Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Deters Conflict

Hegemony is key to prevent great power wars

[Yuhan, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, January 22, 2011, East Asia Forum, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, accessed 7/7/13, WD]

However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid.

However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way.

For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy.

Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

U.S. primacy solves war – empirical and statistical data

[Robert, 5-10-13, American Thinker, “The Case for Hegemony,” http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/05/the_case_for_hegemony.html, accessed 7-5-13, MSG]

According to data compiled by the University of Maryland, an average of 52.5 wars occurred per decade of the Cold War through 1984. As a result of those conflicts, an average of nearly 4.6 million people died per decade. This is hardly peaceful. By contrast, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden found that state-based conflicts decreased by approximately 40% from 1992 to 2005. Battle deaths since 1990 make up only a small fraction of those incurred through any decade during the Cold War, and the frequency of attempted military coups has dropped significantly; an average of 12.8 occurred per year between 1962 and 1991, while just 5.9 were attempted per year from 1992 through 2006. From 1989 to 2005 the number of genocides decreased by 90%.

If the confrontation of the Cold War is not a correct paradigm for a peaceful future, perhaps one resembling that of the Concert of Powers and the long held mutual goal of a balance of power that prevailed in Europe between 1815 and 1914 would provide a greater blueprint for the 21st century. Such a restructuring of the world order has been called for from analysts and commentators as diverse as Henry Kissinger and Noam Chomsky. But was the world after the fall of Napoleon until the outbreak of World War I really as peaceful as some of the advocates of balance of power would lead you to believe?

In fact, it was largely the example of the tumultuous environment of 19th century Europe that molded America's earliest perceptions of a proper security environment. What was essentially conceived by George Washington and was later refined by John Quincy Adams, American leaders have long sought to avoid entangling the nation in any sort of foreign policy based on balance of power. Expressing his deep seated reluctance for any type of balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, Adams noted in 1811 that were the United States not to emerge as the hegemon of the Americas, "we shall have an endless multitude of little insignificant clans and tribe at eternal war with one another for a rock or a fish pond, the sport and fable of European masters and oppressors." Multipolarity, in the absence of a global congruence of interests and widespread cooperation, will inevitably lead to such a situation the world over.

Indeed, any future deterioration of American hegemony would be accompanied by catastrophic consequences. History reveals that tragic violence inevitably follows newly created power vacuums. The decline of the Ottoman Empire brought on a massacre of the Armenians, and the end of British rule in India resulted in massive devastation in South Asia. As was persuasively illustrated in Niall Ferguson's War of the World, the weakening and contraction of Western empires were indispensable contributors to the unprecedented bloodshed of the 20th century. Make no mistake, history will repeat itself - beginning in Iraq - should the United States loose its nerve and retract from its responsibilities as the world's lone superpower. While it has become fashionable to proclaim that the 21st Century will emerge as the "Asian Century," the United States - and its many allies - should do everything in their powers to insure that we are indeed at the dawn of a new American century.

Unipolarity prevents great power wars and economic collapse – smaller conflicts may be inevitable but hegemony keeps them from escalating

[Ronald and Jacek, 2006, Chinese Journal of International Politics, “Power Transition and China–US Conflicts,” http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/35.full.pdf, p. 37-44, accessed 7-5-13, MSG]

Dynamics of the Theoretical Framework

Figure 1 integrates and relates in a dynamic fashion the central variables of¶ our strategic argument: power, hierarchy, satisfaction and the probability of¶ war or peace. It illustrates interactions among the three key variables under¶ the condition that the international hierarchy is dominated by one¶ recognized preponderant power.5

