I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet

He then discussed the British proposals and the dangers facing Britain. He stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic; that for some time past, Japan had shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East; and, he advised the addressees to watch this situation keenly. Unquestionably, he said, the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabiliz­ing effect in the Far East. The question, he said, was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he advised that as much time as available be devoted to training.

Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941 he told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl harbor, i.e. air attack, blocking of harbor etc. He told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port when an attack came; that it took two to four hours to sortie and that once an attack was started it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the Fleet (page 367). In general, he said, he felt that the Fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor; but he made no protest and made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers.

On June 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a memorandum for Admiral Stark (Exhibit 10) with copies to General Marshall, Admiral King and Admiral Towers, in which he stated:

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

"(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

"(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt hey are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equip­ment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.‑Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

"To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

"Please relay this information to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information as to steps to be taken iv the event of Russian participation in the war, and making various requests for equipment.

According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.
Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made. (p. 258)

Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department. He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo‑China and perhaps Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by the United States. (p. 408)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)
He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States em­bargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43‑45).

Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).

In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things, discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do Admiral Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark had had some extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941 (Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The Article provides for the use of force in self‑preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.

The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i.e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time."

Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter, Admiral Stark asked "... would it not be possible for your force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull bad informed Admiral Stark that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an understanding at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.

A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again talked to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral Stark

This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty‑six Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in answer to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.

Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.
D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET
Admiral McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).

His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States‑Japanese relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might not be involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch and British was possible without the United States being initially involved.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL‑41 (Revised) from the Commander-in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8). This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).
Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander‑in‑Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)
This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;