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AR – Growth Solves Warming
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- Dedev isn’t the solution—exacerbates inequality and conflict
- Dedev won’t be accepted—greed and status-seeking are entrenched
- Degrowth won’t be accepted—pragmatic action within the current system is best
- Elites will cling to growth
- Not feasible
1AR – Growth Solves WarmingGrowth’s driving successful climate adaptation and reversal on a global scale now---solves their impact John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344 Perhaps the most significant shifts in resource management consciousness have emerged through climate change adaptation and the recognition that institutions, infrastructure, and ecosystems have been managed on the basis of climate “stationarity,” which is the assumption that the past is an effective guide to the future [30],[39]. We suggest that ecosystems and economies should be managed flexibly for at least three non-stationary processes, including demographics, economics, and climate. A fourth non-stationarity should target research and investments that lead to increased efficiency and smaller resource footprints. Taken together, these non-stationarities fit social–ecological resilience theory quite closely. Complex and shifting human interactions with ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles can be translated into decision-making processes [40]. With increasing scientific knowledge and global awareness of emerging environmental risks, scarcities, and potential tipping points in social and ecological systems, measures are being taken to correct our flawed economic models—internalizing externalities in accounting and decision making, integrating planetary boundaries in policy discussions, and committing to reverse trends in environmental and social decline. We agree with our respected colleagues that this change is not happening at the scale or pace necessary to resolve the problem [1], and exceeding tipping points is a genuine risk. Such signal failures of resource management as the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery in the 20th century [41] or the lack of a global carbon emissions agreement at the UNFCCC CoP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 highlight our difficulty in negotiating science, institutional change, and governance. However, we also highlight that the adaptive capacity of humanity to overcome seemingly insurmountable constraints on human development within a productive and resilient biosphere has been demonstrated at more modest scales and that this capacity for transformation exists in our interconnected global community at a scale previously unimaginable. Science-based resource management has seen dramatic growth in sophistication in recent decades, as conservation and economic development have blended together and flexible, non-stationary management approaches have become increasingly mainstream in development banks, governments and aid agencies, and corporations. These shifts represent real advances in linking ecology to practical challenges in managing resources across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Solvency / Mindset Shift Dedev Fails – Doesn’t Solve Environment De-growth doesn’t solve the environment—not sufficient van den Bergh, 11 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, ICREA, Barcelona, Spain, Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat, Ecological Economics, Volume 70, Issue 5, 15 March 2011, Pages 881–890, “Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”” DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.035, Science Direct, accessed online via Wayne State library, jj) It is anyway unlikely that a direct physical degrowth strategy will solve our problems. Even if we would manage to “scale the economy down” to 50%, something that seems really impossible from a social–political perspective, we still only would have reduced the size of the environmental problems by half. But this is by far insufficient for most environmental problems. To illustrate, to stabilize CO2 concentrations at about 450 ppmv by 2050, global emissions would have to decline by more than 50% by 2050, and in industrialized countries even by possibly 80% (Jackson, 2009). One cannot expect or hope for degrowth to such an extent. Behavioral changes guided by tough environmental regulation (notably rising energy prices) and additional measures (as outlined in Section 6) are needed to realize such ambitious reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Degrowth may be part of the outcome but any direct planning of it would be completely arbitrary. Should we then have to aim for 10, 50 or 80% degrowth? Nobody knows. Let instead environmental regulation with clear, environmentally motivated aims do its job and just await what it implies for the combination of behavioral, structural, technological and scale (de/growth) changes. Of course, if physical degrowth just means degrowth of CO2 emissions, then the concept does not offer anything new — this is already the starting point of the entire mitigation policy debate. Labeling it as degrowth will not contribute in any way to concrete solutions or political acceptance of needed policies and strategies. Good, effective environmental policies should by definition lead to physical degrowth of the latter kind, namely simply in terms of a reduction in resource use and pollutive emissions (without knowing and having to know beforehand what this would mean for other aspects of the “physical scale of the economy”). In this sense, traditional environmental policy thinking, notably as proposed by mainstream environmental economics, is not necessarily inconsistent with physical degrowth. Dedev isn’t the solution—exacerbates inequality and conflictWiener, 1 (Anthony J. Wiener *, Department of Management, Polytechnic University, Technology in Society 23 (2001) 515–521, ““The ‘De-materialisation’ Myth” and the Limits to Growth: a Commentary on Dr. Trainer’s Paper” accessed online via Science Direct, jj) Dr. Ted Trainer’s paper1 focuses on whether economic growth, even