Gdi 2011 Gemini Lab China qpq cp
A2: Plan = Modelling – Transparency Solves
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- A2: Plan = Modelling – Spillover
A2: Plan = Modelling – Transparency SolvesOnly transparency solves miscalc conflicts Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, received his master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law, " Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Spring, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, AD 6/29/11) AV Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain. A bilateral and transparent U.S-China treaty is necessary to prevent weaponization - the U.S must act first. Hagt 6 (Eric, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, " Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space." www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_8.pdf, AD 7/1/11) AV China’s consideration of hedging strategies to counter the United States in space in turn further drives U.S. military space plans in the direction of a weaponization strategy – thus entrenching a security dilemma. This impasse can be ameliorated by greater transparency regarding both capabilities and intention. Transparency, however, is conceived differently by the Chinese and American sides, with the former focusing on underlying strategic objectives, and the latter, capabilities. It is vital that both countries work to enhance communication regarding their programs, bilaterally and within international forums. However, as the nation with vastly superior capabilities in space, America must first confront the central issue upon which the possibility of transparency and greater cooperation with China rests: Does the United States intend to control space? A2: Plan = Modelling – SpilloverFormal Sino-American space cooperation spills over - allows scientific and commercial cooperation which increases trade and solves disease. Wortzel 5 (Dr. Larry, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies of The Heritage Foundation, "The Rules of Engagement: The Russia Model." May, http://www.space.com/1102-rules-engagement-russia-model.html, AD 6/30/11) AV Sino-American Space Cooperation There are a couple of natural constituencies in the United States for Sino-American space cooperation. Within the government, the Department of Commerce would probably argue that such cooperation is a natural component of existing scientific and commercial cooperation protocols between the United States and China. The Department of Commerce would probably find natural allies in some of the bureaus of the Department of State for this generous position with respect to China. In U.S. industry, satellite manufacturers would likely want to take advantage of the cheaper launch services China offers, as they did in the 1990s. And technology research and development firms might seek outside markets by supplying hardware or services to China. These constituencies would probably seek to weaken any export controls placed on space technology by the Department of Defense or U.S. intelligence agencies. But the best approach is a cautious one. Some of China's actions on the earth's surface, and below the sea, are worrisome. China has violated the territorial waters of Japan in undersea exploration. China has challenged the nations of Southeast Asia on the delineation of borders and undersea resources. It would be foolhardy to design a program with China that would alarm friends and allies in Asia. Nonetheless, within the context of the existing ISS program, there are a number of things that can be done with China. Research on the nature of proteins and enzymes useful for possible disease treatments and new drug development can be carried out in cooperation with China. Here, China must demonstrate that it will honor intellectual property rights agreements if it is to be allowed to participate in such programs. The same is true of the types of tissue culture and flames, fluids and metal interaction experiments that are carried out in the ISS. Basic research in these areas--provided China is a contributor and not a consumer of research--is something the ISS partners, including the U.S., could explore. The ISS project already involves Canada, Japan, the European Space Agency, the United States and Russia. Brazil and Italy are also contributing to the station. Thus, there is room here to include China when its own programs are ready to permit cooperation with others. Cooperation with China in space also offers unique opportunities to observe China's intentions in space, monitor its activities, and develop international legal protocols. A formal agreement ratchets up defense cooperation Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, USAF, Spring, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG) I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons. 52 After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets. 53 The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China’s ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race. These costs must be weighed against the benefits of space weapons championed by advocates of space weaponization. Despite their relatively open exposure to ASAT attack, some space weapons do provide significant military capability. One question, however, is whether the military benefit of space weapons, for example a long rod penetrator, is much greater than the benefit provided by terrestrial or Air Force weapons. A second reason for US commitment not to place weapons in space is the negotiating leverage such a concession would provide. Of course, such leverage cannot be taken for granted. Rather, agreement not to weaponize outer space could be loosely conditional on making progress in other areas of US security. 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