Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin America is at the top of the agenda for Iran – trade with Brazil, cooperation with ALBA, and Ahmadinejad’s visits prove

(Ray, Summer 2012, “The Future of Iran’s Influence in Latin America,” The Jewish Policy Center, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/3233/iran-influence-latin-america, accessed 7/7/13, IC)

On the geopolitical chessboard, Iran pursues a multiple track policy in the Western Hemisphere. With Latin America's democracies, it professes to want only normal diplomatic, trade, and cultural ties. With the set of states participating in the Chavez-Castro alliance (the Bolivarian Alternative for our Americas, or ALBA), Iran acts as friend and ally in relentless contention with what it considers a U.S. dominated world. Overall, Iran has multiple objectives: regular diplomatic relations, trade, prestige, sanction evasion, and a potential action base for asymmetric warfare and terror.

Iran: Ordinary Nation in the New World

Since the overthrow of the Shah and the emergence of the Islamic Republic, Iran has attempted to expand its influence as a middle-sized, regional power with global reach. It clearly seeks to avoid isolation as an international pariah despite the fact its extremist ideology, repressive police state, abhorrent anti-Semitism, and state sponsorship of terror make it an unfit and dangerous international actor. It aims to demonstrate it is a responsible—if often misunderstood and unfairly treated—global citizen demanding respect and sovereignty and prepared to work within international rules.

Tehran's ability to build a strong relationship with Brazil and other Latin American democracies remains a key objective with trade and prestige diplomacy atop its agenda. Recently, Iranian trade has grown with the Western Hemisphere, reaching $3.5 billion in 2010, mainly in Iranian imports. Likewise, Brazil leads the way as an important agricultural exporter to Iran.

Under President Inacio Lula de Silva (2004-2010), Brazil's relations with Iran reached an amicable highpoint. Lula downplayed the post-election violence of 2009, callously comparing Iran's brutal repression of the Green Movement with a clash of rival soccer fans in Brazil, and later hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in November 2009. The following May, Lula traveled to Tehran and with the Turkish prime minister announced a nuclear fuel swap agreement that handed a momentary victory to Iran as it battled against UN sanctions. Lula's diplomacy gave credibility to Iran's claim that its ambitions do not include nuclear weapons and left a false impression of Iranian readiness to compromise on the nuclear issue. As a rotating member of the United Nations Security Council, Brazil also voted against 2010 UN Iran sanctions. Since the arrival of President Dilma Rousseff in January 2011, however, relations have cooled significantly.

Advancing relations with Iran is tempting for Brazil's foreign policy makers. It allows them to appear as a counterweight to the U.S. It also reflects Brazil's ability, as now the world's sixth largest economy and an aspirant global status, to project influence and assume a more assertive role in troublesome issues that menace global peace.

In addition to trade and prestige diplomacy, Iran also aims to improve its image as a "civilized" nation by projecting "soft power." Iran supports 36 Shi'a cultural centers in Latin America. In February 2012, Iran launched a region-wide Spanish language television network. Yet, the number of converts to Shi'a Islam will likely remain small and Iran's capacity to win friends and extend influence to people across a divide of civilizations remains minimal. Relations between Iran and the Western democracies hinge on rational choices by elected leaders who must weigh the costs (such as U.S. disapproval, perceptions of hypocrisy, and danger of Iranian covert action) against the benefits (such as standing up against the U.S. and commercial advantage). For the foreseeable future, Iran will pursue relations with the region's democracies via a mix of Persian charm, trade and commercial offers, and secretiveness.

Iran as Geo-Strategic Partner and Ally

A second, smaller set of nations in the region view Iran as friend and ally; they are led by radical populists, strongmen(caudillos), and dictators (Castro brothers) who harbor deep-seated antagonism toward the U.S. They proclaim themselves nationalist, pro-poor, and anti-imperial, standing in opposition to capitalism, globalism, materialism, and the values of representative or liberal democracy. With Iran, they share similar psychologies that mix revolutionary zeal, paranoia, and hostility toward a common enemy, be it "the Great Satan" or "Yankee Empire." They hope for a multi-polar world where U.S. power and influence is vastly reduced or destroyed.

Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, with support from Fidel Castro, launched ALBA in 2002. Today ALBA has eight members and is largely sustained by Venezuela's petroleum largesse. The oil that binds ALBA together helped open doors for Iranian-Venezuelan cooperation in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). ALBA has increasingly presented a united diplomatic front, aligning itself with Iran and Syria, while demonstrating sympathy for violent non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This year Venezuela has provided Iran's ally, the brutal Asad regime in Syria, with much needed fuel supplies, while ALBA members defend Syria's right to put its house in order and vote in the UN against censure or sanctions for either Syria or Iran.

Nevertheless, Iran's future relations with Venezuela are heavily contingent on Chavez's ability to hold on to the presidency he has held since 1999. In 2011, Chavez underwent surgery to remove a "baseball size tumor." He returned to Cuba for surgery and therapy in 2012 and speculation about his ability to live to compete in the October presidential elections abound. An electoral victory by opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski would certainly lead to a swift downgrading of ties with Iran.

Often debated is the potential for nuclear cooperation by ALBA members to advance Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. ALBA members defend Iran's right to develop a "peaceful" nuclear program and pursue uranium enrichment. While Iran's ALBA partners in the Americas possess important deposits of uranium and could aid Iran either with direct supply or indirect support such as sanctions evasion or illegal technology transfers—evidence of complicity remains sketchy.

Iran Rising Now – Argentina

Iranian influence growing now – Argentina has explicitly allowed them to gain a foot hold in Latin America

Kredo, The Washington Free Beacon National Security & Foreign Policy Senior Writer, 7/9

(Adam, 7/9/13, The Washington Free Beacon, “Kirchner Opens Door to Latin America for Iran,” http://freebeacon.com/kirchner-opens-door-to-latin-america-for-iran/, accessed 7/9/13, IC)

Argentina’s populist-socialist president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has allowed Iran to infiltrate its economic sector and potentially use the country as a terrorist launching pad, U.S. officials and multiple experts said on Tuesday.

Iranian agents have been permitted access to Latin America’s Free Trade Zones, which operate throughout the porous borders that separate Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, the terrorism experts testified before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency.

Iran has significantly boosted its diplomatic ties with Argentina and other socialist countries, a move that allows Iranian officials to circulate through the region, according to the experts and independent U.S. officials not present at the hearing.

Under Kirchner, Argentina has begun to export large amounts of food and agricultural products to feed its hungry population, which has suffered under Western sanctions, according to U.S. officials.

Iran also recently opened a joint chamber of commerce last year in Buenos Aires, according to the U.S. officials.

Exports from Argentina to Iran jumped from around $84 million in 2008 to some $1.2 billion in 2011, according to U.S. officials. Argentina is Iran’s second largest trading partner in the region, according to the intelligence officials.

As Tehran gains access to Latin America it has been able to build a complex “pipeline to move illicit products all across the region,” according to Joseph M. Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society.

These Latin American trade zones help Iran launder money and move people, military hardware, and other products throughout the region, Humire said.

The experts ultimately concluded that Iran has built a full-blown terror network that includes spies and senior military officials across Latin America, as socialist countries such as Argentina strengthen ties with Iran.

Iran has signed more than 500 trade and diplomatic agreements with a handful of Latin American countries over the past several years. The agreements are estimated to be worth some $40 billion dollars, experts said.

Iranian officials have said that it has 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers across Latin America, according to U.S. officials and expert Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council.

These diplomatic compounds and embassies have traditionally been used as a base for Iran’s Quds Force, which also is tied to Hezbollah, according to U.S. officials.

These agreements have allowed Iran to place its diplomats and military-backed businessmen throughout the region.

While Tehran claims to operate legitimate businesses and embassies, Iranian agents have quietly radicalized the indigenous populations and used their influence to procure illicit military hardware, according to Humire.

The expert testimony comes just a month after the State Department published a mostly classified report that concluded, “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning.”

