Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Brazil is balancing US influence in Latin America – da Silva’s reforms led to regional interdependence and a joint front against the West

(Martina, 1/2011, Contemporary European Studies, “Same Goal, Different Ways: Hegemonic Efforts of Regional Powers Brazil, India and Iran,” http://www.ces.upol.cz/pic/item/pdffile/65.pdf, p. 67-70, accessed 7/9/13, IC)

The idea of Brazil as a great power has been slowly developing since the first half of the 20th century when the country was economically dependent on the United States. But rise to world power required breaking these ties of dependence. Subsequent economic development forced later military governments (since the 1970s) to think over “the concept of greatness” that represented not only Brazilian national interests and foreign-policy priority, but has been upgraded to the national purpose (Bandeira 2006: 20). Former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio “Lula da Silva (2002–2010) built on previous efforts of its predecessors and openly claimed a leadership position for Brazil not only in South American region, but also in the rest of the world” (MercoPress 2009).

Although Brazil has always been aware of its prominent position in South America, it never aspired to act as an oppressive regional hegemon. On the contrary, it sought to coexist peacefully with other states in the region (Bandeira 2006: 20–21). Transformation of this approach came with Lula da Silva who (more explicitly than former presidents) asserted Brazil’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. In the past, Brazil’s crucial foreign-policy strategy regarding its closest surroundings was to secure its borders and maintain stable relations with its neighbours, especially within the context of a longstanding geopolitical rivalry with Argentina that has been considered as another candidate for the regional-power status in the South America (Valladão 2006). In the late 1980s Brazil and Argentina settled disputes between them, which created an opportunity for closer economic cooperation within the region. What is even more important, their mutual reconciliation was followed by the formation of the Southern Common Market (or Mercosur) in 1991. Cooperation within regional organizations notably facilitates the long-standing goal of Brazilian government — to develop peaceful or even friendly relations with neighbouring states and to improve general intraregional ties (Alden and Vieira 2005: 1084).

Regional Integration and Multilateralism

Main Brazil’s regional-policy objectives include: first, creating regional (South American) cooperation institutions; second, closer economic ties with neighbouring countries; and third, support for and cooperation with states that — just like Brazil — prefer multilateralism in international relations and multipolar world system, both aimed at balancing and enhancing their bargaining position towards the United States (Vaz 2009: 21).

The aim of building up regional organizations and supporting broader economic cooperation with neighbours relate to several governments’ intentions. For such an economically strong country as Brazil, it is highly important to stabilize both the political and security situation in its nearest surroundings in order to secure progressive economic growth (Vaz 2009: 21). The opportunity to mutually cooperate and negotiate at the multilateral level consolidates relations between states and thereby stabilizes the political and socio-economic environment in the region. Currently, there is a strong interdependence between Brazil and its neighbours in such domains as the economy, trade, infrastructure, and also security cooperation (mainly with regard to transnational organized crime) (Valladão 2006).

To make it clear, Brazil has got a correct relation with the USA that is based on mutual respect and perhaps some shared values, as well as economic and political cooperation. But, although Lula da Silva sought a friendly relationship with Washington — according to Alden and Vieira (2005: 1084) as an approach “to overcome its relative weakness within the international system” — there still exist many significant differences between their national interests and foreign-policy goals. Especially Brazil’s ambitions to become the next great power in the world system influences the US perception of Brazil and has shaped their mutual relationship for several decades. The main question is whether the United States actually wants to see such a fast-growing power in its vicinity (Bandeira 2006: 21)

Great Power Ambitions

One of Brazil’s foreign-policy priorities, as mentioned above, is developing better relations with countries opposing unilateralism and dominance of by the few most powerful (Western) states in the international system. Strengthening economic and political ties with Southern nations is connected with Brazil’s great-power ambitions. The so-called South-South cooperation, e.g., within IBSA forum or BRICS, together with demanding a seat as a permanent member at the UN Security Council, constitute the most visible current signs of this aspiration. Apart from this, Brazil has been gradually developing its power capabilities and creating its image as an independent international actor with the view of becoming a great power since the 1960s.

