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No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad
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No Solvency – Formal Treaty BadHard to verify and disarm Borrie 6 (John, Disarmament Manager, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/109177/ichaptersection_singledocument/40b46b92-caa5-473c-90fb-0f122ef862fc/en/Chap1.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG) Although they are more formal terms than political will, disarmament, arms control and humanitarian assistance are, nevertheless, also concepts that have to reflect political imperatives and be elastic enough to be fitted around various contexts for the policymakers and negotiators using them. Consequently they are difficult to test by means of falsification: there are no hard-and-fast rules about what may or may not qualify for consideration within the disarmament, arms control and humanitarian spheres, apart from political acceptability. In a post-11 September world this has already proved more malleable than it was perceived to be previously. Formal treaties fail -- verification, cheating, new systems, and empirically proven Klotz 99 (Frank, Council on Foreign Relations, January, http://www.scribd.com/doc/292644/CFR-Space-Commerce-NationalSecurity, accessed 7-1, JG) More recently, Clinton administration officials have emphatically stated that arms control discussions to ban antisatellite testing or systems are neither "underway, envisioned, or under consideration."66 In fact, upon closer examination, formal arms control agreements would not appear to hold much promise as an approach to protecting U.S. military and commercial satellites in the emerging space environment. The basic problem with limiting capabilities is determining just what capabilities to limit. During the Cold War, the major arms control initiatives dealt almost exclusively with fielded military capabilities and relatively mature technologies. Even so, there was considerable room for debate over the "units of account"-that is, what things should or could reasonably be subject to limits. For example, in the first strategic arms control talks, negotiators could not agree on ways to constrain intercontinental ballistic missiles directly, so they settled upon limiting their launchers, or silos. The problem is compounded in the case of antisatellite weapons. In the absence of an extant threat, an agreement aimed at weapons that could pose a threat to satellites can only speculate as to the types of systems, capabilities, or activities that should be subject to restriction. Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could emerge within the life of a formal arms control treaty. Thus, limiting a particular kind of capability-such as the rocket-mounted satellite interceptors developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War-would provide little protection against systems based on entirely new or different technology and could engender a false sense of security. Additionally, some of the systems that might be used to attack satellites, which would therefore be subject to limitation, might also have other, entirely legitimate civilian or military purposes. Reduction ad absurdum, any satellite that can be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with another satellite could theoretically be used for "antisatellite" purposes. While one might counter that the functions of individual satellites are generally widely known, not everyone will agree. The Soviet Union, for example, objected to the U.S. space shuttle as a potential antisatellite platform since it had the capability to "snatch" satellites in orbit.67 Even those future systems that have been popularly identified as having a possible antisatellite role-- such as space-based lasers or a military spaceplane--could also perform a variety of other missions. The former has in fact been most closely identified with defense against ballistic missile warheads. The latter could be used to perform routine but cost-effective logistical tasks, such as repair, refueling, or replacement of satellites in orbit. Thus, unless a system is unmistakably identified as an antisatellite weapon-- either by declaration or unequivocal action--it may be exceedingly difficult to apply an ASAT label to it. Limiting a system simply because it possesses a potential antisatellite capability would be unduly restrictive and could deny the nation capabilities that might prove militarily or economically important. Finally, attempting to place limits on multiple-use systems only if they were equipped for an ASAT role would pose obvious verification and enforcement problems or, conversely, opportunities for cheating by one or more parties. Likewise, restricting certain activities that ostensibly constitute deliberate interference or "attacks" on satellites would also add little value. The international legal regime already contains provisions for noninterference. As noted earlier, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty endorses the principle of noninterference in the peaceful exploration or use of space. Similarly, the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention states that all "space objects" must be operated in such a way as to avoid harmful interference to the radio services or communications of others. No Solvency – Formal Treaty BadFormal treaties don’t solve anything – states enforce stability – Cold War proves Hays 10 (Peter, National Security Space Office, 9-4, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG) Second, the superpowers devoted considerable effort towards negotiations on ASAT arms control and on the Defense and Space Talks but were unable to come close to signing any treaties, agreeing to space “rules-of-the-road,” or even defining what constitute offensive or defensive space systems. Finally, all the ASAT testing, deployments, and deactivations show that some level of arms control and stability can be achieved without a formal treaty. For open, pluralist democracies like the United States, arms are always controlled as a part of normal debates over guns versus butter and open dialogue about the strategic utility of specific weapons systems. These mechanisms for controlling arms hold the potential to become increasingly important for China if it chooses to embrace democratic processes, publicly debate guns versus butter issues, and engage in transparent dialogue over the strategic utility of space weapons. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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