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EXT – Growth Solves Poverty

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EXT – Growth Solves Poverty

Growth solves poverty

Balakrishnan, 2000 (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, “Hardt and Negri’s Empire”, New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275)

Inseparable from the failure to think politically, Hardt and Negri, like the rioters endlessly disrupting World Trade Organization meetings, offer no evidence to support their basic charge that economic globalization is causing wide-scale planetary misery. Predictably, this past summer, as the G-8 meeting got underway in Genoa, Italy, the New York Times chose these two "joyful" Communists to write a lengthy op-ed extolling the virtues of anti-globalization rioters. The truth about globalization is exactly the reverse of what Hardt and Negri assert. Globalization is dramatically increasing world prosperity and freedom. As the Economist's John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge point out, in the half century since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the world economy has expanded six-fold, in part because trade has increased 1,600 percent; nations open to trade grow nearly twice as fast as those that aren't; and World Bank data show that during the past decade of accelerated economic globalization, approximately 800 million people escaped poverty.

Economic collapse breeds poverty

Vasquez, director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Global Economic Liberty, 1

[Jan, Cato, “Ending Mass Poverty, September, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/vas-0109.html]

The historical record is clear: the single, most effective way to reduce world poverty is economic growth. Western countries began discovering this around 1820 when they broke with the historical norm of low growth and initiated an era of dramatic advances in material well-being. Living standards tripled in Europe and quadrupled in the United States in that century, improving at an even faster pace in the next 100 years. Economic growth thus eliminated mass poverty in what is today considered the developed world. Taking the long view, growth has also reduced poverty in other parts of the world: in 1820, about 75 percent of humanity lived on less than a dollar per day; today about 20 percent live under that amount. Even a short-term view confirms that the recent acceleration of growth in many developing countries has reduced poverty, measured the same way. In the past 10 years, the percentage of poor people in the developing world fell from 29 to 24 percent. Despite that progress, however, the number of poor people has remained stubbornly high at around 1,200 million. And geographically, reductions in poverty have been uneven.

Growth solves poverty and reduces the global wealth gap

Goklany, 4 (Indur M. Goklany, Property and Environment Research Center Julian Simon Fellow and PhD in Electrical Engineering, Former Chief of the Technical Assessment Division @ National commission on Air Quality, “Economic Growth, Technological Change, and Human Well-Being” accessed online via pdf, jj)

