I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
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- Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. (p. 214)
- Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete.
- The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows
- Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p.138)
- Intelligence officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148)
Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investigative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case in those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the activities of the so‑called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336) The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, according to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information they secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite. When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place, one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 469 Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander‑in‑Chief as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that was pertinent although the Commander‑in‑Chief had many sources of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however, that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander‑in‑Chief. (p. 13) Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelligence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral DeLany), the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in this manner. (p. 33) Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. (p. 214) The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were: "The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attaché, Tokyo, Naval Attaché, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander‑in‑Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215) Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete. Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p. 215) Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216) Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the First opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation. (p. 216) The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows: "The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the 470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated air strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217) Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. Commander Rochefort's source of information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF, and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to ComFOURTEEN personally and to the Commander‑in‑Chief, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that that organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p. 309) Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through Colonel Edward Bailey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p. 218) In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack. Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and so far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373‑5) Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two cases dealing with counter‑espionage. (p .70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo‑China. He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70) Admiral DeLany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84) Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p.138) Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 471 Intelligence officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148) Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improvement. (p.241) Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him page 281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page 281) Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interexchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plane for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283). Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and reports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904). He thought that local Army Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he informed them in general (page 908). Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was efficient, although not adequate in apace and personnel, and kept him and CincPac informed page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably did (page 392). Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472). Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was automatically passed to CNO. CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472). The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193): 1. The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo‑Takao circuit was unreadable on mid‑watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure‑Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third 472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22). The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered November 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Feet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22). 3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual A1 Nev ("Alnav"? LWJ), and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air feet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander, in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet. Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22). The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent and dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief, PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 473 Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was sail that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the letter's known progress from the Empire to Chichijima and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22). 5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated than an effort was made to deliver all despatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time. The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure‑Sasebo area in the direction of South China. and Indo‑China"; Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that a same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo‑China forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22). 6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated 474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued. Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been, recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22). 7. The communication intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22). 8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 6th, stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo‑China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22.) 9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo‑Mandates circuit in duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 475 of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either." There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo‑China (Hew. Exhibit 22). Any time important information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOURTEEN would come and discuss it. General Marshall said that prier to December 7th he thought that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page 864). (2) Interception of Japanese communications: Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was concerned (Exhibit 18) were received by him from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p 58). Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 18) which he did not recollect having seen before (p. 57-59). One of these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii. Admiral Mayfield said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit 40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December 1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryption on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signaling by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Admiral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used (p. 564‑565). Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency, War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, (Exhibit 18) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii (p. 522‑523). Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 18) were in the Japanese PA‑K2 code and could have been 476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all "purple" and J‑19 messages and would not have touched the PA‑K2 communications as long as there were any J‑19's on hand (p. 530‑531). Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice‑Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local Japanese population. (p. 379) To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate to say that the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383) Wire tapping was discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379‑81) With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571) Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being necessary even then to use a Japanese code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries of decoded copies of messages sent from 1 December to 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383‑5) Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know when this message had been received in his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December.(p. 566‑567) Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone conversation of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 360) Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communications, Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 477 destroyed under authority of the Federal Communication's Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411‑113) Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387‑388) Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909-910). 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