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Perm Solves the Link – Congress Takes Cover – 2AC
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- Perm Solves the Link – Key to PP – 2AC Domestic backlash to spying crushes prez powers – only the perm can preserve presidential power Wu ’06
- Perm Solves the Link – Key to PP – 1AR The perm gives president the most power Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02
- When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum
- No Link – Aff Doesn’t Kill Pres Powers
- CP Doesn’t Solve Pres Powers Doesn’t solve pres powers – no spillover Kreider ‘6
- PP Bad – Heg **Pres powers collapse heg – e nables entanglements abroad Paul ‘98
- Empirically proven – Iraq Holt ‘7
- Too much deference to the White House
- PP Bad – Democracy Restraint solves democracy better – checks and accountability Deats ’10
- PP Bad – A2: Checks Solve Theoretical checks don’t solve – Congress can’t or won’t Covington ’12
- In actuality
- The same applies to the courts Covington ’12
Perm Solves the Link – Congress Takes Cover – 2AC **Perm solves pres powers – congress will follow his lead Bendix and Quirk 15 (assistant professor of political science at Keene State College; Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the University of British Columbia) (William Bendix and Paul J. Quirk, Secrecy and negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance, Issues in Governance Studies, March 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligence-congres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf) Lacking any settled disposition on surveillance issues, Congress will respond to the leadership, and sometimes merely the political cover, provided by other institutions—especially the president, the intelligence agencies, and the FISA Court. It may take cues from the Justice Department or other executive agencies, and it will defer to rulings by the regular federal courts. In the end, Congress’s performance in protecting privacy may depend on the design of the legislative arrangements for dealing with secret programs and on the structures and missions of relevant administrative and judicial institutions. Perm Solves the Link – Key to PP – 2AC Domestic backlash to spying crushes prez powers – only the perm can preserve presidential power Wu ’06 (Edieth,- Associate Dean and Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law “DOMESTIC SPYING AND WHY AMERICA SHOULD AVOID THE SLIPPERY SLOPE”) In response to the recent revelations of secret domestic surveillance and the concomitant upset of the balance of government powers, a disturbing divide has developed among the American public.107 According to an AP-Ipsos poll, 56% of respondents said the government should be required to obtain a warrant before conducting domestic surveillance, while 42% do not believe that a warrant should be required.108 If the government continues with the current spying program, the divide in public opinion will surely become more contentious, and it will likely result in protests and legal attacks reminiscent of those which addressed the overzealous immigration enforcement immediately following September 11. In April 2002, for example, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a nationwide class action challenging the “government’s pretextual use of immigration authority to detain Arab and Muslim foreign citizens long after they ha[d] agreed to leave the country.”109 Contentious litigation effectually results in a filtering down of information to the American public. Other legal battles over “rule of law” violations have occurred in New York, New Jersey and the District of Columbia.110 As a result of such litigation, and particularly due to outcomes favoring civil liberties, information is filtering down to the American public and creating in it a broader appreciation of the importance of respecting the rule of law in the United States.111 Specifically, the propositions stating that (1) “respect for basic human rights is as integral to our security as fighting terrorism,” and (2) “we are in danger of losing sight In response to the recent revelations of secret domestic surveillance and the concomitant upset of the balance of government powers, a disturbing divide has developed among the American public.107 According to an AP-Ipsos poll, 56% of respondents said the government should be required to obtain a warrant before conducting domestic surveillance, while 42% do not believe that a warrant should be required.108 If the government continues with the current spying program, the divide in public opinion will surely become more contentious, and it will likely result in protests and legal attacks reminiscent of those which addressed the overzealous immigration enforcement immediately following September 11. In April 2002, for example, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a nationwide class action challenging the “government’s pretextual use of immigration authority to detain Arab and Muslim foreign citizens long after they ha[d] agreed to leave the country.”109 Contentious litigation effectually results in a filtering down of information to the American public. Other legal battles over “rule of law” violations have occurred in New York, New Jersey and the District of Columbia.110 As a result of such litigation, and particularly due to outcomes favoring civil liberties, information is filtering down to the American public and creating in it a broader appreciation of the importance of respecting the rule of law in the United States.111 Specifically, the propositions stating that (1) “respect for basic human rights is as integral to our security as fighting terrorism,” and (2) “we are in danger of losing sight law, which “has never been more critical”120 than at this juncture