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- China will freak out if US develops space weapons-the cp prevents the arms race and china freak out
- US china co op good key to solve relations- violent china rise and cost savings
- US China co op good- key to R and D
- US co op with china to ban space weaponization prevents arms race and instability
- Broad consensus that US must discuss weaponization – Chinese uncertainty, stops international treaties
Extensions china co op solvencyCP solvo- things China and US should do to avoid space conflict and destructionHays and Danielson 9- Peter Hays, Senior Scientist, Policy and Strategy Division Science Applications International Corporation National Security Space Office, Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology, National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC, Improving Space Security through Enhanced [Bruce MacDonald’s report on China, Space Weapons, and US Security for the Council on Foreign Relations offers a number of noteworthy additional specific recommendations for both the US and China including: For the US—assessing the impact of different US and Chinese offensive space postures and policies through intensified analysis and “crisis games,” in addition to wargames; evaluating the desirability of a “no first use” pledge for offensive counterspace weapons that have irreversible effects; pursuing selected offensive capabilities meeting important criteria—including effectiveness, reversible effects, and survivability— in a deterrence context to be able to negate adversary space capabilities on a temporary and reversible basis; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as China does, unless there is a substantial risk to human health and safety from uncontrolled space object reentry; and entering negotiations on a [kinetic energy] KE-ASAT testing ban. MacDonald’s recommendations for China include: providing more transparency into its military space programs; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT tests as long as the US does; establishing a senior national security coordinating body, equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council; strengthening its leadership’s foreign policy understanding by increasing the international affairs training of senior officer candidates and establishing an international security affairs office within the PLA; providing a clear and credible policy and doctrinal context for its 2007 ASAT test and counterspace programs more generally and addressing foreign concerns over China’s ASAT test; and offering to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concerns and becoming actively involved in discussions on establishing international space codes of conduct and confidence-building measures.21 Finally, Beijing and Washington should pursue specific initiatives to follow-up on the cooperative dialogue during the visits of General Xu Caihou and President Obama, as well as initiating discussions about recent statements by General Xu Qiliang, commander of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), that a space arms race is inevitable and the PLAAF must develop offensive space operations.22 President Hu quickly repudiated these statements but the two sides need to find a way to initiate and sustain focused discussions about the difficult space security issues raised by the general’s statements since they represent an unprecedented level of public transparency on the part of the PLA, undoubtedly reflect the position of the PLA and other important stakeholders within the Chinese government, and represent an inherent part of the context for space security about which the US and China must develop better shared understanding. Counterintuitively, Beijing and Washington can lay a stronger foundation for sustainable space security through transparent dialogue over these most difficult issues rather than by trying to avoid them since more diplomatic approaches may assuage but cannot eliminate the growing strategic and military potential of space capabilities.] China will freak out if US develops space weapons-the cp prevents the arms race and china freak outHui 05 (Zhang Hui is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research includes nuclear arms control verification techniques, the control of fissile material, nuclear terrorism, nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and space. An extended version of this paper was produced for the, Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf) [The United States does have legitimate concerns about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations, economy and society are increasingly dependent on space assets and such assets are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources. However, it does not mean that the United States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.6 Further, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, since these weapons are also vulnerable to many types of attack, similar to the satellites requiring protection. The true aim of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance American military dominance. Prof. Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently presented his view that the Transformation Flight Plan indicated that "many types of space-based weapons will be developed," and "the tendency toward space weaponization is obvious and serious." He further noted that military dominance on Earth is not enough, "the U.S. also seeks to dominate space."7 Beijing fears that by unilaterally developing missile defense systems and pursuing space weaponization, the United States is seeking to establish a global military superiority using both offensive and defensive means.8 Moreover, China's fears about U.S. hegemonic tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that space weapons, due to their vulnerability to other less expensive, asymmetric measures, are inherently first-strike weapons. 9 ] CP solvo- Sino-US co op on space issues- agreements help avoid china misperception, and improve US China relations as well as have economic benefits- trade and exchange of tech and info would also be goodHays 11- Peter L. Hays, Dr. Peter L. Hays is a senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office. A retired Lieutenant Colonel with 25 years of service in the Air Force, he has focused his studies and research on U.S. national security space., Chapter 28: Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower [Since Sino-American relations in general and space relations in particular are likely to play a dominant role in shaping the quest for space-power and sustainable security during this century, other proposed Sino-American cooperative space ventures or TCBMs are worthy of further consideration, including inviting a taikonaut to fly on one of the remaining space shuttle missions and making specific, repeated, and public invitations for the Chinese to join the International Space Station program and other major cooperative international space efforts. The United States and China could also work toward developing nonoffensive defenses of the type advocated by Philip Baines.14 Kevin Pollpeter explains how China and the United States could cooperate in promoting the safety of human spaceflight and "coordinate space science missions to derive scientific benefits and to share costs. Coordinating space science missions with separately developed, but complementary space assets, removes the chance of sensitive technology transfer and allows the two countries to combine their resources to achieve the same effects as jointly developed missions."15 Michael Pillsbury outlined six other areas where U.S. experts could profitably exchange views with Chinese specialists in a dialogue about space weapons issues: "reducing Chinese misperceptions of U.S. Space Policy, increasing Chinese transparency on space weapons, probing Chinese interest in verifiable agreements, multilateral versus bilateral approaches, economic consequences of use of space weapons, and reconsideration of U.S. high-tech exports to China."16 Finally, Bruce MacDonald's