NCs On framework – Assumes the initial social contract was legitimate – future generations didn't consent to the sovereign so the contract is no longer binding Birthplace is arbitrary, so any theory based on borders violates the axiom of equality "Contractual necessity" doesn't imply absolute sovereignty – if the government fails to promote the original purpose of the contract, then sedition is permitted On the contention – Speech is a prerequisite to determining if the sovereign is legitimate – denying the value of speech for determining ethics is a performative contradiction since that's exactly what framework debate is. Turn – the highest sovereign in the US is the USFG, not public colleges. Since the Supreme Court has commanded colleges to protect speech, removing restrictions is key to complying with the sovereign. A2 Scarsdale Kant NC Their framework assumes that colleges have a consistent intention, which is false: Colleges change administrations Colleges are conglomerates of many administrators and professors with different aims Their frameworks start from the position of equal access which is not actually met, obligating us to correct injustice
Bruenig 14 [(Matt, cites political theorist Charles Mills) “Charles Mills on White Liberalism”] AT
One such methodological assumption, Mills argues, is the assumption that the proper way to philosophize about political justice is through the use of "ideal theory." Under an ideal theory approach to theorizing about politics, the requirements of justice are derived by imagining how best to construct a system from scratch at the beginning of history. You see this ideal theory approach present in theorizing about the "state of nature," the "veil of ignorance", and the "original position" more generally. In all cases, you essentially construct an ideal society at the beginning of time and then use that ideal society to determine the justness of institutions in actually-existing societies and to prescribe ways to make those societies more just. The decision to use ideal theory to ferret out the requirements of justice is not, according to Mills, a neutral one. Instead, it is one that tracks the justice concerns of the white philosophers who comprise the tradition that continues to this day to rely on this method. For white philosophers, expository devices that operationally exclude all of history pose no particular problem. History is largely irrelevant to the kinds of justice concerns that press upon white populations. To the extent that it is relevant, it's only marginally so and therefore easily relegated to an after-the-fact special consideration that is separate from the core theories. This is not the case for non-whites as the ghosts of historical injustices heavily factor into their present justice needs. For these populations, the issues of rectificatory and reparative justice are not secondary issues best treated as footnoted exceptions. Rather, they are center stage. Whereas white philosophers operating in the racially-exclusionary liberal tradition find it most fitting to start with ideal theory and then move on to non-ideal historical problems as a side issue, a less racially-biased philosophical tradition would go in the reverse order. Abstract thought experiments that walled off history (as in ideal theory) would at minimum be replaced with ones that fully included history into their considerations. Instead of asking, as in Rawls, what kind of political institutions people would select at the beginning of time if they didn't know who in that society they'd wind up being, you would ask what kind of institutions those same people would select if they knew the society they would blindly enter into has a legacy of racist oppression that has set the stage for lasting racial disparities. That the liberal tradition continues to select the ideal theory approach to contemplating justice, even as it marginalizes the justice concerns of non-white people, is, according to Mill, a legacy of its racist origins and the philosophical methodologies those origins set in place.
No link – the plan doesn't overturn speech codes or anti-harassment laws – only zoning where free speech is allowed Turn – student activism builds collective resistance against racism both on and off campus – that's Curwen – the black power movement, anti-apartheid, and civil rights movement prove Missing internal link to the NC – colleges wouldn't be responsible for hate speech since they don't cause it A2 Sedition Bad Revolution is sometimes needed – Kant agrees
Cummiskey 8 [David Cummiskey, "JUSTICE AND REVOLUTION IN KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY," Current Trends in American Kantian Scholarship; Cambridge Scholar Publishers 2008] AZ
Although Kant rejects happiness based principles of justice, his theory of justice has a clear consequentialist element. The juridical postulate of practical reason (the duty to make property possible) entails a duty to bring about a state of affairs where reciprocal property rights are determined by and enforced by a united general will. We are to do whatever is necessary, including using violent means, to bring about this juridical state of affairs. Given these consequentialist aspects of Kant’s theory of justice, in principle, it must be permissible to use coercive or violent means to undermine, reform, or remove a regime using coercive power to perpetuate a non-juridical state of affairs. Whether, in any particular circumstance, violent revolutionary activity is also advisable must be determined by difficult, pragmatic, consequentialist considerations. Caution should, of course, rule such decisions. Still, there are unfortunate cases where the calculus is clear and action is called for. Revolution is not only permissible, it is also, regrettably, sometimes required.
And, restricting freedom of speech puts the sovereign in contradiction with its supreme authority, undermining the omnilateral will.
Suprenant 15 – bracketed for gendered language Chris W. “Kant on the Virtues of a Free Society” April 7th 2015 https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society JW
The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where [her] his actions “put [her] him in contradiction with himself.” This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violate the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., academics), as undermining his own authority.
CRF no date [Constitutional Rights Foundation, A "Clear and Present Danger"] AZ
Thus, according to Justice Douglas, "freedom of speech, though not absolute, is protected against censorship or punishment unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."
A2 Must Have Trigger Warnings
Counterinterpretation – the affirmative does not have to give a trigger warning before [whatever] Trigger warnings sap agency from the oppressed and aren't effective at treating PTSD
Robbins 16 [Susan Robbins (professor of social work at University of Houston), "From the Editor—Sticks and Stones: Trigger Warnings, Microaggressions, and Political Correctness," Journal of Social Work Education, 1/19/2016] AZ
As a profession that increasingly relies on evidence-based practices, it is also important to examine the extant research on trauma treatment. A comprehensive examination of treatment for PTSD has shown exposure therapy to be the most effective intervention for those who have experienced sexual assault. Yet trigger warnings accomplish exactly the opposite by allowing trauma victims to avoid all mention and images related to the trauma, which may in fact have the opposite effect and be reinforcing. In addition, there is sound evidence that reorganizing one’s identity around a traumatic event can exacerbate PTSD and lead to poorer mental health outcomes (McNally, 2014). If we are to foster resilience in our students, trigger warnings may have the opposite effect and keep them embedded in a culture of victimization. Finally, if this trend continues (and I suspect that it will), given the fact that social work education routinely covers most, if not all, the topics that are thought to be triggers, it may be prudent to let applicants to our programs know in advance that such content is mandated by the very nature of our profession. This will allow them to make fully informed choices about entering the field of social work. Permitting students to opt out of lectures or readings to avoid content that may cause discomfort or canceling entire lectures or classes to assuage student fears of emotional distress does a disservice to our students and to the profession.
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