Harvard 2013 1 ddi executive Self Restraint cp + Prez Powers da – Starter Pack Read Me
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Koh ‘95 (Harold Hongju, Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, 22nd Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, M.A., Oxford, 1996, J.D., Harvard, 1980, Developments Editor of the Harvard Law Review, B.A., Oxford, 1977 (Marshall Scholar), A.B., Harvard, 1975, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, former law clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the United States Supreme Court and Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, former Attorney-Adviser for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice,, Yale Law School 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 1) Both precedents have obvious parallels today, not to mention a third possibility: that temptation might draw the executive branch into a "splendid little war" - like Grenada or Panama - with an eye toward a possible presidential bounce in the polls. That possibility raises Maxim Two: that weak presidents are more dangerous than strong ones. Jimmy Carter, for example, in the last two years of his presidency, engaged in perhaps the most dramatic nonwartime exercise of emergency foreign power ever seen, not because he was strong but because he was so politically weak. 43 In foreign policy, weak presidents all too often have something to prove. 44 In a gridlock situation, the president's difficulty exhibiting strength in domestic affairs - where Congress exercises greater oversight and must initiate funding proposals - makes it far easier for him to show leadership in foreign affairs. At the same time, weak presidents may underreact to looming crises that demand strong action, for fear that they cannot muster the legislative support necessary to generate the appropriate response. But when these weak presidents do finally respond, they tend to overreact: either to compensate for their earlier underreaction, or because by that time, the untended problem has escalated into a full-blown crisis, Bosnia and Haiti being the two prime Clinton Administration examples. 45 When private parties bring suits to challenge these presidential policies, courts tend to defer to weak presidents, because they view them not as willful, so much as stuck in a jam, [*12] lacking other political options. Finally, weak presidents are more prone to give away the store, namely, to undercut their own foreign policy program in order to preserve their domestic agenda. This raises the question of whether this Democratic president may be forced to sign restrictive congressional legislation - or whether Congress might pass such legislation over presidential veto, as Congress did with the War Powers Resolution in 1974 - which may later come back to haunt future presidents. Nor, in this media age, is any president's strength truly secure. These days every president, whatever his current popularity rating, is potentially weak. We sometimes forget that just after the Gulf War, George Bush's popularity rating stood at 91%, only ten months before he lost reelection, and five years before he recanted about his actions during the war itself. PP Good – War Presidential powers are key to solve nuclear war. Paul 98 J.R. Paul, Professor, Law, University of Connecticut, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,” CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW v. 86, July 1998, p. 699-701 Whatever the complexity of causes that led to the Cold War - ideology, economics, power politics, Stalin's personality, Soviet intrigue, or American ineptitude - the tension of the bipolar order seemed real, immutable, and threatening to the U.S. public. <=136> n135 The broad consensus of U.S. leadership held that the immediacy of the nuclear threat, the need for covert operations and intelligence gathering, and the complexity of U.S. relations with both democracies and dictatorships made it impractical to engage in congressional debate and oversight of foreign policy-making. <=137> n136 The eighteenth-century Constitution did not permit a rapid response to twentieth-century foreign aggression. The reality of transcontinental ballistic missiles collapsed the real time for decision-making to a matter of minutes. Faced with the apparent choice between the risk of nuclear annihilation or amending the constitutional process for policy-making, the preference for a powerful executive was clear. <=138> n137 Early in the Cold War one skeptic of executive power, C.C. Rossiter, acknowledged that the steady increase in executive power is unquestionably a cause for worry, but so, too, is the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the president has been called upon by the American people to solve in their behalf. They still have more to fear from the ravages of depression, rebellion, and especially atomic war than they do from whatever decisive actions may issue from the White House in an attempt to put any such future crises to rout....It is not too much to say that the destiny of this nation in the Atomic Age will rest in the [*700] capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional dictatorship. <=139> n138The call for executive leadership in the face of international crisis came not only from members of the executive