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CP key to prevent environment impacts form space weaponization
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- CP solvo/Space Weaponization bad- space laws could avoid miscalc through negotiation
- US efforts to go at it alone will not work to prevent space arms race- only if US takes the lead in wep development
- CP solves China Russia relations and arms race
CP key to prevent environment impacts form space weaponizationSpace weapons bad and co op good key to avoid harmful consequences of weaponization acid rain environment- other “bads”Moltz 2- James Moltz, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Protecting safe access to space: Lessons from the first 50 years of space security, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op1.htm [Given the presence of four shared factors in encouraging military space restraint across the three cases of greatest tension in space security from the 1957–2007 period, we can conclude with some confidence that these are general trends in space behavior, at least for the first 50 years of space activity. Arguably, military space restraint has worked most to the advantage of the USA, since it has been able to use this norm to develop the most advanced scientific, commercial, and military support programs in the world. Indeed, as strategist Barry Posen argues: [The United States] benefits from the fact that those states capable of space activities have eschewed putting weapons in space. The United States has made the same decision, on the assumption that if it did, so would others. Ultimately the United States has more to lose than to gain from such a competition [16]. Looking ahead, the continued presence among all leading actors in space of strong incentives to keep space weapons-free supports the case for the continued maintenance of core cooperative agreements (such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty) and the prospects for the strengthening of the current foundations of space security, either via rules of the road or more formal arrangements (such as a debris treaty, rather than a voluntary convention). Notably, in other recent areas of human activity affected by collective “bads,” such as acid rain, carbon emissions, and ozone depletion, enhanced international cooperation is emerging, slowly convincing skeptical nations to get on board, largely out of their own, long-term self-interests. National populations in many areas are demanding such collective action, as are a host of international organizations, non-profit groups, and even a growing number of private corporations.] CP solvo/Space Weaponization bad- space laws could avoid miscalc through negotiationGallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security, The prospects for miscommunication, misperception, and inadvertent conflict are multiplied in a world with many space powers unless the rules for cooperation are more clearly defined, states and non-state actors (e.g. commercial entities that may be only loosely associated with states) provide information to document their compliance with the rules, and international arrangements exist both to assist less developed countries with their compliance obligations and to address concerns about willful non-compliance. Of course, multilateral negotiations can be more challenging than bilateral ones, but skillful, motivated diplomats can take advantage of complexity to forge creative bargains and focus intense pressure on recalcitrant states. It is unrealistic to expect that multinational space cooperation will spontaneously increase and be sustained over time with no formal discussion, let alone negotiation, of new rules and reciprocal obligations to enhance mutual space security. It is equally unrealistic to hope that codes of conduct, rules of the road, parallel unilateral declarations, and other less formal arrangements can provide the same scope and stability of cooperation as full-scale legal agreements, without the corresponding difficulties of negotiation and ratification.64 US efforts to go at it alone will not work to prevent space arms race- only if US takes the lead in wep developmentKrepon and Clary 03- Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College., Clary is currently a PhD student in the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., Space Assurance or Space Dominance? Put another way, the dominant position of the United States provides agenda-setting powers in space. The flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities is surely inevitable if the United States takes the lead in this pursuit, but not if Washington maintains prudent hedges against unwelcome developments in the form of a readiness to respond in kind to any flight tests or deployments of space weapons by weaker states. These hedges, as discussed in Chapter 3, should be sufficiently persuasive to foreclose such a competition, unless weaker space-faring nations make very unwise choices. While a hedging strategy is necessary, it is also insufficient. Hedges against the flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities need to be accompanied by initiatives that underscore the positive and affirming uses of space for the benefit of humankind. Space assurance, broadly defined, also requires the reaffirmation of existing norms against the weaponization of space CP solves China Russia relations and arms raceUS not helping in space arms control- this is pissing off China and Russia killing relations and possibly resulting in an arms race between the US and an advisory internal netbenifitElhefnawy 6- Nader Elhefnawy, written on space policy and international security for several years. He is currently teaching at the University of Miami., The National Space Policy and space arms control, November 6 06, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1 [Nonetheless, explicitly ruling out even the consideration of arms control in the policy is unquestionably a diplomatic and political error, unnecessarily provocative to other states that already view US policy with alarm. All of this makes the new policy less of a surprise than a formalization of the movement of the US in this direction, though this is debatable where arms control is concerned. Despite the stated willingness to consider arms control in the previous document, the US government showed little sign of being willing to negotiate this matter long before the release of the new document. The abandonment of the ABM Treaty (much to the chagrin of Russia and China) and the more general refusal of the US to participate in new international agreements must have made it seem highly unlikely that a new agreement would be realized anytime soon. Nonetheless, explicitly ruling out even the consideration of arms control in the policy is unquestionably a diplomatic and political error, unnecessarily provocative to other states that already view US policy with alarm. For the last several years, Russia and China have been actively trying to build on the OST. On June 27, 2002 they presented a working paper