Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 Hegemony Core Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz



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AT – Hegemony Alternatives




AT – Multipolarity Good




The US, as the world’s hegemon, provides security and stability – multipolarity would cause a disruption in this security


Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 2007

(Robert, July 17, Stanford University Hoover Foundation, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, Policy Review, Volume: 144, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

Multipolarity is empirically proven to fail – Unipolarity is key to prevent nuclear war


Khalilzad, former US ambassador to the UN, 95

(Zalmay, Mar 22, The Washington Quarterly, “Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the Cold War,” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-16781957/losing-moment-united-states.html, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future - and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating.

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.



Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.

Multipolarity bad – resource wars, arms races, economic crises, and climate change


Layne, Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M, 9

(Christopher, summer 2009, Texas A&M University, International Security, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?,” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
What will multipolarity mean? The NIC’s answer is equivocal. Although it predicts that, along with Europe, new great powers will oppose a continuation of a U.S.-dominated unipolar system, Global Trends 2025 does not anticipate that the emerging great powers will seek to radically alter the international system as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (p. 84).20 Still, there are factors that could lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources—especially energy—which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63–66)21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93–94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them (p. 81). Although no one can be certain how events will unfold in coming decades, Global Trends 2025 makes a strong argument that a multipolar world will be fundamentally different than the post–Cold War era of U.S. preeminence. [End Page 154]

Multipolarity prompts miscalculation and reckless wars


Ye, Boston University International Relations Professor, 2004

(Min, September 2004, China Institute for Public Affairs, “The U.S. Hegemony and Implication for China,” http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
In the wake of the Cold War, many scholars from Europe and quite a few in the United States have argued that the world is heading toward a multipolar system and multipolarity is better for the stability of system. To them, multipolarity enables flexible and efficient balancing and hence enhances stability, according to classic realists like Kissinger. This argument is not tenable because, the more poles exist in the system, the more unstable the balancing becomes. Minor powers have choices to change allies readily. Besides, multipolarity makes miscalculations rather easy in international relations. States can miscount their allies’ loyalty and their own material capabilities; reckless wars are rather easy to occur.
History proves multipolarity unstable – collapse of hegemony risks wars.

Kagan, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Senior Fellow, 12

(Robert W., February 11, “Why the World Needs America,” Wall Street Journal,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX)
Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world?

Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation.



War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815.

The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded.



The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power."

There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand.
Without US presence, American ideals disappear and chaos is the result.

Kagan, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution 2012 (Robert W., February 11, “Why the World Needs America,” Wall Street Journal,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX)


Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just—not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen.

But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.

There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it.

If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

Multipolarity theory fails- a multipolar future would be marked by violent bids for primacy- the theory assumes a preference for equality.


Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9

[William C., January 2009,World Politics “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH]


¶ When applied to the setting of great power politics, these propositions¶ suggest that the nature and intensity of status competition will be influenced¶ by the nature of the polarity that characterizes the system.¶ Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously¶ number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency¶ and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that¶ reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively¶ revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives¶ to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a¶ hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a¶ status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other¶ state’s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one’s own¶ state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to¶ any order in which another state is number one. The expected result¶ will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.

Cooperation doesn’t solve security issues – no consensus


Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)


As for the possibility that the “international community” might play the collective role of system-enabler, Bremmer is pessimistic, as am I. He anticipates no significant outcomes from the upcoming G-20 summit, for instance, because there is simply no consensus among the participating states on how to cope with any of the problems topping the global agenda. No state, not even the United States, can impose its will on the rest, while all the major powers can exercise effective vetoes to torpedo action. The United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the no-fly zone over Libya last year, once considered a possible model of great power cooperation, looks more and more like an outlier.

AT – Bipolarity Solves




Bipolarity theory fails- a bipolar future would be marked by violent bids for primacy- the theory assumes submissive secondary states and a preference for equality.


Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9

[William C., January 2009,World Politics “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH]


37¶ For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position¶ to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is¶ less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the¶ other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers¶ would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two¶ poles’ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would¶ not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and,¶ to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies¶ of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be¶ expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer¶ to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous¶ status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is¶ unambiguously outranked by the other.

Overwhelming theory and evidence indicate that it is human nature to pursue higher status- means that bipolarity or multipolarity will never solve.


Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9

[William C., January 2009,World Politics “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH]



Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition¶ for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and¶ related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to¶ the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings¶ presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory,¶ but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist¶ theories of hegemonic war.¶ How much status competition matters in light of the many competing¶ explanations remains to be seen. The theory is distinguished¶ chiefly by its causal mechanisms rather than by its brute predictions—¶ mechanisms that continue to operate in a world in which the mechanisms¶ central to other theories do not. In experimental settings, competition¶ for status can be neatly distinguished from behavior motivated¶ by instrumental pursuit of material rewards. In actual world politics,¶ by contrast, the quest for status is likely to be intertwined with other¶ aims in extremely complex ways. Substantial further refinement, ideally¶ informed by new experimental work, would be necessary to conduct¶ convincing tests against aggregate data.