Lawmakers and experts rejected this conclusion, claiming that all available evidence indicates that Iran’s presence in the region has grown exponentially in recent years.

“I seriously question the administration’s judgment to [downplay] Iran’s presence at home,” Rep. Jeff Duncan (R., S.C.) said during the hearing, criticizing the Obama White House for neglecting to include “the input of our foreign allies across the region.”

Duncan said there is no way to be sure that Iran is not “smuggling people, drugs, and weapons through our porous southern border.”

“The overall conclusion was the influence is waning. That took me aback,” Humire said during a small press conference earlier in the day. “I really don’t see many indicators where you can say the influence is waning.”

Iran has actually built “a maze of subsidiaries all through the region that don’t just work in the defense industry but the private industry,” Humire said. “It hoodwinks these companies to work on” weapons technology and nuclear hardware.

Iran’s access to the transportation, mining, and shipping industries have “put a veil over Iran’s military program” and recruitment, Humire said.

From Venezuela to Bolivia and other socialist-oriented countries in the region, Iran has planted engineers, scientists, and private businessmen who are affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to Humire.

Iran “now [has] a military presence that is unprecedented in the region,” he said.

U.S. officials have further determined that Iran is funding a defense academy in Bolivia.

The academy, which is training various Latin American forces, was formally inaugurated last years by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, according to the U.S. officials, who estimate that around 50 to 300 Iranian trainers are stationed in Bolivia.

Others warned that Iran is quickly building a network that extends to countries bordering North America.

Engagement Checks Iran

US engagement prevents challenge of hegemony by Iranian involvement

Fite Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12

[Brandon, 4/4/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States”, https://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf, p. 31, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]

The US should neither overestimate Iran’s capabilities in the periphery, nor treat peripheral ¶ theaters of competition as critical ones; it should monitor Iranian advances with an eye toward ¶ discerning Iran’s overarching strategy to evade Western pressure and expand its regional ¶ interests. By all accounts, Iran is far from achieving a global alliance to counterbalance against ¶ the West; but Iran’s distance from that goal is in part provided for by the engagement and ¶ vigilance of status quo powers. To secure the periphery, the United States must continue to¶ engage where possible, and closely monitor Iran’s relationships with states on the geographic ¶ and political margins of the US-Iranian competition.

Iranian Influence Bad – Proliferation

Iranian influence in Latin America has allowed them to obtain uranium for nuclear proliferation

Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12

(Ilan, Summer 2012, “Iran Courts Latin America,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 64-66, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH)

Since the start of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions nearly nine years ago, it has become an accepted belief that Tehran’s atomic program is now largely selfsufficient and that its progress is, therefore, largely inexorable. This, however, is far from the truth; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs a considerable, and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to fuel its atomic effort.

According to nonproliferation experts, Tehran’s indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be both “limited and mostly of poor quality.”12 When Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi mapped out an ambitious national plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government was forced to procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly four decades later, this aging stockpile has reportedly been mostly depleted.13 As a result, in recent years, Tehran has embarked on a widening quest to acquire uranium ore from abroad. In 2009, for example, it is known to have attempted to purchase more than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.14 In that particular case, deft diplomacy on the part of Washington and its European allies helped stymie Tehran’s efforts—at least for the time being.

The Iranian quest, however, has not abated. In February 2011, an intelligence summary from a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency reaffirmed the Islamic regime’s continued search for new and stable sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program. 15 This effort has recently focused on two principal geographic areas. The first is Africa where Tehran has made concerted efforts to engage a number of uranium producers such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo.16 The second is Latin America where Tehran now is exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships.

