Despite a massive surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund – Port Maintenance is underfunded now



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**Terrorism**

Uniqueness

WMD Terror Attack


Terrorist WMD attack on ports is a possible threat

CRS 5 (Congressional Research Service/Jonathan Medalia, January 24, “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports”, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf, June 25, 2012, A.R.)

A terrorist nuclear attack on a U.S. seaport could cause local devastation and affect the global economy. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways, though each poses difficulties. Ability to detect a bomb appears limited. The United States is using technology, intelligence, international cooperation, etc., to try to thwart an attack. Issues for Congress include safeguarding foreign nuclear material, mitigating economic effects of an attack, and allocating funds between ports and other potential targets. This report will be updated as needed. Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. While it would probably be more difficult for terrorists to obtain or fabricate a nuclear weapon than other WMD, an attack using a nuclear weapon merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence. U.S. seaports could be targets for terrorist attack. A terrorist Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb (15 kilotons, the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT) detonated in a port would destroy buildings out to a mile or two; start fires, especially in a port that handled petroleum and chemicals; spread fallout over many square miles; disrupt commerce; and kill many people. Many ports are in major cities. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens data for all containers, and reportedly inspects about 6 percent of them. Containers could easily hold a nuclear weapon. Many believe that ports and containers are vulnerable. An FBI official stated, “The intelligence that we have certainly points to the ports as a key vulnerability of the United States and of a key interest to certain terrorist groups....” Commissioner Robert Bonner believes an attack using a nuclear bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to “devastating” consequences for the global economy. ...” People can, however, find ways to minimize economic problems.

Containers = Vulnerable Now

Studies prove – containers pose a huge risk to ports now


Pirah 06 (She holds a master's degree in government from Johns Hopkins University and a journalism degree from Ohio University, http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2006042100&PHPSESSID=jedjod8oq2ge21c14mfn71e191, 4/21/06, NC)

The ports are not secure,” warned former Gov. Thomas Kean, R-N.J., co-leader of the bipartisan investigation of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks known as the 9/11 Commission. “You and I can walk today into the port of New York . . . and get into areas where people shouldn't get.” The commission last December graded the administration on port security and gave it a “D” for failing to screen more cargo. New government studies show U.S. port security programs are highly vulnerable to terrorists. Only 5 percent of the estimated 11.3 million containers arriving at American ports last year were either physically inspected by Customs agents or screened with X-ray-like imaging machines capable of detecting unusually dense objects, such as a dirty bomb encased in lead that would elude radiation detectors. Ports overseas are even more vulnerable: Only 2.8 percent of containers destined for the United States were screened for radiation in 2005, and only about one-third of 1 percent were X-rayed.

Ports = Vulnerable Now

Ports are extremely vulnerable to terrorism –with little effort to thwart security


Igor et all 07 (Post-Doctoral Training, Biostatistics and Toxicology, Harvard University, 1997. Ph.D., Environmental, Occupational and Radiation Health, University of Pittsburgh, 1995. M.S., Physics and Mathematics, Polytechnic Institute, 1990. B.S. equivalent, Materials Science, Polytechnic Institute, 1988 Completed all course requirements for MS in Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1996). Under direction of Nato, http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/bios.cfm?Id=Linkov-EP-R, 2007, NC)

Terrorism is a multidimensional risk that will probably never be eliminated with limited resources as long as there are those willing to deliver harm. Therefore, the goal is to achieve maximum possible risk reduction by spending dollars to minimize security weaknesses at certain points of vulnerability. DHS has adopted a risk-based fund allocation principle to address the problem. but more than five years after the 9/ l I attacks, U.S. borders remain vulnerable to terrorism threats Maritime borders are particularly vulnerable due to the sheer size of waterways that need to be protected and plethora of targets that terrorists can attack. DHS employs layered approach to seal maritime borders against terrorist plots and has introduced several initiatives to this end. While these initiatives and other DHS efforts have helped defend the American homeland against this persistent threat. They still leave gaps in maritime security which could be exploited by an adaptive adversary. This paper is an attempt to summarize the status of homeland security in the maritime domain. More dollars will be spent and more resources will be mobilized in the future for better defense. Expected benefits of every dollar spent to mitigate terrorism risk should be measured after a comprehensive analysis of the status of security in the maritime domain. Different elements of maritime security have complex interdependencies that determine the marginal value of new countermeasures and initiatives. For example, new technology to improve container security may yield limited benefits if other avenues to deliver a dirty bomb are left open. Therefore, a systems-based risk analysis should be used to evaluate the benefits of new technologies, policies and initiatives




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