branch, <=140> n139 but also from members of Congress, <=141> n140 academics, <=142> n141 and legal commentators. <=143> n142 Reviewing the history of this period, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported at the height of the Vietnam War, our country has come far toward the concentration in its national executive of unchecked power over foreign relations, particularly over the disposition and use of the Armed Forces. So far has this process advanced that in the committee's view, it is no longer accurate to characterize our government, in matters of foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and balanced, against each other.... <=144> n143 [*701] In the committee's view, the continuing series of Cold War crises and the perceived need to expedite decision-making in the nuclear age led to a concentration of power in the executive: Since 1940 crisis has been chronic and, coming as something new in our experience, has given rise to a tendency toward anxious expediency in our response to it. The natural expedient - natural because of the real or seeming need for speed - has been executive action....Perceiving, and sometimes exaggerating, the need for prompt action, and lacking traditional guidelines for the making of decisions in an emergency, we have tended to think principally of what needed to be done and little, if at all, of the means of doing it. <=145> n144 [sex modified] PP Good – War/Heg Only presidential powers can solve hegemony – the impact is global conflict Paul 98 J.R. Paul, Professor, Law, University of Connecticut, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,” CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW v. 86, July 1998, p. LN. Borchard's Yale colleagues, Professors Myers McDougal and Asher Lans, answered his [or her] argument in a highly influential law review article that justified the interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements in light of the new post-war responsibilities facing the United States. <=386> n385 McDougal and Lans argued that the Constitution adapted to changed circumstances. <=387> n386 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the nation recognized the need for creating international institutions for collective security: Above the holocaust of the present war has arisen a demand from the people of the United States for a foreign policy that will do everything humanly possible to prevent future wars and to secure their other interests in the contemporary world. <=388> n387 Technological changes in communication, transportation, and production shrank the modern world. Both developments in military technology and economic interdependence made it impossible for the United States to maintain its traditional isolation: This basic condition of interdependence, the profound weakness of the world's present system of organization, and, conversely, the strong power position of the United States in the world society make it imperative that the United States not only participate, but take a leading part, in establishing a new order of political, economic, and cultural relationships and institutions, both in direct association with other nations, great and small, and through international organizations. <=389> n388 The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in power from Congress to the executive. "Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to implement integrated and responsible [*748] policy." <=390> n389 In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a powerful executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the new world environment, the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy took precedence over the deliberative process: Executive officers, who are charged with the task of conducting negotiations with other governments, must be able to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the minorities.... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly characteristic of past eras when economic and political change proceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the interests of the United States. <=391> n390 McDougal and Lans' expediency discourse ultimately triumphed over Borchard's appeal to constitutional process. Courts or other legal commentators never clearly drew on McDougal and Lans' distinction between sole executive agreements and congressional-executive agreements. Instead, the expediency argument created a legal justification for a new executive power to make agreements that legally bound future generations both internationally and domestically. PP Good – Terror Prez powers key to the war on terrorism Taylor 5 Stuart Taylor, Jr., journalist, “The Roberts Court,” THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, v. 37 n. 37, September 10, 2005, LN. Given the unsettled state of the law in this area, a Chief Justice Roberts and another Bush justice could play crucial roles in determining how strong a check the Court will provide on presidential moves to override civil liberties, international treaties, and congressional objections. And one critical question to be explored during Roberts's testimony next week is whether, as some experts fear and others hope, his record suggests an inclination to push for greater deference to the president. These two vacancies come at a time when