This theoretical framework, described in policy terms in the earlier¶ paragraphs, draws many conclusions, but one in particular stands out in its¶ strategic importance: wars (in dark grey) occur at the global level when a¶ dissatisfied challenger sees an opportunity to take on the pre-eminent¶ international leader. Under an equal distribution of power, peace and¶ integration (in light grey) may take place, but only when major global¶ participants all agree on the set of norms and rules that govern world¶ politics. From this perspective, the democratic peace—among Germany,¶ Britain and France after the World War II and the subsequent evolution of¶ the EU—emerged precisely because the United States imposed a common¶ set of democratic institutions on Europe and forced the emergence of¶ ‘liberal’ democracies. Thus, even though the power distribution in Europe¶ was similar to that preceding World Wars I and II, peace broke out and¶ integration followed because nations shared common institutions and norms¶ as established by the United States. Following the collapse of the Soviet¶ Union it became clear, albeit slowly, that the theoretical proposition that a¶ balance of power guaranteed peace was inconsistent with the structural¶ reality of the international system. Global peace is maintained when there is¶ one overwhelmingly powerful dominant country. Figure 1 intellectually turns the balance of power concept on its head.6

In Figure 2, by comparison,¶ the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded. This¶ ‘preponderant’ view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who¶ measure the probability of wars, and implicitly by many in the policy¶ community.7

The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the¶ international system challenge one another for dominance when they¶ anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible.¶ An important new insight emerges from Figure 1. Conflict can still take¶ place despite strong power asymmetry, but its severity will be much reduced.¶ This deduction is supported by empirical evidence.¶ When the global hierarchy was uniform, the United States and its¶ allies were engaged in World War II. After 1945, the United States emerged¶ as the preponderant power. It continued to wage wars in Korea, Vietnam,¶ Kuwait and Iraq, but these wars produced limited casualties (compared¶ to World Wars), as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda. Despite US¶ preponderance, these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced. This¶ formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and¶ Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction; the Seven Weeks’ War between¶ Austria and Prussia occurred at parity, but both nations were jointly¶ satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders.¶ The probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but¶ the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that¶ war limited.8

This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to¶ the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing¶ to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from¶ England to the United States.9

As Figure 1 indicates, the condition required¶ for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on¶ the rules that guide the hierarchy. It is not just power relations—as realists¶ would argue—that lead nations to wage conflict. Agreement or disagreement with preferences, in coordination with parity, leads to war and¶ peace.10

This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that¶ informs our political strategy. At the bottom left corner, Figure 1 accounts¶ for the process of integration. Integration is the most important new¶ phenomenon emerging since World War II. A comparison of Figures 1¶ and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric¶ period. Deutsch et al. independently observed such a pattern in 1957. They¶ indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity.¶ Rather, integration occurred around ‘cores of strength’ where a dominant¶ nation provided the ‘nucleus’ for integration.11

Policy Implications

The internal mobilization of resources, and effective alliance formation or¶ neutralization, can be manipulated in response to policy changes. A reliable¶ strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics, particularly¶ for the United States, as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of¶ either global stability or instability.

There is substantial empirical support for the power parity proposition¶ throughout the conflict literature.14 In other research environments, such¶ formal and empirical evidence would have been sufficient to challenge the¶ fundamental assertion that a parity or ‘balance of power’ preserves peace.¶ However, given the widely held belief among practitioners and academics¶ that the underlying logic of balance of power is correct, these two research¶ directions continue to develop side by side. The collapse of the Soviet Union¶ is one such critical test that has awakened the need to reformulate long-held¶ beliefs.

No one can argue today that Russia presents a direct threat to the Western¶ world or that another challenger of a similar magnitude is already in place;¶ yet stability increased after the decline of the Soviet Union. Further, the¶ emergence of asymmetry in nuclear weapons combined with the re-targeting¶ of such weapons by both the United States and Russia make it difficult to¶ argue that Mutual Assured Destruction continues to preserve the existing¶ stability in the international system.¶

