Epa vaapuu, Appellant, V. American samoa government, Appellee



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[1] The determination of whether Tuika was wrongfully terminated depends initially on whether Tuika’s employment with the Rainmaker is a just cause or an at-will relationship. Both parties agree that a formal written contract was not negotiated and signed by Tuika and the Rainmaker. Rather, the determination of Tuika’s employment relationship depends on whether the Manual or the Handbook justified an employee’s expectation of a just cause firing and subsequent termination procedures.
[2] Tuika has the burden of proving the existence of a contract and all the facts essential to the cause of action. Stiles v. Skylark Meats, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Neb. 1989). In order to establish a breach of employment contract claim based upon violation of personnel rules, an employee must prove that a personnel manual actually became part of an employment contract and that the terms of the manual were breached. Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 254 (Ariz. 1986); see also Poklitar v. CBS Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1023, 1029-1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
For these purposes, we find that the Handbook is controlling for determining whether the guidelines justified an expectation of just cause employment. However, even if the Manual created contractual rights, the Handbook superceded the Manual and modified the terms of employment created by the Manual. See Burton v. Atomic Workers Federal Credit Union, 803 P.2d 518, 520 n.1 (Idaho 1990) (employment manual may modify terms of employment); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 431 N.W.2d 296, 300 (N.D. 1988) (an original employment contract may be modified or replaced by subsequent unilateral contract in employee handbook)
[3-4] Upon reviewing relevant case law and the Handbook, we find that the Handbook does not give rise to contractual rights and obligations by employees. Evidence relevant to this decision includes the language of the personnel manual, any representations made by the employer, and the course of dealing between the employee and employee. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 254 (citation omitted). In Palelei v. Star Kist Samoa, 5 A.S.R.2d 162, 166 (Trial Div. 1987), this court found that the handbook then at issue gave way to contractual rights. Among the provisions the court found persuasive were a description of a progressive discipline scheme, a list of transgressions that resulted in immediate dismissal, and the requirement that the employee sign the handbook, indicating that he or she understood the terms set forth. Id. at 166. The progressive discipline scheme was detailed, allowing for counseling by the employee’s supervisor and written notice. The Star Kist handbook also specified which provisions of the discipline scheme would be utilized for each offense, up to the fourth offense. The level of detail included in the Star Kist handbook is sufficient to justify an employee’s expectation of this disciplinary procedure. A combination of all these items resulted in contractual rights. The Rainmaker Handbook simply does not contain this kind of mutual commitments.
[5-6] Even if the original Manual was not subsequently amended by the Handbook, we find that the Manual also does not give rise to contractual rights. The only element similar to the Star Kist handbook is that the Manual lists violations which subject employees to “disciplinary action up to and including immediate discharge for cause.” Manual at 2. This statement, by itself, does not lead to contractual rights. In addition, the Manual does not specify any progressive discipline procedures or require a signature evidencing understanding of the guidelines. Unlike the Handbook, however, the Manual does provide for certain termination procedures, but they are internal, managerial procedures. For example, the termination procedures simply specify procedures that the employee’s supervisors must follow for terminating personnel. These procedures do not require the employers to provide the employees with notice of termination or allow for a hearing of any kind.
[7] The Handbook is even more vague. All that the Handbook contains are random sentences specifying causes which result in immediate termination. In addition, the Handbook does not provide for any discipline scheme or signatures by the employee. Nor are there any other relevant guidelines which may lead us to conclude that a just-cause employment relationship had been formed. Tuika was an at-will employee. Her employment could be terminated for any reason or even no reason, regardless of the merits of the grounds assigned as the basis of this result. Dodd v. Singer Co., 669 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1990); Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc. 433 N.W.2d 221, 223 (S.D. 1988).
[8] Tuika still contends that, in any event, she was not afforded any opportunity to pursue the Rainmaker’s customarily established post-termination grievance procedure. According to three witnesses, a grievance procedure was commonly available at the Rainmaker in termination situations. Without express terms conveyed to an employee, however, an employer is not legally bound to treat each and every employee in the same fashion based upon past policies and practices. First Atlantic Leasing Corp. v. Tracey, 738 F. Supp. 863, 878 (D.N.J. 1990). Moreover, causes for termination listed in the handbook resulting in immediate dismissal do not require post-termination grievance procedures. See Palelei, 5 A.S.R.2d at 166 (employer’s failure to use progressive discipline sanctions provided in policy manual before terminating plaintiff was not wrongful when plaintiff had apparently committed acts explicitly listed in the manual as justifying immediate dismissal). As set forth in the Handbook, immediate dismissal is warranted for gossiping, spreading rumors, and for stealing. No post-termination grievance procedure, therefore, was required for terminating her employment with the Rainmaker.
[9] We do find, however, that the Rainmaker did not act in good faith in informing Tuika of her termination. On May 26, 1996, Taga`i recommended that the Rainmaker’s Board of Directors approve Tuika’s suspension and dismiss her from her position as purchasing officer. Tuika was not formally notified of her termination. She apparently first learned that she was terminated on August 7, 1998, during the course of discovery proceedings after this lawsuit was commenced. This was more than two years after her suspension on May 9, 1996. Although an employer is not obligated to immediately terminate an employee once a decision to terminate has been made, the employer must act in good faith and notify the employee of this decision in reasonable manner. Connolly v. Montana Board of Labor Appeals, 734 P.2d l211 1215 (Mont. 1987). The Rainmaker failed to act in good faith by neglecting to provide Tuika with notice of termination in a timely manner.