There can be no doubt that human well-being has improved continually over the past two centuries, but some people and organizations still claim that inequalities between the developed and developing nations continue to widen. Here is a typical observation, this one from the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999: Nearly 30 years ago the Pearson Commission began its report with the recognition that “the widening gap between the developed and developing countries has become the central problem of our times.” But over the past three decades the income gap between the richest fifth and the poorest fifth has more than doubled. . . . Narrowing the gaps between rich and poor . . . should become explicit global goals. . . . (11) Indeed, as Table 2.4 shows, there are wide—and, in many cases, growing—disparities in income between the richer and the poorer countries. The gaps in per-capita income between Western Europe and the United States and other regions have ballooned since 1700 (Maddison 1998, 1999), and many people remain terribly poor. According to the UNDP (2000), 1.2 billion people, mainly in the developing world, live in “absolute poverty” (defined as subsisting on less than US$1 per day), and at least thirty-five nations had lower per-capita incomes in 1998 than in 1975 (measured in real dollars). These claims have become a rallying cry for the forces that oppose globalization (see, for example, Goklany 2002a). However, a number of recent studies have disputed the claim that income inequalities have been widening in recent decades. Dollar and Kraay, pro-globalization economists at the World Bank, have challenged such statements, countering that “the best evidence available shows the exact opposite to be true . . . [and that] . . . the current wave of globalization, which started around 1980, has actually promoted economic equality and reduced poverty” (2000b). More recently, development economist Xavier Sala-i-Martin found that poverty rates declined substantially between the 1970s and 1998 (2002). Worldwide between 1976 and 1998, despite a population increase of 43 percent (FAO 2003), the number of people subsisting on an income of $1 a day declined from 16.1 percent to 6.7 percent of the population, or by 235 million, while those living on an income of $2 a day declined from 39.1 percent to 18.6 percent, or by 450 million (Sala-i-Martin 2002, 36). The bulk of the decline took place in Asia. Latin America reduced poverty overall, but most of the reduction occurred during the 1970s with little or no reduction after that. On the other hand, the number of people living in poverty in Africa increased by 175 million people (from 22 percent to 44 percent of the population) according to the one-dollar definition and by 227 million (from 53 to 64 percent) according to the two-dollar definition. However, if consumption, rather than income, is used to determine the $1- and $2-a-day poverty levels, then for any given year the portion of the population (as well as the numbers) living in poverty goes up. For instance, in 1998 the $1-a-day poverty rate based on income was 6.7 percent compared with 16.0 percent had it been based on consumption (Sala-i-Martin 2002, 36). The latter figure works out closer to the nowfamiliar 1.2 billion people estimated to live in absolute poverty (or on less than $1 a day). Notably, consumption-based global poverty levels also declined between 1976 and 1998—from 31.0 percent to 16.0 percent using the dollar-a-day definition and from 53.1 percent to 34.7 percent using the two-dollar definition (Sala-i-Martin 2002, 36). Sala-i-Martin, using each of nine separate indices of income inequality, also showed substantial reductions in global income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, it seems that claims of increasing poverty and rising income inequality in the recent past are not substantiated by data. More important, what about gaps in other, more significant indicators of human well-being, such as hunger, infant mortality, life expectancy, education, and child labor? After all, as we have already seen, the importance of economic development stems from its ability to help improve these measures of welfare. The central issue is not whether income gaps are growing, but whether wealth and globalization advance well-being, and if inequalities in well-being have indeed expanded, whether that is because the rich have advanced at the expense of the poor. Consider the trends in life expectancy, perhaps the single most important indicator of human well-being. Before industrialization, life expectancy at birth was about thirty years. But because the rich countries discovered, developed, and adopted modern public health and medical technologies first, large gaps in life expectancy had opened up between rich and poor countries by the mid-1900s. But these gaps have since shrunk because of the diffusion of those technologies owing to trade in and transfer of ideas, goods, and services from rich to poor. From 1960 to 1990, relative to high-income in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries (HiOECD), the gap for medium-income countries declined from 24.5 to 8.1 years; that for low-income countries declined from 25.7 to 18.8 years; and that for sub-Saharan Africa dropped from 29.4 to 26.4. Cross-country analysis for any specific year also indicates that, generally, richer is also longerlived. It seems counterintuitive, however, that the lower the initial gap, the faster it closed (because the higher the life expectancy, the harder should it have been to raise further). But that is consistent with the fact that groups that lagged in globalization also lagged economically and in access to health technologiesand should, therefore, have found it harder to close the life expectancy gap (Goklany 2002a). Similar patterns were exhibited by trends related to other critical measures of well-being—suchas freedom from hunger, infant mortality, and child labor between the 1960s and the late 1990s—and, between 1975 and 1999, for trends related to the UNDP’s human development index. In each case, the indicators generally improved with wealth and the passage of time, and gaps in the indicators (relative to HiOECD) shrank the least for sub-Saharan Africa and the most for mediumincome countries (Goklany 2002a). From 1990 to 1999, however, life expectancy gaps widened. The gap betweenHiOECD and middle-income countries increased slightly, from 8.1 to 8.6 years, mainly because life expectancies in middleincome EEFSU nations declined along with their economies while the gap between HiOECD and sub-Saharan Africa increased from 26.4 to 31.2 years, largely due to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis and aggravated by additional economic disruption arising from civil and cross-border conflicts (Goklany 2002a, 11). Increases in the life expectancy gap in the 1990s occurred because when faced with new diseases (for example, AIDS) or a resurgence of ancient ones (for example, malaria and tuberculosis), poor countries lacked the economic and human resources to develop effective treatments or to import and adapt treatments invented and developed in rich countries. In other words, although the technologies are out there to cure many diseases, poor countries cannot afford them. This unfortunate state of affairs exists not only for expensive-to-treat diseases (for example, AIDS), but also for diseases that are relatively cheap to treat (for example, tuberculosis and malaria). Although neither globalization nor wealth are ends in themselves, globalization increases wealth, which in turn advances more direct measures of human well-being by providing the resources to improve these measures (see Chapter 4, by B. Delworth Gardner, in this book). Regardless of whether globalization has increased income inequality, gaps between rich and poor in the more critical measures of human well-being have shrunk dramatically since the mid-1900s. Notably, where these gaps in well-being have shrunk the least or even expanded in recent years, it is because of too little, rather than too much, globalization. Finally, the rich are not better off because they have taken something from the poor, rather the poor are better off because they have benefited from the technologies developed by the rich; their situation would have improved further had they been better able to capture the benefits of globalization. In fact, if the rich can be faulted at all, it is that by subsidizing favored economic sectors and maintaining import barriers, they have retarded globalization and made it harder for many developing countries to capture its benefits. The Cycle of Progress We have seen that human welfare advanced more during the twentieth century than it had in all the rest of mankind’s tenure on Earth. This progress in human well-being was sustained, and perhaps even initiated, by a cycle composed of the mutually reinforcing, coevolving forces of economic growth, technological change, and free trade. Technology increases food production through various mechanisms. It boosts yields through special seeds, mechanization, judicious application of inputs such as fertilizers and lime, and reductions of losses to pests, spoilage, and waste. Use of this technology is closely linked to economic development because not everyone can afford it. One reason poorer countries have lower cereal yields is that farmers cannot afford sufficient fertilizer and other yield-enhancing technologies (Goklany 1998, 2000). Thus yields increase over time and with wealth (Goklany 2001a, 26). More food also means more healthy people who are less likely to succumb to infectious and parasitic diseases. That—along with capital and human resources targeted on improvements in medicine and public health—has reduced mortality and increased life expectancy worldwide (Fogel 1995, 2000; World Health Organization 1999). Hence, as populations become more affluent, mortality decreases and life expectancy increases (Goklany 1999b; see also Pritchett and Summers 1996; World Bank 1993). Thus, a wealthier population is healthier. A healthier population also is wealthier because it is more productive (Barro 1997; Bloom 1999; Fogel 1995; World Bank 1993; World Health Organization 1999). Fogel (1995, 65) estimates that the level of food supplies in eighteenth-century France was so low that the bottom 10 percent of the labor force could not generate the energy needed for regular work, and the next 10 percent had enough energy for about half an hour of heavy work (or less than three hours of light work). A healthier and longer-lived population also is likely to invest more time and effort in developing its human capital, which contributes to the creation and diffusion of technology. It is not surprising that levels of education have gone up with life expectancy or that researchers today spend what at one period was literally a lifetime to acquire skills and expertise necessary for a career in research. In addition, several measures undertaken to improve public health provided a bonus in economic productivity. Draining swamps not only reduced malaria but also added to the agricultural land base (Easterlin 1996). World Bank (1993, 19) reported that an international program to curtail river blindness, the Onchocersiasis Control Program, a mix-ture of drug therapy and insecticide spraying, has protected thirty million people (including nine million children) from the disease, and it is freeing up 25 million hectares (60 million acres) of land for cultivation and settlement. The improved food supplies should result in better nutrition, which may aid learning. (This is one of the premises behind school meals programs [Watkins 1997].) Improvements specific to health, food, and agriculture also benefit from a larger, more general cycle in which broad technological change, economic growth, and global trade reinforce each other. Other technologies— invented for other reasons—have led to medical advances and improved productivity or reduced the environmental impacts of the food and agricultural sector. For example, computers, lasers, and global positioning systems permit precision agriculture to optimize the timing and quantities of fertilizers, water, and pesticides, increasing productivity while reducing environmental impacts. Plastics—essential for food packaging and preservation—also increase productivity of the food and agricultural sector. Transportation of every kind increases the ability to move inputs and outputs from farm to market and from market to farm. Broad advances in physics and engineering have led to new or improved medical technologies, including electricity (without which virtually no present-day hospital or operating room could function), Xrays, nuclear magnetic resonance, lasers, and refrigeration. These specific impacts do not exhaust the benefits of broad economic growth, technological change, and global trade. Technological change in general reinforces economic growth (Barro 1997; Goklany 1998), giving countries more resources to research and develop technological improvements (Goklany 1995) and to increase education. Freer trade contributes directly to greater economic growth, helps disseminate new technologies, and creates competitive pressures to invent and innovate (Goklany 1995). As an example, trade accelerated the cleanup of automobile emissions in the United States because the threat of cleaner cars from imports advanced the introduction of catalytic converters in the 1970s (Barbour 1980; Seskin 1978). By expanding competition, trade helps contain the costs of basic infrastructure, including water supply and sanitation systems. A vivid example of the importance of trade in improving human well-being comes from prewar Iraq. Because of trade sanctions, Iraq was unable to operate and maintain much of its water, sanitation, and electricity systems, resulting in significant public health problems (United Nations 2000). In terms of income alone, trade raises incomes for both the poor and the rich (Dollar and Kraay 2000a; see also Frankel and Romer 1999). Dollar and Kraay (2000a) also find that economic growth favors rich and poor equally, confirming analyses by Ravallion and Chen (1997) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). Similarly, increased protection of property rights and fiscal discipline (defined as low government consumption) raise overall incomes without increasing inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2000a). Thus, each link in the cycle—higher yields, increased food supplies, lower mortalities, and higher life expectancies—is strengthened by the general forces of economic growth, technological change, and trade. Qualitatively at least, this explains why all the figures for cereal yields, food supplies per capita, safe water, life expectancy, and postsecondary education, when plotted against per-capita income (as seen in figures here and in Goklany 2001a), show improvement, with rising per-capita incomes. Conclusion The foregoing brief investigation into the course of human well-being since the start of industrialization reinforces Lomborg’s (2001) conclusion that the state of humanity has never been better (87, 328). For every indicator of human well-being examined in this chapter, crosscountry analysis shows that well-being advances with the level of economic development. These improvements are generally greatest at the lowest levels of economic development. This gives further credence to Lomborg’s contention that economic development is a key factor in advancing well-being (324, 327). This chapter also extends Lomborg’s analysis by showing explicitly that technological change is critical to such advances. Thus, Lomborg is justified in his skepticism of a precautionary principle that would— under the cover of the old aphorism “better safe than sorry”—limit new technologies if, despite clear and certain social, economic, or healthrelated benefits, they also might result in uncertain environmental costs (348–50; Goklany 2001b, 2002b). Calling such an approach a “precautionary principle” would be a misnomer; it would prolong existing risks to human well-being and, thereby, retard further progress. Perhaps the most vivid examples of the perverse outcomes of such misuse of the principle are Zambia’s rejection of genetically modified maize to feed its starving population, and the discontinuation of sprayingDDTindoors in areas where that effectively reduces malaria (Goklany 2001b). In order to ensure that the precautionary principle does indeed reduce overall risk, decisions regarding new technologies must weigh the social, public health, and environmental benefits against the costs associated with adopting (or rejecting) those technologies (Goklany 2002b). The importance of both technological change and economic development is reinforced by trends in gaps in well-being in the past halfcentury. During the first two decades of that period, gaps in some wellbeing indicators between rich and poor countries shrank, although inequalities in income, that is, economic development, increased. The shrinkage was because of technological change brought about by the diffusion of technologies from the rich to the poor via trade in and transfer of goods, ideas, knowledge, and services, that is, through globalization. More recently, however, gaps in life expectancy between the rich countries and sub-Saharan Africa and EEFSU nations have begun to expand. This is largely because of economic difficulties in these areas, which rendered them unable to marshal the resources needed to acquire and implement the technologies for dealing with new diseases (for example, AIDS) or the resurgence of old diseases (for example, tuber-culosis and malaria). Thus, despite the vociferous complaints one hears about globalization, insufficient globalization creates a larger problem. Notably, improvements in well-being have not yet run their full course. Substantial additional improvements in infant mortality and life expectancy are possible in developing countries if they become wealthier and if existing-but-underused safe-water, sanitation, and agricultural technologies are more widely spread (Lomborg 2001, 334–35). However, once the easy and relatively cheap improvements in health and life expectancy have been captured, solutions to remaining problems (such as AIDS and the diseases of affluence), being expensive, might be increasingly unaffordable, whether one lives in a developed or developing country. Further improvements in human well-being will depend largely on the development of human and capital resources and encouraging the development and deployment of new risk-reduction technologies. Thus, it is critical to focus on strengthening the domestic and international institutions that will boost technological change and economic development, which include free markets, freer trade, individual property rights, the rule of law, and transparent government and bureaucracies.