AT – Retrenchment Solves/AT – Posen




Posen is wrong – the US will not willingly relinquish its power – global engagement is inevitable which means your turns don’t matter and it’s only a question of effectiveness


Ferguson, Oxford Senior Research Fellow, 7

[Niall, November/December 2007, The American Interest, “The Case for Restraint,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=335, accessed 7/6/13, WD]


So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!”

Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should:

1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented.

2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12.

3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters.

4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say.

5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law?

6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to).



Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

AT – Offshore Balancing Solves




Hegemony is key to solve conflicts—offshore balancing does not solve


Lind, New America Foundation Economic Growth Program Policy Director, 7

[Michael, May 2007, New America Foundation, “Beyond American Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381, accessed 7-6-13, MSG]


Another option favored by some realists and libertarians, an offshore-balancing strategy, is unlikely to be adopted and would be unwise. The offshore-balancing strategy would have the United States intervene only at the last moment to "tip the balance" against one side in a contest among Eurasian great powers -- China versus Japan, or Russia versus Germany or the European Union. It would be far better for the United States to maintain a role in diplomacy and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, in the hope of defusing conflicts and deterring aggressors, rather than to intervene belatedly, as it did in the two world wars.

Offshore balancing fails to achieve international objectives and causes war


Schake, Hoover Institution Research Fellow, 10

[Kori, October 13, 2010, “Limits of offshore balancing,” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits_of_offshore_balancing?wp_login_redirect=0, accessed 7/9/13, WD]


The New America Foundation convened a conference this week to showcase the work of Robert Pape, in the hopes that his policy prescriptions will be picked up as an alternative to our current strategy in Afghanistan. This would be a terrible idea.

Pape's research shows that the majority of suicide bomb attacks occur in places occupied by U.S. military forces; from this he concludes that we should adopt a strategy of "offshore balancing." By which he means to remove U.S. forces and rely on military strikes into the countries, along with more effective political and economic engagement. Neither the research nor the prescriptions are sound bases for policy.

To say that attacks occur where U.S. forces are deployed is to say no more than Willy Sutton, who robbed banks because "that's where the money is." Pape's approach ignores the context in which deployment and stationing of U.S. forces occurs. We send troops to advance our interests, protect our allies, and contest the political and geographic space that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban are operating in. Of course the attacks will stop if we cede those political objectives. But the troops are not the point, the political objectives are the point.

The second important context Pape glosses over is that suicide attacks do not occur wherever in the world U.S. troops are deployed. Troops stationed in Germany, Japan, or South Korea are not at risk of suicide attacks from the people of those countries. This is not just about U.S. troops, but also about the societies we are operating in. It is about a radical and violent interpretation of Islam that we are using military force to contest.

The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most durable. That was the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces.

An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our objectives. We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive ways.

Except for the "improved" political and economic activity. How that will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious. Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic engagement, we'd already be doing that.

Convincing allies the U.S. will commit itself to fight unless we have troops stationed where we expect the fight to occur has always been difficult. The history of the Cold War is replete with transatlantic discussion of extended deterrence: would the United States really send the boys back over if Germany were attacked? Would the United States really use nuclear weapons when our own homeland would be at risk of retaliation? It seems unlikely those concerns would be attenuated in societies we are less politically and culturally similar to than we are to Europeans.

In short, Robert Pape's "offshore balancing" approach would reduce violence by giving our enemies what they want: our disengagement, the ability to terrorize with impunity the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places where the battle of ideas about Muslim modernity is engaged.



Offshore balancing will never happen – no support domestically or internationally


Taliaferro, Tufts University Associate Professor of Political Science, 7

[Jeffrey W., Summer 2007, “Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 181, dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00064.00015‎, accessed 7/9/13, WD]


Second, many of Layne's arguments about the feasibility of an offshore balancing strategy today seem disconnected from political reality. He devotes only five pages in a 2 90-page book to a discussion of how the United States ought to go about implementing his preferred strategy. He never grapples with the tremendous sunk costs of U.S. forward deployment in Europe and East Asia, nor does he consider the lack of support for such a radically different grand strategy among officials in Washington or the American people. It is also difficult to imagine Washington's allies in the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and even Western Europe openly advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the near future, if for no other reason than that the American military presence dampens the security dilemma in those three regions.

No debate – offshore balancing is terrible – destroys all US heg and causes regional nuclear escalation


Kagan, Brookings Foreign Policy Senior Fellow, 11

[Robert, January 24, 2011, “The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3, accessed 7/9/13, WD]


Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability.

Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations.

At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal.

Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history.

It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach.

From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy.

Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order?

Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs.

The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.


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