INTEROCEAN SHIPS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff

SOONAFAI TIUMALU and FUATAU ALI`IPULE, Plaintiffs,
v.
LUTU TENARI, AINA SAOLUAGA, NUA,

TUILEFANO VAELA`A, MALAETASI TOGAFAU,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE, Defendants.
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division

CA No. 103-99
November 18, 1999

[1] Where a complaint alleges no facts upon which to sustain wrongful termination actions against defendants, the defendants are improperly named in the complaint and the action as against them is dismissed.

[2] The proper remedy for wrongful termination is damages at law, not an injunction in equity.
[3] Monetary injuries resulting from loss of salaries are precisely the type of injuries that damages may adequately cure as a remedy at law, and therefore injunctive relief is precluded.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, TUA`OLO, Chief Associate Judge, and SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiffs, Katopau T. Ainu`u

For Defendants Aina Saoluaga Nua, Tuilefano Vaela`a, and

Malaetasi Togafau, Brian M. Thompson

For Defendant Lutu Tenari, pro se

OPINION AND ORDER
On October 12, 1999, plaintiffs Soonafai Tiumalu and Fuatau Ali`ipule (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief directing defendants to refrain from preventing Plaintiffs from returning to work. Plaintiffs also sought a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunctive relief. Defendants filed a cross motion to dismiss the complaint.
A hearing was held on November 9, 1999. The parties appeared with counsel except defendant Lutu Tenari, the President of the Senate, who appeared under subpoena but did not wish to defend as he sided with Plaintiffs. At the hearing, the defendants represented by counsel Thompson stipulated to the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Facts
As the facts in this matter are uncontested, we take the following facts relevant to the motion before us from Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs were previously employed as Legislative Financial Analysts for the Legislature of American Samoa. They were suspended for three months on May 5, 1999, on the recommendation of the House Investigative Committee, and then terminated on July 23, 1999, at the direction of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, defendant Aina Saoluaga Nua, and Senate President Pro Tempore, defendant Tuilefano Vaela`a. Plaintiffs contend that this termination “had no basis in fact or law” and was accomplished without procedural due process and that as a result, Plaintiffs have suffered serious financial difficulties.
Defendants, on the other hand, move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to T.C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants assert that the pleadings do not provide a legal theory upon which Plaintiffs can seek relief.
Discussion
Plaintiffs’ claim may be discerned in paragraph 17 of their complaint, wherein it is asserted that plaintiffs were “illegally terminated.” In more familiar terms, Plaintiffs are alleging wrongful discharge or termination.
[1] In examining this claim, the court first notes that the complaint alleges no facts upon which to sustain wrongful termination actions against defendants Lutu Tenari, the House Investigative Committee and its chairperson Malaetasi Togafau. Nowhere in the complaint or the hearing testimony did Plaintiffs assert that these three defendants caused the alleged wrongful termination. While the Committee may have provided the impetus for the firings, it was the House Speaker and the Senate President Pro Tempore who terminated Plaintiffs’ employment. Furthermore, naming Lutu Tenari as a defendant is baffling, to say the least, as he rehired, rather than fired, Plaintiffs. Thus, the court finds that these three defendants, Lutu Tenari, the House Investigative Committee, and Malaetasi Togafau, were improperly named in the complaint and, therefore, dismiss Plaintiffs’ action against them.
[2] Having determined that Plaintiffs assert a claim of wrongful termination, it remains to be seen whether this claim can support the requested equitable relief against the remaining defendants. In short, it cannot. The proper remedy for wrongful termination is damages at law, not an injunction in equity. This legal principle is black letter law and the rule in countless other jurisdictions. See Restatement (Second) of Agency: Wrongful Discharge § 455; 82 Am.Jur.2d § 246; Billiot v. Toups Marine Transport, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 1265 (D.C.La. 1979); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F.Supp. 870 (D.C.N.Y. 1972); Boise Cascade Intern, Inc. v. Northern Minnesota Pulpwood Producers Ass’n, 294 F.Supp. 1015 (D.C. Minn. 1968); Novak v. Commonwealth, 523 A.2d 318 (Pa. 1987); Mosely v. De Moya, 497 So.2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
[3] Furthermore, as stated by this court, “the most distinguishing prerequisite of permanent injunctive relief is the inadequacy of a remedy at law, usually in the form of money damages.” Thompson v. Fetalaiga, 24 A.S.R.2d 127, 132 (Land & Titles Div. 1993). Plaintiffs allege only monetary injuries resulting from loss of their salaries. Notwithstanding their conclusory assertions of irreparable injury, these injuries are precisely the type that damages may effectively cure.
In sum, Plaintiffs have alleged no claim upon which an injunction can issue, for two reasons. First, damages are adequate to compensate Plaintiffs for their lost income in this case, thus precluding injunctive relief. Second, in the employment context, damages are the only remedy to which they are entitled. For both of these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which the requested relief can be granted.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to T.C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the complaint is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
**********