Growth solves all of their offense

Lomborg, ’12 (Bjørn, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School and head of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, “Environmental Alarmism, Then and Now,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug, Vol. 91, Issue 4, ebscohost, bgm)
But the Club of Rome did not just distract the world's attention. It actually directed that attention in precisely the wrong direction, identifying economic growth as humanity's core problem. Such a diagnosis can be entertained only by rich, comfortable residents of highly developed countries, who already have easy access to the basic necessities of life. In contrast, when a desperately poor woman in the developing world cannot get enough food for her family, the reason is not that the world cannot produce it but that she cannot afford it. And when her children get sick from breathing in fumes from burning dung, the answer is not for her to use environmentally certified dung but to raise her living standards enough to buy cleaner and more convenient fuels. Poverty, in short, is one of the greatest of all killers, and economic growth is one of the best ways to prevent it. Easily curable diseases still kill 15 million people every year; what would save them is the creation of richer societies that could afford to treat, survey, and prevent new outbreaks.

By recommending that the world limit development in order to head off a supposed future collapse, The Limits to Growth led people to question the value of pursuing economic growth. Had its suggestions been followed over subsequent decades, there would have been no "rise of the rest"; no half a billion Chinese, Indians, and others lifted out of grinding poverty; no massive improvements in health, longevity, and quality of life for billions of people across the planet. Even though the Club of Rome's general school of thought has mercifully gone the way of other 1970s-era relics, such as mood rings and pet rocks, the effects linger in popular and elite consciousness. People get more excited about the fate of the Kyoto Protocol than the fate of the Doha Round--even though an expansion of trade would do hundreds or thousands of times as much good as feeble limitations of emissions, and do so more cheaply, quickly, and efficiently for the very people who are most vulnerable. It is past time to acknowledge that economic growth, for lack of a better word, is good, and that what the world needs is more of it, not less.

Growth massively improves quality of life for billions of people—it is a matter of life and death.

Friedman 5 — Benjamin M. Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, former Chair of the Department of Economics at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, 2005 (“Economics and Politics in the Developing World,” The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Published by Knopf Publishing Group, ISBN 0679448918, p. 297-298)

The attraction of economic growth in the developing world, where incomes are mostly very low compared to Western industrial standards, is in many ways straightforward. In more than three-fourths of the world’s countries, encompassing roughly 5 billion of the world’s 6 billion inhabitants, if per [end page 297] capita incomes are higher, people can expect to live longer. Fewer of their children die in infancy. Both children and adults suffer less from malnutrition and disease. They are more likely to have clean water and basic sanitation, and they have better access to medical care. They are more likely to be able to read and write, and they enjoy greater access to education in general. When incomes and living standards are low to begin with, what economic growth means before anything else is enhancement of the most basic dimensions of human life.

Growth increases overall quality of life—it solves pollution and disease.

Reich 10 —Robert Reich, Chancellor's Professor of Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California-Berkeley, former Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, former Professor of Social and Economic Policy at Brandeis University, served as Secretary of Labor in the Clinton Administration, 2010 (“Why growth is good,” Robert Reich’s blog at the Christian Science Monitor, August 20^th, Available Online at http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/320828, Accessed 08-16-2011)

The answer is economic growth isn’t just about more stuff. Growth is different from consumerism. Growth is really about the capacity of a nation to produce everything that’s wanted and needed by its inhabitants. That includes better stewardship of the environment as well as improved public health and better schools. (The Gross Domestic Product is a crude way of gauging this but it’s a guide. Nations with high and growing GDPs have more overall capacity; those with low or slowing GDPs have less.)