in America’s history. In an age where the American public is generally aware of the restrictions on presidential powers, people are increasingly reluctant to accept that “the commander in chief clause” of the Constitution trumps all others.121 The president must remember that the commander in chief powers are at their strongest when the president acts in conjunction with congressional authorization.122 Consequently, a divided nation, and thus a divided Congress, will make it difficult for the president to act within the “expressed or implied will of Congress, [and] his power [will be] at its lowest ebb.”123 Perm Solves the Link – Key to PP – 1AR The perm gives president the most power Bellia, Law Professor at Notre Dame, 02 Patricia L Bellia, Associate Law Professor for Notre Dame Law School, “Executive power in Youngstown’s shadows”, LexisNexus.com, 02 Justice Jackson suggested that presidential powers "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." (59) He offered the following grouping of presidential actions and their legal consequences: 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. (60) No Link – Aff Doesn’t Kill Pres Powers **Congressional oversight in one small area of surveillance doesn’t spill over to destroy all the powers that their impact evidence assumes – war powers prove Linn 2K (Alexander C., “INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION”, in William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, from Lexis Nexis 8 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 725) Both the executive and legislative branches have a constitutional role to play in the use of force, but the legislative branch has primacy in committing forces to hostile theatres. History reveals, however, a shift in the war power from the legislative to the [*727] executive branch. Executive authority in Vietnam revealed a strong need for Congress to check executive power. An amended view of war powers and the Resolution should now be constructed to meet the modern parameters of international politics. A small subset of Congress should have the ability to play an influential role in executive troop commitments in a way that does not unconstitutionally impair the President's ability to commit U.S. forces quickly to multilateral operations. CP Doesn’t Solve Pres Powers Doesn’t solve pres powers – no spillover Kreider ‘6 (Kyle L. Kreider, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at the Political Science Department, Wilkes University June 2006 [http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm) A part of the strategic environment surrounding executive orders is what Congress is likely to do in response. As Warber sees it, Congress has two options: apply verbal pressure or pass legislation “to nullify or reform existing executive orders” (p.108). While Congress has these two options, the data show that “Congress devotes a small portion of its time debating executive orders” (p.114) and “has been relatively inactive in reforming and eliminating specific executive orders issued by presidents who served between the Kennedy and George H. W. Bush administrations” (p.120). Warber concludes with a cursory examination of President George W. Bush’s use of executive orders and some thoughts on where future research should go. While his political opponents and some members of the media criticize President Bush for his penchant for acting unilaterally (in both domestic and foreign affairs), expanding the powers of the presidency, and sometimes bypassing the expertise found in Congress, “the results demonstrate that Bush has not significantly departed from previous presidents regarding the types and quantity of executive orders that he issued during his first term” (p.124). However, what has been different under President Bush is his willingness to change existing public policy by revoking, superseding, or amending executive orders made by previous presidents. Yearly averages show President Bush to be second only to President Carter in revising inherited executive orders. A key finding of this book is that “presidents have not dramatically expanded their power with [executive orders] across the modern presidency” (p.128). Though Warber does not have the specific answers as to why presidents have not increased their use of executive orders over time, he speculates the stasis in presidential directives to a number of [*437] factors, one being the continued existence of separation of powers—specifically Congress’s ability to pass legislation to revoke or revise executive orders and the federal courts’ authority to decide upon their constitutionality PP Bad – Heg **Pres powers collapse heg – enables entanglements abroad Paul ‘98 (Paul R, Professor @ University of Connecticut School of Law “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements” California Law Review, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 671, Lexis) Second, the growth of executive power has created a bias in favor of internationalism that has often led to failure. Possessing a virtual monopoly power over foreign relations has tempted presidents to send troops abroad or to make foreign commitments. Time and again the executive has stumbled into foreign conflicts, like Bosnia, Lebanon, Iran and Somalia, with tragic results. n32 At a minimum, congressional [*680] participation might have slowed decision-making, leaving time for public deliberation. n33 Third, the absence of congressional debate has often accounted for the lack of public support for foreign commitments. When U.S. forces have suffered casualties, such as in Somalia or Beirut, public opinion turned against the executive. Without the popular will to stay the course, presidents have withdrawn U.S. forces in some cases. As a result, U.S. policy has often lacked