Even major global powers won’t use hsr, China is failing
Download 0.81 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- It’s not visible enough – no motivation.
- Underwater surveillance successful now – deters a terror attack, this postdates
- Improving infrastructure doesn’t solve alone terrorism – small vessel tracking key
- Terrorists unskilled and divided
Case**Terrorism F/L**Terror on transportation is inevitable: First, ports.Port Strategy September 2011 “Can US Port Security Stand up to the Cuts?” http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/americas/can-us-port-security-stand-up-to-the-cuts The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) points out that in the decade since the World Trade Centre attack there have been substantial security gains. However, among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden's Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Kurt Nagle, AAPA president and CEO said, “Clearly, America’s ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate.” Mr. Nagle added, “There’s no question that more investment in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed.” Given ongoing threats such as these, the seaport industry is asking US congress and administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. Mr. Nagle said, “Regrettably, the more than 50% funding level cut recommended for FEMA’s State and Local Program grants, which includes the Port Security Grant Program, could impact the current security capabilities of many US ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection plans.” Second, the aviation sector. Ben Brandt, November 30 2011. “Terrorist Threats to Commercial Aviation: A Contemporary Assessment.” Ben Brandt is a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) – prepares Americans with news on recent security measures. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-threats-to-commercial-aviation-a-contemporary-assessment One aspect of aviation security that is not frequently addressed is the potential for terrorists to strike other aspects of aviation infrastructure beyond aircraft. Commercial airlines are highly reliant upon information technology systems to handle critical functions such as reservations and crew check-in, a fact not lost upon Rajib Karim when he suggested in correspondence with Anwar al-`Awlaqi that he could erase data from British Airways’ servers, thus disabling the airline’s website.[15] Such an approach would mesh closely with al-Qa`ida core’s and AQAP’s stated aims of waging economic jihad against the West. The operational control centers operated by air carriers are another significant point of vulnerability, which conduct the airlines’ flight control, meteorology, and emergency management functions. Despite their criticality to flight operations, these control centers are rarely heavily guarded, meaning that a team of attackers equipped with inside knowledge could temporarily shut down the global operations of a major air carrier, particularly if backup facilities were to be targeted as well. Another threat to commercial aviation is the increasing number of plots and attacks targeting airports themselves rather than aircraft. There have been two significant attacks staged at international airports thus far in 2011 in Frankfurt and Moscow. Attacks against airports have been planned or executed using a variety of tactics, such as firearms, car bombs, suicide bombers, and hijacked aircraft. The targets have included airport facilities such as fuel lines, arrival halls, and curbside drop-off points. Terrorists could also breach perimeter fencing and assault aircraft on runways, taxiing areas, and at gates. This tactic was used during the 2001 Bandaranaike airport attack in Sri Lanka, when a team of Black Tigers[16] used rocket-propelled grenades and antitank weapons to destroy half of Sri Lankan Airlines’ fleet of aircraft.[17] More recently, Afghan authorities announced the discovery of arms caches belonging to the Haqqani network near Kabul Airport and claimed that the group had planned to use the caches to stage an assault on the airport.[18] The actions of activist groups—such as Plane Stupid, which has breached perimeter fencing at UK airports so that activists could handcuff themselves to aircraft in a protest against the airline industry’s carbon emissions[19]—demonstrate the viability of such an attack in the West as well.[20]¶ The trend toward attacking airports rather than aircraft has likely been driven by a number of factors, particularly increased checkpoint screening measures and terrorists’ growing emphasis on decentralized, small-scale attacks on targets of opportunity. Firearms will likely prove to be a key component of future attacks, given their relative ease of use compared to explosives, as well as their wide availability in the United States and many other countries. This trend was exemplified by the 2011 Frankfurt attack, which was conducted by Arid Uka, an employee at the airport’s postal facility, who shot and killed two U.S. soldiers at a bus at the terminal. Although deployment of plainclothes security personnel and quick reaction teams can help ameliorate the impact of attacks on airports, their ease of execution and the impossibility of eliminating all airport queues (be they for drop-off, check-in, security screening, baggage claim, or car rentals) make this tactic a persistent threat.