titled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The paper proposed a treaty obliging signatories not to place “any kinds of weapons” in space or resort to force or the threat of force against space objects. This would rule out attacks on spacecraft by land-, sea-, and air-based systems. Russia and China have also presented a number of follow-up working papers to continue the case for a new agreement, despite US disinterest. The conventional wisdom appears to be that Russia and China are essentially impotent, and their disapproval irrelevant, which is not accurate. Even if neither they nor any other state is likely to engage the US in an arms race today, they have other options. Professor Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago recently wrote in the journal International Security about “soft balancing.” Where traditional “hard balancing” in balance of power politics centered on the use or threatened use of military force to counter the power of a threatening state, “soft balancing” involves the use of nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine moves by a state seen as aggressive. The denial of United Nations Security Council approval for the invasion of Iraq by France, Russia, and China, and the refusal of Saudi Arabia and Turkey to provide US forces complete access to their territory, are examples of such soft balancing against the United States prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.] CP solvo- Join in Russia China US negotiations about international rules and verification and transparency would help relations and solve weaponizationGallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security, Another suggestion is to precede PAROS negotiations by seeking international agreement on verification and transparency measures that would enhance space security “whether or not new treaty prohibitions are implemented.” Michael Krepon suggests that “if Russia and China are as concerned about an arms race in space as their public statements suggest, they will accept the application and adaptation of intrusive measures negotiated for other purposes to a space assurance regime” even though this would “require that Moscow accept even more openness regarding military practices established over the past two decades, and that Beijing adopt a sea change in attitude toward transparency.”67 Regardless of whether or not Russia and China are sincerely interested in mutual constraints on space weapons, they are unlikely to accept specific demands for intrusive verification, let alone undertake a “sea change” in attitudes toward transparency, before the United States even agrees to a negotiating mandate for a PAROS committee. It would be most unfortunate if we repeated the Cold War pattern of interpreting the rejection of a “first step measure” that asked the other side to make all the major concessions as evidence that they were more interested in competition than cooperation. CP solvency-Negotations would help avoid negative effects of space weaponization by improving relation ships and avoiding need to weaponizeMoltz 2-James Moltz, A longtime securities analyst and respected mentor cites the importance of geopolitics, Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control [For the Pentagon, such a regime would entail some limitations in terms of ASAT weapons, but it would also create an environment in which other states would find development of hostile systems extremely difficult without detection. For Congress, space would be protected for high-profile, civilian manned missions and lucrative commercial applications. For the arms control community, this regime would set the world a short distance down the “slope” of weaponizing space by allowing the use of low-Earth orbit for missile defense purposes from the Earth, sea, and air. However, the slope would no longer be “slippery,” as it is today, but would instead be marked with clear barriers against further descent. Detailed negotiations would be needed on how many tests to allow each state per year in low-Earth orbit and what debris mitigation techniques to require. Although this would affect mainly the United States in the short run, it would create a powerful set of restrictions for future space-faring states as well, thus protecting U.S. commercial and passive military interests in debris-free low-Earth orbit. In sum, a number of key players would come away from the table with tangible benefits.] CP solvo- US international co op would sustain us heg and would also solve other negative impacts and risks about space- economy- improved relations-Krepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.,“Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option” Rebuilding the political foundations for a more constructive space policy requires reevaluating the strategic circumstances associated with globalization. Space policy is but one of many security problems that illustrate the fallacies of assuming that the ascendance of the United States as the sole information-age superpower offers perpetual military dominance that can be used to achieve a wide range of American objectives regardless of other countries’ interests or concerns. Just as we saw that trends associated with globalization strengthen rather than undermine the logic of mutual restraint in space, the development and diffusion of other technologies that are integral to the global economy and that create new vulnerabilities provide powerful incentives for all countries, regardless of their historical animosities, to engage in forms of security collaboration that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War.70 A shared interest in preventing global terrorism, particularly acts of mass destruction, is motivating new forms of information sharing and policy coordination not only among the United States and its traditional allies, but also with Russia and other countries that are simultaneously cited as justifications for US military transformation. The United States also needs international support to use its military superiority in ways that are considered legitimate enough to avoid stimulating a counter-reaction. That support will be increasingly difficult to achieve unless other countries get more reliable reassurances that this concentration of power will provide protection for everyone — not just the favored few — and that it will not be used against anyone who displeases the United States but is not considered by the rest of the world to be a threat to international peace and security. It remains to be seen how long it will take for the United States to remember that if it wants more reliable cooperation, it must return to its traditional leadership role in building rules and institutions that shape everyone’s behavior for the benefit of all. Even before this general reorientation of US security policy occurs, the dangerous futility of trying to protect US space assets through competitive national programs should be clear enough to create the political conditions for a serious discussion of collaborative steps to enhance space security. 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