Poorer countries tend to be more polluted than richer ones because they don’t have the capacity both to keep their people fed and clothed and also to keep their land, air and water clean. Infant mortality is higher and life spans shorter because they don’t have enough to immunize against diseases, prevent them from spreading, and cure the sick.

Growth improves quality of life—affluence is crucial to investment in public goods.

Friedman 5 — Benjamin M. Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, former Chair of the Department of Economics at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, 2005 (“What Growth Is, What Growth Does,” The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Published by Knopf Publishing Group, ISBN 0679448918, p. 12)

Greater affluence means, among many other things, better food, bigger houses, more travel, and improved medical care. It means that more people can afford a better education. It may also mean, as it did in most Western countries during the twentieth century, a shorter workweek, which allows more time for family and friends. Moreover, these material benefits of rising incomes accrue not just to individuals and their families but to communities and even entire countries. Greater affluence can also mean better schools, more parks and museums, and larger concert halls and sports arenas, not to mention more leisure to enjoy these public facilities. A rising average income allows a country to project its national interest abroad, or send a man to the moon.

EXT – Uniqueness – Poverty Decreasing

The world is getting better now – poverty is down – try or die false

Beauchamp, 12/11/13 [“5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human, Zack, Reporter/Blogger for ThinkProgress.org, He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He grew up in Washington, DC.History”,http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/#]
Between the brutal civil war in Syria, the government shutdown and all of the deadly dysfunction it represents, the NSA spying revelations, and massive inequality, it’d be easy to for you to enter 2014 thinking the last year has been an awful one. But you’d be wrong. We have every reason to believe that 2013 was, in fact, the best year on the planet for humankind. Contrary to what you might have heard, virtually all of the most important forces that determine what make people’s lives good — the things that determine how long they live, and whether they live happily and freely — are trending in an extremely happy direction. While it’s possible that this progress could be reversed by something like runaway climate change, the effects will have to be dramatic to overcome the extraordinary and growing progress we’ve made in making the world a better place. Here’s the five big reasons why. 1. Fewer people are dying young, and more are living longer. The greatest story in recent human history is the simplest: we’re winning the fight against death. “There is not a single country in the world where infant or child mortality today is not lower than it was in 1950,” writes Angus Deaton, a Princeton economist who works on global health issues. The most up-to-date numbers on global health, the 2013 World Health Organization (WHO) statistical compendium, confirm Deaton’s estimation. Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of children who died before their fifth birthday dropped by almost half. Measles deaths declined by 71 percent, and both tuberculosis and maternal deaths by half again. HIV, that modern plague, is also being held back, with deaths from AIDS-related illnesses down by 24 percent since 2005. In short, fewer people are dying untimely deaths. And that’s not only true in rich countries: life expectancy has gone up between 1990 and 2011 in every WHO income bracket. The gains are even more dramatic if you take the long view: global life expectancy was 47 in the early 1950s, but had risen to 70 — a 50 percent jump — by 2011. For even more perspective, the average Briton in 1850 — when the British Empire had reached its apex — was 40. The average person today should expect to live almost twice as long as the average citizen of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country in 1850. In real terms, this means millions of fewer dead adults and children a year, millions fewer people who spend their lives suffering the pains and unfreedoms imposed by illness, and millions more people spending their twilight years with loved ones. And the trends are all positive — “progress has accelerated in recent years in many countries with the highest rates of mortality,” as the WHO rather bloodlessly put it. What’s going on? Obviously, it’s fairly complicated, but the most important drivers have been technological and political innovation. The Enlightenment-era advances in the scientific method got people doing high-quality research, which brought us modern medicine and the information technologies that allow us to spread medical breakthroughs around the world at increasingly faster rates. Scientific discoveries also fueled the Industrial Revolution and the birth of modern capitalism, giving us more resources to devote to large-scale application of live-saving technologies. And the global spread of liberal democracy made governments accountable to citizens, forcing them to attend to their health needs or pay the electoral price. We’ll see the enormously beneficial impact of these two forces, technology and democracy, repeatedly throughout this list, which should tell you something about the foundations of human progress. But when talking about improvements in health, we shouldn’t neglect foreign aid. Nations donating huge amounts of money out of an altruistic interest in the welfare of foreigners is historically unprecedented, and while not all aid has been helpful, health aid has been a huge boon. Even Deaton, who wrote one of 2013′s harshest assessments of foreign aid, believes “the case for assistance to fight disease such as HIV/AIDS or smallpox is strong.” That’s because these programs have demonstrably saved lives — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 2003 program pushed by President Bush, paid for anti-retroviral treatment for over 5.1 million people in the poor countries hardest-hit by the AIDS epidemic. So we’re outracing the Four Horseman, extending our lives faster than pestilence, war, famine, and death can take them. That alone should be enough to say the world is getting better. 2. Fewer people suffer from extreme poverty, and the world is getting happier. There are fewer people in abject penury than at any other point in human history, and middle class people enjoy their highest standard of living ever. We haven’t come close to solving poverty: a number of African countries in particular have chronic problems generating growth, a nut foreign aid hasn’t yet cracked. So this isn’t a call for complacency about poverty any more than acknowledging victories over disease is an argument against tackling malaria. But make no mistake: as a whole, the world is much richer in 2013 than it was before. 721 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) in 2010 than in 1981, according to a new World Bank study from October. That’s astounding — a decline from 40 to about 14 percent of the world’s population suffering from abject want. And poverty rates are declining in every national income bracket: even in low income countries, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day in 2005 dollars) a day gone down from 63 in 1981 to 44 in 2010. We can be fairly confident that these trends are continuing. For one thing, they survived the Great Recession in 2008. For another, the decline in poverty has been fueled by global economic growth, which looks to be continuing: global GDP grew by 2.3 percent in 2012, a number that’ll rise to 2.9 percent in 2013 according to IMF projections. The bulk of the recent decline in poverty comes form India and China — about 80 percent from China *alone*. Chinese economic and social reform, a delayed reaction to the mass slaughter and starvation of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, has been the engine of poverty’s global decline. If you subtract China, there are actually more poor people today than there were in 1981 (population growth trumping the percentage declines in poverty). But we shouldn’t discount China. If what we care about is fewer people suffering the misery of poverty, then it shouldn’t matter what nation the less-poor people call home. Chinese growth should be celebrated, not shunted aside. The poor haven’t been the only people benefitting from global growth. Middle class people have access to an ever-greater stock of life-improving goods. Televisions and refrigerators, once luxury goods, are now comparatively cheap and commonplace. That’s why large-percentage improvements in a nation’s GDP appear to correlate strongly with higher levels of happiness among the nation’s citizens; people like having things that make their lives easier and more worry-free. Global economic growth in the past five decades has dramatically reduced poverty and made people around the world happier. Once again, we’re better off. 3. War is becoming rarer and less deadly. APTOPIX Mideast Libya CREDIT: AP Photo/ Manu Brabo Another massive conflict could overturn the global progress against disease and poverty. But it appears war, too, may be losing its fangs. Steven Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels Of Our Nature is the gold standard in this debate. Pinker brought a treasure trove of data to bear on the question of whether the world has gotten more peaceful, and found that, in the long arc of human history, both war and other forms of violence (the death penalty, for instance) are on a centuries-long downward slope. Pinker summarizes his argument here if you don’t own the book. Most eye-popping are the numbers for the past 50 years; Pinker finds that “the worldwide rate of death from interstate and civil war combined has juddered downward…from almost 300 per 100,000 world population during World War II, to almost 30 during the Korean War, to the low teens during the era of the Vietnam War, to single digits in the 1970s and 1980s, to less than 1 in the twenty-ﬁrst century.” Here’s what that looks like graphed: Pinker CREDIT: Steven Pinker/The Wall Street Journal So it looks like the smallest percentage of humans alive since World War II, and in all likelihood in human history, are living through the horrors of war. Did 2013 give us any reason to believe that Pinker and the other scholars who agree with him have been proven wrong? Probably not. The academic debate over the decline of war really exploded in 2013, but the “declinist” thesis has fared pretty well. Challenges to Pinker’s conclusion that battle deaths have gone down over time have not withstood scrutiny. The most compelling critique, a new paper by Bear F. Braumoeller, argues that if you control for the larger number of countries in the last 50 years, war happens at roughly the same rates as it has historically. There are lots of things you might say about Braumoeller’s argument, and I’ve asked Pinker for his two cents (update: Pinker’s response here). But most importantly, if battle deaths per 100,000 people really has declined, then his argument doesn’t mean very much. If (percentage-wise) fewer people are dying from war, then what we call “war” now is a lot less deadly than “war” used to be. Braumoeller suggests population growth and improvements in battle medicine explain the decline, but that’s not convincing: tell me with a straight face that the only differences in deadliness between World War II, Vietnam, and the wars you see today is that there are more people and better doctors. There’s a more rigorous way of putting that: today, we see many more civil wars than we do wars between nations. The former tend to be less deadly than the latter. That’s why the other major challenge to Pinker’s thesis in 2013, the deepening of the Syrian civil war, isn’t likely to upset the overall trend. Syria’s war is an unimaginable tragedy, one responsible for the rare, depressing increase in battle deaths from 2011 to 2012. However, the overall 2011-2012 trend “fits well with the observed long-term decline in battle deaths,” according to researchers at the authoritative Uppsala Conflict Data Program, because the uptick is not enough to suggest an overall change in trend. We should expect something similar when the 2013 numbers are published. Why are smaller and smaller percentages of people being exposed to the horrors of war? There are lots of reasons one could point to, but two of the biggest ones are the spread of democracy and humans getting, for lack of a better word, better. That democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other is not seriously in dispute: the statistical evidence is ridiculously strong. While some argue that the “democratic peace,” as it’s called, is caused by things other than democracy itself, there’s good experimental evidence that democratic leaders and citizens just don’t want to fight each other. Since 1950, democracy has spread around the world like wildfire. There were only a handful of democracies after World War II, but that grew to roughly 40 percent of all by the end of the Cold War. Today, a comfortable majority — about 60 percent — of all states are democracies. This freer world is also a safer one. Second — and this is Pinker’s preferred explanation — people have developed strategies for dealing with war’s causes and consequences. “Human ingenuity and experience have gradually been brought to bear,” Pinker writes, “just as they have chipped away at hunger and disease.” A series of human inventions, things like U.N. peacekeeping operations, which nowadays are very successful at reducing violence, have given us a set of social tools increasingly well suited to reducing the harm caused by armed conflict. War’s decline isn’t accidental, in other words. It’s by design. 