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- Empirically proven—growth makes states overestimate strength, makes all conflicts violent
- Economic growth fosters competition in states that cause war and genocide
Exts – State ResolveGrowth encourages overconfidence and cyclical violence—makes war more likely and severeBoehmer, ‘10 [Charles Boehmer is a Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242690903568801#tabModule] The earliest literature predicting that economic growth leads to war dates back nearly a century. The basic theme advanced is that economic growth expands war-making capability. This is known as the ‘war-chest proposition’. Nikolai Kondratieff (1926) associated the frequency of war and other social upheavals to ‘long-cycles’ in the global economy of roughly 25 year phases of economic growth followed by contractions of similar length. Scholars in economics and political science have theorized that the power capabilities of states, particularly the major powers, also follow cycles (but not necessarily Kondratieff cycles) (Doran, 1983, 1985; Doran and Parsons, 1980), result in power transitions as states growing in power surpass states that had been at the top of the international power hierarchy (Organski and Kugler, 1980), or more generally relate to economic expansion (Kuznets, 1966; Choucri and North, 1975). Some scholars have provided evidence supporting Kondratieff’s claim that expansions in the global economy increase the frequency or severity of international conflicts (Hansen, 1932; Väyrynen, 1983; Goldstein, 1988; Mansfield, 1988; Pollins, 1996; Pollins and Murrin, 1999). However, studies that argue long cycles affect the behavior of individual states without direct observation of state behavior commit an ecological fallacy. It is possible that the foreign policies of most states could be unaffected by periodicities or patterns at the systemic level of analysis. This study, in contrast, studies the effect of economic growth at the state (monadic) level of analysis. Blainey’s (1988) analysis suggests that the ‘war chest’ theme can be generalized to the state level of analysis. Kennedy (1987) also offers a historical discussion of the war chest theme to explain the rise and fall of major powers. Some studies argue that it is not increases in military capabilities from economic growth alone that raise the risk of conflict but also a higher willingness to use such capabilities by directly affecting the decision-making process. Some scholars argue that growth leads to ‘optimism’ or bellicose foreign policy ‘moods’ (Kondratieff, 1926; MacFie, 1938; Klingberg, 1952, 1983; Kuznets, 1966; Väyrynen, 1983; Holmes, 1985; Elder and Holmes, 1985; Blainey, 1988; Holmes and Keck, 1999; Pollins and Schweller, 1999). The studies by Klingberg, Holmes and his associates, and Pollins and Schweller (1999), investigate foreign policy moods in the American case and find that war and other disputes are more likely to occur when the American economy is in growth phases. Two studies avoid the ecological fallacy mentioned above by linking American foreign policy to Kondratieff cycles (Pollins and Schweller, 1999; Holmes and Keck, 1999). To directly test this proposition cross-nationally is difficult given that public opinion data are limited, especially for non-democratic regimes, which could lead to sample bias. However, Blainey’s theory can in part be generalized to the state level of analysis and is hence most relevant to this study. Blainey argues that economic growth perverts perceptions of power, leading states to be more optimistic about their chances of victory in international contests. “While there may be no clear pattern to war, one ‘clue’ we have is that optimism abounds at their onset” (Blainey, 1988: 41). Economic growth increases optimism that states will triumph in international crises, leading to a heightened risk of war. Blainey attempted to be systematic in his review of history using informal case studies or examples to support his hypothesis, although few studies have undertaken a similar test using quantitative data. Hence, this study seeks to test Blainey’s proposition, which is most appropriate at the monadic level of analysis. Empirically proven—growth makes states overestimate strength, makes all conflicts violentBoehmer, ‘10 [Charles Boehmer is a Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242690903568801#tabModule] Still, states often experience economic growth, whereas violent interstate conflicts are rare events. I do not argue that economic growth is a general and direct source of conflict between states. I contend instead that growth acts as a catalyst, pouring fuel on fires where conflicts have already commenced. Economic growth should influence the perceptions state leaders have about their state’s performance. I argue that economic growth acts as a catalyst for violent interstate conflicts by increasing the willingness of states to use military force in foreign policy, particularly to reciprocate militarized threats and uses of force or to escalate conflicts in a violent manner. Most and Starr (1989: 22) define willingness as “the willingness to choose (even if the choice is no action), and to employ available capabilities to further some policy option over others.” Most and Starr situate willingness against a background of ‘opportunity’. Naturally, not all states have the same opportunity to realistically choose policies that lead to interstate violence or war, at least with an equal chance of victory. Hence, the opportunity for war varies for states. Later I will present control variables for conflict opportunities but for now will note that some factors increase or decrease opportunity, and are important here. Our goal must be to isolate and control for opportunity variables. First, states that are major powers will have a higher capability of sustaining war and foreign policies that increase the chance of international conflict globally. Second, states with fewer neighbors are less likely to be involved in conflicts compared to those with many neighbors. In summary, economic growth is not a