[10] Although the notice of suspension to Tuika informed her that she was suspended indefinitely, we find it incredulous that she would not affirmatively inquire as to her employment status during the lengthy period of time that transpired after her suspension. Tuika attempts to excuse her lack of mitigation on the failure to be informed of her termination status at the Rainmaker. Tuika, however, could and should have inquired into her status after a reasonable period, which we find to be no more than three months after her suspension.
Tuika is not entitled to reinstatement of her employment with the Rainmaker. She is entitled to receive unpaid regular, overtime, and vacation pay. However, there is no basis for her claim to sick pay or severance pay. The amounts that she claimed for her annual salary rate, unpaid overtime compensation, and unpaid vacation pay are uncontroverted under the evidence. Therefore, we conclude that Tuika is entitled to recover $3,525 in back salary (equal to three months), plus $3,000 in overtime compensation and $813.46 in vacation pay (equal to three weeks’ regular pay), subject to required statutory withholdings and any deductions which Tuika had authorized in writing at the time of her termination. She is also entitled to her costs of suit incurred in this action.
[11] Although Taga`i and Tuisamatatele were named defendants, they are not Personally liable to Tuika. Taga`i and Tuisamatatele are both agents of the Rainmaker.37 An agent is not liable for lawful acts done within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of a disclosed principal.” 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 302. The act of investigating and terminating Tuika are presumed to be acts done within the scope of authority granted by the Rainmaker to Taga`i and Tuisamatele No allegations by the Rainmaker have been made and no evidence has been presented to the contrary. A principal is solely liable for acts of its agent committed in the course of or within the scope of the agent’s employment. Pollas v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Ind. App. 1996) (citation omitted); Southwest Land Title Co. v. Gemini Financial Co., 752 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App. Dallas 1988) (citation omitted). Therefore, among the named defendants, the American Samoa Development Corporation, dba Rainmaker Hotel, alone is liable to Tuika and responsible for payment of the judgment.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.

TUILEFANO M. VAELA`A, et al. Petitioners,
v.
TOETOGATA ALBERT MAILO,

Attorney General of American Samoa, Respondent.
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division


CA No. 71-99
October 12, 1999

[1] The court has jurisdiction only over actual cases or controversies. Under A.S.C.A. § 43.1101, in a declaratory relief action, the parties must have adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment.


[2] In a declaratory relief action, the court considers the likelihood that litigation will eventually follow if such relief is not granted.
[3] In an attorney-client relationship, the attorney advises the client, but the client makes the ultimate decisions on how to proceed.
[4] Under A.S.C.A. § 41.0206, the Attorney General (AG) has the legal authority to prevent the Immigration Board (IB) from acting, and so the AG did not act in its capacity as the Board’s attorney when it interpreted the Immigration Act as exempting American Samoa Government employees from IB approval and registration; therefore a decision by the court would not be advisory.
[5] Under A.S.C.A. § 41.0206, the Immigration Board (IB) is legally required to follow the Attorney General’s (AG) interpretation of the law, and where it therefore canceled deportation hearings despite its belief that the AG’s interpretation of the law was incorrect, a controversy exists between the parties, and there is sufficient adverse interest between them for the court to determine whether the IB must approve aliens employed by the American Samoa Government before they may enter American Samoa.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, LOGOAI, Associate Justice, SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Justice.
Counsel: For Petitioners, Brian M. Thompson

