Foreign students graduate courses

II Investment

Investment theory under uncertainty

Irreversibility

III Growth

Extensions of the basic model

Endogenous growth theory

IV Overlapping generations model and welfare state

Welfare state and social security

Ricardian equivalence

V Real Business Cycle

VI New-keynesian models

Why does money affects output? Price staggering models

The New Neo-Classical Synthesis and optimal monetary policy

EDUCATIONAL AIM

The course will analyse the basics of the modern dynamic macroeconomic theory.

READING LIST

The course will be mostly based on papers analysed during the lectures. Reference material can be found in Aghion, P., e Howitt, P.; (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, Ch. 1, 2. Bagliano, F. e Bertola,G., (1999) Metodi dinamici e fenomeni macroeconomici, il Mulino,ch.1, 2, 4. Barro, R.J. e Sala-I-Martin, X., (1995) Economic Growth, Mc Graw Hill, parti. Blanchard, O. J.; e Kiyotaki, N., (1987) Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand, American Economic Review, 77, 4, pp. 647-66. Blanchard, O.J. e Fisher, S., (1989), Lectures on Macroeconomics, MIT Press, ch. 2,3. Blanchard, O.J., (1985), Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 2, pp. 223-47. Romer, D. Advanced Macroeconomics, Mc Graw Hill, ch 2.8. Romer, D., (1996) Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill, ch. 1,2-2.8 e 2.12, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8. Taylor, J.B e Woodford, M., (1999) Handbook of Macroeconomics, North Holland, ch. 14, 15.

ASSESSMENT

Written

ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS

6 and 9 ECTS
LEVEL

GRADUATE
YEAR

FIRST
SEMESTER

SECOND
LECTURER:

PAOLO BERTOLETTI (1 ST PART)

ALBERTO CAVALIERE (2ND PART)

9 ECTS

Part I

Utility maximization: optimal consumption choices and the Marshallian demand system.

The expenditure minimization problem: compensated (Hicksian) demands, Slutsky equation and duality in consumption.

Applications: classes of utility functions, labour supply, revealed preference and Marshallian consumer surplus.

The theory of production choices: technology descriptions, the production function and firms’ behaviour.

The profit maximization hypothesis: optimal production choices, the unconditional input demand system and the supply function.

Cost minimization: cost functions, Envelope Theorem and duality in production.

Applications: profit, cost and input demand functions under alternative technologies, the elasticity of substitution.

Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games. 1.1. Introduction. 1.2 What is a game. 1.3 The extensive form representation of a Game 1.4 Strategies and the normal form representation of a game 1.5 Randomized Choices

Simultaneous-Move Games. 2.1 introduction. 2.2 Dominant and dominated strategies. 2.3 Rationalizable strategies 2.4 Nash Equilibrium 2.5 Games of incomplete information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Dynamic Games. 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction and subgame perfection. 3.3 Beliefs and Sequential Ratuionality.

Applications to oligopoly theory: 4.1 Bertrand competition 4.2 Cournot Competition 4.3 Collusion and Repeated Games 4.4 Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation: equilibrium and entry issues.

The Economics of Information 5.1 The Principal-Agent problem 5.2 Full information: monopoly 5.3 Full information: competitive solution 5.4 Hidden Action: monopoly solution 5.5 Hidden action: competitive market 5.6 Hidden information: monopoly 5.7 Market equilibrium: hidden information and adverse selection 5.8 Signalling and Signalling games.

The course aims to provide students with the foundations of modern microeconomics, with respect to both strategic and non strategic individual choices. It presents the basic duality results in consumer and production theory, and the game theoretical analysis of oligopoly behaviour and choice under asymmetric information

Part I: Hal Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton 1993: Chapters 1-10.

Part II A. Mas Colell, M.D. Whinston, J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. Chapters 7, 8, 9, 12 and par. 13.C.; Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 1993, third edition, chapter 25.
ASSESSMENT

Written exam and oral (optional)

6 ECTS
EDUCATIONAL AIM

The course aims to provide students with the foundations of modern microeconomics, with particular reference to strategic choices. After an introduction to non cooperative game theory the course will provide students with a game theoretical analysis of oligopoly, considering also product differentiation issues.

Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games. 1.1. Introduction. 1.2 What is a game. 1.3 The extensive form representation of a Game 1.4 Strategies and the normal form representation of a game 1.5 Randomized Choices

Simultaneous-Move Games. 2.1 introduction. 2.2 Dominant and dominated strategies. 2.3 Rationalizable strategies 2.4 Nash Equilibrium 2.5 Games of incomplete information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Dynamic Games. 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction and subgame perfection. 3.3 Beliefs and Sequential Rationality.

Applications to oligopoly theory: 4.1 Bertrand competition 4.2 Cournot Competition 4.3 Collusion and Repeated Games 4.4 Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation: equilibrium and entry issues.
READING LIST

A. Mas Colell, M.D. Whinston, J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. Chapters 7, 8, 9, 12. Further references will be given during the lectures

GRADUATE
YEAR

FIRST
SEMESTER

FIRST
LECTURER:

PAOLO GIUDICI
E-MAIL:

giudici@unipv.it

COURSE PROGRAM:
Basic analysis of datas

Classification and regression models

Linear models

Comparison between models

Quality analysis

Risk management

Credit risk

Operative risk

Reputation analysis


EDUCATIONAL AIM

The purpose of the course is to furnish the methodological tools, necessary to the students to effect elaborations and analysis of statistic data, particularly for the characteristic applications of the economic and social sciences. The theoretical lessons will be equipped by exercises developed in the computer classroom

Further information available on: http://www-1.unipv.it/wwwscpol/

GRADUATE
YEAR

FIRST
SEMESTER

FIRST
LECTURER:

Cerchiello Paola and Giorgio Vittadini
For more information please see the Collegio website.

ANALISI DELLA CONGIUNTURA

BUSINESS CYCLE ANALYSIS
6 ECTS
LEVEL

GRADUATE
YEAR

FIRST
SEMESTER

SECOND
LECTURER:

CARLUCCIO BIANCHI
E-MAIL:

cbianchi@eco.unipv.it

COURSE PROGRAM:

Aims of short-run business cycle analysis; definition and measures of economic fluctuations; data and indicators available for analyzing the short run behaviour of the economic system; techniques and methodologies for assessing and forecasting the short run dynamics of economic activity; discussion of case studies; analysis and use of standard structural and ad hoc business cycle models; examination of the most common short run business cycle reports and forecasts by international organizations (such as IMF, OECD and EU) and national research centres (such as Government, Bank of Italy, ISAE, Confindustria, Prometeia, Ref, Unicredit, Banca Intesa, etc.).

The course purports to examine the various techniques and methodologies currently used by business cycle analysts in assessing and forecasting the short run dynamics of economic activity. After illustrating the type of information and indicators available for studying the short run behaviour of any economic system, there will be a classroom analysis and discussion of various case studies, through the examination of the most common business cycle reports and forecasts by international organizations and national research centres. The lectures will also host interventions of external business cycle experts who will show the students the techniques and results of their institutions’ short run analysis and forecasts. The final aim of the course is to enable students to write an essay on the short run dynamics of the Italian economy and to provide a forecast of its macroeconomic behaviour in the near future.