Probability of Conflict at the Global Level¶

Power parity provides the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation.¶ While power is central to the deductions of balance of power and power parity, the conditions that lead to war and peace are very distinct.¶ Moreover, each perspective provides different substantive policy advice. The¶ parity approach allows contenders to anticipate the choice of peace or war.¶ When there is an extended dispute—in particular, a lasting territorial¶ dispute—that creates the underlying condition required for a serious¶ confrontation. Military buildups and arms races are predictors of the¶ willingness of contenders to choose war over peace when both parity and an¶ extended dispute are present. Werner and Kugler show that these conditions¶ are associated historically with the overwhelming number of choices to wage¶ major war.15

Empirical Implications: The Asian Challenge

Applying the power parity logic to the Asian region permits us to determine¶ which interactions have the potential to escalate to a serious confrontation and possibly a major war. These interactions, while being potentially¶ dangerous, are not deterministically conflictual and can be resolved¶ peacefully even though they appear threatening at this time.

Figure 3 presents the relative power and income of the main international¶ competitors compared with that of the United States from 1950 extrapolated¶ to 2070. The conditions for parity are met when a challenger has over 80%¶ of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease when the challenger has¶ exceeded the dominant nation’s capability by 20%—when it becomes the¶ dominant nation. Previous research strongly suggests that the period of¶ greatest danger is when the challenger manages to overtake the dominant¶ nation and traverses the region between 100 and 120%.16 In order to address¶ the Asian region, first we will detail the global context in terms of structural¶ power relations.17

At the global level, the lack of an open confrontation between the United¶ States and Russia, so feared by most analysts during the Cold War, is¶ completely consistent with the power parity perspective. The Cold War¶ did not become ‘hot’ because the USSR never approached parity with¶ the United States. Between 1945 and 1989, despite arms buildups¶ and ideological confrontations, the USSR did not approach or overcome¶ US preponderance. Furthermore, following the breakup of the Soviet Union¶ the prospects for such an overtaking are remote. This means the probability of war between the US and Russia well into the future is quite remote even¶ if they have significant policy disputes.

Next consider the US–European relationship. No challenger to the US is¶ expected to arise here. No single nation in Europe—Germany, UK, Italy or¶ France—has sufficient resources to become a contender. The largest, Germany,¶ even after re-unification only approaches the size of Japan. Again, given the¶ population base of major European nations, none can overcome the United¶ States in the foreseeable future, or challenge China or India. Thus, the¶ probability of a confrontation between any European country and the¶ United States is very small and such a conflict would not be severe.

US hegemony and alliances deter arms races, security competition, and wars

Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Associate Professor, 6

[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate, p. 108-109, http://books.google.com/books?id=YgE-1HjR70sC&pg=PT120&lpg=PT120&dq=%22The+fourth+critical+fact+to+consider+is+that+the+security+provided+by+the+power+of+the+United+States+creates+stability+in+international+politics%22+%22Thayer%22&source=bl&ots=Iis_jTPT73&sig=LXJVWPrRNhtXHZm-t-gCsMKzLMo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=R9rYUb_UGOG8jAKQ5IGABA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false, accessed 7-6-13, MSG]

The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the¶ power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is¶ vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph¶ Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it¶ were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be¶ much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would¶ result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We¶ can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey,¶ Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia,¶ Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race¶ between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would¶ have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another¶ European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that¶ the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace¶ and stability.

The United States does not provide security to other countries because it¶ is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call¶ a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it¶ would be a mistake to seek "benevolence" in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might¶ appear to be "benevolent" actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist¶ Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids¶ the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually¶ intertwined with a humanitarian impulse.¶

The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the¶ United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."2

The present world is structured around American interests and in a post-American world, the current world order would be destructured. The lack of structure without heg would lead to potential conflicts.

Kagan, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution 2012 (Robert W., February 11, “Why the World Needs America,” Wall Street Journal,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX)

If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it.

What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps?

Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order.

Hegemony key to check conflicts – prevents the rise of hostile rivals

Khalilizad, Former US Ambassador to the UN, 95

[Zalmay, 3-22-95, Washington Quarterly, “Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the Cold War.,” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-16781957/losing-moment-united-states.html, accessed 7-9-13, MSG]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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