¶ Required Steps to Improve Aviation Security¶ Given the breadth and complexity of threats to commercial aviation, those who criticize the TSA and other aviation security regulatory agencies for reactive policies and overly narrow focus appear to have substantial grounding. Three particularly serious charges can be levied against the TSA: it overemphasizes defending against specific attack vectors (such as hijackings or passenger-borne IEDs) at the expense of others (such as insider threats or attacks on airports); it overemphasizes securing U.S. airports while failing to acknowledge the significantly greater threat posed to flights arriving or departing from foreign airports; and it has failed to be transparent with the American people that certain threats are either extremely difficult or beyond the TSA’s ability to control. Furthermore, the adoption of cumbersome aviation security measures in the wake of failed attacks entails a financial burden on both governments and the airline industry, which has not gone unnoticed by jihadist propagandists and strategists. While the U.S. government has spent some $56 billion on aviation security measures since 9/11, AQAP prominently noted that its 2010 cargo plot cost a total of $4,900.[21]¶ With this in mind, there are several measures that could be undertaken to improve U.S. aviation security. First, policymakers must recognize the timely collection and exploitation of intelligence will always be the most effective means of interdicting terrorist threats to aviation, whether by disrupting terrorist leadership in safe havens, breaking up nascent plots, or preventing would-be terrorists from boarding aircraft. The successful exploitation of intelligence gathered from the Bin Ladin raid in May 2011 has likely done far more to defend commercial aviation from al-Qa`ida than the use of advanced imaging equipment and patdowns.¶ Second, the TSA and other aviation security regulators must increase their liaison with the airline industry regarding the development of risk mitigation strategies, as airlines are far more aware of the vulnerabilities inherent to commercial aviation, as well as the practical constraints on proposed security measures.¶ Third, rather than increasing spending on screening equipment and employees deployed in the United States, the TSA and other regulators should instead provide financial support for airlines attempting to improve security for their overseas operations. This could include subsidizing background checks on airlines’ international employees and vendors, paying for armed guards at ticket counters, helping upgrade security for airlines’ computer networks and control centers, and paying for the deployment of ETD screening equipment. Aviation security regulators should also work to improve the quality of threat information shared with airlines, which is frequently dated, irrelevant, or inaccurate.¶ It’s not visible enough – no motivation.Catherine Z. Raymond, 2-9-2006, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits," Global Terrorism Analysis, Vol. 4 Issue 3, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369896 ASG and MILF traditionally operate within their locality of the Philippines and its surrounding archipelagic waters; it would be uncharacteristic of them to carry out an attack on shipping in the Malacca Straits. This is related to the fact that they are both separatist groups, with the aim of establishing an independent Islamic state in the Philippines. Therefore, their targets tend to be either located within the country, or closely associated with it. GAM is also a separatist group and while there may be some overlap in terms of its area of operations and the Malacca Straits, its targets have traditionally included the Indonesian military and security forces. In addition, GAM has just signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government, which includes the disarmament and demobilization of its 3000 fighters (PNG Post-Courier, August 23, 2005). Through this process of elimination, the group that would appear to be the only real threat to shipping in the Malacca Straits is JI. The group has shown an interest in attacking shipping in the Straits and vessels visiting Changi Naval Base in Singapore and is suspected of developing more expertise in this area. Its maritime capability, however, remains underdeveloped when compared to its land capability. Attacks against targets in the maritime domain would require specialized equipment and skills; depending on the target, they may also require knowledge of shipping patterns, boat operation and maintenance, and boarding techniques. This explains the predictions of a piracy-terrorism nexus, of which there is still no evidence. Various explanations have been proffered as to why there is still no sign of any cooperation between pirates and terrorists. One explanation is that the majority of those committing acts of piracy in the Malacca Straits are largely un-organized petty-criminals who use piracy as a way of supplementing their inadequate income. These small groups and individuals