If TNWs are removed, the US will defend Turkey with higher level technology weapons
Warden 2010 (John, research assistant working with the Project on Nuclear Issues, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: An Ineffective Deterrent, Unnecessary for Assurance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance)
Fortunately, U.S. defense of Europe doesn’t rely on NSNW. To whatever extent nuclear weapons do deter adversaries, the United States (along with Britain and France) will continue protect NATO allies under the umbrella of its strategic nuclear weapons (these are the weapons that would be actually used in an nuclear conflict anyway). The United States will also continue to station troops in Europe and give our allies access to effective missile defense technology. Opponents might argue that nuclear deployments are critical because they are the most stable U.S. commitment. While certainly a reasonable argument, there’s no reason other capabilities can’t be a more permanent part of the alliance in the future. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Foundation identifies a number of far more effective commitments that the United States can make to defend NATO allies: Debate over the fate of the NATO-based nuclear bombs will be constructive only if it puts much-needed attention on the need to reduce threats in Europe and to deploy strategies and capabilities to deter and defeat at an appropriate scale those threats that cannot be removed. NATO nuclear bombs are no substitute for cyber defense and deterrence; diversification of natural gas supply lines to reduce Russia’s coercive power; renovated confidencebuilding measures between Russia and NATO states to limit the scale and offensive character of military exercises, or if Russia refuses, enhanced forward deployment of defensive capabilities in new NATO states that would deter by denying Russia the prospect of a quick successful incursion. The moral hazard in Europe today is not in taking useless tactical nuclear weapons out, it is in pretending that they can protect allies from twenty-first century threats and doing too little in the meantime to develop capabilities and diplomatic strategies to deny those threats. A second objection to withdrawing NSNW from Europe is allied proliferation. In particular, Miller, Robertson, and Schanke argue that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey play an important role in dissuading Turkey from acquiring an arsenal of their own. This is certainly an important concern, especially as Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, while ignoring its obligations under the NPT. However, for the same reasons that NSNW are an ineffective deterrent, they are unlikely dissuade Turkish proliferation. According to Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke of the Ploughshares Fund, the readiness problem is even more pronounced in Turkey: Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Other capabilities, such as missile defense and strategic deterrence are more important in demonstrating U.S. commitment to Turkey (there are rumors that the United States will place an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey). According to Johan Bergenäs of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they ‘would not insist’ that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.”
TNWs Would Be Replaced
US is going to replace TNWs with even more accurate missiles
Interfax 10 (information compiler for China, Russia and Eurasia, March 04, 2010 U.S. to replace tactical nukes with non-nuke missiles – Kommersant, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=150270)
The United States may replace its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with planned non-nuclear missiles that would be deployed on U.S. soil but take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe, Kommersant said on Thursday, citing American sources. This may follow a review of the American nuclear potential that the U.S. administration is preparing, the Washington correspondent for the Kommersant newspaper said. The U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed at American military bases in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and the Netherlands, Kommersant said. The daily newspaper cited U.S. administration officials as saying these weapons serve a political rather than military purpose. Kommersant, which said a review would be published at the beginning of April at the earliest, cited experts as saying the U.S. is ready to officially abandon designing new types of nuclear weapons this year. The newspaper deduced from all this that the White House is going to opt for non-nuclear weapons. The paper said last month's Quadrennial Defense Review, a review of Defense Department strategy and priorities, announced a plan to develop a new class of non-nuclear missiles that would take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe. Kommersant said, citing American sources, that missiles of this class, called Prompt Global Strike, are planned to be deployed in the U.S. and that their launch pads might be open for international, including Russian, inspectors to make sure the rockets carry no nuclear warheads. Weapons of this type would be capable of massive strikes against Al Qaeda positions in Afghanistan or preventing North Korea from firing a missile. Supporters of Prompt Global Strike are sure the proposed missiles would be as effective as tactical nuclear weapons but could rule out a full-scale nuclear war, Kommersant said.
-----A2: Iran Advantage-----
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