2NC Disability K2 “isms” Addressing disability allows us to rethink the basis of social collectivity on a broader scale – it reformulates our entire conception of justice
Breckenridge and Vogler, 2001 (Carol, Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago, Candace, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability’s Criticism”, Public Culture, Vol. 13 No. 3, Fall, Project Muse)
Some of us have hereditary traits that register socially and culturally as disabilities. Some of us become disabled naturally through aging, coercively through warfare, and accidentally through misfortune—whether the disabling incident occurs during the passage through the birth canal (when cerebral palsy can occur), at the industrial workplace, or in the course of everyday life. No one emerges selfsufficient from the womb, no able-bodied person can be sure that she will continue to be able-bodied throughout her later years, and there is no guarantee that any of us will escape disabling encounters with the world. In this sense, no one is ever more than temporarily able-bodied. The designation temporarily ablebodied invites us to consider different sorts of vulnerability, different points of frailty, as features of our common lot and accordingly to shift our understandings of flourishing, social justice, and embodiment. Anxiety on the part of the able-bodied that their condition is both fortunate and temporary implicitly acknowledges that things can happen to make life much more difficult for them than it is at present—on even the worst, the most impossible, day. The anxiety and the significance of able-bodiedness register the centrality of economic circumstances to disability studies. In the United States, for example, few of us are ever more than a few paychecks away from material devastation. Developing an understanding of social justice informed by disability studies would require us to break frame with much current thought about the distribution of social goods and resources and with the traditional rationales given for various distributive schemes. Whether the “goods” to be “distributed” were educational, nutritional, material, social, or political, we would no longer be able to see the end of social justice as the production of a body politic, each member of which brought a roughly equal share of cognitive, affective, and physical “ability” to the business of the daily reproduction of individual and social life. Traditional theories of justice always tend to presuppose that the places where wealth is lodged now are places where it belongs, that it was accumulated in some legitimate, vaguely Lockean fashion, and that the way to produce equity is by ensuring that individuals are well equipped to pursue wealth individually. The production of disability through, for example, warfare and conditions of poverty that defy Lockean analysis, the nurture of a heterogeneously able society through liberal reproductive choice, and the victories won through disability activism make disability studies a powerful lever for transforming traditional North American and European work on justice. We need to ask what justice would look like if we assumed that everybody who is here belongs here and that any reasonable image of collective flourishing will take this into account. A first step might be to imagine collectivities—for example, a disabled person and her caregivers—as the bearer of rights, rather than simply to identify a collective’s individual members as rights-bearers. In thinking disability, we have the opportunity to rethink the basis of social collectivity more generally and, through it, both well-being and justice.
The societal concept of disability sets the basis for discrimination and violence against other minorities
Baynton, 2001 (Douglas C., Associate Professor at the University of Iowa, "Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History", http://courses.washington.edu/intro2ds/Readings/Baynton.pdf)
Disability has functioned historically to justify inequality for disabled people themselves, but it has also done so for women and minority groups. That is, not only has it been considered justifiable to treat disabled people unequally, but the concept of disability has been used to justify discrimination against other groups by attributing disability to them. Disability was a significant factor in the three great citizenship debates of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: women's suffrage, African American freedom and civil rights, and the restriction of immigration. When categories of citizenship were questioned, challenged, and disrupted, disability was called on to clarify and define who deserved, and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship. Opponents of political and social equality for women cited their supposed physical, intellectual, and psychological flaws, deficits, and deviations from the male norm. These flaws-irrationality, excessive emotionality, physical weakness-arc m essence menial, emotional, and physical disabilities, although they are rarely discussed or examined as such, Arguments for racial inequality and immigration restrictions invoked supposed tendencies to feeble-mindedness, mental illness, deafness, blindness, and other disabilities in particular races and ethnic groups. Furthermore, disability figured prominently not just in arguments for the inequality of women and minorities but also in arguments against those inequalities. Such arguments took the form of vigorous denials that the groups in question actually had these disabilities; they were not disabled, the argument went, and therefore were not proper subjects for discrimination. Rarely have oppressed groups denied that disability is an adequate justification for social and political inequality. Thus, while disabled people can be considered one of the minority groups historically assigned inferior status and subjected to discrimination, disability has functioned for all such groups as a sign of and justification for inferiority.
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