Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz



Download 1.85 Mb.
Page2/45
Date02.06.2018
Size1.85 Mb.
#53116
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   45

Latin America

Uniqueness




Hegemony Declining Now




US hegemony is decreasing in Latin America, leaving it vulnerable to domestic terrorism – Hezbollah has already been able to smuggle drugs, weapons, and operatives across the US-Mexican border


Neumann, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11

(Vanessa, 12/2011, Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism: Hezbollah and Venezuela,” http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html, accessed 7/9/13, IC)


Yet for all this massive spending on fighting terrorists and insurgents in the Middle East, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to them here, on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United States is under territorial threat through its Mexican border. Hezbollah operatives have already been smuggled, along with drugs and weapons, in tunnels dug under the border with the US by Mexican drug cartels. Only a week after my October 5th interview by KT McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of a possibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried out inside the US with the complicity of South American drug traffickers, the global press revealed a plot by the elite Iranian Quds Force to utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a bombing that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour.

Second, American assets in Latin America are under threat. Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energy pipelines and American- or Jewish-sponsored community centers and American citizens have already been targeted by terrorist groups all over Latin America for decades: FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is also rumored to have a strong presence in Brazil.

Third, while American soldiers give their lives trying to defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the Middle East, these same groups are being supported and strengthened increasingly by Latin America, where they receive training, weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement far more costly by any metric: loss of life and financial cost.

Indeed over the last decade, Latin America is a region spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region with which the United States has a growing asymmetry of power: it has more importance to the United States, while the United States is losing influence over Latin America, which remains the largest source of oil, drugs and immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of recent US population growth, as well as a growing portion of the electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections. The discovery of huge new oil reserves in Brazil and Argentina, that might even challenge Saudi Arabia, and the 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America of increasing strategic importance to the U.S., particularly as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes ever more uncertain, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in previously secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs and the resurgence of previously waning terrorist organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence and murder cross the U.S. border, costing American lives and taking a huge toll on U.S. law enforcement. The United States needs to develop a smart policy to deal with these challenges.



US leadership declining now in Latin America – poor leadership in negotiating free trade agreements


Boaz, Cato Institute Executive Vice President, 9

(David, CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 2009, page 637-638, CATO Institute, RH)


During most of the time since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada in 1993, however, the United States showed no such leadership. Instead, Washington promised to create a hemispheric free trade zone, known as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, but made little effort to promote the idea.

The result was unfortunate, and a window of opportunity was lost. Latin American countries that were eager to enter into a free trade agreement gradually became disillusioned with years of U.S. inaction, and some turned decidedly against the idea of free trade. Worse, as economist Sebastian Edwards points out, Washington’s promise of promoting the Free Trade Area of the Americas had the perverse effect of actually halting unilateral trade barrier reductions in Latin America as those countries waited to negotiate reductions as a group with the United States, an expectation that went unfulfilled. Moreover, from the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95 to the Brazilian currency crisis of 2002, Washington supported massive International Monetary Fund bailouts that encouraged irresponsible behavior by investors and policymakers and surely increased the severity of economic crises in the region.



Hegemony Low Now – Latin America Shifting




Latin America is moving away from a US dominated, unipolar world – the US’ hegemony caused balancing


Marcella, U.S. Army War College Americas Studies director, 13

(Gabriel, 3/22/13, Journal of International Affairs, “The transformation of security in Latin America: a cause for common action,” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+transformation+of+security+in+Latin+America%3a+a+cause+for+common...-a0330143508, accessed 7/9/13, IC)


Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a transformation of security in Latin America. Latin American countries have been moving toward the concepts of multidimensional security and security of the individual and society, and away from the classical understanding of the security dilemma posed by an external threat to the state. Illegal narcotics, the proliferation of guns, and other transnational threats, combined with undergoverned space and the weak state syndrome, generated an extraordinary crime wave, which gives the region the highest murder rate in the world. Moreover, crime imposes a heavy cost on economic growth and democratic governance. This insecurity crosses international borders, and the institutions of public security--police, military, and judicial systems--are hard pressed to meet the challenge. The privatization of security is a symptom of the problem and a potential source of abuse. The United States shares responsibility for the violence due to U.S. demand for illegal drugs and the fact that it is a supplier of arms to Latin America. At the same time, there is a growing consensus in support of common action, as evidenced by the international coalition that is operating under Operation Martillo--the antinarcotics effort in the Caribbean and Central America. Moreover, a number of Latin American countries contribute to international peace operations. Accordingly, the new strategic consensus among Latin American countries should be a cause for common action.

