Airports disregard cultural destinations – shows modern man’s disregard for the past.
Aviation Environment Foundation [last cite 2007] [AEF, “WHAT ARE AN AIRPORT’S IMPACTS?”, last cite 2007, AEF, http://www.aef.org.uk/uploads/PlanningGuide2.pdf AD] Heritage (or cultural) assets include archaeological remains, both above ground and buried; historic buildings and sites such including listed buildings, cemeteries, parks, village greens, bridge and canals; historic areas and landscapes; and other structures of architectural or historic merit. Heritage designations include, at the international level World Heritage Sites (e.g. Blenheim Palace); and at the national level Scheduled Ancient Monuments, Areas of Archaeological Importance, listed buildings of different grades (in decreasing order of importance Grades I, II* and II), conservation areas, and parks and gardens of historic interest. Ancient woodlands are often valued and protected for their biodiversity, but their sheer age also gives them heritage value. The county archaeologist and local conservation officer(s) will normally keep a list and map of heritage assets, including areas with potential but not yet confirmed archaeological remains. Heritage assets can be affected by aviation and airports several ways: • They can be razed or built over to make way for airport-related development. This would happen to a number of listed buildings, for instance, if a second runway was built at Stansted; • Their structure can be affected by vibrations from aircraft or road traffic: there are concerns, for instance, that this could happen at Speke Hall, a Tudor building situated near Liverpool John Lennon Airport;• Their building materials can weather faster due to air pollution; • The vegetation of historic parks and landscapes can be harmed by air pollution: this is the case, for instance, with Hatfield Forest, a medieval forest near Stansted; • Their curtilage (the enclosed area of land surrounding a house) or geneal landscape setting can be eroded, so that one can no longer view them in context. Ideally, heritage assets should be preserved in their context, including the wider landscape in which they are seen. Mitigation (as opposed to avoidance) measures include digging up archaeological artefacts, recording them, and moving them to a museum; preserving buildings or archaeological remains in a different setting (e.g. as part of the open space in an office development, or under a car park with a raised ground floor); and taking them apart and moving them to a different location. However it is impossible to replace the sheer age of heritage assets. Often it will not be possible to mitigate impacts on them.
Destroying cultural heritage allows a cultural revolution to occur: this sterilizes humanity and creates a dystopia – it allows for the cultural and social elite to decide our attitudes.
Kang ’97 [Muse, “Hegemony and Cultural Revolution”, 1997, New Literary History 28.1 (1997) 69-86, http://muse.jhu.edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/new_literary_history/v028/28.1liu.html AD] In view of the tangled relationship of revolutionary traditions to contemporary cultural studies and postcolonialism, a reassessment of the relationship between Gramsci's hegemony theory and Chinese Marxist theory and practice of cultural revolution is necessary. Such a reassessment may first of all shed light on the revolutionary "core" of Gramsci's theory, now recognized as an "analytical pluralism" in cultural studies of the industrial West. 2 A double displacement within contemporary cultural studies can thus be uncovered by contrasting Gramsci's strategies of revolution with its new academic labels and usage. The double displacement, prevalent among the academic Left of the West, involves first of all a replacement of revolutionary theory by academic theoretical discourse, and secondly a replacement of the issues of commodification and of economic and political inequality by erratic, fragmented "war of positions," "identity politics," and so on. Furthermore, Gramsci's hegemony theory and the Chinese Marxist theories and practices of cultural revolution are mutually illuminating. The Gramscian "hegemony" provides a significant frame of reference from which to reexamine Chinese revolution. In light of Gramsci's theory, a main feature of the Chinese revolutionary legacy can be seen as the construction and consolidation of a revolutionary hegemony through cultural revolution. The Chinese experience in both revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods, on the other hand, problematizes hegemony and cultural revolution as strategies to oppose capitalist modernity. China, after all, remains a socialist country where the revolutionary tradition and ideology still legitimate the social order. Simply to dismiss or displace this revolutionary tradition from a postcolonialist position helps us very little in comprehending the historical transformations that China has gone through since the late-nineteenth century. To see China's revolutionary legacy as a continuing process of constructing and consolidating a revolutionary hegemony, however, may illuminate China's own way of socialism, which differed from Russia's in the past and has not followed the track of the former Soviet Union recently. Last but not least, a comparison of Gramscian and Chinese theories of hegemony and cultural revolution may reveal their misconceptions and false resolutions, and hopefully open up a space for rethinking the structural relationship of culture, revolution, and economic-political determinations within the context of post-cold war globalization. [End Page 71]
We end up with a society like Communist China – the ruling class decides how they want the current to be – even in capitalistic societies the top 1% get to decide our norms and expectations.