The best known of these partnerships is with Venezuela; cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between the Islamic Republic and the Chavez regime. The Iranian regime is currently known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela’s border with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be analogous to Canada’s Athabasca Basin, the world’s largest deposit of uranium.17

Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a significant source of strategic resources for the Iranian regime. With the sanction of the Morales government, Tehran is now believed to be extracting uranium from as many as eleven different sites in Bolivia’s east, proximate to the country’s in- dustrial capital of Santa Cruz.18 Not coincidentally, it is rumored that the now-infamous Tehran- Caracas air route operated jointly by Conviasa, Venezuela’s national airline, and Iran’s state carrier, Iran Air, will be extended in the near future to Santa Cruz.19 Additionally, a series of cooperation agreements concluded in 2010 between La Paz and Tehran have made Iran a “partner” in the mining and exploitation of Bolivia’s lithium, a key strategic mineral with applications for nuclear weapons development.20

Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador’s uranium deposits. A $30 million joint mining deal concluded between Tehran and Quito back in 2009 has positioned the Correa regime to eventually become a supplier for the Islamic Republic.21

Regional experts note that Iran’s mining and extraction efforts in Latin America are still comparatively modest in nature, constrained by competition from larger countries such as Canada and China and by Tehran’s own available resources and know-how.22 However, the region is unquestionably viewed as a target of opportunity in Iran’s widening quest for strategic resources— both because of its favorable political operating environment and because states there (especially Bolivia) represent unknown quantities in terms of resource wealth. This raises the possibility that Latin America could emerge in the near future as a significant provider of strategic resources for the Iranian regime and a key source of sustenance for Iran’s expanding nuclear program.

Venezuela and Iran are sharing nuclear technology – Venezuela is exporting uranium to Iran.

Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10

(Ely, September/October 2010, “Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 278-279, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH)

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Venezuelan–Iranian alliance is cooperation in the nuclear field. On November 13, 2008, the two governments further formalized their collaboration in a memorandum of understanding to ‘‘cooperate in the field of nuclear technology.’’

According to reliable reports cited by Roger F. Noriega, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, in an article dedicated mostly to this subject, Venezuela is supplying Iran with uranium. It was reported even that the British authorities confronted Chavez with those reports and warned him of the consequences of that irresponsible behavior.22

In his first visit to California since he was kicked out of the United States in a diplomatic row last year, the ambassador of Venezuela defended his country’s exploration of nuclear energy and said there was nothing secret about it. ‘‘We have a lot of oil, but we have to start thinking of when there’s a prospect of running out,’’ said Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez. ‘‘It’s good to explore that potential.’’ Commenting on revelations of the Venezuelan mining minister that the government of Iran was helping to explore uranium deposits in areas of Venezuela, Alvarez said that those comments were misconstrued. ‘‘The only thing we’re doing with nuclear is what we did with Russia,’’ he said, referring to an accord made last year in which Russia will help Venezuela develop a nuclear power plant.23

In an interview with the French Le Figaro, Chavez declared that he and Ahmadinejad, ‘‘an ally and a friend,’’ agreed to transfer Iranian nuclear technology to Venezuela after a new agreement was signed in Tehran. Chavez mentioned that preliminary steps have been taken to enable Venezuela to kick off its plan to establish a ‘‘nuclear village’’ with the help of the Iranians. On this occasion he reiterated that ‘‘Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy.’’24

Iranian Influence Bad – Terrorism

An increase in Iranian and Hezbollah presence in Latin America boost Iranian proliferation and instability in Latin America.

Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10

(Ely, September/October 2010, “Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 290-291, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH)

This article gives a glimpse of the extensive Iranian and Hezbollah presence and activity in Latin America, which intensified during 2009 and has been successful in developing closer ties with Brazil, the continent’s giant and world player, and the small, vulnerable Caribbean states.

The problem with this presence and activity is that it goes beyond the normal political, economic, social, and cultural levels and creeps into the dangerous area of terrorism and subversion, threatening not only outside actors and interests but possibly the very stability of the host countries.

It is evident that Iran’s political and strategic standing in Latin America strengthens the Tehran regime and diminishes the possibility of United Nations backed international diplomatic and economic pressures to convince it to renounce the nuclear project.

Thus indirectly at least, it enhances the threat of Iran’s nuclear hegemonic projection vis-a`-vis the moderate Arab states, with all that means for the stability of the Middle East, the stability of oil prices, and nuclear proliferation to other states in the region.

