Are engagement mechanisms effective?
In the previous two sections, I have considered the first two research questions posed by this thesis: what are the roots of hostility and resistance between fire fighters and residents, and how are these explained by social identity approaches. In this section, I will start to look at the practical application of this research project, continued more fully in the next section, by asking the final research question: to what extent are current engagement mechanisms effective? As discussed above, and listed in Appendix 6, AFRS conduct a wide range of interventions in the community. These are based on a number of different theoretical positions, including a number discussed previously in the Literature Review, but which tend not to be overtly acknowledged by the fire service or the fire fighters delivering the interventions. However, understanding the theoretical basis of the work is a useful tool in understanding the way in which this package of measures is delivered, whether they are effective in themselves and congruent as a whole.
A key set of interventions conducted by AFRS appear to be premised on contact theory, which suggests that groups are in conflict with one another because group members stereotype and are prejudiced against members of other groups (Allport 1954). It is thought that by putting groups in a positive situation where cooperation is required for a superordinate goal to be reached, personal relationships can be formed, stereotypes and prejudice rejected and conflict reduced. Although few in the fire service are likely to cite contact hypothesis if asked, there is a clear link between the theory and the practice: community fire safety centres have been established in communities that are perceived as problematic in the hope that establishing a presence will lead to improved relationships and an increased level of trust, hopefully leading to fewer fires. Some of the informal schools schemes seem to work in a similar way: fire fighters go to some of Bristol’s ‘tougher’ schools with professional rugby players to coach rugby. The groups play alongside each other, without the fire fighters giving any overt fire safety messages, and only disclosing their profession if asked. In this way, it is hoped that relationships can be established with some of the boys, who will then advocate for fire fighters in potentially volatile situations. By developing a reputation for being ‘sound’, fire fighters hope that fire safety messages and in schools interventions will be better received.
However, contact has been shown not to be universally successful (Dixon, Durrheim et al. 2005, Dixon, Durrheim 2004), and tends to be dependent on precise situations (Pettigrew 1998), (Reicher 2004). Of particular relevance to this research project are further critiques which suggest that contact theory fails to address the roots of conflict (Dixon, Durrheim et al. 2005), or may allow for it to reemerge. This may well impact on the effectiveness of contact based interventions, especially where they are based on the underlying assumptions of the contact hypothesis, and these approaches are perhaps particularly likely to be met with resistance, with the additional potential that they will exacerbate existing problems. Further, the data collected through the various studies demonstrates that fire fighters are not universally welcome in communities, and that on occasion, their presence, although envisaged as breaking down barriers and improving contact, can actually have the opposite effective. This was seen to be the case especially in the vignettes presented in Study 3, and, pertinent also to police work (Skogan 2006) it may be the case that contact with the fire service in the community actually has a negative impact on perceptions of the service.
Other interventions, such as those dealing with ‘cleaner, safer, greener’ issues seem to be based on ideas stemming from broken windows theories (Wilson, Kelling 1982, Taylor 1999). As with the contact hypothesis, there are clear links between AFRS activity and broken windows theory. Although interventions which remove or report waste or abandoned vehicles have an overt fire prevention focus, by removing the fuel for a fire, they also fit in with a wider social agenda, very much espoused by community safety partnerships and regeneration practitioners, whereby environmental interventions, designed to make areas cleaner, safer, and greener, also have a knock on societal effect. AFRS are closely linked in with these activities, for example through local ‘days of action’ and are instrumental in their organisation, not just their execution, and their involvement in this area demonstrates their attempts to link in with other service providers. However, as discussed in the literature review, broken windows theory can have the effect of blaming residents for the consequences of their own poverty and it should be acknowledged that physical incivilities have a number of roots, not all of which can be addressed through short term clean up campaigns.
Further, data collected, for example through the focus groups, suggested that residents were somewhat confused by AFRS conducting work which did not seem to be fire related, and potentially thinking less of them for doing so. This type of ‘mission creep’ has the dual effect of potentially alienating residents who do not understand why AFRS are not doing their core work, as well as opening the way for criticism when, for instance, waste is not collected. The more different areas the fire service are involved in, as discussed above, the greater the possibility of criticism.