report for the Council on Foreign Relations, "China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security," offers a number of noteworthy additional specific recommendations for both the United States and China. For the United States, MacDonald recommends assessing the impact of different U.S. and Chinese offensive space postures and policies through intensified analysis and "crisis games" in addition to wargames; evaluating the desirability of a "no first use" pledge for offensive counterspace weapons that have irreversible effects; pursuing selected offensive capabilities meeting important criteria— including effectiveness, reversible effects, and survivability—in a deterrence context to be able to negate adversary space capabilities on a temporary and reversible basis; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as China does, unless there is a substantial risk to human health and safety from uncontrolled space object reentry; and entering negotiations on a kinetic energy ASAT testing ban. MacDonald's recommendations for China include providing more transparency into its military space programs; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT tests as long as the United States does; establishing a senior national security coordinating body, equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council; strengthening its leadership's foreign policy understanding by increasing the international affairs training of senior officer candidates and establishing an international security affairs office within the People's Liberation Army; providing a clear and credible policy and doctrinal context for its 2007 ASAT test and counterspace programs more generally, and addressing foreign concerns over China's ASAT test; and offering to engage in dialogue with the United States on mutual space concerns and become actively involved in discussions on establishing international space codes of conduct and confidence-building measures.17] US china co op good key to solve relations- violent china rise and cost savingsLogan 7- Jeffery Logan, M.S. in environmental science and Master in Public Administration,1995, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs B.S. in aerospace engineering and B.A. in general arts and sciences, 1985, Pennsylvania State University Prior work experience Specialist in energy policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC (2007-2008) Senior energy analyst, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC (2005-2007) Senior energy analyst, International Energy Agency, Paris (2003-2005) Scientist, Advanced International Studies Unit, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington, DC (1997-2003), China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation, December 07 Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: ! Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. Regular dialogue would need high-level political support to succeed, but could help address national security concerns. ! Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. ! Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation. Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China. US China co op good- key to R and DHays and Danielson 9- Peter Hays, Senior Scientist, Policy and Strategy Division Science Applications International Corporation National Security Space Office, Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology, National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC, Improving Space Security through Enhanced [Other specific Sino-American cooperative space ventures or TCBMs that have been proposed and are worthy of further consideration include: inviting a taikonaut to fly on one of the remaining space shuttle missions and making repeated, specific, and public invitations for the Chinese to join the ISS program and other major cooperative international space efforts. The US and China could also work towards developing non-offensive defenses of the type advocated by Philip Baines.18 Kevin Pollpeter explains how China and the US could cooperate in promoting the safety of human spaceflight and “coordinate space science missions to derive scientific benefits and to share costs. Coordinating space science missions with separately developed, but complementary space assets, removes the chance of sensitive technology transfer and allows the two countries to combine their resources to achieve the same effects as jointly developed missions.”19 Michael Pillsbury outlined six other areas where US experts could profitably exchange views with Chinese specialists in a dialogue about space weapons issues: “reducing Chinese misperceptions of US space policy, increasing Chinese transparency on space weapons, probing Chinese interest in verifiable agreements, multilateral versus bilateral approaches, economic consequences of use of space weapons, and reconsideration of US high-tech exports to China.”20] US co op with china to ban space weaponization prevents arms race and instabilityZhang 11 – Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, Volume 51, No. 2, pp. 331-332 Once the above measures begin to relax the security dilemma, China, the U.S., and other major powers can work toward a multilateral agreement governing the military use of space. Although China’s military space programs, especially its January 2007 ASAT test, contradict its official policy of seeking to ban weapons in space, they can be interpreted as a hedging strategy in response to the security dilemma. When the U.S. opposed efforts to ban the weaponization of space, the PLA felt compelled to initiate its own military space programs. Now that the Obama administration is willing to ban weapons in space, this could bring both China and Russia to the negotiating table for a multilateral agreement. Indeed, in February 2008 China and Russia jointly proposed such a treaty at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese experts have repeatedly emphasized that arms control for outer space remains China’s top priority, though it is prepared for an arms race if necessary. President Hu’s statement on the issue in November 2009 effectively reaffirmed this position. Therefore, the current strategic adjustment by the U.S. and President Obama’s new space policy could make a multilateral approach feasible. According to a PLA strategist assessing the new directions in U.S. space policy: If Obama, who champions the theme of change, forsakes the longtime U.S. strategy for space hegemony and is willing to pursue arms control in outer space through an international treaty, then, with effective mechanisms for monitoring and verification, the world community will be able to walk on the right track toward peaceful use of space, eradication of [the] arms race, and realization of permanent peace. 58 Broad consensus that US must discuss weaponization – Chinese uncertainty, stops international treaties,Blazejewski 8 – Kenneth S. Blazejewski, master's degree in public affairs from Princeton, JD degree from the New York University School of Law, Spring 2008, "Space Weaponization and US-China Relation" www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf The US refusal to engage in discussions on the weaponization of outer space imposes two significant costs. First, it increases Chinese uncertainty and suspicion, leading China to assume its worst-case scenario about US space weaponization. Second, it prevents the international community from developing new rules and norms in areas such as advancing situational awareness, coordinating launches, and deterring the further development and proliferation of ASAT weapons that could benefit US space assets. There is broad consensus that the United States can no longer afford to remain silent in the international debate on the weaponization of outer space. The Rumsfeld Commission, the US-China Commission, 51 and many spacearms-control advocates all recommend greater US participation in setting rules for the use of outer space beyond the existing legal framework. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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