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XT Perkinson- Japan Econ

Causes escalatory Asian instability, collapses the alliance, and leads to China war


Envall 10 (David Envall, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of International Relations, MacArthur Foundation Asian Security Initiative, “Implications for Asia in Japan’s Economic Decline,” East Asia Forum, August 11, 2010)

‘To lose one decade may be a misfortune…’ ran a recent article in The Economist, the unstated quip being that the next one was lost due to carelessness. Another ‘lost decade’ would further justify such dark humour and would also present the Asian region with a significant security challenge. Japan’s economic decline is well established. That country’s stock market, which was just below 40,000 points in 1989, finished 2009 at just over 10,500. Yet Japan’s underlying economic problems are wider and more complex. They range from low growth and deflation to expanding public debt and rising inequality. And the global financial crisis has further exacerbated matters. What makes Japan’s economic woes a regional security challenge is the important role of the US-Japan alliance in maintaining regional stability. If the alliance were weaker, it would have serious implications for regional stability. As a Japanese analyst recently observed, a US downgrading of the alliance or withdrawal from the region could well lead to faster Japanese military growth (notwithstanding its current economic lethargy), heightened regional threat perceptions and a greater scope for global insecurity. Alliance troubles would make it harder if not impossible for the US to pursue its ‘double assurance’ strategy of instilling confidence in strategic partners and competitors alike. How could Japan’s fiscal weakness potentially undermine the alliance? Worsening economic troubles would add greater constraints to the already considerable political and cultural restrictions on Japan’s ability to contribute to the alliance and thus negatively affect America’s confidence in Japan as an ally. Declining military spending over the past seven years illustrates Japan’s predicament, and the trend, in light of the country’s public debt, could well continue. Shifting greater amounts of the total bill for ongoing agreements to the US, as a recent report on the alliance’s future postulates, ‘would undoubtedly put strain on the alliance’. Economic weakness together with export dependency could also influence Japan to mismanage its current hedging strategy in dealing with China and the US. Japanese leaders describe its current approach as pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, but the rise of China has provoked Japan to respond to the resulting geostrategic pressures in Asia. This ‘return to Asia’ policy might resolve some of Japan’s problems associated with its dark history, but there is no guarantee that any such policy would be more repentant than chauvinistic.

Decline leads to broader Asian war


Auslin 9 (Michael, resident scholar AEI, “Japan's Downturn Is Bad News for the World The U.S. can't count on Japanese savers”, 2/17/2009)

If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far. The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region. This is the backdrop upon which the U.S. government is set to expand the national debt by a trillion dollars or more. Without massive debt purchases by Japan and China, the U.S. may not be able to finance the cost of the stimulus package, creating a trapdoor under the U.S. economy.

XT Perk - India Econ

Indian economic decline leads to global conflict and nuclear war between India and Pakistan


Bouton 10 (Marshall M. Bouton, President – Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “America’s Interests in India”, CNAS Working Paper, October)

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and development of both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every one of India’s neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely important counterweight to the prevalent instability and conflict all around India’s periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability on a scale that would have global consequences, including damage to the global economy, huge dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism, and much greater potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict.


Economic growth is the key internal link to decreasing hostility and mitigating Indo-Pak conflict


Mamoon 8 and Murshed 08 Dawood Mamoon, Netherlands Fellowship holder at the Institute of Social Studies, Professor of the economics of conflict and peace at the Institute of Social Studies and S. Syed Mansoob Murshed, Professor of international economics at the Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK, “On the Conflict Mitigating Effects of Trade: The India-Pakistan Case,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 25. April 2008)

In order to further check the conclusions drawn from our VECM results in table 2, we generated 6 different forecast schedules from 6 co-integrating VECMs as a simulation exercise to predict how conflict would be affected by changes in its determinants. Note that the data on Fatal are only up to 2002. Thus the one year forecasts are generated for Fatal for 2003 period. Figure 6 shows the forecast graphs. Graph 1a, 1b and 1c suggest that if military expenditures in both countries would remain at its current high levels, along with trade with the outside world at their 2002 levels, a slight deterioration in democracy scores will have a significant effect on the rise in hostility. However, if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average level. Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. The current low levels of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing, so more trade with increased exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged. More access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able to also export more to India. A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities, as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict, and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind recent India-Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not only India but Pakistan also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% per annum. The forecasts suggest that conflict will rise, even if there is a significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the liberal peace over the democratic peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though recently Pakistan has edged towards greater democracy with elections in February 2008. Pg. 14-15


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