Petra Todorovich et al, Daniel Schned, and Robert Lane, director of America 2050, associate planner for America 2050 and senior fellow for urban design at Regional Plan Association and founding principal of Plan & Process LLP, “High-Speed Rail International Lessons for U.S. Policy Makers”, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011
Each country that has developed high-speed rail has done so with strong national government leadership. Prior to President Barack Obama’s recent embrace of high-speed rail, federal government support had been a missing ingredient in U.S. passenger rail development. However, significant federal investments in high-speed rail in 2009–2010 put the federal High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) Program on a solid initial footing. Whether that commitment can be sustained in a difficult fiscal environment will determine whether high-speed rail in the United States can become a reality. The federal commitment to high-speed rail began in 2008, when Congress passed the Passenger Rail Investment Improvement Act (PRIIA), which authorized funding for Amtrak and state-led efforts to develop highspeed rail corridors between 2009 and 2013. In February 2009, just months after PRIIA was signed into law at the end of 2008, the act became the vehicle for appropriating $8 billion for high-speed rail under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). An additional $2.5 billion for high-speed rail was appropriated by Congress in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget (figure 8). These appropriations, totaling $10.5 billion for high-speed and passenger rail, transformed the preservation-focused program established by PRIIA into a highly visible high-speed rail initiative that later became the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s infrastructure agenda. However, this sudden infusion of funding also revealed PRIIA’s limitations and the challenges of creating an ambitious highspeed and intercity passenger rail programvirtually overnight. The subsequent Congressional appropriation for FY 2011 stripped the program of any funding in 2011 and rescinded $400 million from the FY 2010 budget. This abrupt reversal underscores the program’s vulnerability to shifting political winds as long as it has to rely on annual Congressional appropriations for its funding.
Federal governmet key
Petra Todorovich et al, Daniel Schned, and Robert Lane, director of America 2050, associate planner for America 2050 and senior fellow for urban design at Regional Plan Association and founding principal of Plan & Process LLP, “High-Speed Rail International Lessons for U.S. Policy Makers”, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011
Both California and the Northeast Corridor present strong cases for investment in high-speed rail in their large and growing economies. However, the path to realizing that vision is not yet clear. It will require securing reliable funding commitments based on credible evidence that benefits exceed costs. Without federal support, these and other regional high-speed rail projects are unlikely to secure the necessary state and private funding commitments needed to proceed.
Federal government is key to inspire confidence among states and private sector
Petra Todorovich et al, Daniel Schned, and Robert Lane, director of America 2050, associate planner for America 2050 and senior fellow for urban design at Regional Plan Association and founding principal of Plan & Process LLP, “High-Speed Rail International Lessons for U.S. Policy Makers”, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011
A sustainable funding strategy, including reliable federal commitments, is needed to put the HSIPR Program on a firm footing and inspire confidence among states and the private sector. This strategy can make use of a variety of public and private financing tools that leverage net revenue streams generated by high-speed rail operations. When approaching publicprivate partnerships, a proper allocation of risk among the parties is critical to a successful project.
AT: States CP – Fed Sets Priorities
Federal changes key – current federal funding programs will incentivize highways at the expense of other infrastructure. States will choose the cheapest option
Darren A. Prum and Sarah L. Catz, Assistant Professor, The Florida State University ** Director, Center for Urban Infrastructure; Research Associate, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Irvine ARTICLE: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION TARGETS AND MASS TRANSIT: CAN THE GOVERNMENT SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH BOTH WITHOUT A CONFLICT?, Santa Clara Law Review, 2011, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935
b. Regulatory and Funding Issues In looking at other obstacles posed by the government with regard to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and their impact on transit, both funding and regulatory issues have an [*969] impact and need to be addressed. This begins with the manner in which the federal government distributes money, both as a carrot for incentives and as a stick in requiring outcomes. Customarily, Congress funds transportation across the country via legislation that distributes money directly to the states. n187 This approach tends to either implement the process of planning too late to become a factor, or focus on procedures in lieu of outcomes. n188 Federal dollars spent on transportation do not generally require performance standards from those receiving the federal monies. n189 The regulations put forth by the DOT require states and MPOs to consider certain planning aspects during their analyses, but do not make them compulsory. n190 This creates a situation where the DOT is unable to demand a particular outcome or result, which essentially becomes an open-ended check on the State or MPOs by the federal government. n191 The States or MPOs must certify to the government that the planning factors received consideration, but the DOT's supervision of compliance with these requirements receives little enforcement, if any. n192 Furthermore, past allocations of transportation funds to the states generally occurred based on VMT, fuel used, and lane miles. n193 This policy ends up promoting VMT because, the more of each of these factors a state can demonstrate, the more federal funding they will receive. n194 In turn, more VMT increases states' collection of gas taxes, which then intensifies the counterproductive and endless cycle of revenue generation, the need for more infrastructure, and again, an [*970] increase in VMT. n195 This formulaic funding system favors highways, which ultimately results in greater greenhouse gas emissions, rather than promoting less VMT, reduced emissions, or transit alternatives. n196 In addition, past funding by the federal government with regard to transportation strongly prefers new road projects over other options. n197 For example, when state and MPOs received a choice between getting 80 or 90 percent funding from the federal government versus far less for transit alternatives, the decision makers easily chose the government incentive for new or expanded roads. n198 While the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act tried to address this inequity by leveling the funding gap between highways and transit choices, the legislation came up short by not making this requirement compulsory. n199 As a result, the DOT continues its funding formulas with highways usually receiving 80 percent while transit alternatives seldom achieve the 50 percent level. n200 Thus, the current system used to develop and fund transportation on a federal level provides systemic difficulties through the planning process, as well as financial disincentives to consider and utilize transit options as a tool or alternative in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.