Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz



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Engagement Increases Influence




Economic engagement is key to hegemony in Latin America—empirical evidence proves


Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13

(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR)


Even during the height of U.S. power in the region, it did not act alone, nor did it act in the most cynical of terms. In the cases of intervention--from the days of Dollar Diplomacy to the U.S.-supported insurrection in Guatemala in 1954--the United States did so with the support (at times even at the request of) segments of the local populations. Nor were U.S. actions driven only by its own narrow national interests. Policymakers often acted in what they believed to be in the broader interests of development, peace, and prosperity, but for the very citizens of the countries, were rooted in the perceived risks communism posed to human rights and economic freedom.

It was in this sense that, despite the litany of abuses (assumed or real), the United States gave cause and breath to real interests and benefits in the region. Those contributions to rights and freedoms and to political and economic stability became particularly true in the waning years of the Cold War and the decades after.

In the late 1980s, the United States provided diplomatic and material support to the "No" coalition that opposed the continued rule of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and that eventually paved the way for Chilean democracy today. The creation of and push for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1993, has tied together the economies of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. By providing access to the U.S. market, Mexico has become an exporter of manufactured goods and looks poised to become a global economic leader. In 2000, the United States, in collaboration with the Colombian government, developed Plan Colombia to provide the technical and financial assistance that allowed the one-time beleaguered Colombian state to re-establish security, reduce crime, and regain state control over its territory from armed guerrillas and paramilitaries. And the United States through bilateral assistance and the support of local nongovernmental organizations (NGO) has helped to ensure free and fair elections in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Peru. Through these efforts, the United States has assisted in ushering in one of the longest periods of democratic rule and expanded political representation in the region's history.

While suspicions over U.S. interventions of the past remain a part of the Latin American perspective, leaders like Chavez, Morales, Correa, and the Kirchners (first under President Nestor and today under his wife, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) have cynically stoked those fears to avoid or distract domestic and international criticism. Too often, scholars and observers have taken these suspicions as the example of the decline in U.S. power or deep-rooted, insoluble anti-Americanism. (10) Yet, as Baker and Cupery demonstrate, the patterns of popular anti-Americanism are in fact not correlated with what authors like McPherson and Sweig assume to be its causes: patterns of intervention, proximity, or economic dominance. Instead, Baker and Cupery demonstrate that positive assessments of the United States are most closely linked with close commercial relations and consumption of U.S. products, irrespective of the other factors often wrongly assumed to shape anti-Americanism. (11)



Only US-Latin American ties can allow the US to keep exercising hegemony


Sanchez, Loyola University, Political Science Director, 12

(Megan Scholar, Loyola University, Latin American Studies Professor, December 12, International Journal of humanities and social science, “Power and principle: A new US policy for latin america”, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf , 7/6/13, AL)


Since the turn of the century, however, several Latin American countries have elected presidents who are questioning the so-called Washington consensus. If the United States wishes to remain the region’s hegemon, it must act quickly to design a new regional policy, akin to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour policy or Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Only a more “ethical” policy toward the region will ensure that America can continue to exercise hegemony. By employing the term “ethical,” we are suggesting that the US government will need to ensure that its foreign policy benefits the countries of Latin America, providing such universal values as democracy, peace, and prosperity. A new, ethical policy will not only guarantee vital US interests, but it will also promote the principles that America has rhetorically stood for since its founding—democracy and selfdetermination—and will therefore be welcomed by the leaders and people of the region.

US involvement is key to maintaining influence in Latin America—empirical evidence proves


Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13

(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR)


The lack of an outside or ideological threat in the hemisphere also granted greater autonomy to governments from U.S. intervention while at the same time reducing their historic concerns over national sovereignty. The result was a series of previously unimaginable advances in international oversight and activism in areas such as human rights, elections, and institutional reform--areas in which only a few decades before governments would have bristled at outside interference. (9) The high point of the hemispheric democratic consensus came with the Organization of American States' (OAS) Resolution 1080 of 1991 in which the thirty-four member governments of the OAS granted the multilateral organization with the unprecedented authority to convene member states when it believed that there had been an interruption of the constitutional process (i.e. a coup) to discuss potential action, including suspension from the OAS and voluntary sanctions by member states. The resolution effectively committed the region to defending the democratic processes of governments. In the years that followed, the collective efforts of the OAS and the United States led to the reversal of coup attempts in Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay. Later, in an effort to address the growing, elusive threats to democratic rights and institutions from elected officials themselves, the OAS General Assembly approved The Democratic Charter on 11 September 2001. The charter defined democracy as representative democracy and outlined the OAS commitment to defend the checks and balances of demo cratic government, minority rights, and freedom of expression. Unfortunately, the charter did little to establish clear mechanisms to trigger a collective response for when these were at risk, and as a result the promise and hope of the charter has foundered since.

