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CP solvency general prevention of space weponization
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- An agreement would be more effective at protecting US space assects and avoid negative effects of the use of
- Co op and bans on space weaponization good- avoids bad parts of it as well and provide military advantage
- CP solvo- rules of the road aspects fo the cp /+
- International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is key
- CP key to develop create international co op to prevent space weaponization
- Code of conduct solvency
CP solvency general prevention of space weponizationCP solvo- expansion of norms about space weapons- including no flight testingKrepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt., Avoiding the Weaponization of Space [An essential element of space assurance is the strengthening of existing norms against the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. Many norms for responsible space-faring nations already exist, including prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the aforementioned Outer Space Treaty, helping astronauts in distress, registering space objects, accepting liability for damage caused by national endeavors in space, and acknowledging that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries and humankind. The scope of existing norms needs to be expanded if space assurance is to be reinforced. Traditionally, the forum in which international norms are codified is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This 65-nation body operates by consensus, however, and at best requires many years to reach agreement on treaty texts, which might then be stalled further in the process of ratification, as is now the case with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This reason is not sufficient to block or reject negotiations in the CD relating to the prevention of space weapons, but it does suggest the wisdom of reinforcing existing norms in quicker ways. The development of a code of conduct establishing agreed “rules of the road” for responsible space-faring nations can expedite international efforts to prevent the weaponization of space. Many codes of conduct already exist in the form of bilateral or multilateral executive agreements. During the Cold War, the United States entered into executive agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent dangerous military practices at sea, on the ground, and in the air. The Bush Administration champions codes of conduct to prevent ballistic missile proliferation and terrorism. A similar approach could reinforce space assurance. ] An agreement would be more effective at protecting US space assects and avoid negative effects of the use ofElhefnawy 6- Nader Elhefnawy, written on space policy and international security for several years. He is currently teaching at the University of Miami., The National Space Policy and space arms control, November 6 06, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1 [In short, the opinions of other countries do matter—and the vision espoused by the hawks is a chimera. A case can be made that the current US lead in resources and technology would be best employed to slow down any further weaponization of space, and that there is a great deal of room for negotiation between the US and Chinese-Russian positions. Indeed, experts have already suggested numerous compromise positions, such as a ban on attacks on unarmed satellites or space-to-Earth weaponry, or a no-first-deployment agreement, all of which would allow missile defense and the use of active measures to protect US satellites. An agreement on space weapons could also be linked to strategic weaponry or other security concerns more generally.] Co op and bans on space weaponization good- avoids bad parts of it as well and provide military advantageMoltz 2- James Moltz, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Protecting safe access to space: Lessons from the first 50 years of space security, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op1.htm [Finally, another factor that transcends the three historical cases has been the role of transparency in promoting cooperation. In dealing with space nuclear testing and in assessing debris from kinetic-kill weapons tests, national decision makers have been able to act with confidence that they will know if their adversary attempts to achieve any “breakout” capability. Unlike in other environments, where the development of new destructive capabilities can often be hidden, the fact that space weapons need to be launched and tested in an internationally governed and highly transparent region allows any other country with a reasonable space surveillance system—such as the type possessed by both the USA and the USSR/Russia since the late 1960s and by at least also members of the European Space Agency and China today—can be confident that they will detect the development of any major weapons systems. This factor should play a positive role in weakening the credibility of claims that “secret” programs by potential enemies might create a “catastrophe” some day in space. Looking ahead, however, it must be noted that there may be limitations on this factor. Specifically, when speaking about non-kinetic weapons (such as lasers) and the activities of small satellites, it will be more difficult to detect the acquisition of potentially harmful capabilities by opponents in space. On the other hand, just as stealth technologies are moving forward, technologies for detection—including through on-board sensors—are advancing as well. Thus, there is likely be a continuing ability to track most capabilities and to continue to have confidence that any significant military advantages are not being acquired by other players in space.] CP solvo- rules of the road aspects fo the cp /+Krepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS An alternative or complementary approach would be to pursue a code of conduct or agreed “rules of the road” for responsible space-faring nations. The resulting accords could take the form of bilateral or multilateral executive agreements. During the Cold War, the United States entered into executive agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent dangerous military practices at sea, on the ground and in the air. Comparable cooperative measures could also provide useful building blocks for a space assurance regime. A model code of conduct for responsible sea-faring nations was negotiated in 1972 after a series of highly dangerous military manoeuvres between US and Soviet combatants and naval aircraft. The 1972 Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (“Incidents at Sea” agreement) established important rules of the road. These include avoiding collisions at sea; not interfering in the formations of the other party; avoiding “maneuvers through areas of heavy sea traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect”; requiring that “ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance”; using mutually agreed signals when ships manoeuvre near one another; not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the other party’s ships; informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; requiring the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party; and not permitting simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them. The US–Soviet Incidents at Sea (or INCSEA) accord has served as a model for comparable agreements signed by more than 30 other navies. International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is keyKrepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS There is a widespread international desire to avoid the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. At the same time, a number of nations appear to be hedging their bets by engaging in research and development programmes that would allow them to compete effectively in the event that another country crosses these thresholds first. Only one country—the United States—has publicly endorsed a doctrine of “space dominance” that includes “space force application”. The full fruition of this doctrine would deepen fissures in alliance ties and relations among major powers, whose assistance is most needed to form “coalitions of the willing” to stop and