simple and direct cause of war or lesser conflicts because it affects the willingness of leaders in certain contexts that change from state to state and over time. Economic growth is an indicator to leaders that their state may be strong and may win international conflicts, although this may be more perception than fact. Iraq’s GDP growth averaged 16% between 1974 and 1979 before Saddam Hussein’s regime initiated the Iraq–Iran War in 1980, although the war became an eight-year struggle of attrition nonetheless. Turning back to the Chinese example, policy-makers may view Chinese growth through different lenses. Those that are Realists, pessimistic, or generally fearful of Chinese power may see such growth in GDP and military expenditures as a threat, whereas others that are Liberal may see the creation of an economy of scale and increasing economic interaction with the West that has resulted in a booming economy. Predictions of future bellicose Chinese foreign policy must be evaluated against a background of opportunity. As China develops, it may face fewer severe conflicts, which threaten war with its main trading partners, and also with its bordering states with whom there may be competing territorial claims, although as a major power it faces a higher potential for conflict compared with a state such as Slovakia or Costa Rica. In addition, its proximity to numerous other states means there are more potential rivals or enemies compared with what New Zealand, for example, faces in its neighborhood. The point here is to make it clear that war need not be a result of economic growth but that when growth does contribute to interstate violence it does so by serving as a catalyst of willingness against a backdrop of opportunities. Chinese leaders may be less likely to back away from violent interstate conflict if a crisis occurs during a period of economic growth than they would before economic growth, and this risk is higher for China because its major power status and region provide more opportunities relative to most other states. Based on the rationale above, I do not predict that economic growth makes it more likely that states will initiate militarized conflicts with other states, or that it increases their overall conflict propensity. Economic growth appears dangerous in those situations where states are already involved in a conflict by making it more likely that a state will reciprocate or escalate conflicts. Considering that war is a suboptimal outcome (Gartzke, 1999), states would not risk escalating conflicts to violence or war if they have reason to believe that they may lose. Hubris may lead states into conflicts that turn deadly by providing an increased willingness to fight or even distorting and inflating leaders’ perception of state strength. States often march off to war thinking that the war will be short and that their side will prevail (Blainey, 1988); I suspect economic growth increases this resolve to stand against challenges from other states and to escalate crises. Finland went to war with the USSR because of its refusal to acquiesce to territorial demands made by the Soviets. The Soviets initiated war in 1939 after their GDP grew by 8.9% in the prior five years. The Finnish economy had grown by 6.6% over the same period. Hungary stood its ground by reciprocating Soviet threats that escalated to war in 1956. Hungarian growth had been 5.5% over the prior five years and Soviet GDP growth was just short of 5% over the same period. Similarly, Ethiopia was willing to reciprocate hostilities initiated by Eritrea, resulting in war, after experiencing 6.6% growth in the five years prior to 1988. The Football War between El Salvador and Honduras may not have occurred if the GDP growth rates of both states had not each grown on average by 6% in the five years prior to 1969. Of course, economic growth may not necessarily be a good indicator of state strength or the prospects of victory in any given case; there may be a distinct gap in the actual probability of victory in a crisis relative to the perceived probability, for which economic growth may serve as one indicator prone to error. Leaders may nonetheless use GDP growth as an indicator and be more resolved to stand their ground and thus escalate a crisis. Economic growth fosters competition in states that cause war and genocideStewart, 2011 [Frances, University Professor of Development Economics, Working paper for MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, “Economic and Political Causes of Genocidal Violence: A comparison with findings on the causes of civil war.” March, Online, http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP46_FS.pdf] JAKE LEE In the manifold classifications of genocide, some include a specific economic objective, and thus implicitly an economic motive. For example, Dadrian defines utilitarian genocide (one of four types) as using mass killings in order to obtain control over economic resources; Fein describes ‘developmental genocide’ (also one of four types) where the perpetrator destroys peoples who stand in their way in relation to the exploitation of resources; Smith also refers to utilitarian genocide , which is motivated by material gain, and includes colonial killings and post-colonial developments devastating aboriginal groups. Chalk and Jonassohn differentiate motives for genocide, one (of four again) being to acquire economic wealth. These motives are akin to the rent-seeking motives argued to underly the motives of many (particularly leaders) in mobilising for civil wars. In line with this, (Valentino 2000)Bae and Ott (2008) argue that mass killings (not specifically genocide) are motivated by the leaders’ expectations of gain. Again, in common with some findings on civil war, some have pointed to economic depression as predisposing to genocide (Midlarsky 2005)(Valentino 2000). For example, in the German holocaust, the depression of the 1920s and 1930s was an important factor behind Hitler’s popularity, and thus an indirect cause of the genocide. Download 1.08 Mb. Share with your friends:
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