The proved Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the worst terrorist attacks on the continent, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a bad omen for the future. In case Iran’s vital interests such as the survival of the nuclear project were threatened by the international community, by the United States alone, or by Israel, Latin America would be preferred ground for retaliation, directly or with Hezbollah’s support.

One of the most worrying aspects of Iran’s strategic penetration in Latin America is cooperation in the nuclear field with countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and possibly Brazil, just when the international community is trying to convince the Tehran regime to renounce the uranium enrichment and military aspects of the project.

What if Iran decided to deploy its long-range missiles in Venezuela at the request of President Chavez if he feels threatened? Based on Chavez’s invitation to Russian Navy and military aircraft to visit his country, such a nightmarish scenario seems possible.

Iran will conduct a terrorist attack against the United States – their failed operation means Iran views Latin America as a strategic point for an attack.

Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12

(Ilan, Summer 2012, “Iran Courts Latin America,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 67-68, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH)

Conventional wisdom in Washington has long held that Tehran’s activism in the Americas is opportunistic—rather than operational. Yet Iran’s growing asymmetric capabilities throughout the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland. This was hammered home by the foiled October 2011 plot, an attack which—had it been successful—would potentially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the nation’s capital in the most significant terrorist event since 9/11.

The incident represents a seismic shift in Tehran’s strategic calculations. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper observed in his January 2012 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in response to mounting international pressure and asymmetric activity against Tehran’s nuclear program, it appears that “Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i—have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States.”29

Latin America figures prominently in this equation. The foiled October 2011 plot suggests that Tehran increasingly deems the region an advantageous operational theater. Moreover, as its influence and activities there intensify, the Iranian regime will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence in the Americas. Clapper concluded his Senate testimony with an ominous warning: “The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere,” he noted. “These alliances can pose an immediate threat by giving Iran—directly through the IRGC, the Qods force, or its proxies like Hezbollah—a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and allies.”30

AT – Iran Rise

Iran influence is waning in Latin America

Kelly, US Marine Corps Commander, 13

(John, 3/19/13, SOUTHCOM, “Posture statement of General John Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command”. http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM%202013%20Posture%20Statement%20FINAL%20SASC.pdf, p. 12, 7/9/13, AL)

Iran in the Western Hemisphere. This brings me to the next issue I would like to discuss, which has serious implications for U.S. national security. I share the Congress’ concerns over Iran’s attempts to increase its influence in the region. The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning. In an attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, the Iranian regime has increased its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been marginally successful, however, and the region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts.

Iran influence waning – sanctions, diplomacy, and Iranian mismanagement.

Goodman, Bloomberg News 6/26/13

[Joshua, 6/26/13, Bloomberg News, “Iran Influence in Latin America Waning, U.S. Report Says”, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-influence-in-latin-america-waning-u-s-report-says.html, accessed 7/9/13, ALT]

Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report.

While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a “concern,” sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report.

“As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” according to the report.

Iranian influence shrinking now – US and EU sanctions and the new, more moderate president check growth

Fox News Latino, 6/27/13

(6/27/13, “Iranian Influence In Latin America On the Wane, State Department Report Says,” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/06/27/iranian-influence-in-latin-america-on-wane-state-department-report-says/, Fox News Latino, accessed 7/7/13, IC)

Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America, the U.S. State Department acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing.

The report, which said that the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region is still a “concern,” said that due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union, Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America.

“As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” the report stated, according to Bloomberg News.

While the State Department declined to comment on the report because it had not yet been sent to Congress, some Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle Eastern nation’s threat in the U.S.’s perceived backyard.

“I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report, told Bloomberg. “I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.”

Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran had forged strong relationships with the left-leaning governments of Bolivian President Evo Morales and the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez.

Current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced in late May that three surveillance drones built with Iran’s help were launched by the Venezuelan government as part of an initiative to curb drug trafficking.

The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran’s presidential election two weeks ago.

