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AT – Epistemology First




Epistemology alternatives fail – they inevitably devolve to hegemonic educational structures and are no more accurate than SQuo methods



Ilan Gur-Ze’ev NoDate

(Haifa University) “Toward a non-repressive critical pedagogy.” No date. Accessed 1/19/11.

http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html
From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of “feelings”, “experience”, and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory and  ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function “successfully”. However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. “Truth” is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of “difference” take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting “the truth”, “the facts”, or “the real interests of the group” - even if conceived as valid only  for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on “facts” of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.


AT – Root Cause




Policymaking can ameliorate the impacts even if it’s incorrect about the root cause



Walt 5

(“The relationship between theory and policy in international relations” Annual review of political science, 23-48)


Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge (e.g., how large are the opponent’s forces? What is the current balance of payments?). Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study (Mearsheimer 1989).3 A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws. An empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. Such laws (e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”) can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, or if our explanations for them are incorrect.


AT – Value to Life Impacts

SURVIVAL KEY TO ANY VALUE TO LIFE



Emrich, ‘5

Kerry [http://all-about.typer.ys.pl/health/defeat-fear-of-death-14174.htm, August 1, “Defeat Fear of Death,” Accessed 1-12-05, JT]


The only realistic fear related to death would be to be afraid of dying from things we can avoid, such as lions, tigers, or war. We can prepare and make plans to avoid such things, to increase the time we have left on this planet. We must live out each day free from the fear of death but still plan to avoid the factors that we can control.

This danger avoidance helps us to prepare and make plans so that we are not currently in any danger. This can be achieved by learning how to swim to help avoid drowning (which of course is a cause of death) and to make to further prepare to learn to avoid or minimize other dangers. Another example of this would be to wear our seatbelt while driving to reduce the risk of injury or death if we are involved in an accident.



Death is a natural part of life, and we must remember that all things will die one day. We can prepare ourselves spiritually for death. This can be formal such as going to church, or other religious temple, or as simple as meditation or simply being a good person.

It is also quite common to have regrets when we die. We can do many things other than to simply have a fear of death to prepare for it, and to reduce the pain of our friends and family when that day comes. Paying our bills, making sure we have insurance to cover our funeral, planning our funeral, these are all things that will reduce the stress and anxiety of others. Each day we can do good things to make our life more meaningful and give us a sense of purpose.




Life is a prerequisite to value



Piper 79

John, Pastor, June 1, 1979 (“the Ethics of Ayn Rand,”) http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/Articles/ByDate/1979/1486_the_ethics_of_ayn_rand/

Rand argued that “life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself” (VS, 17). She did not mean mere existence, but rather the life appropriate to the nature of the organism. No more ultimate value than life can be conceived for any given organism when life is defined as the fullness of existence appropriate to one’s nature. But not only is life the highest value of any given organism; life is also that alone which makes the concept of values possible (VS, 16). For, since a “value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep . . . it presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative” (VS, 15). Therefore, without life values are not possible, and so life must be valuable since on it hangs the very validity of the concept of values. If one is to conceive of values at all, they must ascribe value to life or else contradict himself by devaluing that which makes his very devaluation possible.


EVEN IN THE MIDST OF BARE LIFE, STRUGGLE KEEPS US ALIVE. ANY HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE IS BETTER THAN THE ALTERNATIVE



Thomas 6

Abraham, Jan. 24, [http://ezinearticles.com/?On-Failing-To-Discover-The-Meaning-Of-Life&id=133561, “On Failing To Discover The Meaning Of Life,” ACC. 1-13-10, JT]


The famed psychiatrist, Frankl, survived the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, to narrate the dreaded moment, when a fellow prisoner ceased to struggle for life. Usually, the prisoner refused to go out on to the parade grounds. “He just lay there, hardly moving. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any effect. He simply gave up. There he remained, lying in his own excreta, and nothing bothered him any more.” His life had lost its meaning. Such people died soon after.

But, despite the meaningless torture and beatings, thousands of inmates still struggled against all odds to eke out a life. Frankl submitted that it was a purpose in life, whatever it was, which helped them to survive. These were not large purposes. A hope of meeting a son after the war was a purpose. Even a decision to harden oneself against suffering was a sufficient purpose. After the war, Frankl established a major field in psychiatry, assisting thousands of suicidal patients around the world to recover by discovering an acceptable purpose in life.


Value to life is perspective dependent and operates in a co-existent manner: you can say x has no meaning and still grant equal moral status

Thaddeus Metz,‘7

[Asst. Prof. of Philosophy, Univ. of Missouri-St. Louis, May 15, “The Meaning of Life,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning, acc 3-13-09]
Returning to topics on which there is consensus, most writing on meaning believe that it comes in degrees such that some periods of life are more meaningful than others and that some lives as a whole are more meaningful than others (perhaps contra Britton 1969, 192). Note that one can coherently hold the view that some people's lives are less meaningful than others, or even meaningless, and still maintain that people have an equal moral status. Consider a consequentialist view according to which each individual counts for one in virtue of having a capacity for a meaningful life (cf. Railton 1984), or a Kantian view that says that people have an intrinsic worth in virtue of their capacity for autonomous choices, where meaning is a function of the exercise of this capacity (Nozick 1974, ch. 3). On both views, morality could counsel an agent to help people with relatively meaningless lives, at least if the condition is not of their choosing.



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