Space leadership high now – China and Russia are far behind
Krepon 5 – Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Prior to co-founding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. 2005, "Space Security or Space Weapons?" www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson_Space_brief.pdf
US advantages in outer space have never been greater, while threats to US satellites are far less than during the Cold War. Today, the United States spends $36 billion a year for activities in outer space — over 70% of all global expenditures. The numbers are even more lopsided for defense spending: Washington spends approximately $20 billion a year — almost 90% of the global pie — on military-related activities in space. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a significant competitor in outer space, typically launching over seventy space missions every year. Today, the Russian space program launches less than one-third of this amount. The Pentagon’s budget is now over 10 times larger than Russia’s military budget. The Chinese space program is on the move, but it is still decades behind the United States. Beijing has launched eighty satellites in the past thirty-five years, compared to 1,200 for the United States. The Pentagon’s budget is over four times larger than Beijing’s military spending.
Uniqueness --- No Space Threats Now
No risk of space conflict now – their evidence is hype and US deterrence checks back
Weston 9 – Major Scott A. Weston, US Air Force, Troy University; MA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, "Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications," Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1, 73-82, www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/weston.html
After all the hype about space warfare and space weapons, an examination of currently fielded forces capable of direct counterspace operations against satellites clearly shows that few countries can conduct this type of warfare. Most threats envisioned in the US military's space doctrine simply do not exist in an operationally deployed form. Space-Conflict Scenarios Because current US space policy considers the entire space infrastructure a vital national interest, an attack against it or even preparation for one would likely incur a military response. (31) Rationally, then, we would think that other nations would refrain from attacking US space assets unless they are engaging or already engaged militarily with us. In this regard, the deterrent threat of US retaliation would establish a lower limit to space conflict, much as it does with other forms of military confrontation.
There are no threats to space assets now – hostile ASATs are decades away
Hitchens 2 – Theresa Hitchens is Director of the Center for Defense Information, and leads its Space Security Project, in cooperation with the SecureWorld Foundation. Editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000, Hitchens has had a long career in journalism, with a focus on military, defense industry and NATO affairs. She also was director of research at the British American Security Information Council. Hitchens serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. April 18th, 2002, "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
While it is true that other countries are pursuing both space assets and counter-space options, there is some reason to question whether the current threat assessment is justified. Leaving aside the question of the ballistic missile threat, it is unclear what real threats to U.S. space assets exist today or will exist in the near and medium term. Proponents of weaponizing space usually cite the emergence of an acute threat in the 2020 time frame or beyond; the Space Commission report puts the possible development of hostile anti-satellite systems at decades away.They cite as an indicator of the threat trend the fact that there are more and more countries, now 50-plus, with space capabilities. Available technologies, from imaging to telecommunications to tracking and signals intelligence, are progressing rapidly; and many are available on the commercial marketplace.The Space Commission report also includes extensive analysis of the possible vulnerabilities of U.S. space assets, especially commercial satellites and communications grids: "The reality is that there are many extant capabilities to deny, disrupt or physically destroy space systems and the ground facilities that use and control them." For example, a September 2001 report by the U.S. Department of Transportation, "Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System," highlights the fact that the GPS network is easily disrupted in part due to its low power signals and because its characteristics are well known due to its civil uses.25 The Space Commission noted that there already are available Russian-made, handheld jamming devices that can block GPS receivers for up to 120 miles. In addition, like other satellite networks, the 24 GPS satellites have stable and predictable orbits. However, vulnerabilities do not necessarily result in threats. In order to threaten U.S. space assets, military or commercial, a potential adversary must have both technological capabilities and intent to use them in a hostile manner. There is little hard evidence that any other country or hostile non-state actor possesses either the technology or the intention to seriously threaten U.S. military or commercial operations in space — nor is there much evidence of serious pursuit of space-based weapons by potentially hostile actors.