coherence. Though Congress was blamed for this inconsistency in many cases, one reason members of Congress so readily changed their minds was that they were not politically invested in the policy. Empirically proven – Iraq Holt ‘7 (Pat, former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “Between Congress and the president, a power seesaw” Christian Science Monitor, Feb 1, Lexis) American involvement in Iraq appears to be an unresolvable dilemma: the United States can neither stay in nor get out. It cannot stay in because the public will not support it. It cannot get out because, after four years there, the US has wrecked the country. It would be unconscionable now simply to walk away and leave a nation of impoverished Iraqis among the ruins. America cannot start writing a new policy on a clean slate. But what it can do is adjust the imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Too much deference to the White House got the US into this predicament. A more-assertive Congress might help bring about a solution, and more important, avoid a similar situation in the future. The Iraq war represents a constitutional failure of American government, but it was not the institutions of government that failed; it was the people who were supposed to make those institutions work. The Constitution provides for a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is the separation of powers that creates the crucial checks and balances that enable one branch to keep another in line. A good deal of the thinking that went into this structure was based on skepticism and distrust. From long experience, the framers of the Constitution were skeptical and distrustful of power, and they wanted to build this into the new government. Perhaps the biggest failure with respect to Iraq was in Congress. Members were far too deferential to the White House; they failed to question President Bush's reactions to 9/11 as they were duty-bound to do. Among Republicans on Capitol Hill, there was an exaggerated sense of party loyalty to the president. Among both parties, there was an exaggerated sense of partisanship. The party system and the separation of powers are incompatible. Parties do not work well without cohesion and discipline. The separation of powers does not work well without independence. This conflict was foreseen by the framers. In one of the Federalist papers, James Madison warns against "the pestilential influence of party animosities." The Constitution has been called "an invitation to struggle" between the president and Congress for the control of foreign policy. On Iraq, Congress did not accept the invitation. Republicans reveled in Mr. Bush's popularity. Democrats were afraid of it. Only after the public began to turn against the war did Congress began to follow. Meanwhile, the president was left unchecked. The history of the constitutional struggle between president and Congress is a seesaw with first one branch up and then the other. Congress probably reached its post-World War II high at the end of the Vietnam War when it used its control of money to force the US to end its support of South Vietnam. When President Johnson left office in 1969, a congressional observer remarked that it would take to the end of the 20th century to restore presidential powers to where Johnson found them. Bush became president in 2001 determined to hasten that restoration. He showed his hand early when he supported Vice President Dick Cheney's refusal to name the participants in a committee studying energy policy. The war on terror provided further opportunities. By 2006, the president's end of the seesaw was at a post-World War II high. Now there is an opposite movement propelled, as before, by an unpopular war. With respect to both Vietnam and Iraq, Congress did not assert itself until corrective action became prohibitively difficult. The principal lesson we can learn from the Iraq dilemma is that Congress should join the struggle with the president earlier in the development of a problem. It should combat the natural tendency to let the president take the lead in foreign crises. PP Bad – Democracy Restraint solves democracy better – checks and accountability Deats ’10 (Caleb, J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, 7/2/10, “Obliging The Executive Branch To Control Itself,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633922) 1. Restraining the Executive’s Interpretive Power Makes Constitutional Interpretation Less Representative. --- First, one might argue that, because only the executive branch is directly accountable to the public as a whole, restraining the executive’s power to interpret the Constitution unduly limits the public’s role in that interpretation. Professor Kramer argues that the founders intended “‘the people themselves’---working through and responding to their agents in government---[to be] responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was properly interpreted and implemented.”43 Today, the public can best play the role celebrated by Professor Kramer through its influence over the executive branch. As Professor Franklin notes, “the President is the closest thing we have to an embodiment of the national popular will.”44 In contrast to the executive branch, the judiciary is structurally removed from public control, and Congress’s fragmentation limits its accountability to the electorate as a whole.45 Thus, restraining the executive’s interpretive power by encouraging deference to the other branches arguably removes the Constitution from the public’s influence, undermining our foundational commitments and diminishing the representativeness of our government’s most fundamental law. However, while restraining the executive’s interpretive power may disserve our commitment to popular constitutionalism, doing