as the service sector expands and efficiency increases, can reduce exponentially increasing demands for inputs of matter and energy. He contends that such “de-materialisation” is a “myth” that must now be excluded from arguments against the “limits to growth” thesis. Even if that is true, however, it does not follow that near-term “zero growth” would be a solution. On the contrary, if the scarcity and spillover effects of growth are appropriately priced, conservation and substitution will be induced, and nearterm economic growth will facilitate technological and economic solutions to pollution and depletion. Moreover, the most intractable and dangerous problems of interpersonal and communal conflict and war are greatly exacerbated by shortages, fixed pies, and inequities of distribution – provocations that rankle much more in poverty than in economic growth. Dr. Trainer writes, in his final paragraph: …concerns about the “limits to growth” are not satisfactorily countered by the dematerialisation thesis…a radical change of direction in thinking about the global predicament would seem to be called for. …a just and ecologically sustainable society cannot be achieved unless there is a transition to a fundamentally different socio-economic system, one in which the core principles are simpler lifestyles, small and highly self-sufficient local economies, primarily participatory and cooperative arrangements, and a zero-growth economy.2 Many of us (though by no means everyone) might agree with Dr. Trainer that simpler lifestyles and more participatory and cooperative arrangements would eventually be desirable, and probably necessary for a just society. There would be more questions about his proposed small and highly self-sufficient local economies since some advantages of scale might be lost, such as inexpensive and varied food, advanced medical care, libraries, museums, even universities, if they matter. The issue is whether it is urgent to make the “transition” the primary goal of economic and social policy. No Mindset Shift Not feasible, causes chaos and instabilty van den Bergh, 11 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, ICREA, Barcelona, Spain, Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat, Ecological Economics, Volume 70, Issue 5, 15 March 2011, Pages 881–890, “Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”” DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.035, Science Direct, accessed online via Wayne State library, jj) Perhaps for the majority of degrowth proponents the notion of degrowth denotes a radical change of (or many radical changes in) the economy. This may involve changes in values, ethics, preferences, financial systems, markets (versus informal exchange), work and labor, the role of money, or even profit-making and ownership (Latouche, 2009 and Schneider et al., 2010). Such an approach comprises degrowth notions 2 and 3, but it is broader. Fournier (2008) has called it “escaping from the [capitalist] economy.” The main problem I see here that this is such a grand, imprecise idea which lacks a good, thorough analysis that it will be impossible to obtain political support for it in a democratic system. More importantly, it is void of a good view on systemic solutions and instrumentation, making it unclear how to upscale radical changes in lifestyles and grassroots initiatives by small subsets of the population (“niches”) to society as a whole. Alternative lifestyles, i.e. outside the cultural norm, have always existed but have never been adopted by the large majority of people. So why would this now suddenly be different? This does, of course, not mean such lifestyles need not exist or do not deserve respect. They may influence slow change in dominant lifestyles, but cannot be expected to be copied by the masses. Writings on this issue tend to be normative and idealistic rather than analytical and realistic. They seem to be motivated more by political ideology about justice and equity than about solving urgent and threatening environmental problems (an “ecological imperative”). As a result, they do not necessarily offer an effective approach to combat environmental problems. One can certainly be positive about the underlying humanistic ideals of equality, solidarity, citizenship, locality and “good life.” However, a drastic change in the economy upfront seems an overly risky experiment and a diffuse, undirected strategy that is not sure to meet the desired environmental aims. Moreover, it may well result in unintended social and economic chaos and instability. The main historical, large-scale experiments aimed at moving away from market capitalism which we can learn from, namely central planning by communist states as in the former USSR, Eastern Europe and China, certainly do not offer a good record in terms of clean production and environmental regulation — quite the opposite. Here, a lack of market mechanisms and other incentives seems to have given rise to excessive waste and inefficiency, also in relation to environmentally relevant categories of inputs and outputs. Thinking about radical changes should moreover incorporate received insights about human behavior and its diversity as found in modern psychology and behavioral economics. These are already slowly changing mainstream economics and associated ideas about public policy (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). Given the urgency of environmental and notably climate change problems it makes sense to think carefully about the effectiveness of strategies in the short and medium term, which should involve taking into account behavioral features and limits of human individuals and organizations. Striving for radical degrowth seems risky in this sense as it does not well integrate received insights about human behavior. Instead, a less risky and more effective strategy is adding new institutions to our economies — to begin with an effective international climate agreement. What we need most of all is a hard environmental constraint on our economy (complemented by price regulation and possibly other types of regulation, like of commercial advertising and