Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff
Coop Good – Chinese Militarization
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- Coop Good – Chinese Militarization
Coop Good – Chinese MilitarizationPeaceful Coop can stop Chinese militarization-despite China’s current strategies MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, 5/11/11 [Bruce W., United States Institute of Peace, USIP.org, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission onThe Implications of China’s Military and Civil SpacePrograms” 5/11/11 http://www.usip.org/files/resources/bmacdonald_testimony.pdf , accessed 7/1/11, HK] As significant a role that space diplomacy can play in contributing to space stability and responsible space stewardship, China’s activities in space arms control sadly do not provide any basis for optimism on Chinese, or PLA, intentions in space. China and Russia have for years promoted their joint draft “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).” The PPWT proposes to ban all space weapons but provides no credible means for verification. When I approached one Chinese space specialist about verification a few years ago, he acknowledged that verification would be difficult but told me that “You Americans are so technologically clever – you’ll figure out a way”! The PPWT likely serves primarily as a way for China to buy time to enable them to attain a stronger military position, perhaps even catch up to the U.S., in a field where they were far behind us. With the previous U.S. opposition to international agreements on space, it also left a diplomatic vacuum that China and Russia skillfully filled with the PPWT, portraying an image of peaceful intentions in space. It is intriguing to note that with the EU and U.S. in recent months speaking favorably of a draft code of conduct that is a vastly more realistic step than the PPWT, the PLA is now attacking it as an attempt to impose Western regulations on China. This code of conduct provides an excellent vehicle to challenge China to support realistic and useful “rules of the road” for space, and other steps which I hope the U.S. will pursue. In my conversations with Russian and Chinese counterparts, I find serious Russian interest in this approach but sadly only intransigence from China. Current U.S. space policy and strategy walks back the U.S. aversion to space diplomacy and strikes the right noteson responsible space stewardship and addressing the issues of a space frontier that, at least inthe vicinity of earth, is becoming more of a settled environment that requires some form of management and rules of the road. This realistic direction for space diplomacy, and U.S. and allied support for such approaches, is both a sensible step and also diplomatically turns the tables on China Coop Good – Chinese MilitarizationNo cooperation only has caused Chinese modernization of space Hitchens and Chen 8 (Theresa, Center for Defense Information, World Security Institute and David, CENTRA Technology, Inc, “Forging a Sino-US ‘‘grand bargain’’ in space” Space Policy 24 (2008) pg. 128–131, Available Online at Sciencedirect.com, Accessed June 28, 2011, EJONES) After the 1998 Strom Thurmond Defense Authorization Act imposed restrictions on the export of commercial satellites and related technologies under the State Department’s Munitions List and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Beijing considered such policies as primarily an effort to contain China’s rise as a space power and to prevent its space industry from competing with US industry on the international market. The congressional rationale for the move was, and remains, concern about the transfer of space technology that could be used by the Chinese to improve their intercontinental ballistic missiles, even though technology migration has traditionally gone the other way around, from ballistic missiles to space launch vehicles. Whatever the motivation, the immediate effect of the export control shift was to all but close the Western satellite and launch market to China and vice versa, since US export law extends to all space systems that use US parts. US export laws may have slowed, but have demonstrably failed to ‘‘contain’’ China’s progressive development of space launch and satellite technology. They have also failed to prevent—and some argue have instead provoked— Sino-European cooperation in space, leading to the growth of an ‘‘ITAR-free’’ business model in both Europe and China, to the detriment of the US space industry. As noted by a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘‘Not only have these requirements harmed our domestic technological and manufacturing base, but they have had a drastic negative effect on both the hard and soft power utilization of space’’ [11]. Further, the commercial satellite industry has long advocated the exemption of certain technologies from the list, arguing that these technologies are already available off-the-shelf. It seems that US government officials are finally listening, as the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration and the National Security Space Office are working to review satellite components with an eye to removing at least some of them from the Munitions List [12]. Thus, the cost of ITAR reform, with regard to commercial space, is in reality likely to be much less than some fear, and may be necessary for maintaining the viability of the US satellite industry. Ceding space power allows China to give up its weapons Hitchens and Chen 8 (Theresa, Center for Defense Information, World Security Institute and David, CENTRA Technology, Inc, “Forging a Sino-US ‘‘grand bargain’’ in space” Space Policy 24 (2008) pg. 128–131, Available Online at Sciencedirect.com, Accessed June 28, 2011, EJONES) Considering Chinese investment in its space program as a centerpiece of national prestige and as a lever for economic development, the USA has the opportunity to link a variety of related economic incentives with opening, and concluding, negotiations on a code of conduct in space, including Chinese abandonment of destructive antisatellite weapons programs. These potential bargaining chips include such options as participation in the International Space Station (ISS), joint exploration missions, reform in US policies restricting sales of commercial satellite hardware, and licensing of Chinese launch services. In exchange, China might willingly restrict behaviors that could lead to strategic miscalculation in space, as well as certain forms of counter-space capabilities. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.99 Mb. Share with your friends:
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