Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Colorado
- Jurisdiction: California, USDC S.Dist. S.Div.
- Jurisdiction: 10 th Circuit, Oklahoma
- Jurisdiction: Illinois
- Jurisdiction: 7 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: all
Jurisdiction: Virginia VanBuren v. Grubb, No. 120348 (11//12); Justicia cite: http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2012/120348.html [enhanced lexis.com version]. The Virginia Supreme Court held that supervisors and managers can be held individually liable for public policy wrongful discharge under Virginia common law. A former employee of a medical practice could sue her former supervisor individually after he allegedly discharged her for refusing his sexual advances. Trial in federal courts on an issue involving an issue of state law:
On March 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting that we exercise our jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and Rule 5:40, and answer the following question: Does Virginia law recognize a common law tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of established public policy against an individual who was not the plaintiff's actual employer, such as a supervisor or manager, but who participated in the wrongful firing of the plaintiff? In an order dated April 19, 2012, we accepted the certified question, and, for the reasons stated herein, we now restate the question pursuant to our authority under Rule 5:40(d) and answer in the affirmative. And then the federal courts took over from there. (Note: We may never know if his name had any effect on the considerations of the various courts.) FLSA: meal breaks, automatic deduction policy, missed meals, meals not taken; class action denied Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit White v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation, No. 11-5717 (6th Cir., 11/6/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0379p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]; and also see Frye v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc., No. 11-5648 (6th Cir., 8/21/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0926n-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. These two cases deal with meal breaks and pay issues involving the FLSA, and the decisions favor employers:
White: This ER nurse did not have regularly scheduled meal breaks, but she was allowed to have the flexibility to take them as the demands of her work load allowed. The hospital’s automatic-deduction policy was that thirty minutes were deducted from time worked unless the employee submitted a time-exception form. She failed to do that and did not complain that she was not being paid for that time. The appellate court’s reasoning was that an employer cannot be held liable for conduct of which it does not know, and therefore the employee has the burden to report – which is similar to the duty in discrimination cases. Frye: Cases petitioning for class action certification must involve substantially similar issues of law and fact raised by the plaintiffs in order to qualify for that status. The appellate court ruled that the issues involved in the various cases of the petitioners were too different to be tried together – this ruling is similar to the United States Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc v. Betty Dukes, No. 10-277, 564 U.S. ____ (6/20/11); 131 S. Ct. 2541; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4567;180 L. Ed. 2d 374; 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769; http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version], and numerous other recent class action case in this collection that followed Dukes. FMLA, ADA, Work Comp: return to work, “no restriction” policy and practice Jurisdiction: Colorado EEOC v. Interstate Distributor Company; instructive article by Abizer Zanzi of Franczek Radelet, attorneys and counselors, about the dangers of having a “no restrictions” leave policy of automatically terminating employees after exhausting 12 weeks of leave unless they were able to return to full-duty work without limitation: http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-EEOC_Settlement_ADA.html. The EEOC obtains $5 million settlement. With the passage of the ADAAA it has become important for employers to realize that if there is a possibility that an employee on FMLA leave might not be able to return to work without restrictions, then a prudent employer ought to consider ADA implications and requirements, especially reasonable accommodation. This precaution might also apply to workers’ compensation situations, so don’t overlook that potential problem, too – some employers and work comp adjusters may be unaware of the implications of these federal laws. Litigation: social media, scope of discovery, excessive, too vague for meaningful response Jurisdiction: California, USDC S.Dist. S.Div. Mailhoit v. Home Depot USA Inc., et al., No. CV 11-03892 DOC (SSx) (9/14/12); http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/MAILHOIT-v.-HOME-DEPOT-USA-INC..pdf; http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/cacdce/2:2011cv03892/501445/144 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Danielle Mailhoit sued for mental anguish damages, and the defendant employer requested information from her social networking sites consisting of: 1) Any profiles, postings or messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) from social networking sites from October 2005 (the approximate date Plaintiff claims she first was discriminated against by Home Depot), through the present, that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state of Plaintiff, as well as communications by or from Plaintiff that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state; (2) Third-party communications to Plaintiff that place her own communications in context; (3) All social networking communications between Plaintiff and any current or former Home Depot employees, or which in any way refer [or] pertain to her employment at Home Depot or this lawsuit; or (4) Any pictures of Plaintiff taken during the relevant time period and posted on Plaintiff's profile or tagged * * * or otherwise linked to her profile. Plaintiff acknowledges that "social media is discoverable to the extent it is adequately tailored to satisfy the relevance standard," but argues that Plaintiff's requests are impermissibly overbroad. * * * According to Plaintiff, rather than tailor its requests, Defendant seeks "to rummage through the entirety of [Plaintiff's] social media profiles and communications in the hope of concocting some inference about her state of mind." * * * Plaintiff further argues that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome because she has already testified about her emotional distress, as well as produced or agreed to produce "documents and communications pertaining to her emotional distress damages going as far back as 2004," * * *, which Plaintiff maintains constitute "sufficiently relevant responses." * * * In particular, Plaintiff asserts that she has already responded to requests for her communications with sixteen different current or former Home Depot employees, which Plaintiff contends "presumably" include her communications via social media. Federal court rules of civil procedure require (as do most other court rules) that such a request must be stated with reasonable particularity, and the federal magistrate judge stated: Even if the first part of this category, which seeks communications relating to ‘any emotion,’ could be understood to encompass only communications containing specific words (which the request does not identify), the category would still arguably require the production of many materials of doubtful relevance, such as a posting with the statement ‘I hate it when my cable goes out.’ The second part of the category, which seeks communications relating to ‘events’ . . . [could include] watching a football game or a movie on television . . . that may produce some sort of ‘significant emotion. . . . Essentially, the defendant’s request for social media was too metaphysical and unspecific (even for California). Title VII: litigation issues, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, partial summary judgment dismissal; race; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1302 (“OADA”), as well as violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit, Oklahoma Green v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association, a Delaware corporation, No. 11-5153 (10th Cir., 11/1/12); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-5153.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Essentially, after all of the procedural and other legal matters were resolved in this case, the employee lost on his discrimination and constructive discharge claims:
Litigators: The court affirmed in part, but vacated the grant of summary judgment on certain claims that were not administratively exhausted, and it remand for the district court to dismiss those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Human resource practitioners: The factual background is set forth by the court in detail for about three and a half pages, so I’ll briefly summarize that encourage you to read the court’s full opinion for all of the important factors involved in this racial discrimination claim:
The appellate court reviewed the rulings of the trial court and the case now returns to the trial court for further proceeding in accordance with the decision of the appellate opinion, details of which are in the full opinion – dismiss all of the remaining claims. Public Sector: governmental employee, property interest in employment, private interest Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit, Oklahoma Hughes v. Oklahoma Department of Transportation, et al., No. 12-6124 (11/1/12); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6124.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Government employees have certain property, or proprietary, rights in their employment status, but the important issue is whether the employee’s complaint of an adverse employment action involved a public matter rather than a private matter. Basically, he contended that state and local government entities had harmed his possibility of employment by the decision of state and local officials not to adopt the light rail system he proposed for Oklahoma City – violations, he contended of the First Amendment and federal criminal and transportation statutes by implementing a less desirable transportation system and by disseminating fraudulent information about this system to other government agencies and the public. The district court warned him that his complaint failed to allege a violation of a federal right and that his claims needed to be based on injuries to his own rights or interests, and the appellate court agreed. Privacy: tort, invasion, intrusion; agency law, actions of investigating agents, liability imputed to employer Jurisdiction: Illinois Lawlor v. North American Corporation of Illinois, No. 11-2530 (Oct. 18, 2012); http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2012/112530.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case involves the tort of invasion of privacy and agency law in which the principal is liable for the acts of its agents that were engaged to investigate whether a former employee might be violating a covenant not to compete.
Intrusion on Seclusion: Citations are omitted here to make this legal definition easier to read (see the opinion for details and citations): One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The invasion may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal documents. The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the information outlined. Background information:
Lesson: Hiring someone else to investigate may not protect an employer from tort liability, so checking with competent legal counsel about whether it would be prudent to seek, or even review, personal information relating to an employee, whether the source of the information is social media or otherwise. One potential problem if others have been hired to do it for the employer is that the employer may not know what kinds of methods the agent may be using – perhaps like the gangster movies when the boss says, “Take care of it, but I don’t want to hear about.” ADA: mandatory reassignment to vacant positions Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit EEOC v. United Airlines, No. 11-1774 (7th Cir., 8/7/12); http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=rss_sho&shofile=11-1774_003.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The 7th Circuit has joined the 10th and D.C. Circuits in ruling that reassignment is mandatory under the ADA, i.e., employers appoint disabled employees to vacant positions for which they are qualified, even though they are not the most qualified person for the job. This decision reopened a past 7th Circuit ruling, revised it and put that circuit in compliance with the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court case U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett. As summarized by CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. First, the procedural posture of this case requires brief discussion. An earlier version of this opinion suggested that rehearing en banc was warranted for the full court to consider overruling EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000), in light of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). The EEOC then petitioned for rehearing en banc, and United Airlines, Inc. filed a response. Thereafter, every member of the court in active service approved overruling Humiston-Keeling and it was suggested that the panel use Circuit Rule 40(e) for that purpose. However, the usual formal en banc procedure involving argument to the full court was not pursued. We vacate the original panel opinion and now issue this opinion overruling Humiston-Keeling. We have circulated the new panel opinion to the full court under Rule 40(e), and no member of the court has asked to rehear the case en banc. With that procedural explanation, we now proceed to the merits. In this case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asks this court to change its interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ADA). The case turns on the meaning of the word “reassignment.” The ADA includes “reassignment to a vacant position” as a possible “reasonable accommodation” for disabled employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The EEOC contends that “reassignment” under the ADA requires employers to appoint employees who are losing their current positions due to disability to a vacant position for which they are qualified. However, this court has already held in Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029, that the ADA has no such requirement. The EEOC argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391, undermines Humiston-Keeling. Several courts in this circuit have relied on Humiston-Keeling in post-Barnett opinions, though it appears that these courts did not conduct a detailed analysis of Humiston- Keeling’s continued vitality. The present case offers us the opportunity to correct this continuing error in our jurisprudence. While we understand that this may be a close question, we now make clear that Humiston- Keeling did not survive Barnett. We reverse and hold that the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer. We remand with instructions that the district court determine if mandatory reassignment would be reasonable in the run of cases and if there are fact-specific considerations particular to United’s employment system that would render mandatory reassignment unreasonable in this case. NLRB: pre-recognition agreement between union and employer upheld Jurisdiction: all Montague v. NLRB, No. 11-1256 (6th Cir., 8/23/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0937n-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Dana Corporation and United Auto Workers were allowed to enter into a letter of agreement (LOA) including general terms that are subject to further negotiation, in this case agreeing to negotiate about provisions related to health care benefits and future collective-bargaining agreements. Wages: minimum wage increases
Title VII: harassment, litigation, scope of discovery, Facebook messages and Twitter tweets, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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