Christy 6 – Donald P. Christy, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, U.S. Army War College, March 15th, 2006, "UNITED STATES POLICY ON WEAPONS IN SPACE," www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf
The third argument for weapons in space is that there is a threat to the ever-growing United States economic dependence on space. This presumably makes space assets a target for a potential enemy and requires we defend those assets with space weapons. The questions to consider here are many. How great is the cost to defend those assets with space weapons verses the cost of the assets themselves? Most military space systems are many times more expensive than the civilian satellites they would presumably protect. How likely are civilian space assets to be targeted by an adversary in any case? Most civilian systems or systems with significant economic value operate in very high earth orbit (11,000 nm to 24,000 nm) making them more difficult to target than a military reconnaissance satellite in low earth orbit (350 nm). Finally, why would an enemy want to threaten such systems? Presumably, the reason would be to hurt the United States economically or coerce behavior. 38 Since most economic space assets have terrestrial alternatives like fiber optic communications or terrestrial navigation aids, it would seem space assets would be an unlikely target given the technical capabilities necessary to damage them decisively. Precision would be difficult to achieve. In a highly globalized world economy, damaging space infrastructure would very likely affect more than just the United States economy. Finally, numerous earthbound targets exist that would cause comparable or greater impact at significantly less cost and effort to an adversary.
There is no coming space war – conventional weapons solve
Wilkerson 8 – Don L. Wilkerson, Lieutenant Colonel of the United States Army, US Army War College, Master of Strategic Studies Degree, 2008, "Space Power Theory, Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space," www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300
Space power as a theory illustrates the importance of strategic space systems and demonstrates that space is the “ultimate high ground” in which policy makers and commanders will need to formulate actions to seize and control in support of strategic objectives. Theoretically, on-orbit offensive space capabilities would be used to find, fix, track, and destroy targets in space, air, on land and at sea. Again, if this capability existed, the employment of space weapons would be more of a combat multiplier in support of the other geographical mediums rather than providing unilateral control of all environments from space. Gray contends that space power “adds the greatest value for lethality in combat in the twentieth century.” 22 However, since most of the United States’ current offensive space power capabilities are ground-based and augmented with superior conventional as well as other non-kinetic weapons and forces, one could argue that we currently control the space medium without the cost, proliferation and hazards associated with placing weapon systems in orbit. Gray believes that the strategic interest in terms of space power theory “lies in the consequences of its application for deterrence and the conduct of war as a whole.” 2 The concept of space control put forth by Gray compares the control of the space medium as similar to conducting blockades and ‘choke points’ like Mahan’s maritime strategy for sea power. Space has similar choke points such as specific launch sites attempting to launch offensive space weapons or satellites that are susceptible to attack or that can be held at risk. 24 Again, these choke points or space blockades can be affected using existing capabilities without the need for placing weapons in space. The naval theories of Sir Julian Corbett are probably more fitting when considering a space power theory based on the control of space. Corbett emphasized the “conditional nature” of sea control. He believed that the conditional nature could be positive and defined as one’s ability to travel the seas freely. Corbett also believed that the conditional nature could be negative or the ability to deny this freedom to the enemy. It could either be local or global, permanent or temporary. This theory is very similar and applicable to the strategy of space control. 25
No matter how integral and essential space operations will be during combat operations, it is doubtful that today’s wars and those in the immediate future will be decided in space. Therefore, Gray’s prospect of space control is less likely to be contested under that Mahanian concept of “battle fleets” clashing in space whether manned or unmanned.2
No countries currently threaten US satellites, and space weapons do nothing to help
Zhang 5 – Hui Zhang, research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, December 5, 2005, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943
The United States clearly has legitimate concerns about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations and the U.S. economy are increasingly dependent on them. Satellites are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources, including ground-based missiles, lasers, and radiation from a high-altitude nuclear explosion. However, it does not mean that the United States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.[8] Most analysts believe no country seriously threatens U.S. space assets.[9] Only the United States and, in the Cold War era, the Soviet Union have explored, tested, and developed space weapons; Russia placed a moratorium on its program in the 1980s. To be sure, a number of countries, including China, are capable of attacking U.S. satellites with nuclear weapons, but such an attack would be foolhardy, as it would almost certainly be met by a deadly U.S. response. Moreover, as many experts point out, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites because these weapons are nearly as vulnerable to attack as the satellites themselves.[10] No wonder that many countries, including China and Russia, have sought multilateral negotiations on the prevention of space weaponization.
