AT: Civilian Casualties (2/2)
Near impossible to quantify drone caused civilian casualties
Zenko & Bruno, 10 [Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prevention, Council on Foreign Relations and Greg Bruno, Staff Writer, CFR.org, " Raising the Curtain on U.S. Drone Strikes " June 2, 2010, CFR, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22290/raising_the_curtain_on_us_drone_strikes.html]
You mentioned targeting of civilians. How good is the United States at targeting terrorists and avoiding civilian casualties? It's very difficult to know how many civilians or unintended targets have been struck by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. Within minutes [of a strike], casualties are withdrawn by militants and they're all buried by sunset in accordance with Muslim law. The United States in some instances is able to get DNA samples or people on the ground who can identify exactly who was killed, but it's very hard to know. I was told recently by a very senior U.S. official that in the last six months, they knew that only one civilian had been killed. So it's likely that, one, we're better at doing it; and, two, the intelligence provided by the Pakistani government is significantly better.
In pursuing terrorists with drones, we can maintain acceptable civilian casualties
Green, 10 [J.J. Green, " Collateral damage 'acceptable' when terrorists targeted" March 9, 2010, WTOP, http://www.wtop.com/?nid=778&sid=1907176]
In August of last year, Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was spending a humid night on the roof of his father-in-law's house in South Waziristan. As he relaxed while his wife massaged his legs to ease the painful symptoms of diabetes, a launch order was given for a missile aboard a U.S. drone flying high above in the Afghani sky. In a matter of seconds, the house was reduced to little more than a smoking pile of rubble. Mehsud was killed. So were his wife and bodyguards. "That's an acceptable price for taking out a senior leader in the Taliban," says David Rittgers, a former Special Forces operator who has served three tours in Afghanistan. "I think if we had a chance to kill Adolph Hitler with a drone and Ava Braun was going to be a part of the collateral damage, I think that would be viewed as acceptable," Rittgers adds. "There's a strong parallel between that and Baitullah Mehsud." Al-Qaida has admitted losing two key members in the last three months, suffering significant damage to its ability to plan and launch terror attacks. Saleh al- Somali, senior external operations planner, and Abdullah Said, chief of internal operations, were both allegedly killed in separate U.S. drone strikes. Collateral damage has historically been a major concern for U.S. officials. It remains a prickly issue today. While eliminating more than a dozen top al-Qaida linked terror targets since 2004, hundreds of civilians have died in the process. "While the CIA does not comment on allegations of Predator operations, the tactics and tools we use in the fight against al-Qaida and its violent allies are not only lawful, they are exceptionally precise and effective," says CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano.
AT: Cost O/W Benefits
It’s war, people die – drones minimize the harms of war
Lakhani, 9 [Kalsoom Lakhani, " Drone Attacks: Bombs in The Air Versus Boots on The Ground" July 20, 2009, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kalsoom-lakhani/drone-attacks-bombs-in-th_b_241439.html]
If the strategic costs outweigh the tactical benefits, why does the United States continue to champion such a policy? Upon studying numerous articles and resources, the answer seems to be: because it is their best worst option. According to an article in last week's Wall Street Journal, "Unlike fighter jets or cruise missiles, Predators can loiter over their targets for more than 20 hours, take photos in which men, women and children can be clearly distinguished (burqas can be visible from 20,000 feet) and deliver laser-guided munitions with low explosive yields. This minimizes the risks of the 'collateral damage' that often comes from 500-pound bombs." In Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the U.S. operate the MQ-1 Predator and their more sophisticated successor MQ-9 Reaper drones, the most impressive thing, noted the Atlantic, is that they fly slow. The news piece elaborated, "That's right, in counterinsurgency operations, where the goal is to hunt and kill individuals or small groups of fighters -- rather than to attack mass infantry formations -- the slower a plane flies, the better." From a U.S. standpoint, the use of drones are not only cheaper than conventional planes, they also keep pilots and American soldiers "out of harm's way," particularlyy since most UAVs are manned from thousands of miles away. The Air Force's Predator missions, for instance, are operated by pilots sitting in trailers at Nellis Air Force base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. In the aforementioned 2006 Atlantic piece, "Hunting the Taliban in Las Vegas," Robert Kaplan described the inside of one of these trailers, Like sub drivers, Pred pilots fly blind, using only the visual depiction of their location on a map and math--numerical readouts indicating latitude, longitude, height, wind speeds, ground elevation, nearby planes, and so forth. The camera in the rotating ball focuses only on the object under surveillance. The crew's situational awareness is restricted to the enemy on the ground. Much of the time during a stakeout, the Pred flies a pre-programmed hexagon, racetrack, bow tie, or some other circular-type holding pattern. Each trailer holds a two-person crew: a pilot and a "sensor," who operates the ball. Both face half a dozen computer screens, including map displays and close-up shots of the object under surveillance. Today, MQ-9 Reapers are slowly replacing the Predators, which are a newer model and more heavily armed. And, in a sign of growing U.S. support for these drones, the military is spending significant more money on this technology, from $880 million in 2007 to $2 billion a year. Several sources note that the strikes have disrupted Al Qaeda's operations, and Dennis Blair, the Director of National Intelligence, testified to Congress in February that "replacing the loss of key leaders since 2008 in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas has proved difficult for Al Qaeda." Someone speaking from a U.S. national security standpoint would also point out that bombs in the air are a better and more viable option than boots on the ground.
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