Much of AFRS business is concerned with areas which are typified by social exclusion, with residents of neighbourhood renewal areas twice as likely to die or be injured in a fire as residents of more affluent areas (Arson Control Forum 2004). Needless to say, these are also areas that are covered by a number of area based initiatives aimed to address these related issues in whole or in part. Although probably not familiar with the different discourses of social exclusion (Levitas, 1998), fire fighters on the ground are acutely aware of its effects, of over crowded housing, furniture dating from before regulatory improvement, and a concentration of demographic risk factors, such as single parent families, elderly and disabled people. However, it is the moral underclass discourse which is perhaps most pervasive amongst operational fire fighters, who see, on a daily basis, the effects of smoking, chip pans and heavy alcohol / drug use. This is exacerbated by fire related ASB and attacks on crews to a point where certain neighbourhoods become stigmatised. Although this does not impact on operational response in emergency situations, it may impact on the ability of crews to engage with residents in these neighbourhoods, and an increased difficulty in relaying fire safety messages.
Further, the different ways in which exclusion is used (Levitas 2005), can, like broken windows theory, come to blame the excluded for their own exclusion (Murray, Lister et al. 1996). Processes of exclusion are mirrored in patterns of fire risk (Communities and Local Government 2008) and at times it seems as if fire fighters are complicit in these types of moral underclass discourse. Further, as discussed at length above, the fire service are just one of a panoply of public agencies providing services to residents in hard pressed areas. Where these are seen as unduly intrusive, residents may be more likely to close ranks against them, seeing them as just another interfering public service, and not as the unique service provider the fire service see themselves as being. Further, although allaying some of the more relevant effects of social exclusion may fall within the purview of the fire service, clearly effecting wider social change may be somewhat beyond their remit. However, one method for both understanding and attempting to combat social exclusion is social capital, and much of the engagement work which AFRS performs could be seen to be in this way. Unfortunately, and as discussed in Chapter Two, there are a range of critiques of social capital, including its ability to limit diversity (Crawford 2006), especially where groups are not themselves open to it (Baigent 2001, Bain 2002). Furthermore, where the local norms of a neighbourhood tolerate or condone anti social behaviour, celebrating neighbourhood distinctiveness might send rather mixed messages.
A number of AFRS interventions very clearly attempt to tackle ASB itself, with a heavy emphasis on that ASB caused predominantly by young people, such as vehicle arson and hoax calls. Although some of AFRS’s ASB interventions are popular with some fire fighters, and in communities, they could be seen as problematic in two main ways. Firstly, behaviours such as vehicle arson, making hoax calls, misuse of fireworks and attacking fire crews are all illegal, and are covered by various different areas of legislation. Conflating them with behaviours which are lower impact, less dangerous and not criminal both devalues the danger of some of these behaviours – vehicle arson, for example, could be fatal – and exaggerates the impact of lesser behaviours, such as the visibility of young people in public. Secondly, and in a related point, by seeking to tackle this range of ASB, AFRS are at risk of buying into discourses which stigmatise certain communities and groups (Prior 2009), with the possible result that their actions prove counter productive, as communities close ranks against fire service personnel who are seen as antagonistic to their needs or their culture.
Viewed in the whole, it seems that the fire service has an enormous remit in addition to its ‘bread and butter’ fire and rescue work, and this is no doubt as overwhelming for fire service personnel as it has been for me. The range of different initiatives is confusing both for AFRS personnel and for the resident who is the consumer of these services. Broadly, this can be seen as stemming from a lack of direction at a strategic level. If this was to be addressed, alongside a clearer theoretical input, initiatives on the ground would become both more consistent, better managed and complementary to one another’s aims. AFRS have a lot of resources at their disposal, and a degree of goodwill in many communities. The messages they espouse and the interventions they perform can be literally lifesaving. It would be a shame if a lack of congruence in the delivery of these messages was to prove counterproductive to their execution. As such, although a lot of good work is conducted through current engagement mechanisms, they are not as effective as they could be. The implications for this are discussed in the next section.
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