otherwise might undermine an equally important founding commitment, namely that to checks and balances.46 As Professor Franklin points out, particular instances of executive constitutional interpretation---specifically that undertaken in connection with the NSA’s domestic surveillance program---show “no regard for the checking function of the other branches.”47 Moreover, even if the public exercises more control over the executive than it does over other branches, the conclusion that the executive will interpret the Constitution according to the majority’s wishes does not follow. For example, if the President understands the Constitution to allow her to proceed in secrecy, as President Bush did with regard to the NSA surveillance program, then the public has no opportunity to hold her accountable where it disagrees.48 Finally, that the Constitution does not provide for the election of judges raises questions---both of founding intent and of policy---about how large a role the public should play in constitutional interpretation.49 Thus, while restraining the executive’s interpretive power may in some ways reduce the public’s influence on our understanding of the Constitution, this reduction may actually increase the public’s influence on other constitutional matters and best promote “thicker conceptions of democracy.”50 Secrecy destroys the democratic process – turns credibility Cooper ‘2 (Phillip J, Professor of Public Administration in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University, B.A. in Government at California State University, Sacramento, M.A. and Ph.D. the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, “By Order of the President: Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action,” University of Kansas Press (2002), p. 143-44) Few Americans really understand the negative impressions that people in other countries have about the United States. In some parts of the world, particularly in developing countries that were the battlegrounds of the cold war as the United States and the Soviet Union fought to control ever larger spheres of influence, that attitude today has something to do with how little Americans know about the way we have conducted ourselves over time. Is there some particular reason why many Iranians react so badly to anything American? Why is it that Latin Americans have little or no trust in America's pious pronouncements? How is it that the United States could find itself so often in difficulty in Asia? One element involved in answering those questions is simply that many Americans do not know, and have not been truthfully or fully informed, about U.S. policy in a particular part of the world and by what means that policy was carried out. Nor are many Americans aware that what may seem to be laudable purposes in the abstract have sometimes been pursued by means that do not fit the purposes. Frequently, the mechanisms by which those activities have been undertaken have been NSDS. When Americans come to understand how these directives have been involved in the Iran‑Contra debacle, the U.S.‑sponsored coup d'etat in 1953 in Iran that put the Shah back on the throne, the bloody U.S. coup that ousted the Arbenz government in Guatemala, and the real decisionmaking behind the prosecution of the Vietnam War, it becomes more obvious that NSDs have been tools for destruction as well as for the straightforward implementation of foreign policy. What may come as far more of a surprise, perhaps even as a shock, is that some administrations have employed national security directives not only to best foreign adversaries but also for domestic purposes. Sometimes such practices have even led members of the president's own cabinet to rebel. PP Bad – A2: Checks Solve Theoretical checks don’t solve – Congress can’t or won’t Covington ’12 (Megan, School of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, Vol 8 (2012): July 2012 - Humanities and Social Sciences, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power,” http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556/1738) Challenges to Executive Legislation Theoretically, the president’s use of executive orders and other forms of presidential directives is well restrained by the system of checks and balances between the three branches of government. Congress can overturn or nullify the effects of any executive order by passing new legislation or refusing to approve any necessary funds.41 In the event the president vetoes this new piece of legislation, Congress can override its veto with a 2/3 vote in both houses. Congress could pass and then over ride the inevitable veto on a bill specifically designed to curb executive power, perhaps by banning constitutional signing statements. If the president were to ever seriously overstep his constitutional bounds, Congress could always draw up articles of impeachment. If Congress is unwilling or unable to challenge executive legislation, the Supreme Court can overturn it through judicial review. All executive orders must be reported to the Federal Register to be published unless they contain confidential information, preventing presidents from using executive orders in secret. 42 This requirement also allows for the media to play watchdog and monitor the president’s actions. Finally, any executive order can be nullified by a future president’s executive order, meaning there is no guarantee that any single executive order is permanent.43 These constraints on the presidency are designed to prevent abuse of executive power and preserve the individual authority of the other two branches of government. In actuality, however, Congress is generally unwilling or unable to respond to the president’s use of executive legislation. Congress can override a presidential veto but does not do it very often; of 2,564 presidential vetoes in our nation’s history, only 110 have ever been overridden. 