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China

China Rising Now – Influence

Chinese influence inevitable, source for conflict

Hilton, Open Democracy Editor 13

[Isabel, February 2013, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf, accessed 7/6/13, ALT]

China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the ¶ foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a ¶ loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. ¶ have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. ¶ In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential ¶ for increasing competition for influence in the future. An ¶ escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the ¶ South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise ¶ retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, ¶ the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face ¶ some uncomfortable choices.

China is crowding the US out now – economic engagement is key

Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13

(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR)

Power and its sources in the Western Hemisphere today is more variegated, complex, and subtle. If the measure of U.S. power is the near 170 years of U.S. hegemony or the halcyon days after the Cold War, in which there was a patina of temporary unity and common purpose and the United States remained a global unilateral power, then yes, U.S. power has declined. Against both of those measures, one of near-absolute power and the other a short-lived and artificial aura of common purpose, U.S. power would inevitably appear to be waning if not having already evaporated entirely.

To get a real measure of where the United States stands today, we need to consider in what ways U.S. power has been exercised and has worked in the Western Hemisphere. Historically, U.S. power has come from three main sources: military, economic and financial, and diplomatic, and to those should be added the admittedly vague factors of moral and aspirational power. Of these three main sources of power, the first is one of the least relevant today. The era in which the United States could unilaterally send in its marines to occupy a country has ended. One need only see the fraught debate over actual U.S. military involvement in Mexico's recent war on narcotraffickers to realize that military intervention (even at the invitation of the local government) in Latin American countries is conditioned on international and domestic politics and norms. Yet even during the era of U.S. hegemony, Latin American countries benefited from the umbrella of U.S security. The United States' military dominance over the hemisphere had the benefit of preventing the need for strong national militaries that could thwart outside intervention (though too often those militaries diverted their attentions to meddling in domestic politics and pursuing political opponents). Latin American governments did not need to worry about fending extra-hemispheric threats thanks to U.S. interests, and armed forces with limited offensive capabilities also reduced the risk of border conflicts. At the same time, U.S. support through security and technical cooperation has helped governments in Colombia, Mexico, and Central America in their battles with organized narcotraffickers and criminal groups.

In the economic and financial realm, the influence of the United States has also become less significant but has far from disappeared. The primary reason for this relative decline of influence is the rise of China and the economic growth of Brazil. China has become a regional commercial presence and an implicit, though perhaps unintentional, political counterweight in the region. China's torrid economic growth over the last decade has had three effects. The first is an increase in the prices and demand for commodities such as iron ore, copper, oil, soy beans, and meat produced by countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. (12) The resulting global commodities boom has fueled economic growth in these countries over the last seven years, averaging over 5 percent a year. The second effect has been the growing importance of Chinese markets and investments to raw-material exporting economies like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Today, China is the number one trade partner for Chile and Brazil and ranks in the top five for Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela--allowing all of these countries to diversify their exports away from the United States and thus lessening the sway of the U.S. market. China is also the fastest growing source of foreign direct investment in countries as politically diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Third, due to the increased value of exports (principally, though not only, to China) and investment and commercial loans, the region is facing a fiscal bonus. This bonus has allowed countries like Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela to avoid private credit markets in the West and has reduced the power of U.S. banks and the international financial institutions over sovereign debt, much the way they did in the 1980s.
China has strong ties to Latin America – Chavez and resource dependency prove

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR)

One might assume that the Chinese armed forces, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will be at the forefront of its reach into new relationships around the world, inferring the inevitability of the competitive, threatening stance of the United States and Soviet Union that characterized the Cold War. It transfers to Beijing the ideological basis of Soviet behavior as a given for Marxist-Leninist states--even though China's regime has proven decidedly less committed to Communism, while every bit as interested in maintaining authoritarian control through all available means. The Chinese armed forces, known collectively as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), thus is assumed to mirror the approach that the Soviet military had around the world, and especially in Latin America during the 1960s through the early 1990s in Cuba. (1)

A close political or economic arrangement between Latin America and China has been far from inevitable, making the expansion of interactions between the regions over the past decade noteworthy. President Jiang Zemin traveled the region in April 2001, even as U.S. and Chinese officials negotiated the repatriation of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft that landed in China after it collided with a PLA fighter off the Chinese coast. In November 2004, President Hu Jintao received immense press coverage as he toured the major capitals of South America in conjunction with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Santiago, Chile. Chinese leaders have often travelled to the region since then and have welcomed several of their Latin American counterparts to Beijing. (2) Similarly, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez cultivated strong ties with his Chinese counterpart partially in an attempt to shift his petroleum sales from the United States to China. Numerous trade missions traverse the Pacific from each side in the hope of strengthening economic benefits for both China and various countries in South America. China seeks extractive resources and Latin American countries seek to both sell their goods and be given the opportunity to access a vast Chinese market.