4. Rates of murder and other violent crimes are in free-fall. Britain Unrest CREDIT: Akira Suemori/AP Photos Pinker’s trend against violence isn’t limited just to war. It seems likes crimes, both of the sort states commit against their citizens and citizens commit against each other, are also on the decline. Take a few examples. Slavery, once commonly sanctioned by governments, is illegal everywhere on earth. The use of torture as legal punishment has gone down dramatically. The European murder rate fell 35-fold from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century (check out this amazing 2003 paper from Michael Eisner, who dredged up medieval records to estimate European homicide rates in the swords-and-chivalry era, if you don’t believe me). The decline has been especially marked in recent years. Though homicide crime rates climbed back up from their historic lows between the 1970s and 1990s, reversing progress made since the late 19th century, they have collapsed worldwide in the 21st century. 557,000 people were murdered in 2001 — almost three times as many as were killed in war that year. In 2008, that number was 289,000, and the homicide rate has been declining in 75 percent of nations since then. Statistics from around the developed world, where numbers are particularly reliable, show that it’s not just homicide that’s on the wane: it’s almost all violent crime. US government numbers show that violent crime in the United States declined from a peak of about 750 crimes per 100,000 Americans to under 450 by 2009. G7 as a whole countries show huge declines in homicide, robbery, and vehicle theft. So even in countries that aren’t at poor or at war, most people’s lives are getting safer and more secure. Why? We know it’s not incarceration. While the United States and Britain have dramatically increased their prison populations, others, like Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, reduced their incarceration rates and saw similar declines in violent crime. Same thing state-to-state in the United States; New York imprisoned fewer people and saw the fastest crime decline in the country. The Economist’s deep dive into the explanations for crime’s collapse provides a few answers. Globally, police have gotten better at working with communities and targeting areas with the most crime. They’ve also gotten new toys, like DNA testing, that make it easier to catch criminals. The crack epidemic in the United States and its heroin twin in Europe have both slowed down dramatically. Rapid gentrification has made inner-city crime harder. And the increasing cheapness of “luxury” goods like iPods and DVD players has reduced incentives for crime on both the supply and demand sides: stealing a DVD player isn’t as profitable, and it’s easier for a would-be thief to buy one in the first place. But there’s one explanation The Economist dismissed that strikes me as hugely important: the abolition of lead gasoline. Kevin Drum at Mother Jones wrote what’s universally acknowledged to be the definitive argument for the lead/crime link, and it’s incredibly compelling. We know for a fact that lead exposure damages people’s brains and can potentially be fatal; that’s why an international campaign to ban leaded gasoline started around 1970. Today, leaded gasoline is almost unheard of — it’s banned in 175 countries, and there’s been a decline in lead blood levels by about 90 percent. Drum marshals a wealth of evidence that the parts of the brain damaged by lead are the same ones that check people’s aggressive impulses. Moreover, the timing matches up: crime shot up in the mid-to-late-20th century as cars spread around the world, and started to decline in the 70s as the anti-lead campaign was succeeding. Here’s close the relationship is, using data from the United States: Lead_Crime_325 Now, non-homicide violent crime appears to have ticked up in 2012, based on U.S. government surveys of victims of crime, but it’s very possible that’s just a blip: the official Department of Justice report says up-front that “the apparent increase in the rate of violent crimes reported to police from 2011 to 2012 was not statistically significant.” So we have no reason to believe crime is making a come back, and every reason to believe the historical decline in criminal violence is here to stay. 5. There’s less racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination in the world. Nelson Mandela CREDIT: Theana Calitz/AP Images Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed. Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news. Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely that we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization. It’s not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in 1860: African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The improvements in each of these group’s statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable. On closer look, we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view,” Bobo writes, “but now overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.” The norm against overt racism has gone global. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. Racism obviously survived both American and South African apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. But there’s reason to hope that’ll change as well: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I’m not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning. The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we’ve made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best_year_graphics-04 Once again, these victories are partial and by no means inevitable. Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away” on their own. They’re losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands. That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime. But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as inevitable, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace discrimination and poisoning children’s minds with lead. So far, these choices have more than paid off. It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.