However, even by 2001, the democratic consensus had already begun to fray. So too had the region's commitment to establishing an FTAA. The election of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998, President Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, President Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006, and the re-election of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2006 signaled the emergence of new political currents in the region, brought about in part by the collapse of their traditional party systems. The dramatic and painful collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001, a country once mistakenly thought to be the darling of the Washington Consensus, only added to the growing rejection in some quarters of the hemispheric consensus toward market reform.

Combined with increasing discontent over the persistence of poverty and inequality in the region--in spite of the decade or so of reforms--the 2000s marked a partial and often cynical backlash against the tenets of the consensus and convergence that marked the previous era of market-driven economics and international defense of democracy. The natural corollary to this was renewed public skepticism of the United States and its motives, which had championed these causes. In reality, though, while a proponent of both the Washington Consensus and the efforts toward collective defense of democracy, neither had been unilateral tools of U.S. foreign policy but, rather, represented a broad and genuine consensus at the time.

Major policy needed to sustain hegemony in Latin America


Sanchez, Loyola Chicago political science and Latin America Studies professor & Sholar, Loyola Chicago political science professor, 12

[Peter M. and Megan A., December 2012, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, “Power and Principle: A New US Policy for Latin America”, Vol. 2, No. 23, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf, p. 18, accessed 7/6/13, ALT]


Since the turn of the century, however, several Latin American countries have elected presidents who are ¶ questioning the so-called Washington consensus. If the United States wishes to remain the region’s hegemon, it ¶ must act quickly to design a new regional policy, akin to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour policy or Kennedy’s ¶ Alliance for Progress. Only a more “ethical” policy toward the region will ensure that America can continue to ¶ exercise hegemony. By employing the term “ethical,” we are suggesting that the US government will need to ¶ ensure that its foreign policy benefits the countries of Latin America, providing such universal values as ¶ democracy, peace, and prosperity. A new, ethical policy will not only guarantee vital US interests, but it will also ¶ promote the principles that America has rhetorically stood for since its founding—democracy and selfdetermination—and will therefore be welcomed by the leaders and people of the region.

Security Cooperation Increases Influence


Security cooperation bolsters US leadership


Marcella, U.S. Army War College Americas Studies director, 13

(Gabriel, 3/22/13, Journal of International Affairs, “The transformation of security in Latin America: a cause for common action,” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+transformation+of+security+in+Latin+America%3a+a+cause+for+common...-a0330143508, accessed 7/9/13, IC)


Consensus for collective action is emerging. Colombia has gone the furthest in reducing violence by attacking the sources of violence and asserting greater territorial control. Its experience in democratic state building makes it a model that other countries have been adapting. The task is to simultaneously establish security and rule of law and consolidate the presence and services of the state. (51) Though the work is far from complete, Colombia is more secure and economically dynamic than thirteen years ago. Proud of its accomplishment, it is providing security assistance to others. For example, by 2012, Colombia (52)

1. trained over 11,000 police officers from twenty-one Latin American and African countries, and Afghanistan;

2. trained more than 6,000 Mexican law enforcement personnel, over 500 prosecutors and judicial personnel, and twenty-four Mexican helicopter pilots;

3. provided training programs and exchanges with Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti, Peru, and Paraguay; and

4. were invited by Mexico and Panama to have their national police share lessons learned on the introduction of state services and rule of law into areas where the state is weak.

Additionally, the Colombian Army provides an infantry battalion to the UN Multinational Force and Observers mission in Sinai.

Besides Colombia, El Salvador sent army battalions in support of the coalition in the second Iraq war. Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic also sent troops in 2003 for one year.

OPERATION MARTILLO

Thus far, Operation Martillo is the most extensive demonstration of the emerging international civil-military coalition against the scourge of narcotics. It is also a form of burden sharing between countries that produce, transport, and consume illegal narcotics. Multinational law enforcement and military forces detect, monitor, and interdict narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean and Central American areas. Traffickers use sophisticated submarines, which can remain under water for thousands of miles, to carry cocaine across borders. (53) Directed by the Joint Interagency Task Force South, as of 2012, the following countries have participated in Operation Martillo: Belize, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. It is imperative to note that military personnel support civilian authority in the interdiction operations. The interdictions, boarding, search, seizures, and arrests are conducted by U.S. Coast Guard law-enforcement personnel or partnered with other national drug law enforcement agencies. (54) The map below indicates the impact on reducing the flow of cocaine. (55)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Lamentably, politics at the moment impede progress. Ecuador and Venezuela, which are transit areas for drugs, dirty money, guns, and precursor chemicals, do not participate in the vital operation. Their nonparticipation is based on political and ideological grounds; they see cooperation with the United States as a bigger threat to their sovereignty than the international criminals who devastate the people of Ecuador and Venezuela. Even Mexico, which historically feared security cooperation with the United States, is working closely with Washington via the Merida Initiative to strengthen public security within Mexico.