taxing status goods with serious environmental repercussions) and then let consumers, producers and investors adapt to it. Possibly, this will go along with fundamental, radical changes in our economy and institutions, but it does not seem necessary to require these and have a blueprint of them upfront. Dedev won’t be accepted—greed and status-seeking are entrenchedvan den Bergh, 10 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Institute for Environmental Science and Technology & Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici Cn - Campus UAB 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola) Spain, ICREA, Barcelona, Spain, Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 18, Issue 6, April 2010, Pages 540–543, “Relax about GDP growth: implications for climate and crisis policies” accessed online via Science Direct, jj) Following the last point, I would like to make a few remarks about the notion of de-growth, which has received much support in some circles. Another term is economic decline while the French say “la décroissance”. We may face de-growth if we implement safe, stringent environmental policies. But one shouldn't reverse the causality, that is, say that de-growth is needed or sufficient for an environmentally sustainable economy. I think this is consistent with the view expressed in Victor's book. De-growth is just a possible outcome, not a condition. Stressing de-growth is moreover likely to enhance social and political resistance and lobbying against critical views on growth and progress. One can of course claim that the term de-growth is just intended to shake up public opinion and make people – citizens, economists and politicians – aware of the problematic nature of growth. But I do not believe a conceptually debatable approach like de-growth is the best way forward to solve fundamental problems regarding progress and environment. I instead would focus on tackling GDP as a dominant goal indicator at the public, governmental, national and international levels. As said, this will imply a perfectly neutral stance on growth – that is, growth and de-growth are equally irrelevant in such a framework. I further do not see value in the idealistic view of a voluntary, bottom-up transition to a self-organized de-growth society in which “frugality” plays an important role, as suggested by many de-growth proponents. I believe in facing reality, recognizing and accepting such diverse phenomena like greed, opportunism, status seeking and rebound, which are unlikely to be countered adequately by altruism which some of us indeed show, or at least some of the time. I think reality proofs that we can't expect much from voluntary action for the majority of people on this planet. We need collective action now more than ever, which creates self-constraints that leave no way out, no leakages, no rebounds. I think that setting effective limits, like worldwide ceilings on greenhouse gas emissions or correcting prices for environmental externalities, is crucial to make sure that people account for the right social (including environmental) effects and costs in their private decisions. This can involve very high taxes (or permit prices) if the external costs of GHG emissions are extremely high because of potential catastrophic climate scenarios. This may subsequently give rise to de-growth – about which we should not worry. Unfortunately, many experts do or will worry about it. They should be aware of the GDP paradox as sketched above, which may make them relax a bit. Victor is not the only one currently writing about environment versus growth. There in fact seems to be a sort of revival of the growth debate (e.g., [2], [12] and [22]). This is perhaps due to the fact that it is more and more recognized that the never-ending and unconditional quest for economic (GDP) growth presents an unnecessary barrier to good social and environmental policies and developments worldwide. This special issue and the de-growth movement are part of this revival. Nevertheless, it is clear that resistance against critical views on GDP and growth is powerful. For example, the World Bank recently financed a study by a team of eminent economists led by two Nobel laureates. The result, a report with the general title “The Growth Report”, concluded that economic (GDP) growth should be the world's number one goal. Daly [5] convincingly criticizes this report, regarding it as an apologia for globalization and GDP idolatry. He suggests (p.511) “That such a top-down paean to growth should be thought worth so much renewed effort by the global champions of the credo may be evidence that among common folk faith in growth is waning.” I sincerely wish this were true, but believe we still need to put much intellectual effort in thinking up effective strategies to counter the growth dogma of economics and politics. Degrowth won’t be accepted—pragmatic action within the current system is bestvan den Bergh, 11 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, ICREA, Barcelona, Spain, Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat, Ecological Economics, Volume 70, Issue 5, 15 March 2011, Pages 881–890, “Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”” DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.035, Science Direct, accessed online via Wayne State library, jj) The voluntary, bottom-up view behind many (notably radical) degrowth expressions in my opinion gives insufficient attention to modern insights of psychology and behavioral economics. These state that humans show bounded rationality, myopia, a large degree of self-interest (and a smaller role for altruism), and a propensity to compare, seek status and imitate (sensitivity to fashions). Add to this the interactions between large numbers of individuals, increasing returns to scale which lead to lock-in of undesirable behaviors and technologies, and (energy) rebound, and we end up with an altogether impressively complex and difficult to alter system (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). This should stimulate social scientists to think about systematic solutions and instruments as well as about very