China Rising Now – Military

China’s interest in Latin America is growing – military officer training and declining US investment prove

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

Beijing is willing, however, to take steps to craft limited ties with Latin American militaries as Washington's use of the military instrument wanes in concert with fiscal realities. Inviting Latin American foreign officers to attend the Chinese National Defense University opens a path toward aligning the militaries of these states to Beijing. These invitations are intended to give foreign officers a much deeper empathy to China's positions. (13)

Additionally, the PLA "foreign officer course" provides China with the opportunity to welcome militaries from countries that do not have access to professional military education (PME) programs for a variety of reasons. Some militaries look to this Chinese option because of their nations' ideological trajectories. For example, Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Ecuadoran officers currently serve regimes suspicious of ties with the United States, thus preferring that their officers attend schools somewhere other than in the United States, a traditional destination for many officers from Latin America. Alternatively, Washington may have withdrawn the invitations. Examples of the reasons that countries do not receive invitations to send their officers to the United States include Congressional disapproval over military abuse of human rights, a military coup d'etat, or some other policy disagreement. Consistent with China's long-standing proclamations of nonintervention and respect for state sovereignty, China has proven uncritical of the same types of actions that have provoked such disapproval from Washington. (14) This means that invitations to Latin officers not forthcoming for U.S. PMEs may result in a counter invitation from the PLA. This allows Beijing to appear more "respectful" and open to the needs and sovereignty of countries in Latin America. This policy appeals to many countries in the region due to its contrast to Washington's proclivity towards preaching on democracy and domestic behavior.

China’s interest is growing – arms sales

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

China's defensive concerns have traditionally been continental in nature; thus, the ground forces of the PLA have been the predominant service, while the navy or maritime concerns have been far more limited. In building a navy that is only gradually beginning to deploy out of Asian waters, China is developing a mechanism with which it can engage others in their own territory. The U.S. and British navies have been global in their deployments for decades, while China has traditionally been limited to its peripheral seas. Today, the PLAN is using Latin America as one of several experimental destinations, where it can benefit from showing its flag while also making connections with local navies. The point of the liaisons with Latin American navies is not merely to better relations, but to learn how to operate successfully with navies, which operate with the U.S. Navy, and thus slowly learn more about how the latter engages around the world. This slowly deepening confidence, cultivated over the gradual repetition of brief visits, allows China to expand its knowledge of the U.S. military and how it interacts with partners. This is an indirect manner of learning something of great interest to China as the PLAN also watches the United States interact with several maritime allies in the Asia-Pacific region. This enhanced information also accompanies opportunities for the PLAN to improve its own operational skills in deployment, similar to the experience its sailors are gaining from repeated deployments into the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations.

Similarly, the deployment of Peace Ark to Latin America in September 2011 was a classic example of using a military instrument in a nonmilitary manner. This vessel illustrates the fundamental reassessment that the Chinese leadership has taken regarding its role around the world as well as the selection of tools with which to interact with others. The role of any hospital ship is not only to show the flag, thus making presence in a foreign land clear, but also to provide humanitarian assistance to places where conditions welcome outside care, which may not arrive in any other form. In the 2011 Peace Ark voyage, the Chinese medical team offered care to those in need in Jamaica, Cuba, and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as China's relatively new diplomatic partner, Costa Rica. (15)

Since the U.S. Navy has been the traditional military power providing humanitarian relief in the Western Hemisphere, the Peace Ark was a deliberate message from the Chinese to demonstrate improved capability. Beijing has learned its lesson from its notable absence from the 2004 tsunami relief efforts in the Indian Ocean--a region some called China's backyard when the tragedy occurred. Peace Ark also signaled China's willingness to operate in a region traditionally unwelcome to outsiders because of the Monroe Doctrine's unilateral nature.