On 21 September 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed resolution that condemned the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in support of the United States. (1) That would be the last collective security action under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, also known as the Rio Treaty. The assumption in 1947 was that threats would come from outside the Hemisphere. For the next four decades, that threat was international communism.

Unlike NATO, the Rio Treaty never developed a robust defense alliance that integrated a political decision-making process for using military force, in part because Latin American countries were relative bystanders in the East-West struggle. Moreover, the enormous asymmetry in military power between the United States and Latin American countries created reluctant partners, based on the fear that this power could be used against them. The more the United States pushed for collective defense, the more Latin America resisted, leveraging the instruments of inter-American security to promote their own security and to balance American power. This studied ambivalence did not prevent the emergence of a strategic consensus for common action against the communist-inspired insurgencies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.



Latin America is rejecting US hegemony


Berry, Policy director of the International Relations Center, 5

(Tom, 7/15/5, “Mission creep in Latin America – US Southern Command’s New Security Strategy”, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9472.htm, 7/9/13, AL)


The United States is the great power that has come closest to being a global “hegemon.” Like most hegemons, the United States of America began building its hegemonic reach in its “backyard” or what, in the more elevated parlance of foreign policy journals, is known as the “near abroad.” One might expect that U.S. hegemony would be strongest in Latin America and the Caribbean. But U.S. control is disintegrating in its own hemisphere at the very time when the Bush administration has embarked on global crusades to crush anti-U.S. regimes, combat anti-U.S. terrorism, and bolster alliances among free-market democracies around the globe. Pax Americana in the Americas—a declared foreign policy objective since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823—is no longer a sure bet.

Throughout the region, grassroots movements, opposition leaders, and governments themselves are rejecting U.S. leadership. There’s an emerging consensus that U.S. hegemony is not benevolent but rather malevolent.

The U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), which defines Latin America and the Caribbean as its Area of Responsibility (AOR), is clearly worried. With a more extensive presence in the region than any other part of the U.S. government, the U.S. military has been the first to identify in any integrated way the rising threats to U.S. hegemony.

Rather than questioning the wisdom of current U.S. foreign and military policy, the Pentagon and Southcom have resurrected traditional strategies and launched new initiatives. However, because these responses run counter to the real security needs and national interests of both the United States and the nations within its AOR, these responses serve only to fuel counter-hegemonic forces.

Washington is losing control of its backyard. If the U.S. government “stays the course” with its current foreign and military policy, as President Bush has repeatedly asserted is what’s needed to keep the country strong, the United States is on a collision course with Latin America and the Caribbean.

U.S. national security policy has evolved in recent years through a combination of “mission creep” that encompasses expanding definitions of national security, and more overt hegemonic aspirations. Leading strategists and ideologues of the Bush administration believe openly that U.S. global domination is the best and in any case inevitable form of world governance.

But at the same time this expanding scope of national security and hegemony confronts a counter-hegemonic backlash. There is a new spirit of resistance, reformism, and self-determination in Latin America and the Caribbean.

US influence in Latin America is declining – Latin America is becoming independent of Washington.


Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11

(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH)


Across the region in recent years, the United States has seen its influence decline. Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U.S. allies are even reconsidering their belief in the primacy of relations with the United States. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War, a conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies. Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America.

At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished, Latin America's own capabilities have grown. The region has entered into an era of unprecedented economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse, attracting foreign investment with an economy that grew 7.5 percent last year. (Regionwide, average GDP growth last year was 5.6 percent.) Regular free elections and vibrant civil societies are now commonplace in Latin America, and the region's diplomats are more visible and confident in global forums than ever before. After decades on the receiving end of lectures from Washington and Brussels, Latin American leaders are eager to advertise their recent gains. Santos has been known to tell visiting foreign counterparts that this will be "Latin America's century."