jihadists bent on mass murder -- and eager to obtain nuclear or biological weapons -- pose a domestic security threat graver than any we have faced since World War II, perhaps even since the Civil War. There is a broad consensus that the magnitude of this threat requires a muscular presidential response and considerable judicial deference. Unfettered prez powers are the only way to prevent terrorism – impact is war and extinction Yoo 4 John Yoo, Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law STANFORD LAW REVIEW, December 2004, LN. These developments in the international system may demand that the United States have the ability to use force earlier and more quickly than in the past. Use of force under international law, to be consistent with the United Nations Charter, must be justified by self-defense against an imminent attack (in those cases when not authorized by the Security Council). Elsewhere, I argue that the rise of WMD proliferation, rogue states, and terrorism ought to lead to a reformulation of self-defense away from temporal imminence and toward a calculation of expected harm of an attack. If we understand the use of force as a function of the magnitude of possible harm from an attack adjusted by the probability of such an attack, the United States might need to use force in situations when an attack is not temporally imminent, but nonetheless threatens massive casualties and remains probable. In order to forestall a WMD attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike at a terrorist cell, the executive branch needs the flexibility to act quickly, possibly in situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By acting earlier, perhaps before WMD components have been fully assembled or before an al Qaeda operative has left for the United States, the executive branch might also be able to engage in a more limited, more precisely targeted, use of force. A2: PP Bad – Top Level Presidents won’t abuse prez powers – no risk of any negative impact -fear of impeachment -power of the purse -voters
Goldstein 99 Joel K. Goldstein, Professor, Law, St. Louis University, “The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations,” ST. LOUIS LAW JOURNAL v. 43, Summer 1999, p. 791+. Would these concessions to executive interpretive autonomy leave us naked before a Chief Executive prone to self-aggrandizement? Do we jeopardize the Rule of Law once we allow the President this leeway to apply the Constitution as he, not the Court, sees it? I think not. Protection would come from several sources. First, Presidents like other officials, could be expected to consider respectfully the constitutional arguments of judges and legislators. The people who hold public office and staff those two institutions are neither fools nor traitors; generally their conclusions will be reasonable and persuasive. Even when the President disagrees he [or she]will need to decide whether the benefits of acting on his [or her] different interpretation justify the costs of defiance. Departure from legislative and judicial interpretations, though possible, would require some articulated rationales which would, of course, be subject to discussion, analysis and scrutiny. Second, customs of presidential interpretive humility could be expected to develop. Many of the restraints on the judiciary - justiciability doctrines, immunities, Article I bodies - were created or endorsed by courts. Similar patterns of presidPresidents ential deference should be encouraged. n342 [*848] For instance, might proceed cautiously in areas where no other institution is likely to review their interpretation. It may be appropriate to expect Presidents to articulate a strong constitutional rationale in such cases. A third set of democratic restraints - public opinion and elections - would provide incentive for measured presidential conduct. A President will think at least twice about taking a constitutional position at odds with the Court or Congress if it will cause him to be pilloried by the New York Times or on Larry King Live, will cost him dearly on his [or her] approval ratings, or will jeopardize his [or her] legislative program. Finally legislative controls would check the President. Congress could use its control of the purse and legislative hearings in response to presidential interpretations. Impeachment and removal would be available to redress any presidential actions deemed to constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors."
So the most important arguments in the 2AC is to challenge the solvency of the CP for the aff harms and to make an argument that a permutation (a combination of the Aff and Neg) would resolve the potential harms to presidential power. That said, don’t forget to make a “no link” argument – if you only rely on answering the CP but don’t answer the impact or link to the presidential power DA the other team could just win on the DA alone and not make any more arguments about the CP. I’ve put stars (**) next to some of the cards I think should be in the 2AC but don’t forget to include analytic arguments. We have multiple cards in the 1AC that argue for the necessity of oversight for international credibility/solvency, don’t let those great cards get lost! Try to make at least one analytic argument between every card and don’t forget to make a permutation!