Although Chinese arms sales to Latin America have been relatively small, such sales are increasing. Latin American armed forces still prefer purchasing their arms from the United States, but the staggering expense of many U.S. arms packages makes that prohibitive for the less wealthy Latin militaries. Europe and Brazil remain at least as appealing as China as sources of arms. The focus of Beijing's arms sales to Latin American governments has been on smaller amounts and less lethal items, such as uniforms, transports, or small arms. (16) As China's arms exports diversify and expand, and as U.S. systems become ever more expensive, it is likely that China's share of sales will increase as the U.S. share decreases. The fiscal options available to militaries in the region, along with their growing responsibilities to address transnational organized crime, may in any event force Latin American militaries to focus on lower-tier weaponry. If China's arms sales move up the scale in cost, this would make Latin America continue to go elsewhere for its weaponry.

China is directly competing with US military – Funding Southcom is vital

Simeone, American Forces Press Service, 13

(Nick, 3/19/13, US Department of Defense, “Southcom Chief Warns Budget Issues Could Affect national Security”, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119571, 7/9/13, AL)
“Significantly, reduced U.S military engagement will make it difficult to counter those who would seek to exploit perceptions that the U.S. is abandoning our long-standing commitment to the region,” the general said.

In particular, he suggested that China, which he said is expanding its influence in Latin America, appears ready to fill the void, especially in light of the likely sequestration-triggered cancellation of this year’s deployment to the region of the hospital ship USNS Comfort.

“With an unprecedented three naval deployments to Latin America since 2008, including a hospital ship visit in 2011, China is attempting to directly compete with U.S. military activities in the region,” the Southcom commander said.

Kelly said Southcom already is absorbing a cut of 26 percent across a range of programs, and that if defense cuts continue in coming years, “there will be some missions we will simply no longer be able to conduct.”

AT – China Rise

China is not a threat— US exports to Latin America are greater, and Chinese interest only creates a greater market for US goods.

People’s Daily 12

[People’s Daily Online, 4/15/12, “U.S. not concerned about China's influence in L. America”, http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7787420.html, accessed 7/9/13, ALT]

CARTAGENA, Colombia, April 14 (Xinhua) -- The United States is not concerned about China's growing influence in Latin America, a senior White House official said here Saturday.

"We're not concerned at all," Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, said at a press briefing on the sidelines of the sixth Summit of the Americas.

"In fact, if you look at the numbers, the United States is by far a more significant exporter to Latin America than China," he said, adding that the United States is also a premier export destination for Latin America.

Calling China's investment in the region "a positive signal," he said the region is growing its own markets and its own middle class, a move that will mean greater markets for the U.S. goods.

"Insofar as the Chinese have played a role in investing and trading with some of the countries here, we see that as a potential benefit," he added.

Latin America is not important to China—preserving their economy and the Communist Party rule come first

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

The PRC occupies an improved position over the past decade in Latin America but will always be thousands of miles to the west with a radically different language and culture. The CCP will continue to focus its efforts on improving the standard of living of its citizens in the hopes of preserving its authoritarian rule. Engagement with Latin America is a contributing factor to China's economic growth, but is by no means essential to its continual growth, because Latin America is not a top priority in China's international concerns.

The PLA plays a minor part in Beijing's international relations. China's ongoing use of its military in foreign lands does not pose major threats to Latin America or to U.S. interests in the region. While PLA budget and capabilities have escalated substantially over the past generation, the CCP retains a strong caution against relying on the military as a dominant instrument to achieve its objectives at home and abroad. The CCP is concerned about retaining its power over the military, evidenced by almost weekly reminders that the PLA is an instrument of the CCP. Additionally, the PLA is a more capable force than before, but one that rarely deploys far from the shores of its border.

No conflict over Chinese influence

Hilton, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, 13

(Isabel, February 13, NOREF, “China in latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf, 7/8/13, AL)

The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, ¶ has reacted calmly to date to China’s increasing presence ¶ in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of China’s ¶ importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created ¶ a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S.–¶ China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just ¶ before then-President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington, and ¶ continues under the Obama administration. Through four ¶ rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded China’s ¶ standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set ¶ limits to China’s action in troublesome countries such as ¶ Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela ¶ sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, ¶ China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China ¶ eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the ¶ campaign.

The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished ¶ fears of Chinese competition for the region’s energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan ¶ and Ecuadorian markets, and China’s success in locking up ¶ the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of ¶ its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past.