clever strategies to attain social–political acceptance for these. Just proposing voluntary grassroots initiatives is too easy and idealistic. It neglects the aforementioned complications. Of course, this does not mean a plea against grassroots initiatives but more attention for their upscaling and system-wide impacts and associated policies. Certainly something can be learned here too from studies in psychology and economics on how to elicit pro-environmental behavior. One may argue, of course, that I should not worry too much about a degrowth strategy, as it is highly uncertain to receive widespread social and political support. I indeed fear that degrowth as a political strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians, or even a significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of preaching to the choir, i.e. convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the pessimism about the political feasibility of environmental policies as a motivation to support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of environmental (including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out of time — which does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and environmental policies. For me this includes trying to convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP, relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may alter the balance in trading-off costs and benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a). Elites will cling to growthAlexander, 14 (* Dr Samuel Alexander is a lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne. He is also research fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute and co-director of the Simplicity Institute, Post Carbon Pathways, Working Paper Series, WP1/14 January 2014, “A Critique of Techno-Optimism: Efficiency without Sufficiency is Lost” http://www.postcarbonpathways.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1_Critique_of_Techno_Optimism.pdf, jj) Given that the richest nations demonstrably have the largest ecological footprints, it is surprising, or at least disappointing, that mainstream environmental discourse still tends to assume that sustained growth in GDP, across the globe, will solve the ecological predicament; or at least, that sustained growth is not incompatible with sustainability (UN, 2012). There seems to be an implicit acceptance of the EKC hypothesis, driven by techno-optimism, even though it lacks empirical foundation. This can be explained primarily in terms of political convenience. Politicians seem very reluctant to accept any incompatibility between growth and environmental protection, because that would involve choosing between those goals. Instead of making tough choices, politicians just pretend that there is no incompatibility, which is what people and businesses seem to want to hear. All the while, the biocapacity of the planet continues to decline (Lawn and Clarke, 2010). Not feasibleRees, 14 (William E. Rees, PhD, FRSC, UBC School of Community and Regional Planning, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, June 2014, “Avoiding Collapse” https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/BC%20Office/2014/06/ccpa-bc_AvoidingCollapse_Rees.pdf, jj) In theory, opting for this alternative should not be a difficult choice for Homo sapiens. Would an ostensibly intelligent, forward-thinking, morally conscious, compassionate species continue to defend an economic system that wrecks its planetary home, exacerbates inequality, undermines social cohesion, generates greater net costs than benefits and ultimately threatens to lead to systemic collapse? Remarkably, the answer so far seems to be “yes.” There are simply no strong voices for caution among contemporary leaders and certainly no political constituencies for degrowth. There is no nascent plan for a World Assembly for Mutual Survival. Humanity’s unique capacities for collective intelligence, rational analysis and planning ahead for the common good play no major role in the political arena, particularly when they challenge conventional myths, corporate values and monied elites. On present evidence, there is little possibility that anything like the proposals outlined above will be implemented in time for a smooth transition to sustainability. Daly was right: “evidentally, things still have to get much worse before we will muster the courage and clarity to try to make them better.”61 We are our own worst enemy. People are naturally both short-sighted and optimistic and thus discount the future; we generally react emotionally/instinctively to things that threaten our social status or political/economic power; those most vested in the status quo therefore vigorously resist significant change; corruption and greed (all but sanctioned by contemporary morality) overshadow the public interest. Mindless dedication to entrenched beliefs is a particularly powerful blinder to otherwise obvious truths. History shows that the resultant “Woodenheadedness...plays a remarkably large role in government. It consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions (i.e. ideology) while ignoring any contrary signs. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts.”62 Neuroscientists have long recognized the general phenomenon, but the means by which people become so deeply committed to particular concepts has only recently been revealed. In the course of individual development, repeated social, cultural and sensory experiences actually trace a semi-permanent record in the individual’s synaptic circuitry — cultural norms, beliefs and values can acquire a physical presence in the brain. Once entrenched, these neural structures alter the individual’s perception of subsequent experiences. People tend to seek out situations, people and information that reinforce their neural “presets.” Conversely, “when faced with information that does not agree with their internal structures, they deny, discredit, reinterpret, or forget that information.”63 Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.56 Mb. Share with your friends:
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