(William Bendix and Paul J. Quirk, Secrecy and negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance, Issues in Governance Studies, March 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligence-congres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf) For the immediate future, however, Congress appears to have gone out of the business of determining policy for antiterrorism surveillance. In the near term, the best hope for privacy interests is for President Obama to make good on his post-Snowden pledge, repeated in his 2015 State of the Union Address, to reform surveillance programs in order to instill “public confidence…that the privacy of ordinary people is not being violated.” He promised to work with Congress on the issue. If Congress is not capable of acting, the executive branch can impose its own constraints on surveillance practices.57 But the maintenance of self-imposed executive-branch constraints would depend entirely on the strength of the administration’s commitment—and, in two years’ time, on the disposition of the next president. Because of the president’s central responsibility for national security, the presidency is hardly a reliable institutional champion for privacy interests. No Solvency – Long Term – 1AR Not using a power doesn’t set a precedent Marshall ‘8 (William, William Rand Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at UNC, J.D., University of Chicago (1977) B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1972), Deputy White House Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States during the Clinton Administration, “Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters,” Boston University Law Review, https://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf) 2. The Precedential Effects of Executive Branch Action Presidential power also inevitably expands because of the way executive branch precedent is used to support later exercises of power.34 Many of the defenders of broad presidential power cite historical examples, such as President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, as authority for the position that Presidents have considerable powers in times of war and national emergency.35 Their position is straight-forward. The use of such powers by previous Presidents stands as authority for a current or future President to engage in similar actions.36 Such arguments have considerable force, but they also create a one-way ratchet in favor of expanding the power of the presidency. The fact is that every President but Lincoln did not suspend habeas corpus. But it is a President’s action in using power, rather than forsaking its use, that has the precedential significance.37 In this manner, every extraordinary use of power by one President expands the availability of executive branch power for use by future Presidents. No Solvency – Credibility/Signal – 2AC **Oversight key to solve global perceptions – that’s the ONLY relevant solvency question. None of our advantages stem directly from the surveillance itself Lewis 14 (senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) (James Andrew, Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate, http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_-Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf)
(Greg, JULY 30, 2014 9:22 AM, Is NSA's PRISM program ruining cloud computing's growth?, http://fedscoop.com/nsa-prism-cloud-computing/) "Ensuring that a strong version of USA FREEDOM becomes law is only the first step toward repairing the damage that the NSA has done to America's tech economy, its foreign relationships, and the security of the Internet itself," said Kevin Bankston, OTI's policy director Castro said even with meaningful reform, he doesn't think it will change the perception that companies are fighting an uphill battle with NSA in order to protect their products "I don't think the companies themselves can solve this problem," he said. "The issue is that these foreign and domestic buyers don't trust the U.S. government right now. Until there is a clear signal that the intelligence community is turning the page through policies, I don't think we are going to see a change in perception." Perm Solves Credibility **Working together solves global cred which is the only determinate of solvency FitzGerald ’13 (12-18 Ben,- senior fellow and director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security “NSA revelations: Fallout can serve our nation”) Loss of trust, however, remains the fundamental issue. Washington cannot fix this just by acceding to reforms suggested by others. The administration, with congressional support, must launch a proactive reform agenda, which would demonstrate an understanding of citizens’ concerns — allies and businesses alike. The components are straightforward: public outreach to concerned constituencies, such as Tuesday’s meeting with technology leaders, amendments to policy and law — for example, updating the Safe Harbor frameworks for privacy protection — and review of the National Security Agency’s oversight mechanisms. While these procedural steps are clear, the government can do more. The Snowden revelations are about trust as much as technological frontiers — so Washington’s efforts must focus on confidence building. Security and openness need not be mutually exclusive and technological capability should not be the key to defining operational limits. Confidence can be re-established through government-led development of the explicit principles that set a better balance between security and openness. These principles must be formalized in government agencies’ policies, federal laws, Supreme Court rulings and congressional oversight establishing the government mechanisms to balance security and openness. Credibly addressing this balance represents Washington’s best chance to rebuild the trust that has been so eroded. It is also an opportunity to recast the Snowden revelations as a reason to establish international norms that will govern all nations that are now developing and using similar surveillance capabilities. What is required is to establish standards that Washington can hold itself and others to in terms of healthy collaboration with business, productive relationships with allies and appropriate protections for the data of private citizens. Powerful surveillance capabilities will only grow over time. The United States must therefore establish a new “higher ground” in the international community to lead morally as well as technologically and ensure mutual accountability among governments. The key is to act quickly. Though the United States needs to retain robust foreign surveillance, it is clear that the fallout from the NSA revelations will continue until proactive steps — rooted in trust, policy and law — are taken. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2014 2014 -> For want of a nail 2014 -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 2014 -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> International History Bee and Bowl 2013-14 Asian Division Question Set Bowl Round Six 2014 -> United states patent and trademark office 2014 -> Coffs harbour eisteddfod vocal syllabus 2014 -> Listen News Programs Schedule pledge now 2014 -> Slow club announce third album complete surrender Download 172.75 Kb. Share with your friends:
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