DeDevelopment Neg cfjmp lab’s DeDev File Uniqueness

De-developing to a system without growth can be achieved—economic decline is key to peace—impact is global destruction

The absence of growth does not imply a lack of change or improvement. Within a non-growing or equilibrium economy there can still be a continuous development of practical skills, artistic expression, and technology. In fact, some historians and social scientists argue that life in an equilibrium economy can be superior to life in a fast-growing economy: while growth creates opportunities for some, it also typically intensifies competition—there are big winners and big losers, and (as in most boom towns) the quality of relations within the community can suffer as a result. Within a non-growing economy it is possible to maximize benefits and reduce factors leading to decay, but doing so will require pursuing appropriate goals: instead of more, we must strive for better; rather than promoting increased economic activity for its own sake, we must emphasize whatever increases quality of life without stoking consumption. One way to do this is to reinvent and redefine growth itself.¶ The transition to a no-growth economy (or one in which growth is defined in a fundamentally different way) is inevitable, but it will go much better if we plan for it rather than simply watching in dismay as institutions we have come to rely upon fail, and then try to improvise a survival strategy in their absence.¶ In effect, we have to create a desirable "new normal" that fits the constraints imposed by depleting natural resources. Maintaining the "old normal" is not an option; if we do not find new goals for ourselves and plan our transition from a growth-based economy to a healthy equilibrium economy, we will by default create a much less desirable "new normal" whose emergence we are already beginning to see in the forms of persistent high unemployment, a widening gap between rich and poor, and ever more frequent and worsening financial and environmental crises—all of which translate to profound distress for individuals, families, and communities.

De-development solves for global conflict

Trainer 95, Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, School of Social Work, University of New South Wales, 1995, “The Conserver Society”, p. 165//Roetlin

If the foregoing analysis is valid, not much needs to be said about the alternative. We must develop ways of life in which all can live well without taking more than their fair share and therefore without living in fear of someone else threatening what we have. That is precisely what a radical conserver society involves. A world made up of relatively small communities which were supplying their own needs mostly from their local resources, and concerned primarily with enjoying a life rich in cultural and craft and community activities, without any interest in constantly increasing the amount they consume, would be a far more secure world. There would be no point in you attacking anyone, because you would not want much and what you did want you would have in abundance from local sources. Similarly you would not feel any need for weapons with which to defend yourself, because you would know that others were living comfortable and interesting lives without wanting more resources than they could supply for themselves and therefore they would have no interest in attacking you. Security is an impossible goal if it is conceived in terms of developing the arms needed to defend our imperial interests and to defend ourselves against attack — while we insist on lifestyles which inevitably involve us in taking more than our fair share and therefore asserting control over ‘ours oilfields in the Middle East and in turn having to be armed to the teeth to fight off threats to them. Real security consists in knowing no one has any desire to threaten you.

AT: Diversionary War Theory

No impact-- history proves

Ferguson 6 [Niall Ferguson— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford , “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the_next_war_of_the_world.html] JAKE LEE

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

No impact---Royal’s diversionary war thesis is wrong and doesn’t go nuclear

Jervis 11 [Robert Jervis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011 “Force in Our Times” http://www.siwps.com/programs/SWP.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-1816/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF] JAKE LEE

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of ¶ interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members ¶ of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps ¶ linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, ¶ which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned 18 ¶ ¶ beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts ¶ could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not ¶ so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – ¶ states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil ¶ wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become ¶ discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and ¶ mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking ¶ others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought ¶ that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as ¶ outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very ¶ fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is ¶ the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war ¶ thinkable

No risk of diversionary wars – no suitable targets and unlikely the population will be persuaded

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, Pp. 413–425//SM]

First, Levy (1998; see also Tir and Jasinski 2008) observes that suitable diversionary targets are quite difficult to find. For just about all the states in the international system, the loss of strength gradient (Boulding 1962) is so serious that they are only able to interact militarily with their immediate neighbors. This would limit diversionary opportunities significantly for all but the most powerful states. Furthermore, many countries would make poor targets because they are important economic, security, or diplomatic partners or because the attack would go against the constraints posed by the democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Cognizant of these issues, Mitchell and Prins (2004), for example, focus on diversions between enduring rivals. Enduring rivals (e.g., India-Pakistan) have a history of antagonism, which indicates that they are willing and able to interacting militarily. Moreover, the context of rivalry can provide an aura of credibility to the leader’s claim that their actions are conducted not out of selfish interest but for the benefit of the country. And given their already poor relations, the attacks would not be particularly damaging to their relationship.6 The problem, however, is that rivalry-related diversionary opportunities are available to only few countries. Enduring rivals constitute only 5.4% of dyads that experience militarized international conflict (Diehl and Goertz 2000) and an even smaller fraction of all dyads (.4% to 3.75%, depending on how politically relevant dyads are defined). The above concerns may be lessened in the context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection capability is not necessarily an issue because most territorial conflicts take place precisely between neighboring countries (Tir 2003, 2006; Vasquez 1993). Second, diversionary action has to be perceived by the population as so important that it is persuaded that the conflict (i.e., the diversion) is worth the cost of damaging or even breaking the otherwise important ties. Territorial diversion is arguably in a good position to help the leader do this because territorial issues are seen as so central to the matters of national survival and protection of identity that economic, diplomatic, and other considerations can be subordinated. These important points suggest that diversionary behavior could be a cross-national phenomenon, not limited to the most powerful or rival states. The second critique challenges diversionary theory’s core logical mechanism, which is rooted in the ingroup, outgroup premise (Coser 1956). Diversions are launched to unify a fractured society (i.e., transform it into the ingroup) by painting the foreign enemy as the outgroup.7 Morgan and Anderson (1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992), however, argue that overcoming the societal division to create a cohesive ingroup is no easy task. If the leader calculates that surmounting this important obstacle is unlikely, then they would presumably be deterred from diverting. I argue below that territorial diversion provides what is probably the most promising option for unifying the society, because territorial issues have the unique ability to speak to and ‘‘connect’’ with the broad swaths of the population

Diversionary theory is false - empirics

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, Pp. 413–425//SM]

According to the diversionary theory of war, the cause of some militarized conflicts is not a clash of salient interests between countries, but rather problematic domestic circumstances. Under conditions such as economic adversity or political unrest, the country’s leader may attempt to generate a foreign policy crisis in order both to divert domestic discontent and bolster their political fortunes through a rally around the flag effect (Russett 1990). Yet, despite the wide-ranging popularity of this idea and some evidence of U.S. diversionary behavior (e.g., DeRouen 1995, 2000; Fordham 1998a, 1998b; Hess and Orphanides 1995; James and Hristolouas 1994; James and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986), after five decades of research broader empirical support for the theory remains elusive (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Gowa; 1998; Leeds and Davis 1997; Levy 1998; Lian and Oneal 1993; Meernik and Waterman 1996). This has prompted one scholar to conclude that ‘‘seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in practice’’ (James 1987, 22), a view reflected in the more recent research (e.g., Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004; Meernick 2004; Moore and Lanoue 2003; Oneal and Tir 2006). I argue that this puzzling lack of support could be addressed by considering the possibility that the embattled leader may anticipate achieving their diversionary aims specifically through the initiation of territorial conflict2—a phenomenon I call territorial diversion.

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