CONGREGATIONAL CHRISTIAN CHURCH

IN AMERICAN SAMOA, Plaintiff
v.
VAE TAGALOA, VAE TANIELU, AND VAE FAMILY

OF AFAO VILLAGE, Defendants
High Court of American Samoa

Land and Titles Division

LT No. 15-98
February 23, 1999

[1] It is the duty of public officers to refrain from outside activities which interfere with the proper discharge of their duties.

[2] Within reasonable limits, subject to the limitation that it may not abridge any man’s constitutional rights, the legislature has power to ascertain and declare what activities are inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties.
[3] The American Samoa Rules of Professional Conduct encourage attorneys to perform public interest legal service.
[4] Although the Public Defender is required to devote full time to the performance of his duties, and prohibited in engaging in the private practice of law, he or she may engage in pro bono and public service when such activities: (1) do not present a conflict of interest of any kind; and (2) do not interfere with official government duties.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, TUA`OLO, Associate Judge, SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge.
Counsel Tautai Aviata F. Fa`alevao is the territorial Public Defender. He seeks leave to represent plaintiff on a pro bono basis in this private law suit. As Public Defender, however, counsel is subject to the following statutory restriction:
The Public Defender shall devote full time to the performance of his duties and shall not engage in the private practice of law.
A.S.C.A. § 4.0320(d).

It would seem at first blush that the most straightforward reading of the enactment is that “private practice” in this context means any practice other than in one’s official capacity as Public Defender. Counsel, however, urges an interpretation of the enactment so as not to shut the door on his eligibility to participate in pro bono work.

[1-2] As a threshold matter, “[i]t is the duty of public officers to refrain from outside activities which interfere with the proper discharge of their duties. Within reasonable limits, subject to the limitation that it may not abridge any man’s constitutional rights, the legislature has power to ascertain and declare what activities are inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties.” 63A Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 320.
[3] On the other hand, pro bono service, including charitable organization representation, is consistent with the highest traditions of the legal profession. Indeed, Rule 6.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), adopted in this jurisdiction, reads:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service of charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support or organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.
This laudable public goal of the profession, however, cannot detract from the very clear statutory goal of ensuring that the Public Defenders’ duties and responsibilities are not comprised because of sojourns into non-public defender areas of work. The representation of indigent criminal defendants is, after all, a governmental responsibility of constitutional dimensions.
[4] Faithful to the statute’s public aims, but in the spirit of encouraging pro bono and public service generally, the Court believes that the statute can be construed to allow such outside activities by the Public Defender when such activities 1) do not present a conflict of interest of any kind; and 2) do not interfere with official government duties.⁶²

In furtherance of these premises, the following order will therefore enter,

Leave is granted to the Public Defender, for this case only, to continue pro bono representation of plaintiff upon the following terms:
1. Counsel shall certify with the court by filing an affidavit averring that his pro bono duties in this matter shall not compromise his primary responsibilities to his office as public defender.
2. Counsel shall further certify that he has permission from his supervisor, the Governor, to undertake this pro bono service.
3. Counsel shall further take leave from his official duties, supplying copies of approved leave applications, when engaged in his pro bono activities during normal government work hours.
It is so ordered.
**********

LAIE K. MATAUTIA, Plaintiff
v.
POGISA TUIOLEMOTO, as Administrator of the

ESTATE OF TUIVETA MISA, and

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, and Defendants
High Court of American Samoa

Land and Titles Division

LT No. 56-92
April 1, 1999

[1] Although hearsay evidence of family history and tradition is routinely admitted on land title issues, without corroboration it is regarded as inherently weak evidence.

[2] A customary assignment of communal land does not change the character of the land from communal land to individually owned land.

[3] In the Samoan communal land system, typically only the sa`o has the right to lease his family’s communal lands to non-family members.

[4] Where individual, in possession of assigned family communal land, took the time and effort necessary to negotiate terms of lease of land with government, was responsible for facilitating the lease transactions, and where lease of land to government was inevitable and resulted in displacement of individual, and where individual’s actions were not an attempt to exploit family’s communal land, individual was entitled to compensation.
[5] Although sa`o of family normally determines equitable distribution of monies, including compensation to displaced assignee family members, where history of acrimony existed between party family members, and traditional intrafamily processes would likely be frustrated, it was proper for Court to determine distribution of monies.
Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice, TAUANU’U, Chief Associate Judge, and SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff, Gata E. Gurr

For Defendant Pogisa Tuiolemoto, as Administrator of the

Estate of Tuiveta Misa, Arthur Ripley, Jr.