Quality of life high, and poverty down – we control uniqueness

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of The Economist, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, The Rational Optimist, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen since the 1950s. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

Poverty is disappearing over the long term and only major disruptions can stop that trend

Surowiecki 7 (James, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007)
Goklany depicts a global economy in which nearly all signs are positive -- and in which the problems that do exist, such as stagnation or setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, will be solved if economic growth and technological improvements are allowed to work their magic. Nor is this, in Goklany's account, a new phenomenon. He marshals an impressive array of historical data to argue that the trajectory of the twentieth century has been generally upward and onward. Taken as a whole, Goklany argues, humanity really has been getting better and better day by day, so that today, as his subtitle puts it, "we're living longer, healthier, more comfortable lives on a cleaner planet." Seen from a broad historical perspective, this description is, for most people, accurate enough. Just about everyone living today is the beneficiary of what can almost certainly be called the single most consequential development in human history -- namely, the onset of industrialization. As the economic historian Angus Maddison has shown in a series of studies of economic development over the past two millennia, human economies grew very little, if at all, for most of human history. Between 1000 and 1820 or so, Maddison estimates, annual economic growth was around 0.05 percent a year -- which meant that living standards improved incredibly slowly and that people living in 1800 were only mildly better off than people living in 1000. But sometime around 1820, that all began to change. Between 1820 and today, world per capita real income grew 20 times as fast as it did in the previous eight centuries. In the West, above all, the effects of this transformation have been so massive as to be practically unfathomable. Real income, life expectancy, literacy and education rates, and food consumption have soared, while infant mortality, hours worked, and food prices have plummeted. And although the West has been the biggest beneficiary of these changes, the diffusion of technology, medicine, and agricultural techniques has meant that developing countries have enjoyed dramatic improvements in what the United Nations calls "human development indicators," even if most of their citizens remain poor. One consequence of this is that people at a given income level today are likely to be healthier and to live longer than people at the same income level did 40 or 50 years ago.

Life is getting better—uniqueness disproves critique

Goklany 2004 (Indur, Property and Environment Research Center Julian Simon Fellow and PhD in Electrical Engineering, Former Chief of the Technical Assessment Division @ National commission on Air Quality, in “It’s Getting Better”, Ed. Terry Anderson, http://members.cox.net/igoklany/Economic%20Growth%20Tech%20Change%20and%20Human%20Well-being%202004.pdf)

With this Neo-Malthusian vision of the future, the Global 2000 Report to the President1 began a chilling description of the problems that lay ahead for the world unless radical changes were made. Fifteen years later, Julian Simon2 quoted these words in his introduction to the monumental collection of essays, The State of Humanity. The point of that book, which Simon also edited, was to determine whether trends in human well-being and environmental quality were in accord with a Neo-Malthusian world view. The State of Humanity, in fifty-eight chapters by more than fifty scholars, documented the tremendous strides in human well-being over the centuries, as well as trends in natural resource use and environmental quality. Based on these discussions, Simon wrote: “Our species is better off in just about every measurable material way.” 3

Yet today anxiety about the future continues. Calls to restructure our economy to avoid the pending insurmountable problems are typical. “The challenge facing the entire world is to design an economy that can satisfy the basic needs of people everywhere without self-destructing,” said Lester Brown, president of World Watch Institute, in 1998. 4

This chapter is a conscious effort to emulate, build upon, and update the work of Julian Simon and to provide empirical data to help evaluate the heated rhetoric of Lester Brown and other Neo-Malthusian alarmists. While no one can confidently predict the future, it is possible to scrutinize the past and present to determine the current state of humanity and identify which factors have helped, and which hindered, progress.

Thus, the goal of this much smaller chapter is to collect in a convenient and portable volume the historical trends for indicators that are widely used to illustrate human welfare. These trends are presented not only across time, but, where data are available, across countries with different levels of economic development. In some cases, the data go back to when modern economic growth began—around 1800.5 This chapter will address whether and to what extent modern economic growth has improved humanity’s lot, using the following indicators.

Available food supplies per capita. Having sufficient food is the first step to a healthy society. It enables the average person to live a productive life, while hunger and undernourishment retard education and the development of human capital, slowing down technological change and economic growth. Life expectancy. To most people, this is the single most valuable indicator of human well- being. Longer life expectancy is also generally accompanied by an increase in disability-free years. Infant mortality. Throughout history, high levels of death in early childhood have produced enormous sorrow, reduced population growth, and lengthened the time spent by women in child-bearing. Economic development. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is a measure of people’s income. Thus, it measures the wealth or level of economic development of a country. While wealth is not an end in itself, it indicates how well a nation can achieve the ends its people desire, from greater availability of food, safe water, and sanitation to higher levels of education and health care.

�� Education. While education is an end in itself, it also adds to human capital and can accelerate the creation and diffusion of technology. Education (particularly of women) helps to spread knowledge about nutrition and public health practices.

Political rights and economic freedom. The ability to conduct one’s life creatively and productively usually depends on having political rights and economic freedom. They are critical to maintaining liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which are among the inalienable rights of human beings. �� A composite human development index. Using an approach similar to that employed in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), this index combines indicators for life expectancy, education, and per capita income.6

After examining trends in the above indicators, this chapter will address whether differences in human well- being have widened between developed and developing countries and whether urban residents fare worse than rural residents. Finally, it will discuss the factors that appear to be responsible for the remarkable cycle of progress that has accompanied modern economic growth.

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