PEACEKEEPING

While insecurity increases in the region, a number of Latin American countries are contributing to international security and peace. Brazil has global power aspirations and embarked on a comprehensive modernization of its armed forces (56) Latin American countries have been contributing to international peacekeeping for decades. (57) These countries are motivated by prestige as well as a desire to contribute to international peace and security, support multilateralism (in order to enhance the democratization of global governance), and provide professional development and financial benefits for military personnel. Latin American countries have contributed personnel or battalion-size formations to places as varied as Kashmir, Gaza, Lebanon, Central America, Cyprus, Ecuador, Peru, Croatia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sudan. Perhaps the largest Latin American undertaking is participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, with Brazil providing the command and control and contributing logistics. Personnel come from the following countries: (58)

Military: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

Police: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Uruguay.

In addition, Argentina established a regional peacekeeping training center.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The transformation in the security environment calls for common action. The hemispheric community must build on the emerging strategic consensus. Security arrangements and institutions must be modernized and made effective in order to confront the complex web of transnational threats arrayed against the weak state syndrome. One of the geopolitical realities of the Americas is that little can be accomplished without the leadership and support of the United States. Plan Colombia, Operation Martillo, and the Merida Initiative validate this principle. The U.S. Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the analogous Caribbean Basin Security Initiative are the latest evolutions of the lessons learned--notably from the Colombian experience--in strengthening the capacity of states to deal with the onslaught of drugs, violence, and corruption. With a budget of $496 million in U.S. assistance, the five goals of CARSI are to (59)

1. create safe streets;

2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband;

3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable governments;

4. reestablish effective state presence and security; and

5. foster security, the rule of law coordination, and cooperation within and between nations of the region.

So far CARSI has had only modest success due to a need to better coordinate and establish priorities within the agencies of the U.S. government, and acquire stronger commitments from Central American governments to be more proactive. The $496 million is seed money that must be augmented by the Central Americans themselves. (60)

The central lesson to be learned from American and European support to Colombia is that the host country must mobilize resources in the form of dedicated expertise, money, and sustained programs. The host country must take ownership so that reforms and institution building are legitimately rooted in its cultural and political soil, and the lessons inculcated into the ministries of governance and security, as well as civil society. The international community should provide advice and critical resources on a matched funding basis. To do otherwise invites failure.

In addition, the United States should deepen security partnerships with key countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Caribbean and Central American countries that have the political will and who welcome the opportunity to build more capacity within a structure of regional security. The task is made easier by increasing convergence on the concept of multidimensional security. History will show whether this generation of leaders in the Americas will match its splendid sentiments with effective action, and whether it will be able to set aside ideology and narrow nationalism in order to promote peace, economic development, and democracy.

US is key to successful cooperation – military-to-military relations and funding make the US the best candidate to solve terror


Daremblum, Hudson Institute Center for Latin American Studies Director, 5

(Jaime, 11/2/05, Hudson Institute, “Terrorism in Latin America,” http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/terrorism_in_latin_america.pdf, p. 5-6, accessed 7/9/13, IC)


Further Steps

In many and different ways, the fight against terrorism in Latin America has been yielding substantial results, in no small measure thanks to the resolve shown by some key champions in this struggle –Colombia comes to mind immediately-, and the help provided by the US, all of which has strengthened Inter-American cooperation. But as in all human undertakings there is room for our countries to improve their efforts in the ongoing battle against terrorism, an enemy which cannot be defeated unless we defeat first hunger, poverty and provide better opportunities and, above all, hope to the younger generations of Latin America. Allow me to point out some critical areas that must be addressed if we are to succeed in this difficult task:

It is imperative to foster development and better living conditions. We must do our best to back Latin American efforts for growth and improvement in their living standards. In this regard, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created with bipartisan support, are a powerful and commendable idea. Equally important are CAFTA-DR, the Free Trade Agreements being negotiated with the Andean countries, and the proposal of the U S Trade Representative, Robert Portman -in the context of the Doha Round negotiations- to reduce trade

barriers affecting agricultural exports from Latin American countries.

Institutions and government accountability must be strengthened The weakness of key institutions such as the Judiciary is at the root of the most serious cases of instability in Latin American. Institution building is always difficult, and more so after dictatorships have unwoven essential parts of the social fabric. This calls for:

o An independent and capable judicial system, essential to encourage growth, fight corruption and ensure respect for human rights.

o Property rights must be strengthened because they provide the bedrock for investment, entrepreneurship, and encourage asset leveraging by the poorer strata of society;

o Education and health systems are basic to create better opportunities for new and older generations of Latin Americans.

o Better Funding must be assured. for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), being provided through the Department of State to Latin American countries in order to improve their capabilities in airport security management, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing. Such funding has been relatively short and most of it is consumed by aid to Colombia. Apart from that nation, funding was $2.5 million for the entire Western Hemisphere in 2002. For 2004, it was $5.3

million, including Colombia. In 2005, an estimated $11.1 million has been budgeted, of which $3.9 million is for Colombia and $0.5 million for the TBA. The 2006 request is $9.7 million, with the same amounts as 2005 for Colombia and the TBA. This is an effort that could and should be strengthened to allow improvements in anti-terrorism capabilities in Latin America.