For Respondent, Fiti A. Sunia, Assistant Attorney General



ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
On July 15, 1999, petitioners, comprising the members of the Immigration Board of American Samoa (the “Board”), filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondent, the Attorney General of American Samoa (the “Attorney General”). The Board alleged, inter alia, that the Attorney General’s legal interpretation of the immigration laws is incorrect, and asked the court to declare that aliens employed by the American Samoan Government must obtain the Board’s approval in order to remain in American Samoa.
The Attorney General has moved to dismiss the Board’s petition arguing that that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Attorney General characterizes its dispute with the Board as a disagreement between an attorney and its client, and therefore argues that petitioner is seeking a nonjusticiable advisory opinion.
[1-2] The court has jurisdiction only over actual cases or controversies. In a declaratory relief action, the parties must have “adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment.” A.S.C.A. § 43.1101; Sala v. American Samoa Government, 21 A.S.R.2d 50, 56 (1992). In making its determination, the court considers the likelihood that litigation will eventually follow if declaratory relief is not granted. Sala, supra, 21 A.S.R.2d at 56.
[3] In an attorney-client relationship, the attorney advises the client, but it is the client that makes the ultimate decisions on how to proceed. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a); BNA/ABA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, Lawyer-Client Relationship, at 31:301-303 (1985). As a result, when the Attorney General acts as counsel to an administrative agency, the agency has discretion as to whether or not to adopt the Attorney General’s opinion. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 11 (1994).
[4] Here, in contrast, the Attorney General has the legal authority to prevent the Board from acting because it has the power to enforce and administer the laws pertaining to the status of aliens. A.S.C.A. § 41.0206. Its determination with respect to all immigration law is controlling. A.S.C.A. §§ 41.0206, 41.0614; American Samoa Government v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114, 137 (1990). As a result, the Attorney General did not act in its capacity as the Board’s attorney when it interpreted the Immigration Act as exempting American Samoa Government employees from Immigration Board approval and registration. A decision by this court would therefore not be advisory.
[5] Although litigation may not ensue between the parties if this court does not provide declaratory relief, there is nonetheless a controversy between the parties. The Immigration Board followed the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law, as it was legally required to do under A.S.C.A. § 41.0206, and canceled deportation hearings despite its belief that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law was incorrect. There is a sufficient adverse interest between the parties for the court to determine whether or not the Immigration Board must approve aliens employed by the American Samoa Government before they may enter American Samoa.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.
A hearing on the merits will be held on December 2, 1999.
It is so ordered.
**********


TCW SPECIAL CREDITS, INC., Plaintiff
v.
F/V KASSANDRA Z, OFFICIAL NO. 6553390,

Her Engines, Nets, Furniture, Etc., Defendant in Rem
and
KASSANDRA Z FISHING CO., Defendant in Personam

_________________________________
AND RELATED CLAIMS-IN-INTERVENTION.
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division


CA No. 92-96
October 20, 1999
[1] U.S. law requires that, in certain circumstances, seamen be given written fishing agreements, specifying the period of the agreement, the amount of their compensation, and any other agreed upon terms.
[2] A seaman retained in violation of the law requiring a written fishing agreement is entitled to compensation for services rendered at the agreed upon rate, or the highest rate of wages at the port in which he was engaged, whichever is higher.
[3] Even where a written fishing agreement does not exist, the Seaman Protection and Relief Act does not enable a seaman to accept 95% of his agreed upon wages and then, years later, seek to retroactively void his unwritten agreement and claim significantly higher statutory wages.
[4] The “highest rate of wages” language contained in § 11107 of the Seaman Protection and Relief Act entitles an aggrieved seaman to the highest rate of wages paid a comparable seaman, not any seaman.
[5] All deckhands are not per se comparable, however, a seaman only need make a prima facie showing of comparability in order to make out a § 11107 claim.
[6] Where other vessels in same fleet functioned essentially the same, where all vessels in fleet maintained contact with each other and functioned as a group, where crewmembers often serve on different vessels throughout fleet, and where authority of fish captain was consistent throughout fleet it was appropriate to compare wages of crewmembers throughout fleet for purposes of damages under the Seaman Protection and Relief Act.
[7] A ship’s master, or anyone possessing the ship’s master’s responsibilities, may not recover penalty wages under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 because such individual is charged with the responsibility of securing written fishing agreements with the seamen.
[8] Although case involved many fishermen who had been originally “engaged” to fish in Croatia, they were subsequently hired on a trip-to-trip basis, originating and concluding in the western Pacific, and had been promised wages consistent with those of the western Pacific tuna fishing industry. Their recovery was therefore not limited to the wages of the highest paid comparable seaman engaged in Croatia, but could be based on wages made by other seaman in same fleet.
[9] When a seaman performs work for a vessel in reasonable anticipation of a prospective fishing trip, that seaman is entitled to be compensated for his services on a quantum meruit basis.
[10] It is a common understanding in the fishing industry that a fishing trip is only completed when the catch has been off-loaded to the cannery and the vessel has been cleaned.
[11] The fundamental purpose of Seaman Protection and Relief Act is not to penalize, but rather to compensate seamen for their wages when a company fails to provide its crew with written fishing agreements.

