Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Alt causes to soft power decline – military unilateralism and pressure to conform to US values

(Marius, March 2007, Stellenbosch Press, “An Exploration of the Role of Soft Power in Hegemony: the USA and China”, scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/10019.1/2391/1/Meyer.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, KR)

•inconsistent military targets (why did the US not invade North Korea which proclaimed to have WMD capabilities)

•growing unilateralism which adversely affects consensus building (e.g. not signing the Kyoto protocol and invading Iraq with no UN support)

•refusing to submit to UN war crimes tribunals

•allies fear retribution by those who are aligned against the US (which are growing in number)

The decline of US hegemony (soft power) can also be attributed to the ‘blow back’ or adverse reaction which was forced through military intervention in response to the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks (Goh, 2003: 82). ‘Blowback’ as a term, within this context, refers strictly to the advent of malevolent reaction by terrorist movements to the actions of the perceived aggressors (US)- and most importantly not the ideas which they propagate but rather their physical actions (Goh, 2003: 82). Thus, according to Goh, terrorist and fundamentalist reaction and anti US sentiment which is causal to it- does not stem from the deficiency of shared ideas between the US and the terrorist- but rather from the direct policy and military influence which the US is exerting in the Middle East and the rest of the world. This suggests that the US is experiencing a decline in ‘soft power’ in the light of their opting for hard power influence – which adversely affects ‘soft power’ capabilities and hence the ability to influence others within the international system.

The US is alienating the world through the use of ‘hard power’. It needs to reinvigorate its ‘soft power’ capabilities in order to stem the avalanche of anti US sentiment which is growing in momentum against them. The US has lost a great amount of legitimacy in the eyes of the world- in the light of their military interventionist policies and actions. Legitimacy is imperative to the advent and sustenance of global hegemony. This does, however, indicate decline in ‘soft power’ for the US- yet the damage is not irreparable.

Samuel Huntington is a staunch advocator of US decline- focusing on differentiation between cultures (or civilisations) as the main cause for conflict within the system (Huntington, 1993: 22). Huntington (1999: 36- 37) provides a list of US policies and actions which he argues are the cause for the growing anti- US sentiment and thus the decline in US ‘soft power’:

•pressurises states to conform to US values (overtly and covertly)

•prevents and controls other nations’ military capabilities

•enforces US law and propagates US values in other states

•applies sanctions based on the US’s notion of what is right or wrong

•promotes economic liberalism- contradicting this by also promoting US MNCs’ interest above that of other countries’ MNCs

•shapes agendas and influence leadership in IGOs (UN, WTO, IMF, etc.)

•intervene in sovereign states (Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Somalia, Balkans, etc.)

•force economic policies on sovereign states (Structural Adjustment Programmes)

•military expansionism and the labelling of states as ‘rogue’ or evil based on US values

Credibility

Credibility is key to cooperation and the influence of the US – popular theory and Bush examples

Kydd, University of Wisconsin political science professor, 5

(Andrew, In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation, pgs 19-21, AFGA).

In his State of the Union address in January 2004, President George W. Bush argued that Libya's decision to abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction was due to the United States invasion of Iraq. As he put it, "Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while twelve years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America." The President was articulating a central tenet of deterrence theory, that threats must be credible if they are to influence the behavior of other states.1 The United States said that it would invade Iraq if Saddam Hussein remained in power, and when he did, the United States invaded. Other states can now believe that if a similar threat is made in the future, it is likely to be carried out as well. Deterrence theorists view the credibility of this kind of threat as a key foundation of global order. International hegemons like the United States maintain stability by issuing credible threats that those who violate the rules will be punished, and then backing up these threats with action. In the view of the Bush administration, then, the invasion of Iraq reinforced American credibility, and strengthened world order.

Unfortunately, much of the rest of the world took a different view. The in- ability to find weapons of mass destruction or related manufacturing facilities indicated to many observers that twelve years of sanctions and United Nations inspections, along with U.S. and British military pressure, did effectively dis- arm Iraq. The evidence on Iraqi weapons programs presented before the war was thin and did no! support the claims being made about them. With the stated reason for going to war now rather than later so dubious, the United Slates was seen as. at best, trigger happy—exercising poor judgment and prone to violence—or. more sinister!)', acting on interests that it failed to acknowledge: a desire to control oil resources, protect Israel, or even attack Islam in general. Many foreign observers argued that the Bush administration's uni- lateralism was evidence that the United States was a rogue state, using its military forces in unjustified ways in pursuit of its own interests. In short, the word of America is doubted as never before. This mistrust has led to a failure of international cooperation. If the hegemon cannot be trusted to act deliber- ately and in the common interest, with due respect for the opinions of others and for international law. other states will refuse to be associated with it. This will deprive the hegemon of material aid and international legitimacy, thereby undermining world order.

Both sides would agree that belief in the word of the United States is crucial to its ability to influence international events and maintain stability. However, each side has a very different view of how this matters, and why. The Bush administration's viewpoint is based on deterrence theory and the theory of public goods. The public goods theory of hegemony argues that hegemons unilaterally produce public goods that other stales free ride on. The public good in question is the coercion or deterrence of potential rule breakers in the international system. In this view of hegemony, it is not crucial that most states trust the hegemon. because their cooperation or lack thereof is of negligible importance. What is important is that the potential rule breakers fear the hegemon and find its threats to be credible. This conception of hegemony underlies the Bush administration's emphasis on preventive action against threats, undertaken alone if necessary, as articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy."1 The war against Iraq was conceived of as a public good, benefiting all, which the United States provided while others rode free. The United States should be considered more credible post-Iraq: it said it would invade and it did.

An alternative view of hegemony, however, has a very different under- standing of the role of credibility. In what can be called the hegemonic as- surance perspective, hegemons are seen as overcoming multilateral mistrust problems. Many states want to cooperate if they believe that the cooperative endeavor is well designed to achieve a shared goal, and that enough other slates will cooperate to ensure success. However, there is always uncertainty about the best way to proceed and about the motivations of other states—some states may try to hijack international efforts to serve their own more narrow interests, whereas others want to free ride or exploit the cooperation of others. Trustworthy hegemons solve these problems by working with other states to identify policies that a majority can support, and then providing assurances that the hegemon and enough other states will cooperate in the common good to make it worthwhile for all the well-disposed states to cooperate. Untrustworthy hegemons would be incapable of fulfilling this role, because they would arouse suspicions of the aims or tactics of the cooperative venture, or of the hegemon's intentions of actually cooperating.

Humanitarian

Humanitarian missions are key to US legitimacy

Thayer, Professor of Political Science Baylor University, 6

[Bradley A., Nov/Dec 2006, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, No. 86, Pg. 36, JZ]

American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

Hard Power Undercuts Soft Power

Too much hard power hurts soft power

Nye, former US assistant secretary of defense and National Intelligence Council chair, 2

[Joseph S, The Guardian, 3-30-2002, “Why military power is no longer enough”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1, accessed 7-7-13 BLE]

There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power is "soft power" - getting people to want what you want.

Wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right values, their power will be greater than if they have relied only on cutting off allowances or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do.

Soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And countries like the Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight because of their support for international aid and peace-keeping.

The countries that are likely to gain soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe.

By the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration became convinced that 'America's security depended on its ability to speak to and to win the support of people in other countries.' With World War II and the Cold War, the government sponsored efforts including the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America and the Fulbright student exchange programme.

But much soft power arises from forces outside government control. Even before the Cold War, 'American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world.'

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