may not be willing to cooperate with terrorists who, through their high-profile activities, may trigger a complete crackdown on all maritime crime. Carrying out an attack in the maritime domain also presents a number of difficulties that are not encountered on land. First, if the aftermath of an attack is to be captured by the media, which is often the wish of a terrorist group, then the attack needs to be carried out close to land. This then considerably compresses the theater of operations, as only coastal areas and ports would be suitable. Second, surveillance at sea of potential targets offers less cover and concealment than on land and entails the same environmental challenges as any maritime activity. Underwater surveillance successful now – deters a terror attack, this postdatesWinslow, ‘11 [Lance, Business Consultant, has written a series of books on Future of education and runs a think tank. ”Underwater Robotics and Policing Tech Considered”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Underwater-Robotics-and-Policing-Tech-Considered&id=6736445] After 9/11, think tanks around the country got together to figure out how to protect our infrastructure and our country from future attacks. We tried to consider where the terrorists might try to hit us, and what methods they might use to attack. Indeed, I happen to run a think tank which operates online, and one of the thing\ we were worried about is the incredible number of waterways that terrorists might have access to in order to get close to their destination to create a terrorist act.¶ There was an interesting article recently in the New York Times on December 5, 2011 titled; "Underwater Drones Giving More Eyes to Police Harbor Unit as Searches Grow," by Al Baker, which stated that when President Obama was recently visiting:¶ "The NYC Police Harbor Unit & Secret Service went over locations sweeping for bombs, then cleared, and guarded. This underwater security shows an increasing reliance on a new tactical weapon for the police: an unmanned submersible drone, remote-operated vehicle, or ROV. The Police Harbor Unit has 6 of these underwater drones, similar to those in use by the United States military and by oil companies with offshore operations."¶ It is very smart and wise for police forces, and the federal government be thinking here. Our US Coast Guard, and U.S. Navy also work very hard to protect our ports and military bases, as well they should. Being able to know what is under the water is of supreme value. It will also help us find polluters, and potential sources of environmental contamination which might cause dead zones, and hurt aquatic life, and our ability to fish for food.¶ Being able to study underwater currents, check out underwater volcanoes, and keep surveillance on underwater pipelines, communication lines, and cooling systems for generation plants is extremely important. We need to protect our ports, our docks, and our cruise ship industry. Having pervasive surveillance underwater may sound a little paranoid, but you have to know that the terrorists are thinking here, so let's not let our guard down, just because it's been a long time since we've seen a large attack on our own soil.¶ Our intelligence community has uncovered several plots in the past, and some of them have involved. Improving infrastructure doesn’t solve alone terrorism – small vessel tracking keyDept of Homeland Security 8 [“Small Vessel Security Strategy”, April, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf] Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate vessel operators and the relatively few individuals engaged in illicit activities. The challenge is immense, as it involves nearly 13 million registered U.S. recreational vessels,2 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial small vessels. On any given day, a considerable number of these boats share waterways with commercial and military traffic, operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and in the immediate vicinity of critical maritime infrastructure, including bridges and waterfront facilities such as petrochemical plants. More information concerning small vessels is needed to improve the proper assessment of the risk posed by these vessels. The challenge is to balance the collection of requisite information necessary for proper assessment of risk posed by these vessels, with the freedom of the seas expected by the small boating community. Terrorists unskilled and dividedProf. John Mueller, 2010 (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), Terrorizing Ourselves, Cato Institute, "Assessing Measures Designed to Protect the Homeland", http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ Political scientist Michael Kenney has interviewed dozens of officials and intelligence agents and has analyzed court documents, and he finds homegrown Islamic militants to be operationally unsophisticated, short on know how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and severely hampered by a limited capacity to learn. Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten operational unity, trust, cohesion, and the ability to act collectively. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.81 Mb. Share with your friends:
|