Globalization has eradicated great power war, dedev reverses
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- development , democratization
- states with more trade and more extensive economic relations are likely to have higher opportunity costs from escalation to war
- Wars and violence are declining because of economic growth Gat ‘13
- Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game.
- , the logic of the new economic realities receded during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the great powers resumed protectionist policies
- Economic growth produces peace – statistics prove Ekmekci ‘14
- To achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic ¶ development in the developing world ought to be encouraged and supported.
Impact Debate – WarWar Impact Growth Solves War – General Growth and interdependence have decreased violence and war Gleditsch and Pickering ‘14 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch is a Professor of Government @ the University of Essex and a research associate @ the International Peace Research Institute, Steve Pickering is an Assistant Professor @ Kobe University in Japan and a recipient of the Cedric Smith Prize for Peace and Conflict Research in 2009, The Economic History Review, Vol. 67, Issue 1, pp. 214-230, February, “Wars are becoming less frequent: a response to Harrison and Wolf”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0289.12002/full Furthermore, Harrison and Wolf's discussion of the costs of war focuses solely on expenditure on destructive capacity and completely neglects the costs of war in terms of the destruction caused by war and the opportunity costs of violent conflict. Any serious analysis of conflict must consider how the full costs of war shape the incentives of actors, and their incentives to reach alternative solutions to contentious issues without the use of violence.44 From a bargaining perspective, all wars must eventually come to an end, and if war is costly then the parties should have an incentive to reach an agreement reflecting the likely settlement after a war, without paying the costs of fighting the war. There is no reason to suspect that states no longer have contentious issues—indeed, one might expect that these have increased with greater interaction and globalization. However, development, democratization, and capitalism may have made it easier for states to reach agreement, and avoid escalation to war, and more costly to fail to reach agreement. For example, existing research at the dyadic level suggests that democratic states are more likely to settle their disputes peacefully, possibly since they can externalize their internal dispute resolution mechanisms or delegate dispute arbitration to international institutions.45 Moreover, states with more trade and more extensive economic relations are likely to have higher opportunity costs from escalation to war and may have more opportunities to signal intent and reach resolution by means other than military force.46 The trend towards a decline in war may also be facilitated by important global macro-trends such as increases in education and urbanization, which have been shown to foster attitudes that make people less likely to glorify violence and more likely to seek rational compromise.47¶ We agree with Harrison and Wolf that much remains to be discovered about war and why it has changed over time, and that much additional research is needed. However, it would be a mistake to start this line of research with a false premise, misleadingly presented as an empirical fact.
Azar, Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security and Political Science @ Tel Aviv University, “Is war declining – and why?”, http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/50/2/149.full Is it peace that has become more profitable?¶ So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant.¶ Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.¶ In this limited framework I can only briefly mention the main reasons for the continued outbreak of war during the past two centuries. In the first place, ethnic and nationalist tensions often overrode the logic of the new economic realities, accounting for most wars in Europe until 1945. They continue to do so today, especially in the less developed parts of the globe, the world’s remaining ‘zone of war’. Additionally, the logic of the new economic realities receded during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the great powers resumed protectionist policies and expanded them to the undeveloped parts of the world with the New Imperialism. This development signaled that the emergent global economy might become partitioned rather than open, with each imperial domain becoming closed to everybody else, as, indeed, they eventually did in the 1930s. A snowball effect ensued, generating a runaway grab for imperial territories, Lebensraum, and ‘co-prosperity spheres’. Here lay the seeds of the two World Wars. Furthermore, the retreat from economic liberalism in the first decades of the 20th century spurred, and was in turn spurred by, the rise to power of anti-liberal and anti-democratic political ideologies and regimes incorporating a creed of violence: communism and fascism.¶ Indeed, although non-liberal and non-democratic states also became much less belligerent during the industrial age, it is the liberal democracies that have been the most attuned to its pacifying aspects. This applies most strikingly to the democracies’ relations among themselves, but, as scholars have become increasingly aware, also to their conduct in general. Pinker examines in great detail and nuance the various aspects in the unfolding process over the past centuries, which he labels the humanitarian revolution, the rights revolution, and the democratic, liberal and capitalist peace. Some of the other books surveyed here are more problematic in this respect. Economic growth produces peace – statistics prove Ekmekci ‘14 Faruk, Assistant Professor @ Ipek University with a PhD in Political Science, Peace and Conflict Studies, Spring 2014, Vol. 21, Number 1, pp. 85-99, “Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World”, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/pcs_spring_2014_5_ekmekci.pdf Concluding Remarks ¶ Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two ¶ different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the ¶ proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into ¶ account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their ¶ hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study ¶ aimed to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the ¶ developing world. ¶ My empirical results provided support to the “capitalist peace” argument and ¶ countered the “democratic peace” argument. Economic development was found have a ¶ negative, substantial, and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID in ¶ the developing world. By contrast, democracy’s effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID never ¶ achieved statistical significance even at 90% significance level. These findings were robust to ¶ different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development. Thus, within the ¶ developing world, it seems economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas ¶ democracy does not. This result suggests that, in the developing world, economic ¶ development is not just an issue of economic or humanitarian concern, but also a fundamental ¶ security issue. To achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic ¶ development in the developing world ought to be encouraged and supported. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.56 Mb. Share with your friends:
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