US can foster positive trends in the region. Inter-American cooperation in the fight against terrorism is a very positive and key trend that must be encouraged. Given the good military-to-military relations in the fight against terrorism, it is very important to find ways to make the American Service Members Protection Act more flexible, as suggested by Senator Coleman in recent presentations at Hudson and before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, so that foreign military training in Latin America is not hindered by differences over the International Criminal Court. A way has to be found in order to preserve and promote the military cooperation that is and will be needed for the success of counterterrorism efforts in Latin America.

• Finally, I believe diplomacy needs to be improved both in the US and Latin



America. The US has to become more engaged in the region, and President Bush’s upcoming visit to the area is a very positive step in this direction. On the other hand, Latin American nations should overcome the traditional mode of flirting with antidemocratic leaders as a way of showing independence from Washington. To face the clear and present dangers, cooperation, not confrontation, is required.

Trade Increases Influence




Free Trade Agreements boosts US-Latin American Relations


Boaz, Cato Institute Executive Vice President, 9

(David, CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 2009, page 642, CATO Institute, RH)


Washington should likewise continue to pursue free trade with other Latin American countries that have liberalized their economies and are eager to sign a trade treaty with the United States. Independent of free trade negotiations, the United States should immediately reduce its barriers to Latin America’s exports, especially textiles and agricultural products. At a time when U.S. credibility is being questioned, such a move would restore some goodwill toward Washington and might help persuade reluctant countries to reduce some of their own trade barriers. At the very least, the United States could then not be blamed for hypocrisy, and the welfare of both the United States and Latin America would improve. Such a unilateral policy of reducing trade barriers, moreover, would not conflict with the goal of negotiating free trade agreements. As Cato Institute scholar Brink Lindsey points out, the United States has regularly signed trade agreements affecting sectors of the U.S. economy that enjoy virtually no protection. For countries that are interested in free trade with the United States, such agreements offer the advantage of ‘‘locking in’’ free trade both at home and abroad. Indeed, the certainty provided by free trade treaties is one of their greatest benefits and explains why they tend to result in increases of both trade and investment.

LA Key to US Hegemony




Latin America key to US heg – trade relations are the security pacts of today


Quiliconi, PhD in Politics and IR from USC, 5

(Cintia, 1/1/05, Center for Policy Studies, “US-Latin American Trade Relations: Path to the Future or Dead End Street,” https://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-working-paper-us-latin-american-trade-relations-2005.pdf, p. 24-26, accessed 7/6/13, IC)


Brazil’s engagement with regional integration needs to be understood in strategic and political terms, relating to the construction of sub-regional leadership as a means of mediating the hegemony of the US in the hemispheric and multilateral arenas (Phillips, 2003). The Brazilian indifference to regionalism in the mid-1990s has been replaced by an activism oriented toward strengthening the Brazilian leadership in the region. But at the same time, the reinforcement of Brazilian leadership in the region is seen with benevolent eyes in the US. In this sense, the US needs Brazil’s cooperation to make progress on critical regional issues such as Venezuela’s worsening political confrontation and Colombia’s criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. At the same time, Brazil’s voice also carries weight on broader international issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Lula da Silva has proven, as have most of the new left governments in the region, to be more pragmatic than ideological, a left-wing leader managing to keep support of diverse constituencies domestically and abroad. So far, trade and particularly FTAA negotiations have been the only issues to provoke open friction between the US and Brazil. They have been able to cooperate on difficult issues such as Venezuela and Colombia and have managed to swallow harsh rhetoric and avoid public quarrels on other issues, such as Cuba and the Iraq war (Hakim, 2004).

The FTAA ambitious plan described by President Bush as a “vital link for prosperity,” is mired in disputes that have led to widespread skepticism and opposition about its chances of materializing from not only governmental sources but also civil society movements. With large countries in South America such as Brazil and Argentina firmly opposed to the initiative, the US has clearly redirected its efforts in the last two years from the FTAA to bilateral negotiations with a handful of smaller countries in Central America and the Andean region. However, looking farther South, the Andean nations of Bolivia and Ecuador, hit by violent tumult have little chance to sign a trade agreement anytime soon. Even Peru and Colombia, both having good relations with the US, are experiencing opposition in bilateral negotiations with the US, hesitating because of concerns that their farming sectors may be negatively affected by subsidized American imports.

After more than four years of talks, the Bush administration’s grand initiative in the hemisphere, the FTAA, and the many bilateral negotiations that they have proposed under the competitive liberalization strategy, have signed only Mexico and Chile as full partners. The free trade agenda is becoming a serious problem in Latin America. CAFTA countries are facing resistance to pass the USCAFTA agreement through their Congresses, and negotiations with Andean countries are still shallow and not free of domestic resistance. Prospects were much more positive when President Bush was elected in his first term. Latin America was then declared a priority, and the administration began drumming up support for a tariff-free $3.4 trillion trade bloc stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, comprising 823 million people. “Democratic freedoms cannot flourish unless our hemisphere also builds a prosperity whose benefits are widely shared. Open trade is an essential foundation for that prosperity and that possibility,” President Bush told the Organization of American States in April 2001. The 9/11 attacks have caused a redirection of US priorities abroad in which the scope of engagement with Latin America has shrunk on almost every front except trade policy (Hakim, 2003). But increasingly, Latin American governments and particularly civil society view free trade with the US with suspicion. At the same time, after the failure of the Washington consensus policies the region shifted to left-wing governments and has become increasingly wary of the US’s economic prescriptions as growth flagged and promises of prosperity vanished. The reasons for caution are numerous, from the potent anti-globalization movement that has swept South America, to practical concerns in many Latin American countries about what opening their markets to the US, the world’s largest economy, would mean for their industries.

Ideology has also played a role, with Washington’s leading antagonist in the region, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, calling the Bush administration’s free trade agenda “the medicine of death” more than just a backlash against market reforms and the perceived trade agenda of the US, Chávez has become a key element in the regional opposition to the US financing subversive movements in Latin America such as the MAS4 (Movement Towards Socialism) in Bolivia and the communist narcoguerrillas in Colombia. In recent months, two governments that the US had hoped would sign free trade deals have collapsed in the wake of protests with a strong anti-globalization component. In April 2005, Ecuador’s president, Lucio Gutiérrez, who had close economic relations with the US, was forced out of power amidst riots and violent social protests. Then, in June 2005, in the middle of widespread social protests, Bolivia’s Congress accepted President Carlos Mesa’s resignation and subsequently appointed a new president, Eduardo Rodríguez, who faces the threat of more protests. In this scenario it is impossible to think that Bolivia can start talks to sign a FTA with the US. However, American officials have not given up, stating that most countries in the region should expect even more benefits by signing trade deals with the US. The American focus, for the time being, is to secure a trade pact with CAFTA-DR, in order to set the stage for talks with other countries.

The ratification of the US-CAFTA agreement is the key to continue momentum in the US move to sign bilateral FTAs in the region. Nonetheless, the American talks with the nations of the Andean countries, which started in May 2004, are meeting obstacles. In Colombia, the agriculture sector has lobbied against a free trade deal, claiming that stopping tariffs on American imports while the US maintains subsidies to its farmers would destroy Colombian agriculture. In Bolivia, the authorities worry about small but healthy industries like the country’s pharmaceutical sector. A free trade deal would extend patent protections on old American products, in effect phasing out the generic brands. The impact would not be immediate, but in the long term could result in the closing of these companies.

The interconnection between governments and civil society in the Americas is nowadays more sophisticated, showing that the trade regime has become a complex, multi-layered arena where social forces and contending political projects compete, a far cry from the simple manifestation of an uncontested hegemonic project for market-driven integration as initially mapped out by the US. In this scenario, the prospect of finishing a comprehensive, far-reaching agreement at the FTAA is very unlikely. Nowadays, a two level (hemispheric and bilateral) trade liberalization strategy is guiding the hemispheric trade agenda. In this scenario, the FTAA would probably just imply certain superficial commitments in all the topics under negotiation, meanwhile bilateral trade negotiations led by the US are blossoming and becoming the key to deepening liberalization commitments with Latin American countries.

Anti-Americanism in Latin America was first related to security issues but after the failure of the Washington consensus policies the root of this sentiment mainly originates from economic issues. Nonetheless, if we take into account that economic policy became much more explicitly linked to security policy (Higgott, 2004), it is not that anti-Americanism has changed its target, only that security issues are intertwined with economic issues and the US is exerting soft power through economic relations with security aims. Since 9/11, security has become a top priority, and the US has been criticized for growing distant and detached from the Latin American region, yet anti-Americanism has resurfaced in the spheres of trade and economics, confirming the entrenchment between security and economic issues.

Hemispheric and bilateral US Free Trade Agreement proposals are closely connected to this country’s global hegemony strategy. These new bilateral trade agreements proposed by the US are intertwined with the follow-up of the dissemination of the neo-liberal agenda. However, it is important to highlight that beyond the expansion of the neo-liberal agenda, the US interests in the region are related to security and democracy agendas. In this sense, the FTAA negotiations and the proliferation of bilateral agreements proposed by the US embed security-related strategies into broader trade and economic issues. Trade liberalization has become mixed with other causes, including the conflation of markets and political freedom under US leadership (Tussie, 2005). In essence, this was the universal projection of the American dream—a vision of economic plenty in the context of political freedom as expressed some decades later in the notion of a “free world”. Often a menace or an enemy was necessary to garner consensus on further liberalization. The spirit was re-embodied in the Trade Act of 2002:

“The expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the US. Trade is critical to economic growth and strength of the US and its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity. Trade Arrangements today serve the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold War, binding nations together through a series of rights and obligations. Leadership by the US in international trade fosters open markets, democracy and peace throughout the world.” (US Trade Act of 2002: Title XXI).



As the US extends its power and influence abroad, the challenges multiply. What should be apparent is that as developmental values regain legitimacy, the trade arena has become a site of resistance where the weak or under-represented seek windows of opportunity to reshape rules and reduce pressure for policies they wish to evade or for which they want offsetting concessions. These challenges are not necessarily a general rejection of future cooperation at all times. As they grow in strength and stature, emerging players are investing in becoming technically empowered to resist, confront and shape a number of outcomes. Dealing with the US is less an exercise of helplessness than an exercise of accommodation where state and non-state players interact and feed off each other in a process whereby even though not organic, values become shared, rules gradually codified and all players are able to reinvent themselves.

Expanding markets, drug trade, and immigration all mean that Latin America is a strategic region for the US, and increasing global presence makes it key to global hegemony


Carlsen, IRC Americas program of the International Relations Center director, and Barry, IRC’s policy director, 6

(Laura, Tom, 2/10/06, Americas Program, “U.S. Hegemony Or Global Good Neighbor Policy,” http://www.countercurrents.org/sa-carlsen100206.htm, accessed 7/6/13, IC)


Over the past few years we have faced two major challenges in conceiving of a new foreign policy in Latin America. The first is the relative lack of attention to the region, by both the U.S. government and public. The second is the increasing friction between the current U.S. administration's strategies for global U.S. hegemony and Latin American elected governments and grassroots trends toward greater independence and new models.

The following policy review of U.S.-Latin American relations examines the salient new developments in Latin America and the Caribbean and U.S. policy in the region. It concludes with general guidelines for a more coherent and constructive U.S. Latin American policy in the region, along the lines of the “Global Good Neighbor Ethic for U.S. Foreign Policy.”

I. Why Latin America Matters

Over the past five years, the United States had paid relatively little attention to Latin America. Since September 11, policymakers, media, and the U.S. public have kept the focus on the Middle East and Muslim countries. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, foreign policy, while gaining greater public attention, has become nearly synonymous with the debate over the occupation of that country and the deteriorating conditions for peace in the Middle East.

The United States still retains a special sense of hegemony over its “near abroad” or backyard. But in an age of the global war on terror, global economic integration, and global communication, geographical proximity has reduced relevance in prioritizing international relations. As the only remaining superpower since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, Washington has come to regard the entire globe as its natural domain.

One result of this global reach is that less importance is attached to relations with Latin America than to nations with more strategic resources, especially oil, more profitable investment locations, geopolitical importance, and those that offer expanding consumer markets.

The problem for Latin America is that the lack of coherent policymaking has led to stopgap and piecemeal policies, far more reactive than pro-active. These policies, while generally falling under the erroneous framework of the National Security Doctrine, are not based on a comprehensive and careful analysis of the region; nor do they take into account the needs of the countries themselves. Moreover, between the distinct policy areas—counternarcotics operations, development aid, anti-terrorism, immigration restriction, trade liberalization—they frequently contradict each other and fail to consider broader policy objectives in the region.

Historically, the reasons for Latin America 's relevance to U.S. interests—as defined by the governing elite—have changed. Latin America and the Caribbean were traditionally linked to the United States by geography. In the early 19 th century the U.S. government instituted the Monroe Doctrine to ensure that the Western Hemisphere would remain outside the dominance of colonial powers and mercantilists. In this way it asserted both its interest and its hegemony over the region. The purpose was not only to pull the new nations of the hemisphere into its sphere of influence but also to keep other countries out. This served both security interests and economic objectives.

The Cold War dictated a new set of objectives oriented toward eliminating what were defined as communist threats. But since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the “global war on terrorism,” Latin America has taken a back seat in U.S. foreign policy in relation to other parts of the world. The former rationales of proximity, defeating communism, and maintaining regional hegemony have fallen away to new, more complex forms of involvement.

For many who have analyzed or experienced firsthand the U.S. policies that fomented civil wars, supported military dictators, or helped overthrow elected governments, neglect may seem a positive development in U.S.-Latin American relations.

But the United States continues to exercise strong hegemonic ties in the region, whether through its expanding military presence, NAFTA-style trade agreements, or the dictates of U.S.-dominated international financial institutions. Latin America is still a crucial area for the United States. Moreover, recent political trends have placed it squarely in the center of major debates on the future of U.S. foreign policy and the course of globalization. Latin American nations have called into question the U.S. government's efforts to militarize international relations under a counter-terrorism agenda that does not reflect the reality of the region and have increasingly protested the neoliberal model.

At this juncture, to base alternative U.S. policy in the region on a negative agenda—what the U.S. should not do in Latin America—would be short-sighted, and ultimately would be only a defensive position. Although regional attention has been spotty, conservatives developed a long-term and cohesive foreign policy agenda centered on U.S. global hegemony over a decade ago. To counter that agenda of military presence, intervention, corporate privileges, and deepening rifts between the rich and the poor, we too must develop a more comprehensive agenda.

What's clear is that in today's globalized world, the United States and Latin America remain inextricably linked—and in some ways even more so. The large U.S. market, expanding Latin American markets for U.S. goods, the international drug trade, immigration—all underline the strategic relationship that exists between the two regions.

It is also clear that many countries in Latin America are taking bold steps toward addressing some of the worst inequities of corporate-led globalization and their colonial heritage. A U.S. foreign policy that supports, rather than counters, these initiatives and that resolutely respects the right to self-determination could bring our nations into a shared community of values based on sustainable development, inclusive democracy and peace.

II. Continental Drift: Trends in Latin America

Despite the more dramatic developments in other parts of the world, Latin America has drawn world attention on an increasing number of occasions. This time it has not been due to major crises, such as the economic crashes that rocked the continent with Mexico 's peso devaluation in 1995 or the implosion of the Argentine economy in 2001. Instead, the region has made headlines for its new and unexpected political leadership that in some cases extends to the global stage.



Latin America is key – it’s the US traditional backyard, has a booming economy, specifically Brazil, and is of interest by China, a potential hegemonic rival – means any shift in power represents a global shift


Brand, University of Mainz Department of Political Science Post-Doc Researcher, et al. 12

(Alexander, McEwen-Fial, Susan, University of Mainz Department of Political Science Lecturer, Muno, Wolfgang, University of Erfurt Visiting Professor of Political Science, Hoffman, Andrea Ribeiro, University of Erfurt Willy Brandt School of Public Policy Lecturer, 4/12, University of Mainz, “BRICs and U.S. Hegemony: Theoretical Reflections on Shifting Power Patterns and Empirical Evidence from Latin America,” http://international.politics.uni-mainz.de/files/2012/10/mpiep04.pdf, p. 2-3, accessed 7/6/13, IC)


In our paper we want to assess the validity of such claims by looking at current developments in Latin America. In general, a regional focus as such has its merits beyond the question what makes Latin America a rather unique case given a peculiar constellation of factors (see below): In specifying a “target region” of political and other strategies, it allows for a more differentiated account of how gradually shifting power patterns or potentials indeed translate into political consequences “on the ground”. In our case, a regional focus is to elucidate the factual political implications of a shift in capabilities and patterns of actions among states and between their respective societies. Moreover, shifting patterns of regional hegemony might (as has historically been the case) be indicative of global power shifts. This is because global hegemony – sketched here in a first attempt as the propensity of a state to shape the fate of others on a global scale1 – at least with regard to the case of U.S. hegemony clearly had a regional base to start with a/o to rely upon (e.g. Layne 2006).2

Latin America as a region in itself is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it is seen as the “traditional backyard” of the regional hegemon, the U.S. (e.g. Livingston 2009). Therefore, it could be assumed that any perceived challenges would be tackled in some way or another by the United States thus leading to some form of hegemonic rivalry. Second, the region is home to one of the BRIC-states, namely Brazil, which is increasingly being discussed as a regional powerhouse with not only the potential to act as such but also the aspirations to do so (e.g. Varas 2008). And third, it has recently been deemed of heightened strategic importance by another BRIC-country situated outside the region, namely China.

Although the authors might disagree about the implications for such activism regarding the status of China as a regional hegemonic contender – in terms of its calculus as well as its perception in the eyes of key U.S. policymakers (e.g. Paz 2006; Cala 2011) – it should be clear that the alleged (coming or already existing) hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China on a global scale serves as a backdrop to such thoughts. In this regard, it is not by chance that both diagnoses often go in tandem: the “rise of China” is seen as part of the “U.S. decline”. 3 In that sense, if the ascendancy of the BRICs is to be interpreted as the rise of contenders to U.S. hegemony, developments in Latin America should give us a grasp on the emerging form of contestation as well as efforts on behalf of the United States to manage such attempts.

The second section outlines a more differentiated concept of hegemony. Such an account allows us to infer political intentionalities as well as politically relevant implications of changing patterns of action among a set of actors. This is not to say that a more traditional reading of, let us say, military capabilities, trade volumes, monetary reserves and financial flows is of no use. But a rather simple talk about shifting trends in figures and relative shares within some sectors is either misleading (Strange 1988) or just “not enough” (e.g. Nye 2011: esp. 153-204) if one is to assess political consequences in terms of power shifts or alterations in the patterns of influence. In other words, to speak about quantifiable trends might constitute an important aspect of any assessment of hegemony and hegemonic rivalry, but obviously omits key facets as well.