Hassan Rohani, the only moderate-reformist candidate in Iran's presidential election, secured a surprising first-round victory after garnering more than 50 percent of the ballots.

Rohani, who was backed by two reformist ex-presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, defeated four ultra-conservative candidates and a technocrat who finished in last place

The victory by Rohani, who will succeed two-term incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, could usher in significant changes in Iran's foreign and economic policy and lead to expanded rights for women in the Islamic nation, although there are many restrictions on presidential power and foreign and nuclear policy is determined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran is being solved now – Obama recently signed legislation to increase US counter-radicalization in Latin America against Iran.

Agence France-Presse, French News Agency, 12

(Agence France-Presse, 12/28/2012, Raw Story News, “Obama signs law against Iran Latin America influence,” http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/obama-signs-law-against-iran-latin-america-influence/. Accessed 7-9-13, RH)

President Barack Obama enacted a law to counter Iran’s alleged influence in Latin America, through a new diplomatic and political strategy to be designed by the State Department.

The Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, passed by lawmakers earlier this year, calls for the State Department to develop a strategy within 180 days to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in the region.

Although the strategy is confidential and only accessible to lawmakers, it must contain a public summary.

The text also calls on the Department of Homeland Security to bolster surveillance at US borders with Canada and Mexico to “prevent operatives from Iran, the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), its Quds Force, Hezbollah or any other terrorist organization from entering the Untied States.”

And within Latin American countries, the text provides for a multiagency action plan to provide security in those countries, along with a “counterterrorism and counter-radicalization plan” to isolate Iran and its allies.

Washington has repeatedly stated it is closely monitoring Tehran’s activities in Latin America, though senior State Department and intelligence officials have indicated there is no apparent indication of illicit activities by Iran.

Iran, placed under a series of international sanctions because of its suspect nuclear program, has opened six new embassies in the region since 2005 — bringing the total to 11 — and 17 cultural centers.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made regular visits to Latin America, though he only toured the region twice this year.

Tehran has particularly close ties with Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, where it has strengthened its presence through investments.

AT – Iran Rise – Mexico

Mexico will reject Iran – they value relations with the US

Bensman, Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Agent and Journalist, 9

(Todd, April 9, 2009, Global Post, “Iran Reaches Out to Mexico,” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/mexico/090407/iran-reaches-out-mexico, Accessed 7-9-13, RH)

For their part, Mexican government officials seemed uncharacteristically cavalier about the Iranian proposal, reflecting the Obama administration's apparent change of attitude toward Tehran. Before 1979, Mexico and Shah-era Iran had a strong relationship, as two oil producers wedded by their interests in petroleum and friendly relations with the U.S.

Since 1979, however, Mexico's relationship with Iran has dried up, partly due to Mexico's deference to its northern neighbor's feelings about Iran. Today, the Iranian mission in Mexico invites email inquiries to a hotmail account and offers phone numbers that don't work.

Mexico's ambassador to the U.S., Arturo Sarukhan, did not respond to multiple GlobalPost interview requests. Neither did Mexico's ambassador to Iran, Carlos Tirado.

But one Mexican diplomat who requested anonymity told GlobalPost that Mexico welcomed Tehran's proposal, as it would outreach from any country. The diplomat explained that this was a new outlook based on the Obama administration's approach to Iran.

"I think the Obama administration made it very clear that they would not push other countries the way the Bush administration used to," the diplomat said.

Iran's Mexico City-stationed ambassador, Mohammad Hassan Ghariri Abyaneh, did not return repeated phone calls. But an assistant told GlobalPost that he, like President Obama next week, will be meeting with Mexican President Felipe Calderon.

The inroads may come to nothing, however. Mario Loyola, a former U.S. Senate and Pentagon advisor who is now a national security expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, predicted the Mexicans would ultimately snub the Iranian proposal.

"There just isn't any upside in the Iranian proposal for a conservative government like president Calderon's, which values its relations with the U.S. and looks at things our way," Loyola said. "The Mexicans will certainly avoid insulting the Iranians, but they will also avoid get(ting) mixed up in any sort of shady business with them. Calderon's advisors will advise him to avoid any changes in the tenor or nature of Mexican-Iranian relations."

