Co op is the only way to ensure US leadership effectively and preserve US alliances- other actors can soft balance and also other nations could engage in just an arms race
Elhefnawy 6- Nader Elhefnawy, written on space policy and international security for several years. He is currently teaching at the University of Miami., The National Space Policy and space arms control, November 6 06, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1
[Over time soft balancing can turn into hard balancing. While, as stated before, other countries may not be able to engage the US in an arms race, their response need not be an attempt to match the US satellite for satellite, missile for missile, and laser for laser. Regional powers simply do not have to counter global ones on a one-to-one basis, and a “risk fleet” approach, like the one Germany pursued against Britain in World War 1, can tie down larger forces. Other countries can also invest in approaches that circumvent or overwhelm the space power the US is seeking to build. Both China and Russia are expanding their missile and nuclear capabilities, with the perceived need to be able to overwhelm American missile defenses a likely motive. China’s expansion is particularly problematic because it may encourage neighbors like India to bulk up their own forces. Submarine forces, special-operations forces, and computer warfare afford just a few non-nuclear ways of striking at an opponent about which overwhelming space power can do little.]
An agreement would be more effective at protecting US space assects and avoid negative effects of the use of
Elhefnawy 6- Nader Elhefnawy, written on space policy and international security for several years. He is currently teaching at the University of Miami., The National Space Policy and space arms control, November 6 06, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1
[In short, the opinions of other countries do matter—and the vision espoused by the hawks is a chimera. A case can be made that the current US lead in resources and technology would be best employed to slow down any further weaponization of space, and that there is a great deal of room for negotiation between the US and Chinese-Russian positions. Indeed, experts have already suggested numerous compromise positions, such as a ban on attacks on unarmed satellites or space-to-Earth weaponry, or a no-first-deployment agreement, all of which would allow missile defense and the use of active measures to protect US satellites. An agreement on space weapons could also be linked to strategic weaponry or other security concerns more generally.]
CP ev not nessisarly sovlo but it argues that space weaponization can only hurt us heg- due to the idea that us has best conventional military advantages
Gallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security,
For proponents of the SPACECOM vision, technological change and diffusion strengthen the case for space weapons by increasing American dependence on military and commercial satellites and by expanding potential threats to them. Their selective analysis ignores other countervailing effects of technological change and diffusion that strengthen traditional arguments for space weapons restraint:
- Technological advances are also occurring in non-space-based weapons systems, so it remains true that space weapons offer the United States few, if any, advantages for most military missions. For example, a combination of cruise missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles retrofitted with conventional warheads could provide access, reach, accuracy, and short response time comparable to space-based “global engagement” weapons at a fraction of the cost and no more international opprobrium than should be expected with a “bolt from the blue” space weapons attack. 61
More CP only option ev- Space Weaponization leads to prolif of space weap tech and would cause balancing
Gallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security,
- Technological diffusion means that if the United States deploys space weapons, a number of other countries have the ability to emulate or offset them, so the advantage to the United States would be short-lived. Now and for the foreseeable future, no country or combination of countries could match the United States in terms of total military space spending or technological sophistication of military space systems. This means that the United States can afford to exercise restraint knowing that other countries have even less incentive or ability to suddenly surge ahead of the US than the Soviets did during the Cold War. If, however, the United States continues to forge ahead toward highly threatening space weapons, plenty of countries have enough knowledge, resources, and capabilities to expand their military space operations in ways that would increase the net uncertainty, expense, and insecurity of US space activities. In a global economy, secrecy and export controls cannot protect the American technological advantage in space; instead, they sabotage the US satellite industry and motivate other countries to develop indigenous capabilities and cooperative arrangements that exclude the United States.62
CP solvo- US international co op would sustain us heg and would also solve other negative impacts and risks about space- economy- improved relations-
Krepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.,“Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option”
Rebuilding the political foundations for a more constructive space policy requires reevaluating the strategic circumstances associated with globalization. Space policy is but one of many security problems that illustrate the fallacies of assuming that the ascendance of the United States as the sole information-age superpower offers perpetual military dominance that can be used to achieve a wide range of American objectives regardless of other countries’ interests or concerns. Just as we saw that trends associated with globalization strengthen rather than undermine the logic of mutual restraint in space, the development and diffusion of other technologies that are integral to the global economy and that create new vulnerabilities provide powerful incentives for all countries, regardless of their historical animosities, to engage in forms of security collaboration that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War.70 A shared interest in preventing global terrorism, particularly acts of mass destruction, is motivating new forms of information sharing and policy coordination not only among the United States and its traditional allies, but also with Russia and other countries that are simultaneously cited as justifications for US military transformation. The United States also needs international support to use its military superiority in ways that are considered legitimate enough to avoid stimulating a counter-reaction. That support will be increasingly difficult to achieve unless other countries get more reliable reassurances that this concentration of power will provide protection for everyone — not just the favored few — and that it will not be used against anyone who displeases the United States but is not considered by the rest of the world to be a threat to international peace and security. It remains to be seen how long it will take for the United States to remember that if it wants more reliable cooperation, it must return to its traditional leadership role in building rules and institutions that shape everyone’s behavior for the benefit of all. Even before this general reorientation of US security policy occurs, the dangerous futility of trying to protect US space assets through competitive national programs should be clear enough to create the political conditions for a serious discussion of collaborative steps to enhance space security.
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