There are warnings within the U.S. security community ¶ about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in ¶ Latin America in the future, and concerns about China’s ¶ still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these ¶ sales include Venezuela’s 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters ¶ from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, ¶ however, there has been little response in senior policy ¶ circles to the “China threat”. Regardless of whether there ¶ is any real “threat” to the U.S., key decision-makers have ¶ not reacted.

China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the ¶ foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a ¶ loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. ¶ have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. ¶ In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, owever, and the latent, long-term strategic competition ¶ between China and the United States, there is potential ¶ for increasing competition for influence in the future. An ¶ escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the ¶ South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise ¶ retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, ¶ the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face ¶ some uncomfortable choices.

AT – China Rise – Military

No risk of China military influence – economic ties, lack of focus, and civilian control of the military all check

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

Furthermore, China is aware that it has a complicated relationship with the United States that is vital to the CCP's goals of continuing economic expansion. By upsetting the United States with overt Chinese military engagement on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere, Beijing risks seriously undermining the goals it most seeks to achieve and currently is not likely to choose that path because Latin America is simply not as important as is the United States. However, as ongoing U.S. budget problems continue to restrict national security goals, and as China has more financial resources it can put towards its defense modernization process, the PLA may become an increasingly potent asset for China in its relations with Latin America.

The goal will likely never be to have a sustained, major deployment of forces on the ground in Latin America. This goes against China's traditional strategic context and would require long lines of communication, which puts heavy demands on the military. Latin America does offer a rich set of options for the PLA to learn about relationships with other militaries--a field where it still has little experience with states so far away and in nontraditional tasks, such as military diplomacy. Indeed, Latin America's own armed forces continue to deemphasize their traditional role as security forces in favor of peacekeeping operations and domestic stability requirements against transnational organized crime. These present opportunities for exchanging ideas and learning from each other. Perhaps the testing of PLA operations in Latin America in future years may become an appealing option as China's evolving interests draw it from behind the great wall into a more traditional global power role.

The CCP's willingness to give the PLA more latitude remains open to question. The constraints that China's civilian leadership retains over the military are substantial. The CCP welcomes increased interaction with Latin American states but will make certain that the PLA is an instrument of China's engagement rather than an actor of its own. The Party will insist on retaining control in directing policy for the People's Republic, as it repeatedly reminds the PLA in statements by the Party leadership.

It remains clear that China is still focused on domestic needs and sees Latin America as a means to assist in achieving a level of development, which will satisfy its citizens. (17) While many predict that China will assume a worldwide role in the future as evidenced by Beijing's ultimate goals, a deep and enduring relationship with Latin America remains hazy. With that in mind, the role of the PLA in such an effort remains even hazier. It presently operates in a bounded manner, but there is no way to accurately predict whether that will be true in the future.

China's military assertiveness at present is concentrated along its periphery in areas where others might harm its vital interests--namely the Taiwan Strait, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and the South China Sea. China does not currently appear to have decided that Latin America--even with its rich natural resources, available robust agricultural produce, and abundant energy--is one of those vital areas. If China reassessed its priorities in a manner which raised Latin America in the PRC's ranking of interests, the PLA might become a much more potent instrument at accomplishing China's goals. However, the PLA retains some significant weaknesses preventing its use in a manner similar to the way that the United States uses its military as an instrument of statecraft. Overcoming those issues would be possible but would require Beijing to reconfigure national strategic goals. As China continues to struggle with a wide array of serious internal concerns, the reconfiguration does not appear on the horizon, but it is certainly possible in the future.
China won’t bolster military clout – they’re scared of the US

Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13

China views statecraft in a manner similar to the rest of the world, noting the range of instruments with which to achieve their goals. The Beijing government can still appear somewhat overbearing on foreign policy concerns, but the military has not been China's primary tool to increase its presence in Latin America. China's greater interest has largely been non-military, because Latin America's issues, largely military for the United States, are not central to China's goals in the region.

The 1823 Monroe Doctrine stipulates that the United States would look with the greatest of suspicion upon actions by European countries using their military as an instrument in Latin America. The Chinese occasionally refer to this policy as one where Washington has made its most important interests clear and has shown that it is willing to react if necessary. Beijing, acutely sensitive to Washington's reactions, regards military actions in Latin America through the doctrine's lens as possibly endangering the tremendous successes of post-1972 bilateral ties between the two states and the benefits it has created for millions of Chinese citizens. Beijing has traditionally been cautious in deploying the PLA in this portion of the world where Washington is most sensitive to outside involvement.

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