[12] Seamen’s liens for wages take priority over all preferred liens except for expenses of justice while the vessel is in custodia legis.


[13] In American Samoa, the decision whether to award prejudgment interest lies soundly within the court’s discretion.
[14] American Samoa follows the “American Rule,” whereby in the absence of statute, contract, or other legal basis to the contrary, each party bears the burden of his or her own attorney’s fees.
[15] Absent statutory authorization, the prevailing party in an admiralty case is generally not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
[16] In exception to the rule that each party bears its own costs exists when a party is found to have acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.
[17] Where company refused to pay any wages until resolution of litigation, such action did not rise to level of “bad faith” necessary to invoke the exception to the American Rule.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, TUA`OLO, Chief Associate Judge, ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff TCW, Craig Miller and Barry I. Rose

For Plaintiffs-in-Intervention Michael Datin, et al., William



Banning and William H. Reardon
OPINION AND ORDER
This much-prolonged litigation commenced on July 2, 1996, with the filing of plaintiff TCW Special Credits’ (“TCW”) complaint in rem and in personam for foreclosure of preferred marine mortgages, arising out of TCW’s term loan note from the Kassandra Z Fishing Co., Inc. (“KZFC”), secured by a preferred ship mortgage on the F/V Kassandra Z (“Kassandra Z”), a vessel owned by KZFC. Plaintiffs-in-Intervention Michael Datin, et al. (“the Crew”), members of the crew of the Kassandra Z allegedly owed unpaid wages and other miscellaneous amounts for several past fishing trips, filed a complaint-in-intervention on August 16, 1996 and an amended complaint-in-intervention on October 25, 1996.
Cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed by the Crew and TCW on August 14, 1997 and February 25, 1998, respectively, and our order denying in part and granting in part the motions for partial summary judgment was issued on July 23, 1998. As will be discussed further below, in that order we outlined, inter alia, our interpretation of the “highest rate of wages” language of 46 U.S.C. § 11107.
In the months that followed our order on partial summary judgment, both the Crew and TCW filed several motions relative to the discovery process. In addition, on January 21, 1999, TCW filed a second motion for partial summary judgment as to amounts owed the Crew for certain of the fishing trips at issue. That motion was denied in our order of May 7, 1999, which also addressed many of the other pending motions regarding ongoing discovery disputes.
The trial of this matter was held June 2-4, 1999, with all counsel present. Closing arguments were timely submitted in writing, the last of which was filed on August 31, 1999.
Facts
Although specific facts relevant to any given legal issue will be discussed throughout the opinion, the basic facts surrounding the operations and arrest of the Kassandra Z are set forth below.
Built in 1982, the Kassandra Z is a steel-hulled tuna purse seiner registered at 1651 gross tons. It was a United States flagged fishing vessel, owned by a Northern Mariana corporation (KZFC), and it operated in the western Pacific Ocean, using ports in Hawaii, Guam, and American Samoa, with an official home in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Like its counterparts throughout the western Pacific tuna fishing industry, the Kassandra Z sailed on individual, consecutively-numbered trips, each of which involved proceeding from port to the prospective fishing grounds, spending several weeks or even months fishing at sea, and then returning to port and off-loading the catch to a cannery. Crews technically were hired for individual trips, but the majority of the officers and crew were rehired from trip to trip. The crew lists therefore remain relatively consistent throughout the time period relevant to this case.
On April 27, 1996, the Kassandra Z docked in American Samoa, at the conclusion of trip number 26. Pursuant to TCW’s complaint for foreclosure of its preferred ship mortgage, the Marshal for the High Court arrested the vessel on July 2, 1996. The crew members were forced off the ship; most were eventually given tickets to return home, which for most of the Crew was Croatia. The vessel was sold at auction on October 18, 1996, for $6 million, and the proceeds from the sale remain in the court registry.


Discussion
A. Relevant Federal Statutes
[1] The astounding volume of paper filed in this case notwithstanding, the legal issues involved are not terribly complex. The parties agree that the members of the Crew were never given written fishing agreements in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 10601, which reads:
(a) Before proceeding on a voyage, the master or individual in charge of a fishing vessel, fish processing vessel, or fish tender vessel shall make a fishing agreement in writing with each seaman employed on board if the vessel is—

(1) at least 20 gross tons as measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate tonnage measured under section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the Secretary under section 14104 of this title; and

(2) on a voyage from a port in the United States.

(b) The agreement shall be signed also by the owner of the vessel.

(c) The agreement shall—

(1) state the period of effectiveness of the agreement;

(2) include the terms of any wage, share, or other compensation arrangement peculiar to the fishery in which the vessel will be engaged during the period of the agreement; and

(3) include other agreed terms.



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