reverse proliferation. The choice between space assurance and space weapons is therefore fundamentally important since it will shape the contours of international security, global commerce, alliance ties and relations between major powers. The United States and other countries cannot have it both ways: the flight testing and deployment of space weapons will come at the expense of space assurance, and space assurance is undermined by the pursuit of space weapons. The United States’ choice is therefore stark and clear: it can either take the initiative to flight-test and deploy space weapons on the assumption that 51 conflict in space is inevitable or useful, or it can seek to reinforce an interlocking network of restraints designed to avoid the crossing of these key thresholds. US restraint, however, would not ensure similar restraint by others. Indeed, potential adversaries might mistakenly conclude that they could gain advantage by covertly developing, flight-testing and then using space weapons against the United States first. CP key to develop create international co op to prevent space weaponizationHays and Danielson 9- Peter Hays, Senior Scientist, Policy and Strategy Division Science Applications International Corporation National Security Space Office, Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology, National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC, Improving Space Security through Enhanced [Developing sustainable space security through enhanced international cooperation is a critical issue for the US and all spacefaring actors. The need to improve international space cooperation stems from the burgeoning importance of space, the growing number major foreign space actors, and the increasing efficacy of their space capabilities. In the past, when the US was a more dominant space actor, it sometimes made sense to go it alone. Today, as its relative spacepower declines, the US can bolster prospects for advancing sustainable space security by expanding international space cooperation and improving the effectiveness of these efforts. It is not a panacea, but improving international space cooperation can broaden and deepen the pool of responsible space stewards, make more efficient use of limited resources, and spotlight those actors who choose not to cooperate.] should create a ban- US is a part of this organization and that they should ban most militarizationJohnson 02- Rebecca Johnson, Dr. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University. In addition, she is currently completing a Masters in Divinity at Wesley Theological Seminary with concentrations in ethics and world religions., CHAPTER 3 SECURITY WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS1 [George Bunn and John Rhinelander, legal advisers to earlier US Administrations, have argued that the OST created an “overall rule [that] 74 space shall be preserved for peaceful purposes for all countries”.33 They argue that OST parties would have the right under the treaty to request consultations if another party planned to test or deploy in space a laser or kinetic kill vehicle capable of being used as an ASAT, a description that would cover the space-based component of the Bush Administration’s multi-layered missile defence architecture. Endorsing that OST parties should make use of this provision and request formal consultations with the United States, Jonathan Dean also proposed that nations could pass a resolution in the General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to give an advisory opinion on whether testing or orbiting space weapons of any kind would be contrary to the core rule and objective of the OST that space be maintained for peaceful purposes. On the grounds that the testing or use of space weapons would jeopardize national technical means of verification, enshrined in several treaties and agreements, and the commercial uses of space, he also suggests that legal action could be taken to prevent such threats, utilizing international and US courts, as appropriate.34] Compromise on ban of missile defense-would allow some form but not all forms and help avoid the tech that would cause arms race and full scale wepJohnson 02- Rebecca Johnson, Dr. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University. In addition, she is currently completing a Masters in Divinity at Wesley Theological Seminary with concentrations in ethics and world religions., CHAPTER 3 SECURITY WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS1 [Another proposal builds on an earlier Bunn proposal to distinguish between weapons in low and high orbit. With the aim of getting the support of key actors among the inevitable weaponizers and militarization realists, James Clay Moltz argued the case for prohibiting the use, testing or 75 deployment of weapons or interceptors of any sort above 500 miles and prohibiting the stationing of weapons in LEO. His proposal would permit the testing (and presumably use) of ground-based, sea-based and air-based interceptors in LEO against ballistic missiles but not against satellites or other space-based objects (while recognizing that implementation of this would have to rely on taboo-building and confidence, since verification techniques would be unable to distinguish between permitted ABM interceptors and banned ASAT purposes).36 While such a compromise would be unlikely to satisfy the space hawks, it allows key elements of the Bush Administration’s missile defence plans, while clear barriers would prevent space-based lasers or kinetic kill weapons, and might therefore head off the escalation to higher levels of space weaponization that many fear as the most threatening and destabilizing facet of the missile defence project.] Code of conduct solvencyKrepon 5 – Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Prior to co-founding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. 2005, "Space Security or Space Weapons?" www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson_Space_brief.pdf The peaceful uses of outer space can be promoted by a Code of Conduct to clarify “rules of the road” for responsible nations. Codes of conduct exist to prevent dangerous military practices on the ground, in the air, and at sea. For example, during the Cold War, Washington and Moscow negotiated an agreement to prevent incidents at sea. This agreement requires both navies to avoid collisions and not to interfere with each other’s ships. More than thirty other navies adopted similar agreements. The United States has been wise to set standards to prevent dangerous military practices on the sea, on the ground, and in the air. Space also deserves "rules of the road" to help prevent incidents and dangerous military activities. The Henry L. Stimson Center has drafted a Model Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations. It can be found at www.stimson.org/space. OTHER CODES OF CONDUCT Incidents at Sea Agreement (1972) Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (1989) International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002) Proliferation Security Initiative (2003) KEY ELEMENTS OF A SPACE CODE OF CONDUCT NO Flight-testing of space weapons Deployment of space weapons Simulated attacks in space Harmful use of lasers YES Creating special caution areas in space Avoiding collisions in space Avoiding dangerous maneuvers in space Debris mitigation and reduction Cooperative traffic management Registration and notification of launches Space deserves “rules of the road” to help prevent incidents and dangerous military activities. RULES OF THE ROAD ARE NEEDED IN SPACE Why is a Code of Conduct for space-faring nations needed? Because agreed rules can make us safer and better off by promoting national security and global commerce. Agreed rules also make it easier to identify and build coalitions against those who choose to violate them. But rules do not matter to bad actors. And laws are frequently broken. That doesn’t make the laws irrelevant or unimportant. Rules still matter. We also need to take action against rule breakers. How do we punish rule breakers if we can’t send police to outer space? The United States is the strongest nation on Earth. We don’t have to go into space to punish rule breakers Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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