For Defendant American Samoa Government, Cheryl

Crenwelge-Siofle, Assistant Attorney General
OPINION AND ORDER
On November 24, 1992, plaintiff Laie K. Matautia (“Laie”) brought this action against Tuiveta Misa (“Tuiveta”) to quiet title to certain land within the boundaries of the Fitiuta Airport as the Laie family’s communal land; to permanently enjoin Tuiveta from claiming rental payments by defendant American Samoa Government (“ASG”) for and signing any legal documents involving the land; to preliminarily enjoin ASG from releasing any rental payments for the land to Tuiveta, and Tuiveta from receiving and using any such payments; and to establish a trust account for the accrued rental payments. On December 21, 1992, we denied the preliminary injunction but ordered ASG to deposit accrued rentals with the clerk of courts to be held in an interest-bearing escrow account pending judicial resolution of the underlying issue of the title to the land. Trial was conducted on December 17 and 18, 1998. Laie, Pogisa, their respective counsel, and ASG’s counsel were present.
Discussion
A. Parties to the Action
Tuiveta died on August 23, 1997, at age 79 years, a fact that first appeared of record in this action on May 14, 1998 during the hearing on Laie’s motion to set the trial date. Laie’s claim was not extinguished by Tuiveta’s death and thus, ‘pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.5002, this action and Tuiveta’s defense survived his death. However, none of Tuiveta’s successors or representatives, or Laie, or ASG invoked the process set forth in T.C.R.C.P. 25(a) for the substitution of parties upon a party’s death or dismissal of the action as to the deceased party.⁶³ The trial went forward and concluded without any mention of this issue. All interested entities were afforded full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. Thus, we think that it is more important and appropriate to presently decide the issues involved, both private and public, on the merits rather than to postpone their resolution on a procedural technicality. Accordingly, we allow, sua sponte, this action to continue against Pogisa, as the Administrator of the Estate of Tuiveta Misa (“the Estate”), appointed on December 11, 1998, as the party defendant substituted for Tuiveta.
B. Ownership of the Land
Two parcels of land, totaling approximately 2.625 acres, are at issue. The two parcels are located within the boundaries of the public Fitiuta Airport, designated as Lot 11 and Lot N in ASG’s amended map of the airport, Drawing No. 1863 “B”, in the Village of Fitiuta on the Island of Ta`u in the Manu’a Islands. Lot 11 straddles a portion of the runway. Lot N encompasses a significant portion of the road from the main road to the airport parking area and terminal.
On January 5, 1988, Tuiveta leased Lot 11 to ASG. On March 8, 1991, the lease was amended to add Lot N. Lot 11 is composed of approximately 2.473 acres and Lot N embraces about 0.152 acres, a total of approximately 2.625 acres.<sup>64</sup> The term of the lease, as amended, is 55 years, commencing in 1987 and ending in 2042, with ASG having options to extend the lease for two additional terms of 10 years each.<sup>65</sup> ASG paid a total monthly rental of $262.60 for both parcels during the first five years of the lease, as amended. Under the amendment, the amount of the rent must be renegotiated for each successive five-year period.
The two issues now before the court are: (1) the ownership of Lot 11 and Lot N; and (2) the entitlement to the rents paid by ASG for those two lots. Laie is the sa`o (“head or senior chief”) of the Laie family and claims that Lot 11 and Lot N are part of the Laie family’s communal land known as “Falefasa.” Although the lease and amendment state that Tuiveta is the sa.’o of the Misa family, Tuiveta asserted and his daughter Pogisa maintains that the two lots are owned by the Misa family as its individually owned land known as “Maluatia.” Strictly, of course, Pogisa represents the interests of the Estate.
The protagonists, Laie and Pogisa for Tuiveta, gave us their respective versions of the oral family history and traditions pertaining to Lot 11 and Lot N. Essentially, Laie told us that these lots were part of land given to the Laie family when, in time immemorial, the Fitiuta matai (“chiefs”) divided the lands within the village as family communal lands among the families of the village. Thus, he declared that the lots are the Laie family’s communal land. Pogisa, on the other hand, stated that Misa Leafu, Tuiveta’s grandfather, cleared and cultivated the land encompassing these lots from virgin bush and thus became the individual owner of the land. She maintained that the land was inherited by Laie Misa, Misa Leafu’s son, and then by Tuiveta, Laie Misa’s son, and that until the airport was constructed, only immediate Misa family members worked the land. Thus, she advocated that the lots are the Misa family’s individually owned land.

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