US global heg hinges on its economy – Latin America’s booming economies, geographical proximity, and strong trade ties makes it a key partner


Bitar, Inter-American Dialogue non-resident Senior Fellow, 11

(Sergio, 9/11, Inter-American Dialogue, “Latin America and the United States: Looking Towards 2020,” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf, p. 2-3, accessed 7/6/13, IC)


Over the last decade, the United States has had to adjust to the relative decline of its global power. Its future influence will be subject to greater economic limitations. Latin America, meanwhile, with the exception of a few countries, has emerged from a decade of good governance in a stronger position. The region generally enters the next decade in favorable circumstances for continued development.

In speeches in the three countries he visited, President Obama recognized the emergence of a new multipolar world. As in Egypt and India and at the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he proposed new alliances for the pursuit of global governance and, as a result, new partnerships among countries. Speaking in Santiago to the entire region, Obama used the word partner or partnership 24 times and repeated a phrase he had said in Trinidad: “There are no senior partners and there are no junior partners, there are only equal partners.”

Obama’s vision clearly differs from that of his predecessor. While President George W. Bush employed similar terminology, he carried out a markedly unilateral and militaristic policy based on the premise of a hegemonic power, which was divorced from the current reality. The data supporting this new reality are eloquent. The United States has accumulated an unprecedented debt that will limit its ability to wield global influence for many years, particularly in the coming decade. The recent financial crisis deeply shook the US economy and the international financial system, raising questions about the capacity of the United States to properly regulate its banking and financial sectors. The US military is over-extended, fighting wars on three fronts at the same time, and seems uncertain about how to deal with Chinese expansion.

Against this backdrop, the US administration appears to be advancing a new vision, one that maintains that the country will continue to be the leading power—but its power relative to others will decline. This vision recognizes that military muscle alone is not enough to maintain order, spread US values, and advance strategic interests. Instead, it reaffirms that the basis for renewed US power lies in the strengthening of a competitive economy, which is the only way to sustain its global influence.

For such a concept to take hold greater austerity in the US domestic economy will be required and new alliances to regain influence will need to be pursued. That thinking was reflected in President Obama’s State of the Union address in January 2011.

Meanwhile, emerging economies keep upsetting the balance of economic power. In a February 2011 talk at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Indian economist A. Virmani projected that the size of China’s economy (measured by per-capita income, adjusted for purchasing power, and multiplied by the population) would overtake that of the United States by 2020, while India and Brazil would surpass Japan and France, respectively, by 2015, and Russia would surpass Germany shortly after 2020.

China keeps growing at a pace that shows no signs of slowing. Its saving rate is more than 40 percent, the world’s highest. Its consumption level in recent years has been less than 40 percent of GDP, while Europe’s is 60 percent and the United States’ exceeds 70 percent.

Its domestic market has a tremendous potential for growth, fueled by the rapid expansion of the middle class. The domestic market and strong public spending enable China to protect itself from the vagaries of external demand and keep growth rates up. That middle class will keep driving demand for commodities and food, along with new goods and services. China’s economy is nimble and competitive. In this decade, it risks a slowdown only if growing pressure for a political opening and more freedom and participation prove unmanageable for the ruling Communist Party.

India, likewise, is seeing continued growth that will make it a stronger influence in global and hemispheric affairs. In this context, it is plausible that in coming years Latin America will continue to move towards Asia. After all, Asia’s share of new global demand will be greater than those of the advanced economies, and the region will also offer new export markets and investments in Latin America.

The two giants—China and India—will join Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and Turkey in posting growth rates that exceed those of the developed nations and therefore accounting for a larger share of world GDP.

The world that is taking shape will be multipolar and more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. The United States will be its largest shareholder, though a minority one—and it will have to come to terms with these new circumstances.1 Latin America, for its part, faces a new window of opportunity that it should take advantage of. It is well positioned for a forward push to pursue substantive reforms in the coming decade. The United States cannot underestimate the importance of a region whose current population of 500 million is expected to reach 600 million by 2020.

National differences aside, Latin America’s democracies have spread and will continue to deepen. The progress achieved should be viewed in light of the changes underway in the Middle East. For the most part, Latin America has little risk of armed conflict among countries. Its key challenge is to defeat the violence and organized crime that threatens democratic institutions, especially in northern Central America.



Latin American economies have grown and diversified. In recent years their governments’ macroeconomic management has been more responsible and effective than that of the developed countries. Most nations have made significant strides in reducing poverty, although serious inequalities remain.

Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 18, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized just how important Latin America has become for the United States. More than 40 percent of US exports go to the region; the United States sells more to Chile and Colombia than to Russia; and Brazil is a global power with a growing economy and deepening democracy that will play a greater role in the energy field. Clinton underlined that geography was an important factor to maintain and improve the close link between the United States and Mexico and Central America, to work jointly with new initiatives to address serious crime and drug issues.




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