PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 429

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 429

Again, you must remember that the Sino‑Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back in­stantly."

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was familiar with this message, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark (page 696).

(2) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63) of a message from Wash­ington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent", which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, ‘For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th. So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so‑called 'four principles.'

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non‑aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo‑China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo‑China.

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo‑China.

"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI‑SHEK.

"(5) The abolition of extra‑territoriality and concessions in China.

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

"(8) Stabilization of yen‑dollar exchange.

"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the mainte­nance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three‑Power Pact.)"

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard pro­posals, or we think so."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having seen this message, but that it may have been discussed (pages 776‑777). Admiral Schuirmann said he was familiar with it, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark, although he probably told Admiral Stark that such a note had been sent (page 697).

(3) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code, reading:

"Re your #1189.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern­ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc­tions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen this message (pages 775‑6). Admiral Schuirmann was familiar with this, but did hot deliver it to Admiral Stark (page 698). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 826).

Captain Layton said that neither he nor Admiral Kimmel had been advised of the note of November 26th. He thought that Admiral Kimmel could have been better informed, and that if he had had a full picture he would have had a clearer conception of Japanese‑United States affairs (page 914).

Admiral Kimmel stated that he was not advised of the contents of the United States note of November 26th, which was given to the Japanese, until after his return to the United States (page 301). And, he and Admiral Smith stressed, the press and radio indicated that negotiations between the Japanese and the United States continued after November 27th. But, Admiral McMorris, his War Plans Officer, said that the press may have indicated that Japanese‑United States negotiations were continuing after November 27th; he did not recall (page 893) .

Admiral Stark testified that he had no recollection of press and radio statements between November 27th and December 7th which indicated that negotiations with the Japanese were resumed. He pointed out that, according to "War and Peace" on November 25th and November 28th, Secretary of State Hull had said that there was practically no possibility of an agreement, that the Japanese might break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, and that the plans for military defense should include the assumption that the Japanese might use the element of surprise and attack at various points (page 149). There was, Admiral Stark said, a further conversation with the Japanese on December 1st (page 149).

Dr. Hornbeck stated that between November 26th and December 7th, there were some further conversations with the Japanese representatives (page 767).

Mr. Hamilton stated that there were some meetings with the Japanese Ambassadors between November 26th and December 7th. He, however, considered that negotiations with the Japanese ceased on November 26th. There was a bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might continue, but they had virtually reached a conclusion, and the matter, therefore, was one for the armed services. He considered that there was no chance of getting a favorable reply from the Japanese (page 1074).

Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, did not think that negotiations with Japan had definitely ceased until Tojo saw him on December 7, 1941, after the attack (page 1046).

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

Admiral Ingersoll believed that the "warning" was sent because the Secretary of State had delivered the note of November 26th to the Japanese (page 851).

At the time of drafting the "war warning," Admiral Turner said, he expected that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii (page 995). He did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning," he said, because the places named were the strategic objectives and he did not believe that the Japanese would launch an amphibious attack on Hawaii (page 1020). He invited attention to the differ­ence between the dispatch of November 24th, which had warned of the possibility of a "surprise aggressive movement," and this dispatch, which warned of "an amphibious expedition." The earlier dispatch, he said, was the result of deduction and covered any type of action by the Japanese. On November 27th, however, they knew that, as a fact, the Japanese were on the move (page 997).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he considered that the "war warning" put additional tasks on the Pacific Fleet of security of itself and readiness for any eventuality, but that the message was not to completely interrupt training (page 849). Train­ing, however, should have been secondary after this message (page 821). The October 16th dispatch had directed CincPac to make certain dispositions; he had informed the Chief of Naval Operations and those had been considered satis­factory (page 849). After November 27th, any measures that were necessary to guard the security of a fleet were necessary in all fleets.