44 The 2/3 vote of both houses needed to override a veto basically means that unless the president’s executive order is grossly unconstitutional – and thus capable of earning bipartisan opposition - one party needs to have a supermajority of both houses. Even passing legislation to nullify an executive order can be difficult to accomplish, especially with Congress as polarized and bitterly divided along party lines as it is today. Congress could pass legislation designed to limit the power of the president, but such a bill would be difficult to pass and any veto on it – which would be guaranteed – would be hard to override. In addition, if such legislation was passed over a veto, there is no guarantee that the bill would successfully limit the president’s actions; the War Powers Act does little to restrain the president’s ability to wage war.45 Impeachment is always an option, but the gravity of such a charge would prevent many from supporting it unless the president was very unpopular and truly abused his power. Congress’s best weapon against executive legislation is its appropriations power, but this only gives it power over orders that require funding. Members of Congress may even support a president’s use of executive legislation to establish policy when gridlock occurs on the floor. Congressmen can include policy changes made through executive legislation as part of their party’s recent accomplishments for the next election cycle, giving them more incentive to support executive legislation.47 These factors combined mean that Congress has only modified or challenged 3.8% of all executive orders, of which there have been over 13,000 total, leaving them an ineffective check on the president’s legislative power.48 Essentially the only times Congress can and will challenge an executive order are when the president has extremely low support, when in a divided government the party in power of Congress has a supermajority of both houses, or when a president seriously and obviously abuses his power in such a way as to earner opposition from both parties. The same applies to the courts Covington ’12 (Megan, School of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, Vol 8 (2012): July 2012 - Humanities and Social Sciences, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power,” http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556/1738) The Supreme Court constitutes the other major check on presidential power. Executive legislation – specifically executive orders and signing statements - is considered law, so the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to deem an executive order unconstitutional using judicial review.49 If a case challenging a president’s legislation comes before the court, the judges can choose to hear the case and overturn the legislation if they think it represents a severe violation of the Constitution.50 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is generally unwilling to intervene in the president’s use of executive legislation, even when the directives used are “of – at best dubious constitutional authority [or] issued without specific statutory authority.”51 In addition, the wide and vague grounds the president can use in his defense can make challenging the president problematic.52 Of the executive orders passed in our nation’s history, only 14 have actually been challenged by federal courts and only 2 were completely overturned, showing how very rare it is for the Supreme Court to challenge executive legislation.53 The same applies to the public Covington ’12 (Megan, School of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, Vol 8 (2012): July 2012 - Humanities and Social Sciences, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power,” http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556/1738) Public knowledge of executive orders and other forms of executive legislation is extremely low, in part because presidential directives are not usually part of the basic discussion of the government. Citizens generally are “disconnected from politics, dislike political conflict, distrust political leaders, [and] possess low levels of information about specific policies,”54 so there is no reason to believe the average American understands the complex use and nature of executive legislation. Since so many executive orders, signing statements, and memoranda are used for routine, symbolic, or house-keeping purposes, their use does not always make for an interesting story, meaning that the press does not always pay attention to or cover the use of executive legislation and the public hardly ever hears about it. Phillip J. Cooper insists that “the idea that the president could [...] govern in no small part by decree is a concept of which most Americans are blissfully unaware. If they were alert […], many would most likely be aghast that the president could, in effect, write law.”55 This ignorance of the masses ensures that the president does not really have to worry about the people’s opinion when he uses executive legislation, removing one potential limit on his unilateral power. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2014 2014 -> For want of a nail 2014 -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 2014 -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> International History Bee and Bowl 2013-14 Asian Division Question Set Bowl Round Six 2014 -> United states patent and trademark office 2014 -> Coffs harbour eisteddfod vocal syllabus 2014 -> Listen News Programs Schedule pledge now 2014 -> Slow club announce third album complete surrender Download 172.75 Kb. Share with your friends:
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