Hegemony Low Now – Regional Powers




Regional powers are rising in Latin America as US influence declines – Brazil, Colombia, and multilateral organizations prove.


Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11

(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH)


LATIN AMERICA'S economic growth and political stability are driving an unprecedented power shift within the region. Countries are reassessing their interests and alliances, and the more confident among them are flexing their muscles. Instead of looking to Washington for guidance, Latin American countries are increasingly working among themselves to conduct diplomacy, pursue shared objectives, and, at times, even spark new rivalries.

Brazil's emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. influence in the region. Sensing an opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But complicating Brazil's power play is the reaction from its fellow Latin American nations. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, among others, talk privately about their dislike of Brazil's arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, Brazil's responses to developments such as Chavez's ongoing assault on Venezuela's democracy and even the 2009 coup in Honduras have undermined its credibility as a serious leader. (Brasilia's reluctance to speak out for hemispheric democracy is particularly inexcusable for a government that includes many officials who suffered under the successive military regimes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere's hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, "The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese."

Yet Brazil is learning that leadership means responsibility. Relations with its neighbor Bolivia are a case in point. After the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration was kicked out of Bolivia, Brasilia belatedly realized that Bolivia's cocaine exports--most of which are destined for Brazil, Argentina, or Europe--represented a serious challenge and so stepped up its counternarcotics cooperation with Bolivia. Fortunately, the United States and Brazil are eager to work together on counternarcotics. Bolivia will be a key test of this cooperation--made all the more important by the bitter diplomatic flap that erupted in May 2010 between U.S. President Barack Obama and then Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva over the Iranian nuclear deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey.



Colombian leaders are also aware of the shifting balance of power within Latin America. With the recent departure of the inimitable Lula, whose charisma and presence overshadowed the efforts of other Latin American leaders, Santos now believes his government can assume the mantle of regional leadership by adopting a more balanced foreign policy, one less dependent on Washington. Although Santos has no desire to do away with his country's long-standing closeness to the United States, he understands that Colombia's credibility is now more dependent on its ability to cooperate with other regional governments, most important of all, Brazil's.

Further evidence of Colombia's diplomatic and strategic maturity can be found in the way it has begun exporting its counterinsurgency and counternarcotics expertise to places as far away as Afghanistan. For almost half a century, the Colombian government has waged a bloody war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. But it has been only in the past several years that the Colombian state, backed by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance, has gained the upper hand. Overwhelmed by this fight until recently, Colombia's security forces now use their hangars and equipment to train pilots from Mexico and Peru and counternarcotics operatives from Afghanistan.

As Latin America comes into its own, it is beginning to rely more on its own multilateral bodies. For the past 60 years, the Organization of American States, headquartered in Washington, has struggled to gain credibility in the region, as critics saw it as a guise for U.S. domination. In recent years, however, it has codified the primacy of democracy in its guiding principles--an important development suggesting that OAS members now consider democracy a shared goal as opposed to a foreign imposition.

Hegemony Low Now – China




Hegemony low in Latin America – focus on Middle East detracts


Burbach Center for the Studies of The Americas Director et al 13

[Roger, Michael Fox freelancer, Federico Fuentes Bolivian Socialist Alliance director, 3/11/13, “Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions”, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2013/03/11/latin-americas-turbulent-transitions/, accessed 7/5/13, ALT]


An opening chapter outlines the international context. “The old order is breaking down with the decline of the United States as the planet’s hegemonic power.” And while Washington is preoccupied with its wars in the Middle East and South Asia, its grip on Latin America has weakened as an emerging China enters this market in search of raw materials to supply its booming economy. China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America as a whole increased eighteen-fold in the first decade of this century, while U.S. exports dropped from 55 percent of the region’s total to 32 percent.

Hegemony Unsustainable




US heg decline inevitable in Latin America – countries are becoming more independent – Bolivia proves.


Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11

(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH)


Yet over the past decade or so, the United States' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.

The United States' relationship with Bolivia provides one example of Washington's declining power in the region. Believing that it was time to pay back the Americans for their years of backing his political opponents, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008 and suspended U.S.-funded democracy programs the following year. A decade or so ago, when Bolivia was a faithful client of the United States, it would have been unimaginable for a Bolivian government to even consider such acts, given the diplomatic and financial consequences of provoking Washington's ire. Yet even the ostensibly hard-line George W. Bush administration responded to Morales' repeated diplomatic insults largely with silence. Morales had gone eyeball to eyeball with Washington and lived to tell about it.



Hegemony Increasing Now




US influence in Latin America is high— economic and soft power outweigh lack of overarching policies, but continued interest is key.


Duddy, former Venezuelan Ambassador, and Mora, Florida University Latin America Center Director, 13

[Patrick and Frank, 5/1/13, The Miami Herald, “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?”, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy, accessed 7/9/13, ALT]


Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it.

As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it’s likely the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like “Alliance for Progress” or “Enterprise Area of the Americas” as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever.



The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere. In many ways, U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions.

A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere.

As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.

Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors.

While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.

An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.



From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.

Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists.

Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.

US soft power rising – surveys prove


Rep. Farr, California Democrat, 13

[Sam, Representative from California, 5/22/13, “Latin America on the Rise Briefing Series: US Engagement in Latin America”, http://www.farr.house.gov/index.php/component/content/article/37-2013-press-releases/966-latin-america-on-the-rise-briefing-series-us-engagement-in-latin-america, accessed 7/9/13, ALT]


In 2009, the image of US leadership in Latin America had a 34% approval rating (Gallup). At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Obama stated:

“If our only interaction with many of these [Latin American] countries is drug interdiction, if our only interaction is military, then we may not be developing the connections that can, over time, increase our influence.”



In 2012, the image of US leadership in Latin America had a 40% approval rating (Gallup). During a 2013 trip to Latin America in early May, President Obama stated in Mexico:

“The relationship between our nations must be defined not by the threats that we face, but by the prosperity and the opportunity that we can create together.”



US soft power is on the rise in Latin America even if the region is not a priority


Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11

(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH)


IN HIS first term, U.S. President George W. Bush adopted a heavy-handed, unilateral approach to Latin America, attempting to force governments there to approve the U.S. invasion of Iraq and ensure U.S. soldiers' exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This strategy backfired, and many governments, including traditional U.S. partners such as Chile and Mexico, refused. So in his second term, Bush attempted a more conciliatory approach, for instance, cultivating a personal relationship with the leftist Lula. But it was too little, too late; Chavez and other radicals still played up Bush's reputation as a bully. After Obama took office, however, it became much harder to use the U.S.-bashing strategy. In April 2009, at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, Obama tried to put his imprimatur on Washington's Latin America policy, emphasizing mutual respect and outlining a vision of equal partnerships and joint responsibility. His deferential yet serious style quickly put the most conspiratorial anti-U.S. critics, such as Chavez, Morales, and Ortega, on the defensive--where they have remained ever since.

The United States' enhanced image should not be dismissed as a mere public relations victory; rather, it is indispensable to restoring Washington's influence in Latin America, since it makes it easier for willing governments to cooperate with Washington on shared priorities without appearing to be subservient to the old hegemon. Obama's approach to the region can be seen as a more concerted continuation of the one Bush adopted in his second term, emphasizing responsibility as a prerequisite for cooperation and leadership--an implicit call for Latin America to solve its own problems. Other than focusing on Mexico's drug violence, the Obama administration has not made Latin America a priority. This may not be so bad: a little breathing room is appropriate, given the region's current stability.

US influence is strong in Latin America


Duddy, U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, 13

(Patrick, Frank Mora Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center and Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations in the School of Public and International Affairs at Florida International University, 5/1/13, “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?”, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html, 7/6/13 ,AL)


While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.

An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.

From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.

Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists.

Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.


Directory: rest -> wikis -> openev -> spaces -> 2013 -> pages -> Gonzaga -> attachments

Download 1.85 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   45




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page