AT – Iran Rise – Venezuela

Iran’s relationship with Venezuela will not last – Ahmadinejad was key and Venezuela is in economic turmoil

Morgan, British Journalist and Latin American Specialist, 10

(Susie, October 2010, “Iran’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Middle East Magazine, Issue: 415, page 17, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-9-13, RH)

Some believe the current rapprochement between Iran and Latin America - especially with the radical bloc centred around President Chavez - is driven more by short term political opportunism than by a longterm economic or military partnership, that the current intensity is unsustainable and that it may not continue beyond President Ahmadinejad's term in office. There are also financial constraints on both sides, which inhibit many planned projects and cooperation. It is not clear, for instance, how far Venezuela, which is experiencing economic problems and 30% inflation, will be able or willing to commit to helping Iran's nuclear programme, despite President Chavez's expressions of support. Iran has reciprocated by offering to support a nuclear programme in Venezuela: there are even unsubstantiated reports of offers to help search for uranium there as well as in Bolivia. President Chavez announced last year that he was working on a so-called 'nuclear village' in Venezuela with Iran's assistance. So far the US has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela in connection with alleged Iranian nuclear proliferation.
Iran-Venezuela coop not a threat: temporary, and not a focal point.

Fite, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12

[Brandon, 4/4/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States”, https://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf, p. 14, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]

While the verbal battles of Venezuela and Iran with the US continue—and are likely to do so as ¶ long as Venezuela has any leader like Chavez—economic realities, and the fragility of leaderbased political ties temper the real strategic threat of the Venezuela-Iranian alliance to the US.¶ Venezuela is far more annoying in other ways, and the other aspects of US and Iranian ¶ competition are far more serious.

AT – Iran Influence Impact

No threat— SOUTHCOM concludes Latin America is unreceptive

Simeone American Forces Press 13

[Nick, 3/20/13, “Southcom Chief: Iran Working to Expand Influence in Latin America”, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119586, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]

Despite Iran’s outreach to countries that he said have interests unfavorable to the United States, the general cast Iran’s overtures as being far from successful and described a region as largely uninterested in Tehran’s diplomatic engagement.

“The region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts,” Kelly said in his prepared testimony. But he cautioned that Iran’s allies, including Hezbollah, have established a presence in several Latin-American countries to deadly effect, recalling that Iran and Hezbollah were blamed for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that killed more than 80 people.

There’s no impact to Iranian influence – they have not solidified their presence and Latin America is not key for their nuclear program

Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12

(Ilan, Summer 2012, “Iran Courts Latin America,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 68-69, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH)

Understanding these motivations is essential to assessing the significance of Latin America in Tehran’s strategic calculus and to determining whether its efforts there are successful.

For the moment, Iranian regional inroads represent a work in progress. The Islamist regime has demonstrated a clear interest in Latin America over the past decade and is now striving to expand its influence there. As of yet, however, it has not succeeded in solidifying this presence—or in fully operationalizing its regional relationships and institutionalizing its influence. As experts have noted, despite Tehran’s generous promises of economic engagement with regional states, precious little of this aid has actually materialized, save in the case of Venezuela.31 Moreover, despite increasingly robust cooperation with regional states on mining and extraction, there is as yet no indication that Latin America by itself can serve as the answer for Iran’s strategic resource needs.

Furthermore, an expansion of Tehran’s footprint in the region is not necessarily inevitable. Over the past year, the health of the Islamic Republic’s foremost regional ally, Hugo Chavez, has become increasingly critical, and the Venezuelan strongman is now believed to be in the terminal stages of cancer. Significant ambiguity abounds over Venezuela’s future direction and, as a result, about the durability of the partnership forged between Caracas and Tehran under Chavez.

Directory: rest -> wikis -> openev -> spaces -> 2013 -> pages -> Gonzaga -> attachments

Download 1.85 Mb.

Share with your friends: