmentally damaging activities. . . . The basic idea is straightforward and compelling: the absence of an appropriate price 53 for certain scarce resources (such as clean air and water) leads to their excessive use and results in what is called ‘market failure.’ “The source of this failure is what economists term an externality. A good example is the classic case of the producer whose factory spreads smoke over an adjacent neighborhood. The producer imposes a real cost in the form of dirty air, but this cost is ‘external’ to the firm. The producer does not bear the cost of the pollution it creates as it does for the labor, capital, and raw materials that it employs. The price of labor and such materials induces the fi rm to economize on their use, but there is no such incentive to control smoke emissions and thereby conserve clean air. The point is simply that whenever a scarce resource comes free of charge (as is typically the case with our limited stocks of clean air and water), it is virtually certain to be used to excess. “Many of our environmental resources are unprotected by the appropriate prices that would constrain their use. From this perspective, it is hardly surprising to fi nd that the environment is overused and abused. A market system simply doesn’t allocate the use of these resources properly.”15 Political failure perpetuates, indeed magnifi es, this market failure. Government policies could be implemented to correct market failure and make the market work for the environment rather than against it. But powerful economic and political interests typically stand to gain by not making those corrections, so they are not made or the correction is only partial. Water could be conserved and used more effi ciently if it were sold at its full cost, including the estimated cost of the environmental damage of overusing it, but both politicians and farmers have a stake in keeping water prices low. Polluters could be made to pay the full costs of their actions, in terms of both damages and cleanup, but typically they do not. Natural ecosystems give societies economic services of tremendous value. A developer’s actions can reduce these services to society, but rarely does the developer pay fully for those lost services. Governments not only tend to shy away from correcting market 54 failure but exacerbate the problem by creating subsidies and other practices that make a bad situation worse. In Perverse Subsidies, Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent estimate that governments worldwide have established environmentally damaging subsidies that amount to about $850 billion annually. They conclude that the impact of these subsidies on the environment is “widespread and profound.” They note: “Subsidies for agriculture can foster overloading of croplands, leading to erosion and compaction of topsoil, pollution from synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, denitrifi cation of soils, and release of greenhouse gases, among other adverse eff ects. Subsidies for fossil fuels aggravate pollution eff ects such as acid rain, urban smog, and global warming, while subsidies for nuclear energy generate exceptionally toxic waste with an exceptionally long half-life. Subsidies for road transportation lead to overloading of road networks, a problem that is aggravated as much as relieved by the building of new roads when further subsidies promote overuse of cars; the sector also generates severe pollution of several sorts. Subsidies for water encourage misuse and overuse of water supplies that are increasingly scarce. Subsidies for fi sheries foster overharvesting of already depleted fi sh stocks. Subsidies for forestry encourage overexploitation at a time when many forests have been reduced by excessive logging, acid rain, and agricultural encroachment.”16 We live in a market economy where prices are a principal signal for guiding economic activity. When prices refl ect environmental values as poorly as today’s prices do, the system is running without essential controls. And there are other problems too, discussed shortly. Today’s market is a strange place indeed. At the core of the economy is a mechanism that does not recognize the most fundamental thing of all, the living, evolving, sustaining natural world in which the economy is operating. Unaided, the market lacks the sensory organs that would allow it to understand and adjust to this natural world. It’s flying blind.

Kuznet’s curves are wrong—growth can’t be made environmental


Antal and Van Den Bergh 13 [Miklós Antal is a Researcher at Autonomous University of Barcelona, Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technologies **Spain
Institute for Environmental Science and Technology and at the Department of Economics and Economic History at the Universitat Autònoma in Barcelona and a member of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, and Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam March 2013, “Macroeconomics, financial crisis and the environment: Strategies for a sustainability transition” Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions Volume 6 Science Direct] JAKE LEE

According to mainstream macroeconomics (e.g., Mankiw, 2004 and Krugman, 2012), the solution to environmental problems is the decoupling of environmental pressures from aggregate income (or economic growth), that is, the strategy of sustainable or green growth. This perspective is often kept implicit, but assuming growth as a binding condition leaves no other option. In this view, there is no conflict between indefinite labor productivity2 growth and resulting income growth on the one hand and full employment and decreasing total environmental pressure on the other. The first question posed in this article is whether such a strategy of decoupling is feasible or not.¶ Due to the magnitude of contemporary environmental problems, very large changes are needed to address these issues. Jackson (2009, Chapter 5, notably Fig. 17) shows this for climate change: under a range of income and population scenarios and a policy target of 450 ppm for atmospheric CO2 in 2050, carbon intensity – the average amount of carbon emitted to produce a unit of economic output – has to be reduced by 95–99.2% between 2007 and 2050. The lower-end value of 95% is calculated with 1.4% economic growth, which is relatively low compared to historical average growth rates. In view of historical trends of average energy efficiency improvements in most countries, the feasibility of such dramatic reductions over the course of 3–5 decades through efficiency improvements and structural change while preserving growth (i.e., decoupling) is highly uncertain. In fact, there is no historical evidence of anything that comes close to achieving this aim. Environmental Kuznets curve research (Stern, 2004), which is often referred to as providing a reason for optimism, has only found decoupling for mainly local and less important environmental problems, while it disregards relocation of dirty activities and associated changes in trade patterns as well as the shifting of environmental problems from one domain to another (Peters et al., 2011).¶ On the other hand, looking merely at history may easily lead one to underestimate the potential of decoupling as a means of reducing environmental pressures, because so far we have not seen any widespread implementation of stringent, effective environmental policies. In other words, historical decoupling was largely autonomous rather than induced by policy. Scaling up efforts to increase environmental efficiency is absolutely critical for sustainability transitions. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about decoupling opportunities, as indicated in Table 1.¶ Given the considerations in the table, it is unlikely that we will achieve sufficient efficiency gains to tackle the major environmental problems and compensate the rise of material throughput that accompanies economic growth. Recent trends of relevant indicators are alarming. For example, after improving by approximately 25% between 1980 and 2000, global energy intensity has stagnated between 2000 and 2010 (Yoder, 2011) and in the last two years it has deteriorated (WEO, 2012). So global economic growth and rising energy intensity have both contributed to increased absolute energy use in 2010 and 2011. In view of the formidable environmental challenges and the concerns expressed in Table 1, decoupling as a main or single strategy can be judged as taking an irresponsibly large risk with our common future. Even a minimal consideration of the precautionary principle requires being open to strict environmental policies that may slow down growth or even result in reductions of GDP. Therefore, strategies are needed to make periods of low or negative growth socially and politically acceptable

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