There is no need to protect space assets – ground-based components would be attacked instead
Pena and Hudgins 2 – Charles V. Pena, senior defense policy analyst, Edward L. Hudgins, former director of regulatory studies at the Cato Institute, March 18, 2002, “Should the United States ‘Weaponize’ Space? Military and Commercial Implications,” Policy Analysis, No. 427, page 6, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf
According to the Space Commission, “Nations hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or ground nodes that command the satellites.”29 Much of the Space Commission’s focus has been on the vulnerability of and threat posed to satellites in space. However, Hays and Mueller point out, “Satellites . . . are likely to be a more difficult and thus less attractive target set for direct attack under most circumstances than are other components of space systems, such as launch facilities or ground-control stations, and if they are attacked, it will most likely be through indirect means such as communications jamming.”30 A background paper prepared for the Rumsfeld Commission also states that “one of the easiest ways to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the utility of space systems is to attack or sabotage the associated ground segments.”31 Thus, the more immediate concern should be the vulnerability of ground-based components. Those elements could be susceptible to a variety of threats, including direct military attack (e.g., with aircraft or missiles), terrorist attack, sabotage, and jamming. Space-based assets themselves are not the most likely or easiest targets of attack, particularly for so-called poor rogue states. Thus, there is a less pressing need to focus on space itself and the potential threats to spacebased assets.
It’s easier to attack ground-based components
Pena and Hudgins 2 – Charles V. Pena, senior defense policy analyst, Edward L. Hudgins, former director of regulatory studies at the Cato Institute, March 18, 2002, “Should the United States ‘Weaponize’ Space? Military and Commercial Implications,” Policy Analysis, No. 427, page 6, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf
Electronic jamming is already within the technical competence of many countries, including Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Cuba.32 Most commercial and civilian satellites do not have anti-jamming capability and are, therefore, susceptible to such attacks. Electronic jamming is a legitimate concern because it can be done relatively easily and cheaply. For example, two rookie engineers from the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory were able to build a homemade jammer using a petrol-driven electricity generator, wood, plastic piping, and copper tubing. The total cost was only $7,500, and all of the required parts were obtained at an electronics enthusiasts’ swap meet.33 According to Steve Blum, president of Tellus Venture Associates, a satellite consulting firm, sending a signal up to a given satellite and jamming it is nothing new.34 Also, satellite jamming is relatively easy to trace.35
Space assets are in no danger – adversaries are targeting military on Earth
Krepon and Clary 3 – Michael Krepon, served as the president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher Clary, Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, April 2, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,” Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf
Space warfare initiated by a far weaker adversary offers the prospect of mass disruption, whereas terrestrial attacks offer the prospect of mass disruption and mass casualties. Is poking a much stronger foe in the eye, ear, cell phone, or pager a particularly compelling strategy for those who wish to harm the United States? Terrorists and their state sponsors have chosen far different categories of targets in the past, with disturbingly successful results. Have efforts to counter terrorist designs been so successful that sworn foes would need to move from terrestrial to space warfare? It stretches credulity to argue that asymmetric warfare in space is a virtual certainty by the weak against the strong when the powerful have better means to compensate for vulnerabilities in space than on Earth. The prioritization of threats facing the United States and U.S. friends and allies is essential for developing appropriate countermeasures. A wide spectrum of asymmetric threats continues to plague U.S. citizens and preoccupy the U.S. armed forces. These threats and appropriate responses are not in the heavens; they are thoroughly terrestrial.
Share with your friends: |