Kang ’97 [Muse, “Hegemony and Cultural Revolution”, 1997, New Literary History 28.1 (1997) 69-86, http://muse.jhu.edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/new_literary_history/v028/28.1liu.html AD] The Chinese revolution was conceived by Mao as an alternative to the capitalist modernity, and as such, it was limited by modernity as its condition of possibility. The recent assaults against the Chinese revolution, however, stem largely from the presumption that the Chinese revolution was an obstacle to modernity and Mao essentially an antimodern traditionalist, deeply entrenched in China's traditional culture. Mao's radical iconoclasm, of course, is interpreted as a manifestation of the "totalistic" mode of thinking inherent in China's past, as opposed to liberal, pluralistic frames of mind characteristic of the modern West. 10 But this kind of account tells us less about the Chinese revolution than about the "pluralistic frames of mind" of the narrators, who by and large still possess unchallenged power over the production of knowledge about China. One way to challenge this power, however, is to look beyond the interpretive models or "master narratives" for narrativizing China, models that take the historically specific assumptions and values of Western modernity as universally applicable and indisputable. Gramsci's hegemony theory, conceived as a critique of capitalist modernity, then, offers an alternative look at the Chinese revolution. Furthermore, it helps to reevaluate the relationship of modernity and revolution. 11 As Raymond Williams puts it, the concept of "hegemony" "affects thinking about revolution in that it stresses not only the transfer of political and economic power, but the overthrow of a specific hegemony: that is to say an integral form of class rule which exists not only in political and economic institutions and relationships but also in active forms of experience and consciousness." 12 Mao Zedong's theory of revolution made precisely such "hegemony" central to its strategy. He focused on the transformation of the peasants and the vast rural areas into the material forces and bases of revolution. For Mao, a key issue was how to translate Marxist principles into concrete practices of revolution. Mao's solution of "making Marxism Chinese," or Makesizhuyi zhongguohua (sinification of Marxism) was to endow the urban, cosmopolitan, and foreign thought, that is, classical Marxism, with a "national form," that is, a form that in its rural, nativist, national-popular incarnations was accessible and acceptable by the peasants, and operative as a pragmatic, ideological guide for action. 13 It can be argued that "national form" lies at the heart of Mao Zedong's project of "making Marxism Chinese," in which the establishment of revolutionary hegemony has had the highest priority. In other words, the question of cultural and aesthetic formation ("national form") was elevated to the center of revolutionary strategies for creating a Chinese Marxism in a vernacular and nationalist version, [End Page 79] in order to instill revolutionary consciousness into the peasants and mobilize them in the revolutionary struggles. However, as cultural and aesthetic formations involve the essential problem of consciousness and subjectivity, the staggering absence of any theorization of subjectivity by Mao left a major lacuna in his whole project of revolution and hegemony.
And, this attitude justifies a destruction of other cultures.
Kang ’97 [Muse, “Hegemony and Cultural Revolution”, 1997, New Literary History 28.1 (1997) 69-86, http://muse.jhu.edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/new_literary_history/v028/28.1liu.html AD] Western cultural domination and colonization in the Third World have become the principal targets of attacks by postcolonial critics.China, like the Arab countries, India, and other non-Western states, has experienced in its passage to modernity cultural intrusion and domination from the West. But this Western domination has been inseparable from Chinese modernity since the May Fourth (1919) movement of enlightenment and cultural revolution, which drew primarily on Western ideas and models. The Chinese revolution, too, had as an essential component of its modernity Western revolutionary theories and practices, Marxism, and the Russian October Revolution in particular. Now the radical May Fourth revolutionists are said to have fallen victim to the Western totalizing "master narratives" and "epistemic violence" that denied native voices and forms of discourse. 3 But such a description simply ignores the fact that the Chinese revolutionary tradition is characterized precisely by its native and indigenous reconstruction of an exogenous system of thought, namely Marxism. This fact is crucial in that the native, indigenous reconstruction of Marxism in China corresponds significantly to Gramsci's hegemony theory and notions of the national-popular, which constitute a theoretical basis for postcolonialism. [End Page 72]
