I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet



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Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)

The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:

"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore­-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)

Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)

Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the prep­aration for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made.

Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)

Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.

Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p. 71)

Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel was whole‑heartedly and self‑sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)

Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.

Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rain­bow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
F. ADMIRAL DELANY
Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Depart­ment. He did not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CinCPac (page 506).

The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.

Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear‑cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in the Empire (page 497).

In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).


Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts Commission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 166)

Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive move­ments, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and Commander‑in‑Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not contemplated. (p.170)

Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p. 172).

Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti‑aircraft weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p. 174‑176)

Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for main­taining them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)
From the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a tor­pedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Opera­tions.
Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installa­tions at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did; that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)

Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by them indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in fact start. (p. 78)

Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise air attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon their home territory. (p. 80)

Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 447
G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN
Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's confer­ences ever morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel dis­cussed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that war would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war imme­diately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 938). When the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the others also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).
In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony, Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)
H. CAPTAIN LAYTON
Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand, and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported this estimate to CinCPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning" (pages 912‑3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but he had considered it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).
Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did discuss with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first battle. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu and Nomura. (p. 224)
Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to December 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of guarding against internal sabotage (page 914).
I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER
Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of the so‑called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498‑499)
Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an air attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. He envisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).

Admiral Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would be made on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese‑United States war (page 688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687) .


448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger was in bed with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred with him. (p. 122)

Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought the most probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by means of sabotage. (p.123‑124)
J. ADMIRAL KITTS
Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been considered (page 516).
Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He was not shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL‑41 which indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)
His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships' movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal opera­tions of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor (page 517).

The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled that the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).


K. ADMIRAL WITHERS
Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japanese ships if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take offensive action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor (page 1086).

He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).


Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long time prior to December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without a formal declaration and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)
L. COLONEL PHILLIPS
Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corre­sponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a con­ference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon of December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy "War Warning" message (page 486).

He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his own personal opinion (page 493).


M. GENERAL SHORT
General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would move southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel, McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 449
that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.
XXI. CONFERENCES BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT AFTER NOVEMBER 27th
Admiral Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel and General Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th and December 7th (page 546). He present at some of the staff conferences (page 547).

He said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel did not inform himself of measures taken by General Short; Admiral Smith was present at most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself of Kimmel's actions (page. 551).



He stated that within twenty‑four hours of the receipt of the "war warning," Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had been promptly advised of this message (page 561).
Commander Harold S. Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters, Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at CincPac Headquarters in the presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Com­mander Layton a copy of the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November (Ex­hibit 17, Naval Court of Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General Short. Commander Burr could not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff and left the dispatch. with the Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col William Donnegan, G‑3, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated that on the following day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (pages 877‑8)
He did not recall "the details" of that conference. He thought that the message was intended to put them on their toes and to get them ready to carry out the War Plan.
Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in the week preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Depart­ment to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of the outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practi­cally the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. He said "the Army was undecided whether to put P‑39's or P‑40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before‑hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out." (p. 40‑41)

Concerning the "war warning", Admiral Smith said that it was received somewhere in the mid-afternoon on the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six o'clock that evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In other words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of opinion
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from this dispatch that attacks would be against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and by the others sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he said, was carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning He thought that the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the danger of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise. Admiral Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did not believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken by Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did not recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said the ships at sea were apprised of this warning.

Admiral Smith said that the operating schedule for ships which had been previously issued was not departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was sent to deliver planes to Wake. He said that as a result, at the time of the war warning, two of the three task forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task force returned about the 5th of December, he thought, and also part of Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral. Brown's task force departed on the 4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers, but no battleships; the net result of the adherence to the operating schedules previously issued was that there was a movement of ships inward to port rather than the deployment involving movement outward. Admiral Smith said that it might very well be that these plans had been known to the Japanese and that they chose their time to attack when two task forces were scheduled to be in port.

The war warning, Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the approaches to Pearl Harbor were not covered by any reconnaissance, but recalled no discussion at the conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50‑53)
General Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed his anti‑sabotage alert into effect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel Phillips, the Army went on the anti‑sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 537, 479). General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they were doing (page 242).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held between Admiral Kimmel and General Short regarding utilization of Army aircraft to strengthen defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).



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