Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff



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Space Race – Hegemony




China is using technology to become a space leader.

Morring, Aviation Week senior space editor, & Perrett, Aviation Week Asia- Pacific Bureau Chief, 9

(Frank, Jr., & Bradley, 11/23/09 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19:”New Topic” EBSCOhost, accessed 7/1/11, BLG)


Chinese anti-satellite weapon test will intensify funding and global policy debate on the military uses of space China's successful test of an anti-satellite (Asat) weapon means that the country has mastered key space sensor, tracking and other technologies important for advanced military space operations. China can now also use "space control" as a policy weapon to help project its growing power regionally and globally. Aviation Week & Space Technology first broke the news of the Chinese Asat test on aviationweek.com Jan. 17. China performed the test Jan. 11 by destroying the aging Chinese Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) weather satellite target at 537 mi. altitude. The attack was carried out with a kinetic kill vehicle launched by a small ballistic missile. U.S. intelligence agencies calculated in advance that the Chinese were ready for the exercise and programmed American eavesdropping and space tracking sensors accordingly to obtain maximum information. The White House confirmed the Aviation Week article Jan. 18 and warned China that its actions will carry ramifications. "We are concerned about it, and we've made it known," says Tony Snow, the White House spokesman. "The U.S. believes China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area," said Gordon Johndroe, U.S. National Security Council spokesman. "We and other countries have expressed our concern to the Chinese regarding this action."


Space Primacy Good – Key To Hegemony



US primacy & Asian power projection depends on space dominance

Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, ‘10

(Bruce K, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, January 1, 2010, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:17–24 1469-9982 online “U.S. Space Technology for Controlling China and Russia” p.21 EBSCO host 7/1/11 BLG)


The entire U.S. military empire is now tied together using space technology. With military satellites in space, the United States can see virtually everything on Earth, can intercept all communications on the planet, and can target virtually any place. Russia and China understand that the U.S. military goal is to achieve ‘‘full spectrum dominance.’’ Using new space technologies to coordinate and direct modern warfare also enables the military–industrial complex to reap massive profits as they construct the architecture for space-directed warfare. The deployment of Aegis destroyers in the Asian-Pacific region, ostensibly to protect against North Korean missile launches, gives the United States greater ability to launch preemptive first-strike attacks on China. In April 2009, Army Gen. Walter Sharp, the commander of U.S. forces Korea, told members of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington that the U.S.–South Korean alliance was ‘‘a linchpin for stability in Northeast Asia.’’ Stability in Northeast Asia translates to U.S. control of China. The United States now has 30 ground-based interceptor missiles deployed in South Korea. Many peace activists there, and in Japan, strongly believe that the ultimate target of these systems is not North Korea, but China and Russia. The current U.S. military transformation underway in South Korea and Japan is indeed a key element in this regional offensive strategy to contain China while justifying the military expansion as containment of North Korea.

US primacy in space key to national security

MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, 5/11/11

[Bruce W., United States Institute of Peace, USIP.org, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission onThe Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” 5/11/11 http://www.usip.org/files/resources/bmacdonald_testimony.pdf , accessed 7/1/11, HK]


Space is of major and growing national security importance, which introduces a potentially destabilizing element to U.S. and international security. In addition to responsible behavior, the U.S. ability to fully realize the national security and other benefits of space depends on space remaining a stable and peaceful environment, even in crisis situations if at all possible. Given the heavy and growing U.S. reliance upon space for communications, sensor information, and a host of other benefits, it is no wonder that the space policies of both the previous and current administrations have declared space to be a vital national interest of the United States. Where vital national interests are concerned, stability in space that enables the continuation of substantial U.S. conventional superiority should be a top priority. The primacy of space stability as a key U.S. strategic interest was recognized by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States when it recommended in 2009 that the United States should “develop and pursue options for U.S. interest in stability in outer space, include[ing] the possibility of negotiated measures.” Measures or actions that would threaten to upset the stability of space could thus be dangerous to our national security, and U.S. policy should seek to avoid such steps. This is why as long as the United States continues to derive more benefits from space than its adversaries, it should be very careful about initiating significant space hostilities with a near-peer space power such as China. Against non-peer space powers, we should be able to rely upon our overwhelming conventional superiority to achieve victory. Against a near-peer space power, we must weigh the cost of losing some significant fraction of our space-derived or-transmitted information against the incremental benefit of offensive counter space (OCS) steps versus other means to achieve comparable objectives.




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