Brazil, as one of the largest economies in the world, plays a signifi cance role in global economics. Th e ruling elite envisions Brazil as one of the most important ac- tors at the global level. As Vaz (2009: 20) puts it: “Brazil is a global trader aspiring to become an independent global actor able to exert meaningful infl uence on the international political debate and decision-making processes.” It intends to infl uence primarily economic issues but also to become a part of the global governance structure. As a great power, Brazil would be able to secure suitable international conditions for outstanding economic growth, e.g., to transform the structure of the international economic system, as well as for strengthening its political position among other powerful “core” states that take a decision on many international issues.

And this very possibility to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, moreover with veto privileges, would represent an eligible opportunity to achieve all these objectives. The permanent seat on the UN Security Council would legitimise Brazil’s hegemonic position in the region and its great-power status, which, in addition, would be recognized by other countries in the world, including the most powerful ones. Brazil, the same way as most emerging regional (Southern) powers, seeks to change the current structure of power distribution in the international system, which only few developed Western (or Northern) and most wealthy states benefit from (Bandeira 2006: 21). That is why these most powerful states try to maintain the status quo in international relations at the expense of not so powerful states, such as Brazil. Simply said, the contemporary structure of economic and power system is advantageous to them.

This is also the reason why it will not be so easy for Brazil to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council — all current permanent members have already been resisting its enlargement, which would obviously causes significant decline in their own power in the global politics. Especially the USA may not be ready to accept Brazil — increasingly powerful and autonomous nation in its neighbourhood — as an equal partner. As Alden and Vieira (2005: 1085) more than aptly note: “Brazil has skilfully employed international law to counter-balance the power politics of core states, all the while actively seeking to be accepted into this special group.”

Brazil countering US hegemony – anti-Americanism and relations with Latin American coalitions prove

Varas, FRIDE Associate Researcher, 8

(Augusto, 5/12/8, “Brazil in South America: from indifference to hegemony,” FRIDE, http://www.fride.org/publication/415/brazil-in-south-america:-from-indifference-to-hegemony, accessed 7/7/13, IC)

In the same way, the widening of MERCOSUR to include Chile and the Andean Community of Nations was the Brazilian counter-proposal to the DR-CAFTA with America and other countries outside the region. Its aim, in large part, was to contain Northern influence. Similarly, Brazil’s reluctance to accept ALCA and its decision to resolve protectionist issues in the framework of the Doha Round reveal its new post-Cold War position in relation to the US. In spite of these considerable tensions, direct foreign investment in Brazil has not suffered in consequence; according to The Economist, Brazil is second in that regard only to China.12 Nor has a successful deal with the USA on bio-fuels been hindered as a result, widening relations between the two countries. Seen in this light, its policy of getting closer to Chavez can be seen from both perspectives; as an element of its hegemonic drive in the South and, simultaneously, as part of its US containment strategy in the region.

In the case of the possible international weight which the CSS would add to the region, seen in the context of current political diffusion and the resistance to Brazilian hegemony, the chances of successfully generating a South American military force from the Council would seem more of a pipe-dream than the majority of the integration proposals previously mentioned. Moreover, the successful application of measures of mutual confidence-building in the South American region has been possible in a bilateral context and is not reliant on or at the behest of a mechanism like the CSS. The creation of the joint Argentinean - Chilean brigade called the “Cruz del Sur” (Southern Cross), is an illustration of just such a successful initiative.16 Finally, regional mediation proved it can achieve positive concrete results during the recent Colombia- Ecuador crisis, ensuring greater border security. The threats according to Washington The USA is a dysfunctional actor in this space, with a poor record in Latin America. US interventionist, protectionist, unilateralist and coercive policies have not earned it much sympathy in the region. That being said, the chance to penetrate the US domestic market has proved an incentive attractive enough to convince many Latin American countries to sign FTA’s with the USA or to begin negotiating them. Those which haven’t done so, such as Brazil, aim to resolve market access issues at the Doha Round. In the sphere of Western Hemisphere security, current US policy – inspired by a “broad” concept of what constitutes security – is probably seen even more negatively. In line with its way of looking at regional issues, the primary threats to security in the Western Hemisphere are organised crime, criminal gangs and illegal drug trafficking.17 This April, under the orders of US Southern Command, a “Joint Interagency Security Command” has been established in order to deal with these threats, encompassing issues ranging from long-term economic development, to trade, and law and order, coordinating all relevant US agencies, including civilian ones which operate in the region.18 This concentration and centralisation of law and order responsibilities in military institutions has the effect of militarising civilian affairs and “deprofessionalising” the armed forces, which are assigned duties which do not correspond to their expertise and for which they have been provided neither the training nor the means to address. This is made even more significant by the fact that immigration, drug trafficking and criminal activities are issues of regional importance, and ought to be dealt with by specialised civilian institutions, particularly the police, which need to be given real support and specialised training to avoid the erosion of their field of operations by the armed forces. These ideological and unilateral definitions of regional security issues prevent real questions being given immediate answers, which is vital if instability in the regional strategic fi eld is to be prevented. We are referring here to the need to apply a multilateral and regional solution to the internal crisis in Colombia and its spread across the frontiers of neighbouring states such as has recently been seen in the Colombian-Ecuadorian border conflict; the failure of American counter-narcotics policy; the growing market for arms in the region; the trafficking of light arms and the lack of control of these movements from the USA; reform of the police force; as well as new developments in nuclear matters and their possible military use. Even more serious is the evident US logistical and intelligence support provided to Colombia in its violation of Ecuadorian territory, introducing the policy of pre-emptive action into the region for the first time, something which Washington has used in its war on terror around the globe. The main problem for security in the hemisphere then, is how to contain and prevent the implementation of misguided US policy in the region. Ruling out the possibility of US-Latin American military parity, the only way forward is to “gradually reduce US military infl uence and presence in South America without openly challenging its hegemony”, a political option which cannot be meaningfully developed without recourse to multilateral institutions. If the USA is difficult to constrain within these frameworks, then the danger it poses outside them is scarcely imaginable, with the current Colombian-style bilateral formula being repeated with other states. Whilst a US presence in the OAS can sometimes be an obstacle in the normal development of relations within the hemisphere, America can be brought around to common positions by a tight-knit Latin American coalition, as was the case in the last election of the Secretary General of the Organisation. In this setting, the OAS has a central part to play. The regional organisation has carried out a crucial role in the resolution and stabilisation of Colombian–Ecuadorian relations up until now. The OAS resolution thrashed out on March 5 condemned the Colombian incursion and put an end to the confl ict. This was later ratifi ed by the Rio Group two days later, during a meeting in Santo Domingo organised prior to the outbreak of the confl ict – which was not attended by President Lula –19 to deal with matters such as energy, natural disasters and development. Subsequently, the Secretary General undertook a mission to inspect in situ the Colombian incursion and to independently gauge the situation, something which shows the value of this institution in resolving confl icts and controlling tensions. Likewise, the permanent structure the organisation affords makes it a natural and extremely good place to deal with such issues, and it ought to be preserved and strengthened. As has been pointed out before now “today the Security Hemisphere Commission which operates in the heart of the OAS is the only continental forum dealing with defense and security”.20 For reasons such as the above, the de-institutionalisation of security relations in the Western Hemisphere in the shape of informal talking-shops, such as the meeting of Ministers of Defense (many of whom are members of their respective armed forces), or proposing new formulas such as the South American Defense Council, should not be encouraged if they are going to lead to the erosion or weakening of formal institutions which play a key role in multilateral management of security in the hemisphere. Brazil and regional security From this analysis, we can conclude that the Brazilian proposal for a South American Defense Council is part of a multidimensional, global policy the aim of which is to attain a prevailing role in the world and supremacy in the region. This strategy has been aided by the current evolution of international politics, given that the global system of today, as has been noted, is no longer “multi-polar” or “uni-polar” but instead simply “non-polar” - a system with many centres of power, some of which are not nation states, entities which have lost their monopoly on power and, in some cases, even their preeminence. In short, nowadays “power is now found in many hands and in many places”.21 7 Comment, May 2008 In this context, the Brazilian strategy of playing a global role on the international stage has a good chance of being successful, and for that to be the case, it must bring its South American counterparts into line. In that sense, its proposal to create the CSS – which would obviously fall under its hegemony – is consistent with its policy of trying to achieve superiority in matters of security, as it transforms itself into a military power. The recent agreement on developing nuclear submarines with French support illustrates this point. This policy coincides with the aim of “promoting cooperation in equipment and arms and, in particular, widening the regional market for the Brazilian war industry (which would serve) as a platform and a collective legitimisation of the Brazilian aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council”.22 At the same time, it is a smart way of blocking the Venezuelan backed initiative to create a standing ALBA army. Summing up, with its proposal to create a CSS, Brazil is presenting itself as a powerful actor in a non-polar world and has taken another step forward in its project of hegemonic power in South America. The European Union, in flagrant contradiction to its multilateral approach, pragmatically recognised this fact by signing a bilateral agreement of strategic partnership with Brazil in May 2007.

AT – Brazil Rise

No Brazil dominance – lack of economic strength and isolation

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

Brazil is in important respects best set to emerge as a global trendsetter. It is a stable democracy, blessed with ample, land, labor, and natural resources. At least for now, Brasilia has found a developmental path that combines economic openness with redistribution programs aimed at alleviating inequality. And Brazil faces no geopolitical rivals and resides in a region that has been remarkably free of inter-state war.

But Brazil is not headed for the top ranks; its economy is expected to be five times smaller than that of China in 2050. And Brazil's benign location in South America cuts both ways. Its relative isolation will enable Brasilia to remain aloof from the fray set to ensue in Eurasia and the western Pacific as China, India, Russia, and Indonesia ascend. But its distance will also limit its influence in this geopolitical heartland. Brazil is destined for regional hegemony, not global ambition.

Brazil Hegemony Benign

Brazilian influence benign

Trebat, Columbia Global Center Director, 13

[Thomas, 3/22/13, The Free Library, “New directions for a more prosperous Brazil”, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/New+directions+for+a+more+prosperous+Brazil.-a0330143512, 7/9/13, AL]

Energy is another major theme that will engage Brazil with the world in the decades ahead. Its reliance on hydropower, biofuels, and renewables in general to fuel the economy's growth are well known and lend credibility to the nation on green economy issues and low-carbon growth patterns. A major unknown in the energy picture is the extent and practical importance of the hydrocarbon reserves found in deep waters off the coast. If the technology is available, and government policies well crafted, Brazil could also emerge over the next ten to fifteen years as a major exporter of fossil fuel to a world still dependent on such resources which could reposition Brazil geostrategically.

Apart from these global themes, Brazil will continue to seek new institutional mechanisms to extend its global influence. Brazil already has one of the most extensive diplomatic networks in Africa with nearly forty embassies in African capitals. Brazil will become more intertwined with the African continent and will play an important role in development assistance, agriculture, and food security. For Brazil, African nations are an increasingly important outlet for exports, including construction and mining services, as well as allies in the UN and other international forays on themes of common interest.

A newly prosperous Brazil can greatly contribute to the leadership of the global south, a role that Brazil is carefully cultivating. While much of the institutional interaction with the other BRIC nations (Russia, India, and China) is not much more than a photo opportunity for Brazil's leaders, Brazil and China are the two members of this group with broader ambitions to expand trade with, and to offer leadership to, the south. The India-Brazil-South Africa initiative (IBSA) has contributed little in terms of incremental trade and investment, but it points to future directions in foreign policy and trade for Brazil. Relations with China, its largest trading partner, will grow to be an ever-larger priority for Brazil. Given the intensity of the commodity trade and the growth of Brazilian businesses in China, Sao Paulo and Shanghai are connected through a web of commercial and financial relationships, which are likely to intensify.

Brazil's overall relationship with the West--the United States, Japan, and Europe--will also continue to evolve as Brazil's confidence and resources increase in the next decade. (40) The relationship with the United States and the West has not always been a smooth one. Brazil clashed multiple times with the United States over trade policy. Brazil has always sought friendly relations with the West, but it has also been willing to take individual initiative rather than line up behind the United States and its main allies, most recently in the case of Iran's uranium enrichment program. Yet, one can also see Brazil's future relationship with the United States and the rest of the West improving as common interests in trade and the environment, cultural similarities, and core democratic values play a role in encouraging convergence, while long-standing divergences, such as over Cuba, fade into the past.

Finally, the new Brazil will also seek to redefine relations with its regional neighbors to reflect new realities and differential patterns of political and economic growth which are simultaneously taking place in Latin America. Brazil, along with Mexico, will inevitably remain the predominant Latin American power, yet it will exercise this power with great caution and without hegemonic impulses. For all its size and influence, Brazil is not a natural leader of Latin America, not even of its own Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) network of trading partners. Its use of the Portuguese language alone sets it apart more than is often realized. Its different culture, including important African and other non-Iberian heritages, also creates important differences with the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America.

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